董事会家族特征与公司绩效研究

本文以2004年度沪、深324家家族控股上市公司为研究样本,建立了董事会特征对公司绩效影响的模型。实证分析结果表明,家族成员担任董事长或总经理有利于提高公司绩效;董事会持股比例与公司绩效呈显著的二次曲线关系;董事会规模与公司绩效呈显著的三次曲线关系;家族董事、独立董事与公司绩效的相关性不显著。     

董事会规模与公司绩效实证研究——以中小板上市公司为例

本文以中小板上市公司为研究对象,研究上市公司董事会规模和企业绩效之间的相关性,通过董事会规模与净资产收益率的二元相关性研究,得出了中小板上市公司的净资产收益与董事会规模并不存在相关关系。     

董事会规模的治理效应研究——基于业绩波动的新解释

绩效高低是公司治理效应好坏的重要标准,同时绩效的波动性也是一个重要维度.本文突破仅从公司绩效水平角度考察董事会规模治理效应的局限,研究了董事会规模与绩效波动性之间的关系,及其影响机制和影响途径.通过对我国上市公司2000～2007年数据的分析发现,较大规模的董事会能够缩小公司绩效的波动程度;董事会规模对绩效波动性的影响机制主要是大型董事会成员间的沟通协调问题,而董事之间的搭便车问题难以对此做出解释;从影响途径而言,较大规模的董事会通过减少经营性应计、非经常性损益和经营性操控应计的波动而间接减少业绩的波动.     

董事会治理特征与公司绩效关系的实证研究——基于东北65家国有上市公司的数据分析

董事会治理是公司治理的核心,董事会的治理效率将直接关系到公司利益和股东利益。文章以东北65家国有上市公司为样本,研究了董事会治理特征与公司绩效的关系。研究表明:东北国有上市公司董事会规模对公司绩效并无太大影响,制度设计中的独立董事并未发挥正向作用,董事的股权激励作用也并未显现,而董事的年薪激励方式则效果显著。需加强独立董事制度建设,完善董事薪酬激励制度。     

我国高科技上市公司董事会特征与绩效关系的实证研究

董事会特征可以概括为董事会规模、内部董事和外部董事关系、董事会的领导结构以及董事的薪酬制度.本文以我国高科技上市公司为样本,把董事会的特征作为自变量,公司绩效的三个指标作为因变量,对董事会特征与公司绩效的关系进行多元线性回归分析.研究结果表明:董事会的规模与公司绩效负相关,但相关性不显著;绩效高的公司倾向于两职分离,独立董事所占比例以及董事的薪酬与公司绩效正相关,存在显著的相关性.     

我国商业连锁企业上市公司董事会治理与公司绩效的实证研究

董事会治理是公司治理的核心,董事会的治理运作直接关系到公司利益和股东利益.本文以我国商业连锁企业上市公司为研究样本,对董事会治理结构和治理机制与公习绩效进行实证分析.研究结论表明:董事会的规模、年度会议次数和成员变更与公司绩效具有负相关关系;独立董事的比例与公司绩效成正比,但效果不显著;两职分离有利于提高公司绩效,董事的学历与公司绩效的正相关关系微弱;董事的薪酬、持股与公司绩效显著正相关.     

董事会特征对公司绩效的影响研究——基于纸业上市公司的实证分析

本文以董事会特征对公司绩效的影响为研究目的,从实证的角度研究了中国纸业上市公司中两者之间的影响程度。以2007-2010年期间的上市公司为研究对象,从董事会的规模、独立性、领导结构以及会议频率等方面系统分析了董事会特征对公司绩效的影响。研究结果表明,董事会独立性、董事会领导结构对公司绩效有显著的正向影响,而董事会规模、董事会会议频率对公司绩效有不显著的负向影响。     

公司高管人员薪酬与绩效的相关性研究——基于家族企业与非家族企业的比较分析

家族企业与非家族企业的差异一直是家族企业学研究领域的一个热点问题。现有的研究多是基于资源基础观理论,从家族性角度进行分析。本文则基于委托代理理论和管家理论,从高管薪酬与企业绩效关系的视角对家族企业与非家族企业之间的差异进行深入的研究。论文以2008年年报中的100家家族上市公司与100家非家族上市公司为样本,从高管年薪和高管持股比例这两个方面探讨高管薪酬与企业绩效的相关性。实证研究表明：非家族上市公司与家族上市公司除了在高管年薪上差异不是很大,其余变量皆有显著的差异,其中家族上市公司的高管持股、企业绩效皆高于非家族上市公司。家族上市公司与非家族上市公司高管年薪对公司绩效影响都显著,且都呈正相关,但家族上市公司高管年薪对公司绩效的影响比非家族上市公司大。高管持股比例对公司绩效影响则都不显著。     

董事会结构与公司绩效关系

对于董事会在公司治理结构中所处的中心地位,提高董事会的质量是建立有效公司治理结构的核心任务,也是影响公司绩效的重要因素之一。本文在借鉴已有的董事会结构与公司绩效关系研究的基础上,选取我国创业板上市的153家公司的2010年数据进行了实证研究,得出董事会规模对公司绩效有显著的正向影响、外部董事与公司绩效有显著的倒U型关系的研究结论。     

董事会治理、反倾销与出口企业财务绩效

财务绩效是支持企业成长的源动力.出口企业能否不断提高财务绩效,是关系到中国对外贸易乃至经济是否可持续发展的大问题.本文以2010—2016年沪深A股600家出口企业上市公司为研究样本,利用线性回归模型实证检验了董事会治理和反倾销对中国出口企业财务绩效的影响.研究结果显示:出口企业董事长与总经理两职合一有利于提高企业财务绩效;董事会会议次数越多以及遭遇反倾销的出口企业,其财务绩效往往较差;而出口企业董事会规模、独立董事比例和董事受教育程度对财务绩效的影响则并不显著.本文的研究结论为中国出口企业建立并完善董事会治理结构、反倾销危机管理机制以及提高企业财务绩效提供了实证依据.     

Using demographic identification to estimate the effects of board size on corporate performance

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate the effect of board size on corporate outcomes. To address endogeneity, we exploit the variations in the director-age populations across the states in the US. We argue that firms with access to a larger pool of potential directors tend to have larger boards. Consistent with this notion, our empirical results show that firms located where the size of the director-age population is larger have significantly larger board size. Because the director-age population represents broad demographic trends outside of any firm’s control, it is unlikely related to firm outcomes or policies and should be exogenous. Using the director-age population as our instrument, we estimate the effects of board size on firm value and profitability. Our approach is less vulnerable to endogeneity and is more likely to show a causal effect.     

BOARD GOVERNANCE: DOES OWNERSHIP MATTER?

Good governance is crucial to achieving an organization's mission. Nevertheless, little is known about how the structure of governance is influenced by the nonprofit (NPO) or for‐profit ownership (FPO) structure of an organization, partly because they tend to be active in different sectors. In this paper we overcome this challenge by using data from a global sample of 392 microfinance institutions. The results show that the average NPO has a larger board, more female directors, and a higher number of board meetings than the average FPO. Moreover, where there are larger boards and more frequent board meetings, this has a positive effect on the financial performance of NPOs. It is thus confirmed that ownership structures influence boards’ characteristics and that some board mechanisms are more efficient in some ownership structures than in others. An effective board design should thus be based on a firm's ownership structure.     

Firm Performance and Women on the Board: Evidence from Spanish Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

ABSTRACT

This study examines gender diversity on boards of directors in a sample of nonfinancial Spanish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) for 2003–8, finding that the probability of women on the board increases with firm performance, defined as return on assets, and family ownership, but diminishes with corporate ownership and firm risk. It also finds, when examining the full sample, a positive effect of the presence of women board members on firm performance. The study also obtains a similar positive effect in most subsamples, including in firms with corporate ownership, where family connections play less role in the election of board members, and in firms in the secondary and tertiary sectors, which are characterized by having greater proximity to final consumers than those in the primary sector.     

Does corporate board downsizing increase shareholder value? Evidence from Japan

Japanese firms that have traditionally had large boards have recently become subject to pressures for small boards. This study shows that Japanese firms that substantially decreased board size tended to adopt an officer system and so did not substantially decrease the size of the management team (executive officers and directors). This tendency is especially evident for high-performing firms that face less information asymmetry. Japanese firms endogenously choose the change in the management team size when downsizing their boards. Firms that downsize boards do not show performance improvements, suggesting that board downsizing does not necessarily raise shareholder value.     

Board size,corporate regulations and firm valuation in an emerging market: a simultaneous equation approach

We investigate the association between board size and firm valuation for a sample of 169 firms from 2002 to 2011 in South Africa (SA). The SA corporate context is interestingly and uniquely characterised by an urgency to meet affirmative action regulations, such as black empowerment in board appointments, limited qualified and experienced directors, especially black directors, concentrated ownership, weak enforcement of corporate regulations and greater government ownership. These features make SA corporate boards perform a weaker agency (advisory, monitoring and disciplining) role than Western European and US boards, but a stronger resource dependence role, by providing access to resources, such as business contacts and contracts. This suggests that any positive impact of board size on firm valuation is likely to depend on the effective execution of the resource dependence role more than the agency role. Our results suggest that board size has a positive association with firm valuation, consistent with larger boards providing better access to resources. Overall, our results support the resource dependence role of boards more than their agency role. The results are robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneity, as well as different types of accounting and market-based firm valuation measures.     

上市公司审计委员会的履职活动与潜在绩效

董事会的履职活动是联通治理结构与治理成效的枢纽，对于公司的有效治理有着重要意义。文章就此问题，在审计委员会的履职活动层面探索性地解释了审慎治理与风险管理绩效的关系，并基于2009－2011年国内 A 股市场的主板上市公司，实证检验了审计委员会的实际履职活动及其影响因素与潜在绩效。研究发现：（1）我国上市公司审计委员会的履职质量堪忧，仅有不到40％的履职活动既可信又活跃，大多数公司的履职现状亟待改善。（2）股权集中度高的公司履职质量较差，大公司、成长性低和债务风险高的公司审计委员会表现较为活跃。（3）当审计委员会的履职活动既可信又活跃时，所在公司有较低的业绩波动；当可信度较低时，看似勤勉的公司反而有更大的业绩波动；当履职可信而活跃度较低时，与业绩波动的相关性不稳健。文章说明审慎治理有助于降低公司风险，督促审慎履职、做到真实勤勉而非表象勤勉是治理有效的基础。未来研究可以在董事会层面就审慎治理机制等方面做进一步深化。     

Control–ownership wedge,board of directors,and the value of excess cash

This study investigates the effects of the separation of control and ownership on the value of cash holdings in publicly listed French firms. It also sheds light on the role of board independence in such a relation. Theory suggests that investors are more likely to discount the value of excess cash held by firms with low corporate governance. Using the valuation regression of Fama and French (1998), empirical results show that the value of excess cash holdings decreases dramatically with the separation of control and cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder. This value discount is, however, less pronounced in firms with more independent boards (i.e., boards with more independent directors and separate chief executive officer and chair positions). Our empirical findings support the argument that excess cash contributes less to firm value when minority shareholders are more likely to be expropriated by controlling shareholders. Independent boards seem to be effective in mitigating investors' concerns about the use of excess cash. Overall, the results provide compelling evidence that cash valuation is largely influenced by corporate governance quality in a concentrated ownership setting.     

The value of financial outside directors on corporate boards

The appointment of a financial outside director to the board of a public corporation is associated with positive abnormal returns, attributable entirely to the smaller than median-size firms in our sample. In addition, investment bankers are appointed to the boards of much smaller companies, on average, than commercial bankers or insurance executives. These results suggest that smaller firms, which may have limited access to financial markets and less financial expertise, benefit substantially from these appointments.     

The impact of provincial marketing boards on price relations and pricing dynamics in the North American slaughter hog market

Canadian Provincial hog marketing boards act as sales agents for hog producers. The hypothesis that the introduction of marketing boards in Alberta. Manitoba and Saskatchewan between 1969 and 1972 created seller side market power is tested and supported:their hog prices rose to levels comparable to Ontario where a marketing board had been in place. Organized sellers can also influence pricing dynamics because of the linked spatial oligopsonistic nature of the hog packing industry. Cointegration tests and variance decompositions indicate that establishing boards in the surplus producing western provinces made them relatively less isolated from pricing innovations in deficit producing eastern Canada.     

On the Credibility of Currency Boards*

The paper compares the credibility of currency boards and (standard) pegs. Abandoning a currency board requires a time‐consuming legislative process and an abolition will thus be well‐anticipated. Therefore, a currency board solves the time‐inconsistency problem of monetary policy. However, policy can react to unexpected shocks only with a time lag, thus the threat of large shocks makes the abolition more likely. Currency boards are more credible than standard pegs if the time‐inconsistency problem dominates. In contrast, standard pegs, that can be left at short notice, are more credible if exogenous shocks are highly volatile and constitute the dominant problem.