商界风云——本期推荐名家：国美集团董事长黄光裕

推荐理由：国美并购永乐案尘埃落定，此举意味着国美不仅收购了中国第三大家电零售商，而且间接控制了另外一家家零售巨头——大中电。     

零售商竞争环境下二级供应链协调机制探讨

本文研究由一个制造商和两个零售商组成的二级供应链,并且制造商占主导地位,分别研究了集中式供应链时零售商的最优定价和分散式供应链时零售商的最优零售价格、制造商的最优批发价格.最后得出集中式决策时的最优零售价格比分散式决策时的最优零售价格低;集中式决策时的供应链系统总利润比分散式决策时的供应链系统总利润要大,并且最优零售价格随着零售商之间的敏感系数的增大而增大,供应链系统总利润随着零售商之间的敏感系数的增大而增大.     

未来家电网上零售市场分析与前景预测

2010年,家电网上零售市场得到快速发展.针对家电网上零售市场的发展,本文分析了其迅猛发展的原因,指出了未来网上零售商决胜的关键所在,并对未来的家电网上零售市场前景进行了预测.     

家电连锁零售商的制衡能力分析

目前家电连锁零售商对制造商有很强的制衡能力,这种力量源于对消费者购买行为的影响力和控制力,它由质量、价格、规模和服务四个相互促进又缺一不可的因素凝聚而成。现阶段"吃供应商"的盈利模式继续发展可能会走向反面。专业连锁零售商要长久保持核心竞争力,就必须维护良好的厂商关系,在创造价值中与制造商各尽其能,在利益分割中各得其所,通过与制造商们合作实现共赢。     

国际大鳄的"战略调整"

有关国际连锁业巨头兵败中国市场的商业新闻,近来频频见诸报端。前些时,或说北美最大的家电零售巨头"百思买"经营困难,黯然退出中国市场,或说欧洲最大电子产品零售商万得城在上海寻找合适物业,困难重重,却不料,"百思买""休市"引起的     

我国家电零售业发展特点及问题探析

中国作为世界最大的家电生产基地,家电零售业近年来有了迅猛发展。从上世纪90年代后期以来,家电零售渠道由传统百货商场向大型专业连锁店为主的新业态转变,催生了以国美、苏宁等为代表的家电连锁经营巨头,并取得了令人嘱目的成果。而近几年来,家电零售连锁行业在面对诸多挑战的情况下,呈现出新的特点,出现了新的问题,本文将对近年来该行业的这些特点和问题进行深入的探讨。     

特许速览

家电销售连锁企业的地位越来越突出最近,国内老牌白色家电制造商华凌集团在北京与家电零售业巨头国美签署10万台空调的战略合作协议,涉及金额2.2亿元,借助渠道攻势打响了2004年空调业的开山之战。 越来越多的制造商与国美、苏宁、中永通泰等家电连锁巨头结成利益共同体,以协作、双赢、沟通为基点,共同致力于市场营销网络的运行效率,优势互补。而在这个“渠道为王”的时代,大型家电销售连锁企业的地位越来越突出。上海“易购365”步入盘整今年不主动发展新门店一度在上海零售业界引起轰动的“易购365”超便利店如今已经回归冷静:原定到2004年…     

零售情景下营销组合的基础与框架探索

在零售情景下,传统营销组合范式具有一定的局限性。这是因为传统营销组合框架是以制造商为视角构建起来的,而制造商与消费者交换的内容同零售商与消费者交换的内容是不同的。制造商向消费者提供的是价值方案,零售商向消费者提供的是合格价值方案的获取过程。因此,获取过程是零售商与消费者交换的基本内容。效率、乐趣、费用、沟通是消费者与零售商发生交换的四个必要条件,即零售营销的四项基本功能。零售营销活动的功能性归属分别是:定价属于费用类别,广告属于沟通类别,物理环境的设计与管理属于乐趣类别,商品组合、选址、商店布局、物流与结算属于效率类别。     

解读"便宜"密码

2002年,家电企业似乎愁云密布,日本7大家电巨头,除了索尼一家稍微赢利之外,松下、日立等六大著名品牌皆宣告亏损。中国也不例外,不少家电企业在价格战中伤痕累累。而华南最大的家电零售商东泽电器在理直气壮地喊出"便宜才是硬道理"口号后,前不久又在广州推出"差价补偿"活动:东泽电器店内销售的空调、冰箱,洗衣机、彩电等四种家电将全面降价至广州最低,如果发现同品牌、同型号的相同产品在其他电器店的价格低于东泽时,东泽愿意把差价那部分返还消费者。这大有将价格战进行到底之势。     

基于5W2H分析法的家电零售商品牌主推营销

当前,我国家电制造业和零售连锁业双双步入微利时代,家电企业与渠道企业同时将它们的利润增长都寄希望在渠道环节上,势必会带来激烈的利益冲突。品牌建设是解决中国家电业营销渠道冲突的有效之道,从战术层面来说,家电零售商利用连锁商业的品牌声誉进行制造商品牌主推营销作为一种新型的营销手段,值得研究与推广。本文从家电零售商的角度拟通过5W2H分析法,探索家电零售商如何有效进行品牌主推营销以达到更优质的营销效果。     

Price-matching guarantees in dual channels

Many retailers offer price-matching guarantees (PMGs) whereby they promise their customers that any lower price offered by competition for an identical product will be matched. Suppliers sometimes also offer PMGs to consumers in their direct channels. However, the extant literature on PMGs focuses on retailers and is silent on the role of upper stream chain members. We contribute to the literature by identifying the implications of PMGs in a dual distribution channel in which a supplier reaches consumers via a direct channel in addition to the retail channel. We show that the presence of PMGs in a dual channel hinges on supplier’s strategic ability, or lack thereof, to adjust its wholesale price in relation to the guarantee. Specifically, a PMG fails to prevail at equilibrium when the supplier is capable of strategically adjusting its wholesale price - but may prevail at equilibrium otherwise. The main reason is that the supplier can manage the competition between the retail channel and the direct channel through its wholesale price decision, and offering a PMG limits this ability. On the other hand, offering a PMG can be a beneficial strategy for the supplier when the supplier cannot adjust its wholesale price; for instance in a retail dominant chain where the retailer dictates the transfer price. In a retail dominant chain, if the direct and retail channels are perceived to be similar in quality and service offerings, then both channel members benefit from offering a PMG because it softens the intensity of price competition. On the other hand, when the two channels are sufficiently differentiated in quality and service offerings, then retail managers should be cautious and avoid offering the guarantee if their channel is in a superior position in terms of perceived quality.     

Manufacturer and retailer perceptions of in‐store promotions in South Africa

The objective of this article was to investigate the perceptions of retailers and manufacturers with regard to in‐store promotions A literature review of in‐store promotions was undertaken in the context of channel conflict between manufacturers and retailers In this study, the perceptions of a sample of 133 manufacturers and 144 retailers in South Africa were measured Perceptions of these two groups were obtained about the promotional activities conducted, promotion objectives, price and non‐price promotions and the effectiveness and evaluation methods for promotions The results indicate that there are differences between the two groups, with the retailers being the dominant group Also there is a lack of sound measurement of in‐store promotion Implications for manufacturers are discussed     

The Effect of Product Innovation,Promotion, and Price on Consumer Switching to Private Labels

The channel conflict that exists between retailers and manufacturers of branded products has dynamically shifted as large retailers have expanded their offerings of private label products. This study investigates the ability of consumer packaged goods companies to exert influence in the channel by testing which marketing initiatives implemented by manufacturer brands are more efficient in preventing consumer switching to private labels. We use a hazard model to simultaneously measure the effects due to product innovation, promotion, and price on consumer switching and how strong those effects are. We find that as expected product innovation, promotion, and price exert a negative effect on the consumer likelihood of switching to private labels. However, we find the strongest effect on promotion suggesting the importance of understanding how consumers perceive value in the national brands offer.     

家电零售连锁业物流配送现状及优化研究

作为流通型企业的一员,近年来家电零售连锁业取得了前所未有的发展,本文在调查研究了国美、苏宁等数十家家电零售连锁企业门店的基础上,介绍了家电零售连锁业物流配送的现状,剖析了现状所反映的问题,最后针对家电产品配送的特点提出了优化家电零售连锁企业物流配送体系的思路。     

Equilibrium in supply chain network with competition and service level between channels considering consumers' channel preferences

This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain network consisting of multiple competing manufacturers, multiple competing retailers and multiple demand markets. Each manufacturer produces and distributes his products via direct e-commerce channel along with traditional physical channel. The manufacturers also provide services for the consumers in both channels, while the retailers only offer offline services to the consumers. On this basis, a dual-channel supply chain network equilibrium model with pricing and service decisions are established based on variational inequality theory. Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained by modified projection and contraction method. Combined with numerical examples, we analyze the impact of three critical factors on the equilibrium states and profits. Some interesting managerial insights are derived. We find that the profits of the manufacturers decrease (increase) in the raw material conversion ratio under single channel case (dual-channel case), while the increase of the raw material conversion ratio always benefits the retailers and the whole dual-channel supply chain network; the service level in each channel is positively correlated with its transaction volume. There are significant inconsistencies among the best combinations of cross-channel price coefficients between two channels for the manufacturers, the retailers and the whole dual-channel supply chain network. The same equilibrium decision (service level, price) or profit may exhibit the opposite changing trend with respect to cross-channel price coefficients under two cases of active e-commerce transaction and inactive e-commerce transaction. When the introduction of e-commerce channel can bring more profits for the whole dual-channel supply chain network, the manufacturers should provide reasonable allocation schemes of profit increment for the retailers to satisfy their participation constraints.     

Why is Price Dispersion Higher Online than Offline? The Impact of Retailer Type and Shopping Risk on Price Dispersion

When physically similar products, of similar quality, are offered by retailers both online and offline, we often observe that the dispersion in prices of these products online is greater than the price dispersion offline. This observation runs counter to early theories that suggested price dispersion online would be smaller than that offline due to the ease of search and information availability online. This paper investigates and provides an explanation for this puzzling phenomenon by examining the impact of two important drivers of price dispersion: retailer type and consumers’ shopping risk. Retailer type refers to whether a retailer is a pure offline, pure online, or dual channel retailer. Shopping risk is defined as the product of consumers’ perceived risk of shopping and the transaction uncertainty related to shopping at different types of retailers.A game-theoretic approach is adopted to model consumers’ price search and product purchase, as well as price competition within and across retailer types in online and offline markets. Equilibrium pricing strategies are derived for different retailer types competing for different consumer segments with different levels of perceived shopping risk. The impact of retailer type and shopping risk on online versus offline price dispersion are quantified, and conditions when price dispersion is greater online than offline are identified.Results indicate that price dispersion is greater online when the number of pure online retailers is sufficiently large and is increasing in the number of pure online retailers. In addition, a reduction in online shopping risk may actually increase online price dispersion. Results further suggest that even without any online sales, dual channel retailers should maintain their online presence for the purpose of information dissemination, which justifies the importance for pure offline retailer to incorporate webrooming strategies, where consumers can search for prices online but purchase offline.     

通道费:大零售商挖掘市场效率的一种机制设计

本文运用数值例子和一般化博弈模型对1个生产商、1个大零售商和n个小零售商的市场进行了考察,给出了大零售商对生产商拥有讨价还价力量、生产商对小零售商拥有讨价还价力量时的市场均衡。结论为:(1)在大零售商使用包含通道费在内的"三部费"合约的市场均衡中,上下游可以实现纵向一体化利润。与生产商对下游完全拥有市场力量的情形相比,消费者剩余不会降低,市场价格不会上升,生产商获得的利润也不会减少。(2)大零售商的利润来自于消除上下游市场外部性,以及对市场效率改进的边际贡献。通道费可以视作是大零售商通过挖掘市场效率而获利的一种机制设计。(3)从政策角度看,用单一禁止通道费来提高市场效率和社会福利的目标往往难以实现。与其简单地取消进场费,还不如把政策的着力点放在支持小零售商、改善零售市场结构效率上。     

Perceptions of price (un)fairness in a channel context

This article extends prior research on perceptions of price (un)fairness by attempting to disentangle where in the marketing channel (un)fairness inferences lie. Extant research in this area overwhelmingly considers (un)fairness perceptions with respect to the pricing action only, ignoring attributions aimed at specific channel actors. This article illustrates differences in (un)fairness inferences with respect to retailers and manufacturers given price increases accompanied by decreased product supply, increased demand, or increased variable costs. We show that a retailer is considered relatively more unfair than a manufacturer given a price increase accompanied by a demand increase, as well as when no explicit reason is given for the price increase. Conversely, a manufacturer is considered relatively more unfair given a price increase accompanied by a supply decrease. Both channel entities are considered equally fair given a price increase accompanied by a channel (both retailer and manufacturer) or manufacturer cost increase, while a retailer is deemed relatively more unfair given a price increase accompanied by a retailer cost increase. This research generally suggests that inferences of causality for specific pricing actions may differentially skew toward upstream or downstream channel entities depending on the particular economic circumstances of the price change.     

Digital coupon promotion and platform selection in the presence of delivery effort

In recent years, physical retailers have started selling products to consumers through either third-party or self-operated online platforms. Doing so, they face demand which depends on digital coupon promotions, delivery effort by the platform (i.e., deliver products from retailers to consumers), and channel preference. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to examine the interactions between the physical retailer's distribution channel choices and coupon promotions. In normal operation, retailers prefer to pay lower fees to the third-party platform, but we find, counterintuitively, that when carrying on a digital coupon promotion, the retailer can be better off paying a higher participation fee to the third-party platform. We also identify the conditions under which the retailer prefers the third-party platform over the self-operated platform with and without coupon promotions. Furthermore, we show that digital coupon promotions and delivery effort boost the retailer's profits by price discriminating among consumers with differing purchase utilities.     

Strategic Assortment Decisions in Information-Intensive and Turbulent Environments

Recent trends in the environment have caused changes in consumers’ store patronage, price sensitivity, and need for variety. These changes have led retailers to reconsider some of their assortment options. Specifically, we discuss how they may have led some retailers to move from a single-format to a multiple-format channel portfolio, how they may have contributed to the growth of the discount format, and how they tend to influence the private-label portfolio of many retailers. We end by showing how these assortment changes may, in turn, have various welfare, logistical, and tactical implications.