The use and consequences of perquisite types in nonprofit organizations

We document perquisite use in the nonprofit sector, the determinants of that use, and the ensuing consequences. Relative to the for-profit sector, the nonprofit sector is characterized by a lack of residual ownership rights and less detailed disclosure requirements, factors that have the potential to influence this piece of the compensation package. Using a sample of over 126,000 organization-year observations from 2008 to 2018, we document that approximately 24% of organizations report providing one or more of their executives with perquisites. We find that perks are more likely in larger nonprofits with excess endowments and fewer governance policies, and less likely at organizations with more outside monitors. We also find that perk disclosure has a negative impact on future donations. However, when we decompose our analysis by type of perk, we find evidence that some perks have a positive effect on future donations. Our results are robust to a variety of alternative formulations and provide useful insights for nonprofit regulators, boards, and donors.     

Does it pay to pray? Religious nonprofits and funding

This study examines whether religious identity has an impact on two types of funding, donations and government grants, received by nonprofit organizations. We argue that religious nonprofits attract more donations because (1) donors feel an affinity or special tie to religious organizations and/or (2) donors regard religious organization as having good stewardship. Using 54,917 organization-year observations we find that 18% of the largest U.S. nonprofit organizations have some religious identity and that these organizations receive more donations than their non-religious counterparts. We further find that the association is more pronounced for nonprofits in more religious geographic areas, those with unrestricted donations, and organizations with better stewardship. Conversely, we find that government grants are negatively associated with religious identity, a result consistent with the separation between church and state established under U.S. law and tradition. This negative relationship, however, is mitigated for nonprofits with better stewardship. Our results should be of interest to donors and policymakers who seek to understand the impact of religion on nonprofit funding as well as the role of donor affiliation and stewardship in the fundraising process.     

Funding implications of normal and excessive profitability in the nonprofit sector

We study nonprofit profitability and its effect on nonprofit external funding. In a sample of over 273 thousand U.S. NPOs during 1999–2019, we find that profitability is associated with greater public support; however, when NPOs are excessively profitable, they receive fewer subsequent donations. We find a similar relationship, but to a smaller degree, between profitability and government funding. We infer that funders desire moderate but not overly high profitability. We also find that donors are more tolerant of normal and excessive profitability for NPOs in the healthcare industry, smaller NPOs, and NPOs with shorter planning horizons. The relationship between profitability and external funding is weaker during recession periods, with funders not penalizing excessively profitable organizations during economic downturns.     

Discretionary and Non-Discretionary Revisions of Loss Reserves by Property-Casualty Insurers: Differential Implications for Future Profitability, Risk and Market Value

We develop and estimate a PC-industry specific model in which proxies for both discretion and non-discretion are used to partition loss reserve revisions into discretionary and non-discretionary components. The use of such proxies enables us to test directional hypotheses about the relations between the revision components and future profitability, risk and market value. We predict and find that discretionary revisions are negatively associated with future profitability, positively associated with firm risk, and negatively associated with market-to-book ratios. We predict and find that non-discretionary revisions are positively associated with future profitability and risk but are not associated with market-to-book ratios.     

Boards,Executive Excess Compensation,and Shared Power: Evidence from Nonprofit Firms

We investigate how executives, the board, and excess compensation jointly affect the performance of nonprofits. Since the common measure of nonprofit performance often includes salaries, we also use expenses that directly benefit the targeted population. Our results suggest that above average compensation for executives is associated with poor firm performance. However, the negative relation of CEO pay to performance occurs for firms with only one executive, the CEO. We conclude that a powerful CEO with autonomy can harm firm performance, but other executives can mitigate these agency problems. The board also appears to monitor direct community benefits more than indirect benefits.     

Competition,Loan Rates,and Information Dispersion in Nonprofit and For‐Profit Microcredit Markets

We describe the competitive environment of microcredit markets globally and we study the effects of competition on loan rates of microfinance institutions (MFIs). We use a new database from rating agencies, covering 379 for‐profit and nonprofit MFIs in 67 countries over 2002–2008. Controlling for interest rate ceilings and other country‐specific factors, we first find that nonprofits are relatively insensitive to industry‐wide concentration changes, while for‐profits charge significantly lower rates in less concentrated markets. Second, we find spillover effects between the for‐profit and nonprofit segments. Third, we show that the effects of concentration are consistent with an information dispersion mechanism.     

Determinants of nonprofits’ taxable activities

Although nonprofit is often considered to be synonymous with tax-exempt, many nonprofit organizations earn revenues from unrelated taxable activities, and on average these taxable activities generate $1.5 million in revenues. Policymakers have expressed concern that the pursuit of unrelated taxable revenues can distract a nonprofit from its primary charitable mission. Our results show that nonprofits earn taxable revenues when the taxable activities produce a relatively higher return, the nonprofit itself is experiencing lower profitability, and donor aversion is lower. These results suggest that nonprofits will pursue specific types of unrelated taxable activities, and then only under certain circumstances, reducing concerns over mission drift caused by widespread nonprofit expansion into taxable markets.     

Pensions as a Form of Executive Compensation

This paper investigates the role of pensions as an element of total executive compensation, and the relationship between pensions and performance‐based compensation in executive pay. Using hand‐collected data on FTSE 100 CEOs and senior executives from 2004?2011, we document that pensions function as a substitute for performance‐based compensation (primarily bonuses) in both cross‐sectional and time‐series settings. We also examine the effect of corporate governance characteristics on executive pensions. We find that corporate governance characteristics associated with stronger board monitoring play a constraining role on the magnitude of pensions. Our evidence of substitution effects between pensions and performance‐based compensation is consistent with a managerial power view of executive compensation‐setting, and the use of pensions as a ‘stealth’ element of compensation. Our findings are robust to considering different types of pensions, product market competition, and cross‐listing. Sub‐period analysis shows that pensions decrease and substitution effects weaken following the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, we find no evidence that the use of compensation consultants with potential conflicts of interest is associated with higher pensions. Overall, our study contributes to a greater understanding of the role of pensions in executive compensation, and shows the importance of including pensions in analysis of executive compensation.     

Predictive versus opportunistic earnings management,executive compensation,and firm performance

We examine the association between earnings management and an important component of corporate governance, the incentives provided through compensation. We argue that firms with predictive (opportunistic) earnings management, in which discretionary accruals do (do not) relate to future cash flows, provide a more (less) ideal setting for the use of compensation as incentives. Our empirical tests show that CEO compensation levels (measured by salary, bonus, and other forms of compensation) are positively related to predictive earnings management and negatively related to opportunistic earnings management. We also find that predictive earnings management is positively associated with future returns, whereas opportunistic earnings management is negatively associated with future returns. Overall, our results suggest that firms provide more incentives if their earnings are also more informative because of discretionary accruals.     

EVIDENCE ON THE COMPENSATION OF PORTFOLIO MANAGERS

We surveyed 396 portfolio managers about the structure of their compensation. Overall, more compensation packages are subjective/discretionary than objective/formula based. Firm success factors such as firm profitability have more effect on bonuses than do client success factors such as investment performance. Differences in the structure of compensation across firms, clients, job types, and manager characteristics reflect likely differences in the underlying contracting environments, especially differences in the difficulty of monitoring performance and exerting control.     

Usefulness of fair values for predicting banks’ future earnings: evidence from other comprehensive income and its components

This paper examines whether fair value adjustments included in other comprehensive income (OCI) predict future bank performance. It also examines whether the reliability of these estimates affects their predictive value. Using a sample of bank holding companies, we find that fair value adjustments included in OCI can predict earnings both 1 and 2 years ahead. However, not all fair value-related unrealized gains and losses included in OCI have similar implications. While net unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities are positively associated with future earnings, net unrealized gains and losses on derivative contracts classified as cash flow hedges are negatively associated with future earnings. We also find that reliable measurement of fair values enhances predictive value. Finally, we show that fair value adjustments recorded in OCI during the 2007–2009 financial crisis predicted future profitability, contradicting criticism that fair value accounting forced banks to record excessive downward adjustments.     

Dividend Changes and Future Profitability

We investigate the relation between dividend changes and future profitability, measured in terms of either future earnings or future abnormal earnings. Supporting "the information content of dividends hypothesis," we find that dividend changes provide information about the level of profitability in subsequent years, incremental to market and accounting data. We also document that dividend changes are positively related to earnings changes in each of the two years after the dividend change.     

An Empirical Investigation of the Demand for Bank‐Owned Life Insurance

Key employee life insurance in the banking industry is called bank‐owned life insurance (BOLI). Banks use BOLI to provide financial support to help reduce disruptions due to the death of a key executive and as a part of the executive compensation package. We investigate the characteristics of banks related to the amount of BOLI purchased. We find that BOLI purchases are positively related to bank size and leverage and negatively related to tax rates and employee salaries. We also find that BOLI purchases are related to bank ownership structure and profitability.     

Insurer Reserve Error and Executive Compensation

This article investigates incentives of insurance firm managers to manipulate loss reserves in order to maximize their compensation. We find that managers who receive bonuses that are likely capped or no bonuses tend to over‐reserve for current‐year incurred losses. However, managers who receive bonuses that are likely not capped tend to under‐reserve for current‐year incurred losses. We also find that managers who exercise stock options tend to under‐reserve in the current period.     

上市公司高级管理层报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间关系的实证检验

本文以中国上市公司2002-2004年度的高管人员报酬数据为基础,对高管人员的报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间的关系进行了实证分析。结果表明,中国上市公司高管人员的报酬与公司绩效、股东财富存在正相关关系,其报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间如经典代理理论所预测的那样存在负相关关系,但显著性较弱。进一步分析发现,对于那些增长机会很小或没有增长机会的公司,报酬业绩敏感度与风险存在负相关关系,而对于那些增长机会大的公司,报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间存在正相关关系,这在一定程度上拓展了经典代理理论的预测。     

CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses

We investigate CEO compensation for completing M&A deals. We find that CEOs who have more power to influence board decisions receive significantly larger bonuses. We also find a positive relation between bonus compensation and measures of effort, but not between bonus compensation and deal performance. CEOs with more power also tend to engage in larger deals relative to the size of their own firms, and the market responds more negatively to their acquisition announcements. Our evidence is consistent with the argument that managerial power is the primary driver of M&A bonuses.     

Effect of mandatory pro forma earnings disclosure on the relation between CEO share bonuses and firm performance

This paper examines the effect of mandatory pro forma earnings disclosure on the alignment of CEO share bonuses and firm performance (i.e., annual stock returns). Using 6,583 executive-level observations from 986 non-financial firms in Taiwan over the period 1999–2004, we find a significant shift in the CEO share bonus pay-earnings relation caused by a marked reduction in bonus shares after the new disclosure rule becomes effective. The change in CEO compensation structure in turn leads to a closer link between CEO stock bonuses and annual stock returns. The result suggests that a more transparent earnings disclosure could positively affect board choices regarding compensation arrangements, thus inducing a better convergence of manager and shareholder interests.     

Securitization of corporate assets and executive compensation

We examine the effect of corporate asset-backed securitization on managerial compensation. We find that CEO compensation increases after securitization of corporate assets, which is consistent with two distinct theoretical views: (1) asset-backed securitization improves the efficiency of performance-based compensation as corporate performance becomes a better signal of managerial effort and (2) securitization of corporate assets mitigates liquidity constraints so that firms can make more efficient investments. We find that securitization primarily affects short-term accounting components (bonuses) and less equity-based components of the CEO's performance-based compensation. Further investigation reveals support for the second view of liquidity but not the first view of moral hazard. The results are robust to controlling for both possible self-selection biases associated with the decision to rely on asset-backed securitization as a means of external financing and simultaneity between executive compensation and financial decisions (securitization and leverage).     

CEO Bonus Compensation and Bank Default Risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe

We investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms embedded in CEO cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. For a sample of U.S. and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower the default risk of a bank. However, we find no evidence of cash bonuses exerting a risk‐reducing effect when banks are financially distressed or when banks operate under weak bank regulatory regimes. Our results link bonus compensation in banking to financial stability and caution that attempts to regulate bonus pay need to tailor CEO incentives to the riskiness of banks and to regulatory regimes.     

Getting Attention Through Corporate Philanthropy

This study investigates whether firm donations will attract attention for firms without analyst coverage. We find that: (1) the donations from firms without analyst coverage attract more attention from analysts, (2) donations from firms without analyst coverage improve stock liquidity and institutional holdings at least in the short run, and (3) donations from firms without analyst coverage are positively and significantly related to the future performance of firms compared with those from firms covered by analysts. This study contributes to the understanding of the influence of analysts on firms and the strategic motivations of corporate philanthropy.