渠道博弈视角下粮食最低收购价政策的效果研究

中国是人口和粮食大国,促进粮食生产、保证粮食安全是国之大事。由于市场利益主体之间存在博弈行为,收购价格由农户与粮食收购企业共同决定。采用纳什议价模型表示议价过程,运用2006年至2014年的小麦价格数据,研究农户和企业在粮食收购过程中的议价问题,从而判断粮食最低收购价的政策效果。结果表明：政策确实能改变农民的议价能力,保护农民利益,但政策实施存在时滞;更重要的是,政策会导致农户议价能力从绝对劣势到绝对优势的突变,造成农户凭借最低收购价获得主导价格的能力,即政策扭曲了市场定价机制。最后,给出模型结果、实证结论和政策建议。     

THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

Abstract.  The types of contracts arising in a typical vertical manufacturer–retailer relationship are more sophisticated than a simple uniform price. In addition to setting per unit prices, manufacturers and retailers also revert to non-linear pricing and non-price instruments. These instruments or contracts are referred to as vertical restraints and can take the form of franchise fees, resale-price maintenance, exclusive dealing, exclusive territories and slotting allowances. The use and the effects of one type of instrument versus another depend crucially on specific market assumptions upstream and downstream and on the division of bargaining power between manufacturers and retailers. This paper surveys the industrial organization literature on retail pricing and shows that vertical restraint instruments have important effects on producer and consumer prices, market structure, efficiency and welfare.     

When to haggle,when to hold firm? Lessons from the used‐car retail market

Though haggling has been the conventional way for auto retailers to sell cars, the last two decades have witnessed the systematic adoption of no‐haggle prices by many large dealerships, including the largest new‐ and used‐car dealership chains. This paper develops a structural empirical model to estimate sellers' profits under posted price and haggling, and investigates how market conditions affect sellers' optimal pricing formats. The model incorporates a simple class of bargaining mechanisms into a standard random‐coefficient discrete‐choice model. With the extension, the product‐level demand system is estimated using data with only list prices, and the unobserved price discounts are also recovered in the estimation. The counterfactual experiments yield a few interesting findings. First, dealers' adopted pricing formats seem superior to the alternative ones. Second, dealers enjoying larger market power through vertical differentiation and carrying a large number of models are more likely to have posted price as their optimal pricing format.     

中国房地产交易真的是卖方市场吗？——基于双边随机边界模型的实证研究

科学测算房地产交易市场买卖双方议价能力对市场价格形成的影响作用，是当前政府制定“因地施策”宏观调控机制的重要前提。采用双边随机边界模型，考察房地产交易环节中买卖双方议价能力的差异,结果表明：（1）买卖双方讨价还价因素对商品房销售价格的最终形成存在显著影响；（2）从全国平均水平看，对于整体市场以及住宅、写字楼和商铺等细分市场，卖房者议价能力在双方讨价还价过程中占主导地位，但买方议价能力的影响作用也不容忽视；（3）从一线、新一线、二线和三线城市角度看，除了一线城市商铺市场以及三线城市总体城市、住宅市场和写字楼市场外，其他均处于卖方市场阶段。     

Price discrimination in the housing market

There is little credible evidence on whether price discrimination exists in the housing market. Using a large sample of single-family home sales from Florida where both the race of the seller and buyer are known, we present evidence using the traditional and Harding et al. [HRS, Harding, J.P., Rosenthal, S., Sirmans, D.F., 2003. Establishing bargaining power in the market for existing homes. The Review of Economics and Statistics 85, (1) 178–188] approaches to empirical estimation. Omitted variable bias is found to plague the traditional approach. Results from following the HRS approach indicate that price discrimination exists by whites and Hispanics against blacks and Asians. Price discrimination against blacks is restricted to non-majority black neighborhoods and is smaller in magnitude in neighborhoods containing younger and more educated homeowners.     

Price discrimination and the emergence of secondary markets

A frequently used explanations for the emergence of secondary markets for live entertainment and the ability of resellers to charge a markup over face‐value prices is that promoters do not price discriminate optimally. We test this hypothesis empirically, using instrumental variables techniques on a sample of 45 popular music concerts and find that secondary market markups are not caused by the level of price discrimination used by promoters on primary markets. The experience and success of the artist drive both primary market pricing and secondary market markups, which are consistent with theories of social influence and pricing of complementary products.     

Apple's disaster: Linking two‐sided markets and strategic delegation

Asymmetric pricing structure and different intergroup network externalities are characteristics of two‐sided markets not captured in the analysis of one‐sided markets. Focusing on Cournot duopoly where membership decision may be delegated to a manager, several equilibrium regimes are sustained depending on the fixed cost of managerial hiring and strength of the network externality exerted by the side whose demand is more price sensitive. The change from null to full delegation sharpens the asymmetric pricing structure and reduces the price level in two‐sided markets. Contrary to one‐sided markets with direct network effects, the prisoner's dilemma holds for sufficiently strong indirect network externalities. Imperfect interside discrimination of managerial incentives ensures profit maximization and efficient consumers' allocation. Private hiring should occur when the two‐sided market exhibits symmetric pricing structure. An explanation for Apple's unprecedented event is provided. The reduction of revenue and managerial bonus in 2016 may be justified by the dissemination of full delegation in the Chinese information technology industry. Apple's upcoming strategy may consist on reducing both access prices, although the side whose demand is more price sensitive should have a greater price reduction. Alternatively, improving the content quality may constitute Apple's corporate strategy, thereby inducing a skimming pricing strategy on Chinese rivals.     

An Econometric Analysis of Brand-Level Strategic Pricing Between Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo.

We investigate market structure and strategic pricing for leading brands sold by Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo. in the context of a flexible demand specification (i.e., nonlinear AIDS) and structural price equations. Our flexible and generalized approach does not rely upon the often used ad hoc linear approximations to demand and profit-maximizing first-order conditions, and the assumption of Nash-Bertrand competition. We estimate a conjectural variation model and test for different brand-level pure strategy games. This approach of modeling market competition using the nonlinear Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation method provides insights into the nature of imperfect competition and the extent of market power. We find no support for a Nash-Bertrand or Stackelberg Leadership equilibrium in the brand-level pricing game. Results also provide insights into the unique positioning of PepsiCo.'s Mountain Dew brand.     

基于制造商服务的供应链竞争策略分析

本文以一个具有两家制造商和一家零售商组成的供应链结构为研究对象,探讨了制造商向顾客提供服务的重要性,并着重分析了在零售商占据市场优势的情况下,制造商的定价与服务策略,以及零售商制定产品零售价格时要考虑的主要因素,其结果对企业在供应链体系中制定经营策略具有一定的帮助。     

Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Efficiency

The extant theory on price discrimination in input markets takes the structure of the downstream industry as exogenously given. This paper endogenizes the structure of the downstream industry and examines the effects of permitting third‐degree price discrimination on market structure and welfare. We identify situations where permitting price discrimination leads to either higher or lower wholesale prices for all downstream firms. These findings are driven by upstream profits being discontinuous due to costly entry. Moreover, permitting price discrimination fosters entry which often improves welfare. Nevertheless, entry can also reduce welfare because it may lead to a severe inefficiency in production.     

Wholesale price discrimination: Innovation incentives and upstream competition

In intermediate good markets where there are alternative supply sources, wholesale price discrimination may enhance innovation incentives downstream. We consider a vertical chain where a dominant firm and a competitive fringe supply imperfect substitutes to duopoly retailers which carry both varieties. We show that a ban on price discrimination by the dominant supplier makes uniform pricing credible and reduces retailers’ incentives to decrease the cost of acquiring the competitively supplied variety, leading to higher upstream profits and lower downstream welfare. Our analysis complements existing results by identifying a novel channel through which wholesale price discrimination can improve dynamic market efficiency.     

Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly with Upstream Suppliers

This paper analyzes the noncooperative game on the choice of strategic variable to set in duopoly in the presence of an upstream market for the input. For the case of labor input, the analysis shows that if the wage is the result of decentralized firm-union bargain, a duopoly producing substitutes may choose to compete either in the quantity space or in the price space, depending upon the distribution of bargaining power in the wage negotiation and the union's relative preference over the wage. For the case of input suppliers as profit-maximizing firms, the paper shows that a vertically differentiated duopoly may prefer to compete either in the quantity space or in a mixed strategy setting where the high-quality firm plays price and the low-quality firm plays quantity, depending upon the extent of substitutability, the degree of vertical product differentiation and the distribution of bargaining power in the input price negotiation.     

Competition with Aftermarket Power When Consumers Are Heterogeneous

We study a model of competitive foremarkets and partly monopolized aftermarkets. We show that high aftermarket power prompts firms to engage in inefficiently aggressive below‐cost pricing in the foremarket. This inefficiency is driven by the presence of consumers with valuations below marginal cost. While for intermediate aftermarket power their presence leads to a competition‐softening effect, for high aftermarket power firms attract increasing numbers of unprofitable consumers by aggressively pricing below cost. For high aftermarket power, firms' equilibrium profits can therefore be decreasing in aftermarket power but are always higher than for low aftermarket power. If firms engage in price discrimination by bundling the foremarket and aftermarket goods or by reducing their aftermarket power, they avoid selling to unprofitable consumers but also reduce the competition‐softening effect. This decreases firms' equilibrium profits but increases consumer and social welfare.     

网络外部性、内生成本差异与企业定价策略

在产品成本内生条件下,通过建立扩展的Hotelling模型,分析网络外部性对企业定价策略的影响,结果显示:当网络外部性强度较低时,企业将选择歧视定价策略,当网络外部性强度较高时,企业将选择单一定价策略;在两种定价策略下,Nash谈判能力强的企业将获得更高的市场份额和利润;社会福利大小由网络外部性强度和企业Nash谈判能力共同决定,与产品定价策略无关,当网络外部性强度较高时,社会福利与企业间Nash谈判能力的差异正相关,反之则负相关。     

Measuring the Value of Product Characteristics in the Presence of Price Dispersion

Modeling the price of multi‐attribute products generally requires an assessment of each attributes' market value. In the presence of price dispersion, when similar products are sold at different prices, hedonic pricing models provide users with biased estimates of attribute value. This paper develops the hedonic pricing literature by proposing data envelopment analysis as a prior means of identifying a sub‐sample of products which, after adjusting for attribute provision, display no price dispersion. These products then display a homogenous link between attributes and price, which can be modeled using hedonic pricing. This paper implements and evaluates this two‐stage approach using 1000 observations from the UK mortgage market. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bundling and joint marketing by rival firms

We study joint marketing by firms who price discriminate between consumers who patronize only one firm (single purchasers) and those who purchase from both (bundle purchasers). Firms either set the price of the bundle and then compete along side the bundle; or they determine a rebate that is applied to joint purchasers and then set prices. Even though the pricing structure in the joint marketing scheme is determined noncooperatively, the commitment to the joint marketing agreement allows firms to leverage their stand‐alone prices—leading to higher profits and lower consumer surplus in either case, compared to both uniform pricing and independent price discrimination without a joint marketing agreement. Nevertheless the two schemes differ dramatically, in that rebates increase joint purchasing, whereas bundle pricing diminishes bundle purchases.     

Price versus Quantity in a Duopolistic Market with Bargaining over Managerial Delegation Contracts

This paper studies the endogenous choices of strategic contracts in a duopoly with bargaining between the owner and manager of each firm over the content of the managerial delegation contract. We show that when the bargaining power of the manager relative to that of the owner within each firm is sufficiently high, quantity competition based on the quantity contracts chosen by the owners of both firms can be uniquely observed in the equilibrium, whereas quantity competition and price competition can be observed in the equilibrium when this relative bargaining power is sufficiently low. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pricing Experience Goods: The Effects of Customer Recognition and Commitment

In a two‐period model of nondurable experience goods, we compare the profit and social welfare effects of behavior‐based price discrimination (BBPD) and price commitment (PC) (relative to time‐consistent pricing) in a monopoly. We find that when the static, full‐information monopoly price is higher (lower) than the mean consumer valuation, PC yields higher (lower) profits and social welfare than BBPD. We also identify the market conditions under which BBPD does not increase firm profits and provide an explanation as to when the firm should discriminate against its first‐time and repeat customers, respectively.     

Behavior‐ and characteristic‐based price discrimination

We develop a model of behavior‐ and characteristic‐based discriminatory pricing where consumers are heterogeneous both in tastes and in price sensitivity. Each firm is able to distinguish between the consumers that have bought from it and those that have bought from the rival. Furthermore, each firm learns the price sensitivity of their own consumers. We show that using this additional information may yield higher profits than uniform pricing provided that consumers are heterogeneous enough with respect to price sensitivity. We also discuss consumer surplus implications of such behavior‐ and characteristic‐based price discrimination, and we show that the impact of price discrimination depends on both the consumer type and the level of consumers’ heterogeneity.     

Value and liquidity under changing market conditions

Papers studying the liquidity of a market tend to focus on decisions involving the trade-off between the selling price and the time-till-sale for a given set of market conditions. This paper characterizes market conditions using a price-probability locus; a change in market conditions is some combination of changes in the level and/or slope of this locus. I show how the effect of either type of change on price and on the probability-of-sale can be decomposed into those commonly associated with an increase in the value and those which involve a substitution between price and probability. Two adding-up conditions restrict the set of possible predictions. Though the discussion focusses on real estate market, where scarcity is rationed by a mechanism which combines search and bargaining, the same ideas apply to markets with other types of selling mechanisms.