Sample Selection Approaches to Estimating House Price Cash Differentials

We extend the literature on house price cash differentials in important ways. First, our paper is the first to employ methods to correct for sample selection bias, using both switching regression and propensity score matching of cash vs. non-cash transactions. We use selection models to produce price counterfactuals for cash and noncash buyers. We also include both average treatment effect and a propensity score weighted selection models. From the selection models, we find that previous studies likely overstate the cash discount. Results from counterfactual tests examining cash discounts suggest amplified cash discounts in areas with close proximity to an environmental hazard; and also a pricing differential based on CBG level income, with purchasers in high income areas more likely to pay a cash premium compared to market participants in areas with comparably lower income, where a cash discount is detected. These results provide useful insights for market participants including real estate appraisers, brokers, and buyers and sellers of real estate.     

Fire sale acquisitions: Myth vs. reality

We provide empirical evidence on the conjecture that in economic crises, firms could be forced to sell at deep discounts, or fire sale prices. Using the conventional stock price near the announcement date, we find instead distressed firms in crisis periods receive a 30% higher offer premium than distressed firms in normal periods; they also receive a 34% higher premium than non-distressed firms in crisis periods. Acquirers also do not gain, at announcement and over the long-term. Acquirers, however, may perceive they realize fire sale discounts if the reference is the targets’ highest price in the previous 52 weeks.     

Foreclosure,REO, and Market Sales in Residential Real Estate

Assessment of lender and third-party bidder acquired properties at foreclosure auction is provided. Properties acquired at foreclosure auction by third-party bidders transact at a discount to lender dispositions of real estate owned (REO) properties. The discount reflects a reduction in costs associated with lender owned (REO) dispositions and uncertainty faced by third-party bidders. Moreover, there is a ranking in transaction prices among initial purchases by third-party bidders at foreclosure auction, REO sales, non-distressed property sales and the subsequent sales of third-party bidder acquired properties. Third-party bidder auction prices are below REO sale prices, which are below non-distressed property sale prices, which are below the subsequent sale prices of third-party bidder acquired properties. The price spacing by cohort is logical, intuitive and economically justified in a market with rational participants. Implications are also apparent for the measurement of price changes, net sale proceeds and returns to residential real estate.     

Quantifying private benefits of control from a structural model of block trades

We study the determinants of private benefits of control in negotiated block transactions. We estimate the block pricing model in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (2000) explicitly accounting for both block premiums and block discounts in the data. The evidence suggests that the occurrence of a block premium or discount depends on the controlling block holder's ability to fight a potential tender offer for the target's stock. We find evidence of large private benefits of control and of associated deadweight losses, but also of value creation by controlling shareholders. Finally, we provide evidence consistent with Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis.     

Evidence on the Mean-Reverting Tendencies of Closed-End Fund Discounts

Closed‐end fund (CEF) discounts vary widely over time due to changes in share price, net asset value (NAV), or both. Prior studies suggest discounts are mean‐reverting. We examine the mean‐reversion issue by employing cointegration procedures. Specifically, we identify bond and equity CEFs that exhibit stationary time‐series properties and find statistically significant error correction terms that quantify the speed of mean reversion. The results indicate that mean reversion is caused by changes in both share price and NAVs. However, CEFs can only provide excess returns when the discount narrows due to share price increases.     

Convertible securities in merger transactions

This paper provides a rationale for the use of convertible securities as the medium of exchange in corporate change-of-control transactions. We argue that convertible securities can resolve the information asymmetry about the bidder’s value while at the same time mitigating the information asymmetry about the target’s value. In contrast, deals with cash or stock can only address one information asymmetry or the other but not both. Empirically, we find that a bidder is more likely to offer convertible securities, rather than all cash or all stock, when both the bidder and its target face large asymmetric information problems. We also find that both bidders and targets in convertible deals enjoy positive abnormal stock returns around takeover announcements. These findings provide empirical support for the use of convertible securities to resolve the double-sided asymmetric information problem. Finally, we find that bidder returns in convertible deals are larger than in all-cash and all-stock deals, but that target returns in convertible deals are smaller than in all-cash and all-stock deals.     

The Valuation Impact on Distressed Residential Transactions: Anatomy of a Housing Price Bubble

Most previous empirical studies on foreclosure price discounts are based on data from housing-markets during periods of relative stability (Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Arlington, Texas; and Las Vegas, Nevada in 1980s and 1990s). The few studies with sample periods containing the Liquidity Crisis of 2008 were all focused on the Las Vegas market and even fewer studies have examined the pricing implications of short sale transactions. This study examines the discounts associated with foreclosure and short sale status in the Fresno, California from 2006 to 2010, a time period containing significant housing price volatility. Generally, we find approximately 20 % and 13 % discounts for foreclosure transactions and short sale transactions, respectively. These discounts remain consistent even after controlling for endogeneity of time-on-the-market and self-selection bias. We also document that both the foreclosure and short-sale discounts are time varying based on market conditions. Both foreclosure and short-sale discounts increase from 2008 to 2009 and decrease in 2010. Also, the foreclosure status decreases time on the market while the short-sale status increases time on the market.     

The Effect of Demand for Shares on the Timing and Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offers

Despite high levels of asymmetry of information, firms that issue seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) within a year of their initial public offering (IPO) (follow‐on SEOs) are able to offer shares at a lower discount as compared to more mature firms. We provide evidence that this seeming contradiction can be explained by a very high degree of demand for the follow‐on offering. We find that the likelihood of issuing a follow‐on SEO is significantly related to the level of institutional demand and that discounts are lower for follow‐on SEOs in which institutional demand is high. We also consider the joint effect of cash holdings and follow‐on SEOs on discounts since firms that have recently gone public tend to hold high levels of cash. Underpricing is higher for firms with elevated preoffer levels of cash, which is consistent with market timing predictions. However, this relation is mitigated for both follow‐on SEOs and issues that also have high share demand.     

External and Internal Pricing in Multidivisional Firms

Multidivisional firms frequently rely on external market prices in order to value internal transactions across profit centers. This paper examines market‐based transfer pricing when an upstream division has monopoly power in selling a proprietary component both to a downstream division within the same firm and to external customers. When internal transfers are valued at the prevailing market price, the resulting transactions are distorted by double marginalization. The imposition of intracompany discounts will always improve overall firm profits provided the supplying division is capacity constrained. Under certain conditions it is then possible to design discount rules so that the resulting prices and sales quantities are efficient from the corporate perspective. In contrast, the impact of intracompany discounts remains ambiguous when the capacity of the selling division is essentially unlimited. It is then generally impossible to achieve fully efficient outcomes by means of market‐based transfer pricing unless the external market for the component is sufficiently large relative to the internal market.     

Price Elasticity of Demand and an Optimal Cash Discount Rate in Credit Policy

While the provision of a cash discount is equivalent to a reduction in price, the role of price elasticity of demand in determining credit terms has been neglected in the extant literature. In this paper, this role is investigated and it is shown that the optimal cash discount rate is affected by the price elasticity of demand for the firm's product. The comparative effects on the optimal cash discount rate with respect to exogenous changes in the fraction of credit sales paid after taking cash discount, the cost of short-term funds and the bad debt loss ratio are investigated. A trade-off between the time value gain and the price elasticity of demand is established. We find that firms which sell in locations having different price elasticities for their products, and/or which face various costs of short-term funds in different locations, should vary their cash discount terms accordingly.     

Has market discipline on banks improved after the Dodd–Frank Act?

We investigate whether or not market discipline on banking firms changed after the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) of 2010. If market discipline is improved, we should see a lower discount for size on yield spreads, particularly for banks identified as too-big-to-fail (TBTF) or systemically important (SIFI). Using secondary market subordinated debt transactions we find that the size discount is reduced by 47% and TBTF discount is reduced by 94% after the DFA. The DFA has been effective in reducing, but not in eliminating the size and TBTF discounts on yield spreads. Market discipline of banks appears to have improved further after the rating criteria changes by Moody’s.     

THE PRIVATE COMPANY DISCOUNT

When appraisers or investment bankers value privately held companies by making comparisons to otherwise similar public companies, they typically apply a discount. Most practitioners attribute this discount mainly to the relative illiquidity of private companies; and, for this reason, they value private companies based on empirical studies designed to measure illiquidity discounts. But this assumption and the valuations based upon it are likely to be unreliable because private companies are valued differently than public companies owing to a variety of other, more "fundamental" factors that have caused the firm to stay private rather than choosing to list on an exchange.
This article presents an alternative framework to estimate the discount for private companies that computes four separate valuation multiples for a set of private transactions and a comparable set of public transactions. After comparing these four sets of multiples for both domestic and foreign firms, the authors reach the following conclusions:

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   Domestic private companies are acquired at an average 20–30% discount relative to similar public companies when using earnings (more precisely, EBIT and EBITDA) multiples as the basis for valuing the transactions. The average discount measured using price- to-book value multiples are somewhat lower, and there are no significant differences between the revenue multiples of acquired private and public companies.

       
  
  

Accounting for Risk and Return in Equity Valuation

Standard valuation models forecast cash flows or earnings, add a growth rate, and discount the cash flows to their present value with a discount rate that typically reflects the cost of capital. But as the author argues, projecting the long‐term growth rate is essentially speculative; and along with uncertainty about the growth rate, analysts generally do not have a good grasp of the discount rate either. Thus, instead of reducing uncertainty, these two features effectively compound uncertainty in valuations in the sense that slight changes in the growth rate or discount rate can change the valuation considerably. In this article, the author proposes an alternative approach that views the investor's problem as one of challenging the speculations that are built into the current market price, particularly the speculation about growth. Rather than building in a speculative growth rate (and thereby treating it as if it were a certainty), the author's approach turns the problem on its head by using an accounting analysis of the firm's current earnings and cash flows that provides a basis for recognizing the speculative component of the current stock price. More specifically, the author's analysis identifies the future earnings growth path that is implied by the market price, which can then be evaluated with the question: Do I want to pay for this growth? Because growth expectations are risky, additional analysis can be used to provide an understanding of the risk and return to buying growth, and of the upside and downside if risk growth expectations are not realized. By taking such an approach, investors incorporate their understanding of risk not by increasing the discount rate, but by recognizing that the primary risk in investing is the risk of overpaying for growth.     

Understanding Stock Price Volatility: The Role of Earnings

In an efficient capital market, asset prices vary when investors change their expectations about cash flows, discount rates, or both. Using dividends to measure cash flows, previous research shows that the aggregate dividend‐price ratio varies due to changes in expected discount rates (returns) rather than expected cash flows. In contrast, using accounting earnings instead of dividends as a measure of cash flows, this paper shows that as much as 70% of the variation in the dividend‐price ratio can be explained by changes in expected earnings. Moreover, the paper documents a significant negative correlation between expected returns and expected earnings, suggesting that variations in a common factor to both may generate significant price volatility. The results are consistent with the dividend‐policy irrelevance hypothesis.     

Does bankruptcy law improve the fate of distressed firms? The role of credit channels

Growing financial failure at firm-level can have serious consequences for banks in terms of rising non-performing assets, in the absence of a strong bankruptcy system. Such a scenario in India made its dysfunctional insolvency system to be reformed, introducing the new Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) in 2016. Using a panel of 33,845 Indian firms over the period of 2008–2019 and by employing a difference-in-differences approach, we investigate how the IBC has supported financially distressed firms in mitigating their intrinsic vulnerability during the post-IBC period, compared to their non-distressed counterparts. We find that through expanded credit availability and lower cost of debt financing during the post-IBC period, distressed firms are able to improve their performance relative to non-distressed firms. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the benefits stemming from the implementation of the IBC policy are more prominent for those financially distressed firms that are larger, younger and more collateralized. Our results are robust to a battery of tests and identification strategies. Our conclusions are relevant in contributing to the current academic and policy debates on safeguarding and preserving business performance and continuity under stressed scenarios.     

The Impact of Mispricing and Asymmetric Information on the Price Discount of Private Placements of Common Stock

The price discount on privately placed stock is large and can vary substantially among firms. While earlier studies attribute price discounts on privately placed stock to illiquidity and costs of gathering information, we offer a more complete explanation. We find that firms exhibiting higher overvaluation have significantly larger price discounts in private stock sales. We also find that higher levels of asymmetric information about the issuing firm and about the stock market environment at the time of the private placement cause more pronounced discounts in the offer price. Our analysis also shows that post-issue abnormal returns following private placements are higher when discounts are less pronounced.     

Why do firms issue private equity repeatedly? On the motives and information content of multiple PIPE offerings

This study examines why private equity issues tend to be a repeated source of financing for public firms. We test the recent operational needs theory of public equity issuance within the context of repeated private equity issues. We find that repeated PIPE issuers burn through cash quickly and do not reach the standards of information transparency or profitability needed for a successful public equity offering. This has implications for investor composition and the market response to a PIPE. Initial PIPE offerings are characterized by substantial diversity in investor type. In successive transactions firms increasingly rely upon hedge funds, who extract greater price discounts and more often require cash flow rights as opposed to control rights. As firms select a path of repeated PIPEs to raise funds, successive issues become uninformative to the market. We conclude that, for small public firms, the same motive underlies public equity offerings and repeated private equity offerings—an acute need for cash.     

Mean-Reversion in REITs Discount to NAV &; Risk Premium

REITs discount to NAV is a puzzling regularity. The sharp increase in volatility of REITs prices over the past few years has spurred a relatively new concern amongst academics, managers and investors about the consequences of, and causes of, property risk premium on discount to NAV. The two interrelated questions arising from the recent increase in volatility of REITs prices are: Is the increased volatility responsible for the observed widening in discount to NAV? What does the observed private and public risk premium tell us about discount to NAV? We attempt to address these questions by analysing risk premiums in private and public real estate markets. The analysis is conducted in the most recent years of high stock price volatility. Our analysis reveals two major results: a tendency for discount to NAV to revert to the long term mean value of 20% and, more significantly, a lower risk premium in equivalent yields in private market than in public market. These results suggest that investors in public market have a different conception of property risk and complexity of lease options than what is conveyed by private property valuation.     

Accounting for distress in bank mergers

Most bank merger studies do not control for hidden bailouts, which may lead to biased results. In this study we employ a unique data set of approximately 1000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use undisclosed information on banks’ regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. Among merging banks, we find that improving financial profiles lower the likelihood of distressed mergers more than the likelihood of non-distressed mergers. The likelihood to acquire a bank is also reduced but less than the probability to be acquired. Both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than non-merging banks. Hence, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.     

Closed-End Funds: A Survey

This survey reviews the evolving literature on closed-end fund discounts. Many studies have attempted to explain the existence and the behavior of the discount to net asset value, emphasizing biases in the calculation of NAV, agency costs, tax-timing options and market segmentation. None has been able to provide a full explanation. As a result, some researchers have found it necessary to resort to models of limited rationality. This gives rise to potential opportunities for exploiting the discount. We summarize the findings from over 70 studies of closed-end funds, and present directions for future research.