European Competition vs. Global Competitiveness Transferring EU Rules on State Aid and Public Procurement Beyond Europe

As long as state aid outside the EU is unregulated, the European Commission faces a dilemma: either European firms will be disadvantaged in global competition by strict EU rules, or the Commission will come under pressure to relax the rules, thereby running the risk that fair competition within the EU will be undermined. As a consequence, the Commission attempts to promote EU rules on state aid and public procurement beyond EU borders — in non-member countries as well as at the WTO level. This article analyses the Commission’s channels of regulatory transfer and the factors accounting for its varying success. Bilateral cooperation provides many opportunities to spread European state aid rules, but decentralised enforcement at the national level remains ultimately deficient. Moreover, the transfer of European rules to the multilateral WTO depends heavily on the EU’s ability to reach prior consensus with its most powerful partner and rival, the US government.     

The New Political Economy of EU State Aid Policy

Despite its importance and singularity, the EU’s state aid policy has attracted less scholarly attention than other elements of EU competition policy. Introducing the themes addressed by the special issue, this article briefly reviews the development of EU policy and highlights why the control of state aid matters. The Commission’s response to the current economic crisis notably in banking and the car industry is a key concern, but the interests of the special issue go far beyond. They include: the role of the European Commission in the development of EU policy, the politics of state aid, and a clash between models of capitalism. The special issue also examines the impact of EU policy. It investigates how EU state aid decisions affect not only industrial policy at the national level (and therefore at the EU level), but the welfare state and territorial relations within federal member states, the external implications of EU action and the strategies pursued by the Commission to limit any potential disadvantage to European firms, and the conflict between the EU’s expanding legal order and national.     

The Economic Approach to European State Aid Control: A Politico-Economic Analysis

Since the mid-2000s, the European Commission has employed a so-called ‘more economic approach’ to European state aid control. Under this modified regime, the Commission checks not only whether a state aid has competition-distorting effects, but in addition, whether it enhances social welfare. This reform implies an extension of the Commission’s competences vis-à-vis the Member States as the Commission gets the power to prohibit national state aid regarded as socially wasteful. The Commission explains its reform with the necessity of giving state aid control a sound economic basis. This article, however, demonstrates that the more economic approach – somewhat paradoxically – is not based on a consistent economic view of public policy that would justify the aforementioned shift of competences to the supranational EU level. The economic-theoretical inconsistencies identified in this article may be used by policymakers to rethink some elements of current EU state aid policy.     

The Dilemma of Enlargement for the European Union's Regional Policy

The integration of the former communist countries of central and eastern Europe into the European Union creates a dilemma for the EU's regional policy. The EU's expenditure on regional policy (its ‘active’ regional policy) has been guided by political reactions to deepening or enlarging the EU, not by a rational strategy for regional policy. In contrast, the strong EU instrument of state aid control, developed for competition policy (its ‘reactive’ regional policy) has been relatively successful in avoiding a national race of regional subsidies among the member states. We show that a shift from active regional policy to reactive, competition‐oriented, regional policies is the preferred way for the established member states to handle the challenge of enlargement. At the same time, however, this shift is politically difficult for the accession countries to accept, despite the fact that this shift might prove better for them economically. This regional policy dilemma is one of the major obstacles for the full integration of the accession countries into the EU.     

Economic Patriotism, the Clash of Capitalisms, and State Aid in the European Union

This article analyses the political economy of state aid in the European Union (EU) using the concepts of economic patriotism and models of capitalism. State aid is analysed as a form of economic patriotism, which is conceived here as economic interventions which seek, by a number of means, to advance the perceived economic self-interest of particular groups and actors (firms, workforces, or sectors) defined according to their territorial status. The article argues that the paradox of neo-liberal democracy generated by liberal international markets, overlapping economic governance regimes (such as the EU and the World Trade Organisation), and nationally delimited political mandates presents new problems for policy-makers attempting economic interventions like state aid. Forms of economic patriotism are partly shaped by national institutional and social configurations and state traditions. Within EU economic governance, this generates a ‘clash of capitalisms’ whereby liberal EU anti-trust and competition policy norms proscribe certain state aid and industrial policy measures favoured by some European states. As traditional industrial policy becomes decreasingly viable, new modes of economic patriotic interventionism are enacted within contemporary processes of market-making, and the re-regulatory activity framing European markets. The paper focuses on French state aid responses to the global economic crisis, noting how the retreat of neo-liberal ebullience within the EU provides a conducive environment for resurgent French dirigiste approaches to state aid, indicating that the politics of economic patriotism and state aid will continue to be important features of the European political economic landscape in the years ahead.     

Winners and Losers in EU State Aid Policy

Who gains and who loses from the European Union’s state aid policy? Using data published by the Competition Directorate from 1992 to 2007, I employ pooled time series analysis to understand the motives behind state aid allocations and then interpret the findings in light of the political relationship between Member States and the Commission. Demand for aid is shaped by national macroeconomic and institutional characteristics. Governments then bargain with the Commission to allocate aid. As a result, the Commission finds itself in a delicate balancing act as controller of state aids and as an institution subject to the political power of member government.     

State Aid and Export Competitiveness in the EU

Despite the proclaimed return of industrial policy state aid provided by EU Member States is at historically low levels. This fact is at least partly explained by the unique institutional arrangement in the EU which empowers the European Commission to monitor and restrict state aid activities of Member States. Making use of European state aid statistics over the period 1995–2011 we construct a measure for manufacturing state aid and estimate an expanded macro-economic export function to investigate the relationship between state aid for the manufacturing sector and Member States’ export performance. Since national governments can be expected to provide subsidies primarily to foster domestic value added we use value added exports as the export performance measure. Non-stationarity of the data confines us to investigating the short run relationships in which we only find limited evidence for a significant impact of state aid on manufacturing value added exports.     

Künftige Finanzplanung der EU — neue Prioritäten,höhere Effizienz?

On May 2, 2018, the European Commission proposed a limited and realistic increase for the EU’s next multi-annual financial framework 2021–2027. The draft implies a roughly constant common budget for the EU with a focus on European stabilisation policy and the provision of centralised public goods provision rather than agriculture and cohesion. This shift mirrors the priorities spelled out by Emanuel Macron. However, the Commission combined this pragmatism with its interest in improving budgetary flexibility and autonomy. There is no doubt that the EU27 faces difficult negotiations. EU Member States’ initial reactions to the European Commision’s recent proposals were dominated by juste retour considerations reminiscent of past negotiations. Strengthening EU expenditure through European added value and fundamentally reforming their own resource system, including the introduction of tax-based own resources, will end the deadlock surrounding net position thinking. A more fundamental view on the fiscal policy of the European Union is given in the last paper, which states that the EU requires a complete overhaul of the economic governance structure. It offers a tentative approach that avoids moral hazard problems as well as fallacies about conditional backstops during times of crisis.     

EU State Aid Policy and the Politics of External Trade Relations

European Union (EU) state aid policy has an oft-overlooked but politically-charged external dimension that is most clearly witnessed in the linkage with external trade relations. The article seeks to illuminate the issues and potential problems raised by this state aid-trade linkage. When this linkage is made, the EU engages in an array of complex international interactions through which it may pursue two politically-contentious procedures: countervailing duties or dispute settlement. The article argues that an understanding of the EU’s role in these complex interactions must take into account the Union’s institutional landscape and the competing preferences of different private interests. When deciding to impose countervailing duties against foreign state aids (subsidies), private interests play a significant role in initiating investigations and can use their access to EU institutions to encourage the imposition of such measures. While a variety of factors help to explain why the EU prefers pursuing countervailing duties, the Union also actively uses the World Trade Organization’s formal dispute settlement mechanism. Under this alternative, private interests again play an important role, pursuing varying strategies depending on their preferences. The most important determinant of a firm’s preference to pursue countervailing duties or the dispute settlement mechanism appears to be the extent to which the firm is concerned with restoring competition in their home market or with restoring competition in multiple/global markets.     

The New Generation of Structural and Investment Funds–More Than Financial Transfers?

The European Structural and Investment Funds make up more than 40% of the EU budget and are thereby the EU’s most important financial support to growth, employment, investment and structural change. The funds are programmed for (overlapping) seven-year periods, and all programmes for the new 2014-2020 period were adopted by the end of 2015. What can the EU and its taxpayers expect from this new generation of programmes? How do they fit into the EU’s efforts to strengthen its economic governance and performance, and what role do they play in the Juncker Commission’s “Investment Plan for Europe”?     

欧盟反倾销新方法及应对策略探析--以辽宁紫光成功应诉欧盟热轧钢板桩反倾销案为例

按照《中国入世议定书》的规定,中国加入WTO15年期满后,即自2016年12月11日起,在对华反倾销调查中,世贸组织所有成员国停止使用"替代国"的做法。欧盟为了履行WTO义务,在2016年11月9日提出了修改反倾销和反补贴规则提案,该提案提出了以"市场严重扭曲"概念替代原立法中的"非市场经济地位"的反倾销新方法。2017年12月19日,欧盟公布了《反倾销基础条例》的一个修正案(第2017/2321号条例),删除了有关"非市场经济"国家的规定,确定了市场扭曲的概念,规定了反倾销的特殊计算方法。在存在严重扭曲的情况下,反倾销新规中计算正常价值的新方法使用未被扭曲的价格和成本来构造正常价值,而不使用出口国国内价格和成本,本质上是一种变相的"替代国"方法。本文借助辽宁紫光成功应诉欧盟热轧钢板桩反倾销案,深入探讨欧盟反倾销新方法,并提出相应的对策以促进中欧间经贸关系持续、健康地发展。     

European Parliament elections in times of crisis

In May 2014, EU citizens will vote in the most important European Parliament elections to date. With the new powers allocated to it by the Lisbon Treaty, the new European Parliament will shape EU policies in many important areas and will elect the President of the Commission. However, public confi dence in the EU has fallen to historically low levels — to a great extent due to the fi nancial crisis and its aftermath — and the participation rate in European Parliament elections has dropped steadily since the fi rst call for a direct vote in 1979. This raises fundamental questions about its political and democratic legitimacy. This Forum examines the economic agendas of the main political parties vying for power and the potential outcome of the May elections, including the role that radical and anti-euro parties are likely to play in the campaign and in the next Parliament.     

Economic and political risks of European Monetary Union

As demonstrated by the last European Union summit meetings, the heads of government and of state of the EU's member states appear firmly intent on starting the planned monetary union on schedule on 1st January 1999. The statements they make, and also any pamphlets and advertisements published by their governments and the European Commission, tend to concentrate one-sidedly on the purported advantages of monetary union. Nevertheless, in most EU countries plans for monetary union are greeted with scepticism or disapproval by a large section of the general public. There are good reasons for this reaction because, as will be explained below, European Monetary Union is in fact associated with serious economic and political risks.     

Making the Market Work: Enhancing Consumer Sovereignty Through the Telemarketing Sales Rule and the Distance Selling Directive

This article analyzes the provisions of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, which the Federal Trade Commission promulgated in 1995 pursuant to the 1994 Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act. The author proposes a framework through which the Rule may be understood as embodying a regulatory strategy of controlling abusive telemarketing by enhancing the effectiveness of market forces. In particular, the Rule works by improving the quantity and quality of information flowing to consumers, preventing the occurrence of transactions that the consumer does not truly intend, preventing telemarketers from evading the effects of market forces governing availability of payment mechanisms, and enhancing the effectiveness of the contract regime.The article then applies the same framework to the 1997 Distance Selling Directive of the European Union, yielding several recommendations that EU member countries may find useful when transposing the Directive into national law. The author also discusses some of the special considerations that EU member countries should take account of when transposing the Directive's requirements in the context of electronic commerce.     

The Regulation of Retail Investment Services in the EU: Towards the Improvement of Investor Rights?

Despite the fact that a substantial body of European Community (EC) law already exists to protect retail investors, the markets in retail investment services and products in the EU remain fragmented. Moreover, the recent financial crisis has undermined investor confidence in financial markets more generally, and “packaged” retail investment products (PRIP), such as investment funds or life insurance policies, in particular. To rebuild retail investor confidence in PRIP by empowering retail investors to make active use of their rights, in 2009 the European Commission proposed to extend the provisions of the 2004 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) to PRIP. Is the MiFID, however, fit for the purpose which the Commission has in mind? This contribution explores to what extent the MiFID actually confers rights on retail investors and empowers them to make use of these rights. The author concludes that investor rights and remedies should be taken more seriously when making European financial services law. The current overhaul of the EC legal framework for the provision of investment services provides a good opportunity to do so.     

Designing a European restructuring mechanism without taxpayers’ money

The European Commission’s approach to the supervision and restructuring of the EU banking system has numerous shortcomings. As an alternative, this article proposes a European Resolution Authority and a European Restructuring Fund for systemically important banks and the implementation of a levy paid by banks in accordance with their systemic relevance. This levy should be designed to reduce the risk of future bailouts and the moral hazard inherent in implicit government guarantees.     

Vier Jahre Eurokrise: Wege zu neuem Systemvertrauen

Political gridlock, violations of European law and inconsistent political communication have turned the euro crisis into a crisis of confidence in public policy. To re-establish trust in the system, Europe needs a comprehensive approach consisting of three elements. First, rules can invigorate societies if they provide for cross-border competition in a revived single market and abstain from top-down provisions. Second, new growth perspectives — e.g. by reassigning major parts of the EU budget — can enhance the selfconfidence of societies. And finally, a pan-European debate on common goals and values can help answer the essential question of Europe’s sense and purpose. As the euro can only ever enjoy as much trust as the institutions governing the euro area, the solution of the European confidence crisis is crucial to the fate of the common currency.     

Policy implications

Abstract: In the European Union, the framework of financial services legislation at EU level has been aimed primarily at forming a single market for banks, insurers and other financial services firms. Substantial progress has been made towards this objective. Also, the EU initiatives have stimulated a reappraisal of national regulatory systems. Most of this EU legislation (with the exception of the consumer credit directives) has not had consumer protection as one of its main aims, although it has been assumed that consumers will eventually benefit from a wide choice of financial services providers and from price competition. However, partly in response to consumer pressure, the European Commission is developing a set of initiatives more closely geared to protecting consumers’ interests. Within the context of the EU’s approach, there remain considerable variations in the approach to protecting consumers’ interests in different member states as a result of legal and cultural differences.     

EU data protection reform: Opportunities and concerns

Last year, the European Commission proposed a comprehensive reform of the EU’s data protection rules. The proposed regulation has been surrounded by fi erce controversy and has been the subject of frenzied lobbying by global corporations, industry groups, research centres and privacy campaigners on both sides of the Atlantic. This Forum applies cool economic reasoning to this heated issue. What are the potential economic benefi ts of EU harmonisation? Will the proposed regulation negatively impact the competitiveness and innovation of European fi rms in the global marketplace? Or could it jeopardise attempts to protect privacy as a fundamental right in civil societies?     

Mehr Schutz vor ausländischen Direktinvestitionen?

Currently, there is no comprehensive legal framework at EU level to screen foreign direct investments (FDI) into the EU. In September 2017, the European Commission proposed a framework for screening foreign direct investments into the European Union. The reform will likely come into force at the end of 2018. This paper describes the political background and key concepts of the FDI screening framework and analyses potential economic effects of the new regulation.