AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PAYMENT CARD USAGE*

I exploit a unique data set on the payment card industry to study issues associated with network effects and two‐sided markets. I show that consumers concentrate their spending on a single payment network (single‐homing), although many maintain unused cards that allow the ability to use multiple networks (multi‐homing). Further, I establish a regional correlation between consumer usage and merchant acceptance within the four major networks (Visa, Mastercard, American Express and Discover). This correlation is suggestive of the existence of a positive feedback loop between consumer usage and merchant acceptance.     

THE PRICE EFFECT OF ELIMINATING POTENTIAL COMPETITION: EVIDENCE FROM AN AIRLINE MERGER*

This paper analyzes the gain in pricing power that a firm achieves by merging with a potential competitor in its market. Using pricing data for the merger of USAir and Piedmont, empirical analysis finds that prices rose by 5.0 to 6.0 per cent on routes that one carrier served and the other was a potential entrant. This was more than half the increase on routes where the two carriers had been direct competitors. Other important factors included carrier size, market concentration, incumbent's identity and the potential entrant's presence at one or both endpoints.     

TIME CONSISTENCY AND SELLER COMMITMENT IN INTERTEMPORAL MOVIE DISTRIBUTION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE VIDEO WINDOW*

We study the determinants of the ‘video window’ (the interval between a movie's theatrical and video releases), based on a sample of 1,157 films released on video between 1988 and 1997. For subsets of films having shorter theater run lengths (1 to 17 weeks), windows were generally longer than, and largely invariant to, measures of the time required to exhaust the theater market. One interpretation of our results is that U.S. movie distributors resolved a time consistency problem by coordinating their behavior to maintain longer windows than would have otherwise resulted, but different explanations are also plausible.     

PRICES,SPATIAL COMPETITION AND HETEROGENEOUS PRODUCERS: AN EMPIRICAL TEST*

Homogeneous‐producer models attribute lower prices in denser markets solely to lower optimal markups. I argue here that when producers have different production costs, competition‐driven selection on costs also reduces prices. This selection mechanism can be distinguished from the homogenous‐producer case because it implies that higher density leads not only to lower average prices, but to declines in upper‐bound prices and price dispersion as well. I find empirical support for this mechanism in the prices of ready‐mixed concrete plants. I also show these findings do not simply reflect lower factor prices in dense markets, but result instead because dense‐market producers are more efficient.     

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF RETAILER STORE BRAND PRESENCE ON MANUFACTURER BRANDS IN AN EQUILIBRIUM FRAMEWORK*

This article assesses the impact of retailer store brand products on manufacturer brand prices, profitability and consumer welfare in Boston's white fluid milk market. Estimates from a random coefficients logit demand model are used to specify and test a set of pricing games. Under the selected model, milk manufacturers are Stackelberg leaders to retailers, and store brand milks are procured by retailers at cost. The model is used to investigate counterfactual markets without retailer store brand milks. Counterfactual Simulation results indicate that store brands increase channel profits, retailer profits and consumer welfare, while having mixed effects on equilibrium retail prices.     

ASYMMETRIC MARKET SHARES,ADVERTISING AND PRICING: EQUILIBRIUM WITH AN INFORMATION GATEKEEPER*

We analyze how asymmetric market shares impact advertising and pricing decisions by firms that have loyal, non‐shopping customers and can advertise to shoppers through a ‘gatekeeper.’ In equilibrium, the firm with the smaller loyal market advertises more aggressively but prices less competitively than the firm with the larger loyal market. Our results differ significantly from earlier literature which assumes that shoppers observe all prices and finds that the firm with the smaller loyal market adopts a more competitive pricing strategy. The predictions of the model are consistent with advertising and pricing behavior observed on price comparison websites such as http://Shopper.com .     

INNOVATION AND MARKET STRUCTURE: AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE ‘BOUNDS APPROACH’ IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY*

This paper applies Sutton's [1998] ‘bounds approach’ to the chemical industry. The approach predicts that (i) the lower bound of the ratio of the 1‐firm concentration index to product concentration is bounded away from zero at high levels of product concentration only in high R&D markets and (ii) the lower bound on market concentration is higher and increasing in product concentration in markets with higher R&D intensities. We test these two hypotheses and find that the data strongly support them. A novel feature of our analysis is the use of plant level data in defining products and the classification of products into markets based on end‐use.     

EQUIVOCAL INFORMATION AND ATTRIBUTION: AN INVESTIGATION OF PATTERNS OF MANAGERIAL SENSEMAKING

Organizational research has revealed ample evidence of self-serving attributional patterns in managerial sensemaking, but has not yet resolved whether actor–observer attributional effects also influence managers’ sensemaking tendencies. The primary purpose of this study was to investigate whether such actor–observer effects can be detected in managers’ interpretation of equivocal information. Results indicate that managers receiving equivocal information about the performance of an organization described as their own credited positive outcomes to organizational strengths and blamed negative outcomes on environmental threats. In contrast, managers receiving equivocal information about an organization described as managed by others associated positive outcomes with environmental opportunities and linked negative outcomes to organizational weaknesses. Both self-serving and actor–observer attributional patterns were thus detected. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd