The New Political Economy of EU State Aid Policy

Despite its importance and singularity, the EU’s state aid policy has attracted less scholarly attention than other elements of EU competition policy. Introducing the themes addressed by the special issue, this article briefly reviews the development of EU policy and highlights why the control of state aid matters. The Commission’s response to the current economic crisis notably in banking and the car industry is a key concern, but the interests of the special issue go far beyond. They include: the role of the European Commission in the development of EU policy, the politics of state aid, and a clash between models of capitalism. The special issue also examines the impact of EU policy. It investigates how EU state aid decisions affect not only industrial policy at the national level (and therefore at the EU level), but the welfare state and territorial relations within federal member states, the external implications of EU action and the strategies pursued by the Commission to limit any potential disadvantage to European firms, and the conflict between the EU’s expanding legal order and national.     

The Economic Approach to European State Aid Control: A Politico-Economic Analysis

Since the mid-2000s, the European Commission has employed a so-called ‘more economic approach’ to European state aid control. Under this modified regime, the Commission checks not only whether a state aid has competition-distorting effects, but in addition, whether it enhances social welfare. This reform implies an extension of the Commission’s competences vis-à-vis the Member States as the Commission gets the power to prohibit national state aid regarded as socially wasteful. The Commission explains its reform with the necessity of giving state aid control a sound economic basis. This article, however, demonstrates that the more economic approach – somewhat paradoxically – is not based on a consistent economic view of public policy that would justify the aforementioned shift of competences to the supranational EU level. The economic-theoretical inconsistencies identified in this article may be used by policymakers to rethink some elements of current EU state aid policy.     

Managing the Dilemma of Discretion: The European Commission and the Development of EU State Aid Policy

This article examines the role played by the European Commission in the development of the European Union’s (EU) state aid policy. It does so through the prism of a “dilemma” that exists at the nexus of the Commission’s delegated authority to administer EU treaty state aid provisions, the discretion conferred on Commission authorities by the imprecise language in which those provisions are written, and the political and institutional control mechanisms EU member governments use to influence the exercise of that discretion. Examining Commission efforts to manage this dilemma over the history of the EU, we provide evidence to illustrate how the Commission’s approach adapted to shifting economic and political conditions.     

Legal But Costly: An Analysis of the EU GM Regulation in the Light of the WTO Trade Dispute Between the EU and the USA

In this study, we investigate the new European Union (EU) regulations in the light of the ruling by the World Trade Organization (WTO) panel on the trade in genetically modified crops. To this end, we describe: the basic differences in approaches between the EU and the complaining parties with regard to genetically modified crops, what the main arguments were of the complaining parties as well as the defence of the EU, what the final judgement of the panel was and finally, we describe the current EU regulations. We then analyse to what extent, the arguments and conclusions of the panel still hold regarding the new EU legislation. We find that parts of the current EU legislation, that is, the safety bans as they are currently in place, are in breach of the WTO commitments. Moreover, the new approval procedures have the potential to also break these rules, although whether or not they will, depends on how the European Commission acts. Whether or not the EU will be challenged at the WTO remains an open question, as the decision to fight before the WTO may be more costly than working out new bilateral trade agreements.     

Policy implications

Abstract: In the European Union, the framework of financial services legislation at EU level has been aimed primarily at forming a single market for banks, insurers and other financial services firms. Substantial progress has been made towards this objective. Also, the EU initiatives have stimulated a reappraisal of national regulatory systems. Most of this EU legislation (with the exception of the consumer credit directives) has not had consumer protection as one of its main aims, although it has been assumed that consumers will eventually benefit from a wide choice of financial services providers and from price competition. However, partly in response to consumer pressure, the European Commission is developing a set of initiatives more closely geared to protecting consumers’ interests. Within the context of the EU’s approach, there remain considerable variations in the approach to protecting consumers’ interests in different member states as a result of legal and cultural differences.     

Economic Patriotism, the Clash of Capitalisms, and State Aid in the European Union

This article analyses the political economy of state aid in the European Union (EU) using the concepts of economic patriotism and models of capitalism. State aid is analysed as a form of economic patriotism, which is conceived here as economic interventions which seek, by a number of means, to advance the perceived economic self-interest of particular groups and actors (firms, workforces, or sectors) defined according to their territorial status. The article argues that the paradox of neo-liberal democracy generated by liberal international markets, overlapping economic governance regimes (such as the EU and the World Trade Organisation), and nationally delimited political mandates presents new problems for policy-makers attempting economic interventions like state aid. Forms of economic patriotism are partly shaped by national institutional and social configurations and state traditions. Within EU economic governance, this generates a ‘clash of capitalisms’ whereby liberal EU anti-trust and competition policy norms proscribe certain state aid and industrial policy measures favoured by some European states. As traditional industrial policy becomes decreasingly viable, new modes of economic patriotic interventionism are enacted within contemporary processes of market-making, and the re-regulatory activity framing European markets. The paper focuses on French state aid responses to the global economic crisis, noting how the retreat of neo-liberal ebullience within the EU provides a conducive environment for resurgent French dirigiste approaches to state aid, indicating that the politics of economic patriotism and state aid will continue to be important features of the European political economic landscape in the years ahead.     

State Aid and Export Competitiveness in the EU

Despite the proclaimed return of industrial policy state aid provided by EU Member States is at historically low levels. This fact is at least partly explained by the unique institutional arrangement in the EU which empowers the European Commission to monitor and restrict state aid activities of Member States. Making use of European state aid statistics over the period 1995–2011 we construct a measure for manufacturing state aid and estimate an expanded macro-economic export function to investigate the relationship between state aid for the manufacturing sector and Member States’ export performance. Since national governments can be expected to provide subsidies primarily to foster domestic value added we use value added exports as the export performance measure. Non-stationarity of the data confines us to investigating the short run relationships in which we only find limited evidence for a significant impact of state aid on manufacturing value added exports.     

Towards a Single European Market? The Evolution of the Leasing Industry

It is argued that completion of the internal market for leasing requires sufficient openness of national markets for competition between rules to take place. This study of the leasing industry in the European Economic Area analyses those aspects of the European Commission’s Single Market Programme which are intended to achieve this aim and pinpoints tax harmonisation, banking regulation and mutual recognition of accounting standards as the main areas of Commission regulatory activity which will impact on the evolution of rules for the industry. The paper looks at the structure of the national industries and highlights the constraints and driving forces within the various rule systems which will influence the process of change. It is concluded that relatively high levels of competition between rules are actually occurring. In the long term, national markets will continue to be segmented and it is questionable whether a European leasing industry will actually emerge     

Künftige Finanzplanung der EU — neue Prioritäten,höhere Effizienz?

On May 2, 2018, the European Commission proposed a limited and realistic increase for the EU’s next multi-annual financial framework 2021–2027. The draft implies a roughly constant common budget for the EU with a focus on European stabilisation policy and the provision of centralised public goods provision rather than agriculture and cohesion. This shift mirrors the priorities spelled out by Emanuel Macron. However, the Commission combined this pragmatism with its interest in improving budgetary flexibility and autonomy. There is no doubt that the EU27 faces difficult negotiations. EU Member States’ initial reactions to the European Commision’s recent proposals were dominated by juste retour considerations reminiscent of past negotiations. Strengthening EU expenditure through European added value and fundamentally reforming their own resource system, including the introduction of tax-based own resources, will end the deadlock surrounding net position thinking. A more fundamental view on the fiscal policy of the European Union is given in the last paper, which states that the EU requires a complete overhaul of the economic governance structure. It offers a tentative approach that avoids moral hazard problems as well as fallacies about conditional backstops during times of crisis.     

WTO透明度原则对《SPS协定》通知要求的影响分析

《SPS协定》要求成员通知卫生与植物卫生法规,以贯彻透明度原则。WTO成员可评论措施,促进规则的国际完善。欧盟积极履行了透明度义务,通知了欧盟层面和成员国层面的上述措施,但也存在若干问题,例如欧盟很大程度上依靠科学证据是否修改规则。由于欧盟组织机构的复杂性,通知制度带有一定的模糊性,但相当程度上促进了国际贸易的发展,完善了国际食品安全法律规则。     

Advertising Self-Regulation in a Broader Context

Abstract

As the world braces itself for a unified European marketplace, it is critical that we look at the industries likely to be influenced by, and in turn shape, European integration. The advertising industry and its handling of unification are particularly important given that advertising is the voice of the marketplace and a major communications force, shaping cultural norms and values. In order to ensure the free movement of goods, communications about those goods must also move freely. At this time, however, each European country has its own rules and regulations for advertising. One of the major issues facing European advertising as the European Union (EU) comes together is the regulation of cross-border advertising. In 1991 the European Commission issued a call to action for the European advertising industry and almost immediately the industry began work on a trans-border complaints system. Since then the European Advertising Standards Alliance has worked diligently to iron out issues resulting from international advertising disputes. As this article shows, European regulators must determine how advertising will fit into the larger scheme of European law; who will be responsible for controlling advertising; and whether it should be monitored at the national or pan-European level. Certainly the advertising industry is not the only one struggling to determine which controls can remain at the national level and which should be raised to the European rank. But this analysis of how advertising self-regulation fits into the European legal scheme does provide a useful case study of the hurdles ahead. It will be interesting to watch as Europe works to find the proper balance between free trade and national autonomy to control industries.     

The Hungarian Cocktail of Competition Law and Consumer Protection: Should It Be Dissolved?

Hungary, a candidate country expecting to join the EU in 2004, has to approximate its laws and economic policies to those of the EU. However, it is not certain whether the Brussels standards will always improve national rules.This article will discuss one possible case. It concerns the special Hungarian legislation on competition law and certain consumer protection rules in the Competition Act of 1990 and the amended Act of 1996. The inclusion of rules governing consumer interests in the Acts greatly contributed to the recognition and the enforcement of consumer interests in Hungary.Nevertheless, the European Commission and the OECD increasingly argue that the Hungarian Office of Economic Competition should pass its competence in consumer related cases to another institution and instead pay more attention to more prominent fields of competition law such as horizontal agreements and mergers.This article will contest this argument. Although it is an understandable approach, there are several reasons why it should be carefully reconsidered. These include the position of consumers, which is still weak, the general system of consumer protection in Hungary, and the strong standing of the Office for Economic Competition. The comprehensive nature of the Hungarian Competition Act of 1996 is one of the cases in which the European guidelines should be considered with caution in order to determine whether their implementation would improve or damage a system that already functions well.     

Winners and Losers in EU State Aid Policy

Who gains and who loses from the European Union’s state aid policy? Using data published by the Competition Directorate from 1992 to 2007, I employ pooled time series analysis to understand the motives behind state aid allocations and then interpret the findings in light of the political relationship between Member States and the Commission. Demand for aid is shaped by national macroeconomic and institutional characteristics. Governments then bargain with the Commission to allocate aid. As a result, the Commission finds itself in a delicate balancing act as controller of state aids and as an institution subject to the political power of member government.     

Cross-border trade and contract awards The intellectual myopia at the heart of the EU procurement rules

As part of the Single Market initiative the European Commission has put in place rules to encourage greater transparency about public contracting in the EU member states. Although the new rules are well intentioned, this article argues that the rules, which came into force after 1992, may be based on a false logic concerning the benefits to consumers of neo-liberal market principles. In essence it is argued that the new rules will not have the impact on cross-border contract awards that the framers of the public procurement Directives intended. This argument is supported by an analysis of EU contract awards in 1993.     

The Constitutional Structures of the National Political Economy: Barrier to or Precondition for European Integration?

The Court of Justice of the European Union is increasingly dedicated to the pursuit of economic efficiency. As this article will demonstrate, this has led to diagonal conflict between European legal pronouncements on the free movement of labour within a services regime and national jurisprudence on democratically-legitimated public procurement policies within distinct state aids regimes. Where once the CJEU treated public procurement as a distinctive part of the EU’s state aids regime, or one which might be reconciled with redistributive ethical and social concerns maintained at national level, the application of the EU services regime to procurement has placed this traditional understanding in doubt. This re-alignment, however, as well as the supranational-national conflict that it has created, reflects both the deeper mismatch both between European economic and national social competences, as well as friction between national and European conceptions of constitutional legitimacy. Such tensions must be overcome in order to secure continuing legal integration within Europe.     

Technology competition and regulatory advantage

The importance of competition law as a policy lever to help the EU compete at the forefront of science and technology seems to have been overlooked by the Commission. As a consequence, the EU appears to be at a disadvantage to the USA in terms of the regulatory environment for intellectual property and licensing practices. This article examines these differences and explores the pros and cons of the European and American approaches to competition law, ultimately arguing in favour of regulatory harmonisation.     

欧盟反倾销新方法及应对策略探析--以辽宁紫光成功应诉欧盟热轧钢板桩反倾销案为例

按照《中国入世议定书》的规定,中国加入WTO15年期满后,即自2016年12月11日起,在对华反倾销调查中,世贸组织所有成员国停止使用"替代国"的做法。欧盟为了履行WTO义务,在2016年11月9日提出了修改反倾销和反补贴规则提案,该提案提出了以"市场严重扭曲"概念替代原立法中的"非市场经济地位"的反倾销新方法。2017年12月19日,欧盟公布了《反倾销基础条例》的一个修正案(第2017/2321号条例),删除了有关"非市场经济"国家的规定,确定了市场扭曲的概念,规定了反倾销的特殊计算方法。在存在严重扭曲的情况下,反倾销新规中计算正常价值的新方法使用未被扭曲的价格和成本来构造正常价值,而不使用出口国国内价格和成本,本质上是一种变相的"替代国"方法。本文借助辽宁紫光成功应诉欧盟热轧钢板桩反倾销案,深入探讨欧盟反倾销新方法,并提出相应的对策以促进中欧间经贸关系持续、健康地发展。     

The Dilemma of Enlargement for the European Union's Regional Policy

The integration of the former communist countries of central and eastern Europe into the European Union creates a dilemma for the EU's regional policy. The EU's expenditure on regional policy (its ‘active’ regional policy) has been guided by political reactions to deepening or enlarging the EU, not by a rational strategy for regional policy. In contrast, the strong EU instrument of state aid control, developed for competition policy (its ‘reactive’ regional policy) has been relatively successful in avoiding a national race of regional subsidies among the member states. We show that a shift from active regional policy to reactive, competition‐oriented, regional policies is the preferred way for the established member states to handle the challenge of enlargement. At the same time, however, this shift is politically difficult for the accession countries to accept, despite the fact that this shift might prove better for them economically. This regional policy dilemma is one of the major obstacles for the full integration of the accession countries into the EU.     

EU State Aid Policy and the Politics of External Trade Relations

European Union (EU) state aid policy has an oft-overlooked but politically-charged external dimension that is most clearly witnessed in the linkage with external trade relations. The article seeks to illuminate the issues and potential problems raised by this state aid-trade linkage. When this linkage is made, the EU engages in an array of complex international interactions through which it may pursue two politically-contentious procedures: countervailing duties or dispute settlement. The article argues that an understanding of the EU’s role in these complex interactions must take into account the Union’s institutional landscape and the competing preferences of different private interests. When deciding to impose countervailing duties against foreign state aids (subsidies), private interests play a significant role in initiating investigations and can use their access to EU institutions to encourage the imposition of such measures. While a variety of factors help to explain why the EU prefers pursuing countervailing duties, the Union also actively uses the World Trade Organization’s formal dispute settlement mechanism. Under this alternative, private interests again play an important role, pursuing varying strategies depending on their preferences. The most important determinant of a firm’s preference to pursue countervailing duties or the dispute settlement mechanism appears to be the extent to which the firm is concerned with restoring competition in their home market or with restoring competition in multiple/global markets.     

Comprehensive Trade Agreements: Conditioning Globalisation or Eroding the European Model?

Trade dynamics within the EU are presently pushing it towards deepening globalisation through bilateral comprehensive trade agreements which establish far-reaching rules that govern the bilateral trade relationship. The European Commission has defended these agreements as a vehicle through which to promote world trade in accordance with European values and norms. However, the theory of fiscal federalism and the principle of subsidiarity tell us that one should not centralise decisions at the supranational level which are better taken at the national or regional level when there are different preferences among countries or regions. Consequently, member state and regional competences ought not to be perceived as a mere obstacle to swift trade deals. Rather, they can provide an important checks and balances function with regard to whether EU trade policy is truly working to condition globalisation according to European values and preferences.