Market structure and the effects of trade restrictions with endogenous import quality

This article examines the role of market structure in analyzing the effects of various trade restrictions in an industry supplied only by imports. It is shown that the effects of an ad valorem or a specific tariff and a minimum important quality requirement are dependent on market structure, but the effects of a quota are not.     

Ranking optimal tariffs and quotas for a large country under uncertainty

Optimal tariffs and quotas are compared for a large country under uncertainty. If the import supply schedule has constant elasticity and is subject to multiplicative uncertainty and domestic demand is random then the optimal policy is a fixed ad valorem tariff. If the supply schedule has constant elasticity but this elasticity is random then the optimal tariff is superior to the optimal quota. If the demand and supply schedules are linear then the optimal quota is superior to the optimal tariff if and only if the supply schedule is inelastic and the degree of uncertainty in the demand and supply schedules is small.     

Price equivalent tariffs and quotas under a domestic monopoly

Price-equivalent import tariffs and quotas are compared when domestic production is controlled by a monopolist, say an agricultural marketing board with the power to restrict domestic supply, under endogenous terms of trade. Welfare comparisons boil down to sourcing costs comparisons. Quotas tend to dominate at high domestic prices, ad valorem tariffs at intermediate prices and specific tariffs at low domestic prices. Welfare maxima are achieved with more restrictive policies than under perfect competition. These results rationalize separate negotiations for sensitive products in the Doha Round and the setting of tariff-rate quotas that mimic import quotas for these products. Finally, in ascertaining the robustness of our policy ranking to the choice of variable anchoring the comparisons, we found that specific tariffs unambiguously dominate ad valorem tariffs and quotas when government revenue or imports anchor the comparisons. However, some quota revenues and import levels cannot be achieved with tariffs.     

Do safeguard tariffs and antidumping duties open or close technology gaps?

This paper examines how the country-breadth of tariff protection can affect the technology adoption decisions of both domestic import-competing and foreign exporting firms. The contribution of the analysis is to show how firm-level technology adoption changes under tariffs of different country-breadth. I show that a country-specific tariff like an antidumping duty induces both domestic import-competing firms and foreign exporting firms to adopt a new technology earlier than they would under free trade. In contrast, a broadly-applied tariff like a safeguard can accelerate technology adoption by a domestic import-competing firm, but will slow-down technology adoption by foreign exporting firms. Because safeguard tariffs can delay the foreign firm's adoption of new technology, the worldwide welfare costs associated with using them may be larger than is generally believed.     

Optimal revenue-raising trade restrictions under uncertainty

A country seeks to achieve a fixed expected revenue by restricting trade when it faces uncertainty about domestic demand for a good and about foreign supply. If the uncertainty in the demand and supply functions is multiplicative then the policy which maximises domestic expected surplus is a fixed schedule of tariffs depending only on world price. Under additive uncertainty the ranking of ad valorem tariffs and quotas depends systematically on the targeted expected revenue and the degree of uncertainty in demand and in world price but a specific tariff is superior to both these policies.     

Export dynamics and sales at home

How do firms' sales interact across markets? Are foreign and domestic sales complements or substitutes? Using a French firm-level database combining balance-sheet and product-destination-specific export information over the period 1995–2001, we study how demand conditions in foreign markets affect domestic sales through variations in exports. We identify a number of exogenous shocks affecting the firms' demand on foreign markets, including product-destination specific imports or tariff changes, and large foreign shocks such as financial crises or civil wars. Our results show that exogenous variations in firm-level exports positively impact domestic sales, even after controlling for domestic demand conditions. A 10% exogenous increase in foreign sales generates a 1 to 3% increase in domestic sales in the short-run. This result is robust to various estimation techniques, instruments, controls, and sub-samples. It is also supported by the natural experiment of the Asian crisis in the late 1990's.     

Trade Intermediaries and the Tariff Pass-through

This paper aims at improving our understanding of the price effects of trade policies following two perspectives. First, we wish to study how the role of intermediaries in international trade affects the transmission of tariff changes to domestic prices. Second, we explore how our results are influenced by the degree of competition in the distribution-service market. In a Cournot oligopoly-oligopsony model, we show how the pass-through of tariff cuts to domestic prices is limited by the market power of intermediaries producing distribution services. Our long-run equilibrium is characterized by a larger number of firms selling at a higher mark-up. Market access barriers in distribution services determine to what extent tariff cuts are transferred to domestic consumers and foreign producers, affecting the size of their welfare effects. The benefits of trade liberalization policies can be better achieved if they are complemented by competition enhancing measures in the intermediation sector.     

Indirect Taxes in Oligopoly in Presence of Licensing Opportunities

This paper considers the relative efficiency of unit tax and ad valorem tax in a Cournot duopoly market in the presence of licensing opportunities after the announcement of the tax rates by the government. In case of fixed-fee licensing, if the unit cost difference of the firms is low and tax revenue of the government is high, then unit tax is more efficient than the ad valorem tax. If tax revenue of the government is low, then ad valorem tax is more efficient than unit tax. Ad valorem tax is more efficient than unit tax in the case of royalty licensing.     

Are bilateral and multilateral aid‐for‐trade complementary?

Using the first comprehensive estimates of ad valorem tariff equivalent bilateral trade costs spanning the time period 2002–10, we examine whether the aid‐for‐trade (AFT) inflows reduce bilateral trade costs facing aid recipients. If so, we ask whether the trade costs reduction effects of AFT from bilateral and multilateral sources are complementary. By showing the extent to which the observed trade cost reduction effects of AFT from bilateral (multilateral) sources correlate with the magnitudes of AFT disbursements from multilateral (bilateral) sources, we present plausible explanation for the cross‐country variations in the extent to which AFT promotes trade flows. Our findings have, thus, important policy implications for shaping future discourses on the coordination of disbursements for enhancing the effectiveness of AFT.     

Tariffs, quality reversals and exit in vertically differentiated industries

In a vertically differentiated industry a domestic and a foreign firm first choose the quality of their goods and then compete in quantities, or prices, in the home market. We investigate the cases in which a tariff is chosen before, or after, the firms’ quality decision. These cases are referred to as the ex-ante and the ex-post game, respectively. Optimal ex-post tariffs are positive and ensure that the domestic firm always produces the high quality good. The optimal ex-ante tariff is prohibitive and welfare under domestic monopoly is lower than under ex-post tariffs, unless firms compete in prices and the domestic firm is high quality.     

An examination of the investments in U.S. biotechnology firms by foreign and domestic corporate partners

This study examines the characteristics that make start-up biotechnology firms attractive alliance partners. We distinguish between firm specific and location-specific characteristics as well as between foreign and domestic corporate partners. We present and test a longitudinal model of alliance development based on data from 64 public biotechnology firms. The results provide evidence that foreign and domestic alliance capital inflows are driven by different factors. Firm-specific factors explain minimal variance in capital inflows from foreign alliance partners; rather, location-specific factors seem to matter more. The reverse is true for domestic alliance partners. Further, our results suggest that firm size moderates the relationship between location-specific factors and capital inflows from foreign alliance partners such that larger firms benefit more when located in technologically munificent environments.     

Trade policy with endogenous entry revisited

This paper revisits the effects of tariffs and quotas in a competitive setting where three results are thought to hold. These are: that quotas are equivalent to specific tariffs, the form of tariffs—specific or ad valorem—does not matter, and that the way in which a quota is allocated has no real effects as it only affects the allocation of rents, not their size. We show that all three of these results are false when entry/exit is endogenous. Equivalence holds only if the initial level of entry is set at the long-run level under the quota.     

Maximum-Revenue and Optimum-Welfare Tariffs in International Mixed Duopoly: Does the Order of Firms’ Move Matter?

This paper examines the effect of privatization on the priority of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff in a mixed oligopoly with partial privatization and foreign competition. Major findings of this paper are that: firstly, in a mixed duopoly with partial privatization and asymmetric marginal costs, when the marginal cost of the privatized firm is higher than a critical value, the optimum-welfare tariff will be lower than the maximum-revenue tariff regardless of the order of firms?? move; secondly, if the degree of privatization is sufficiently high and cost is symmetric, the optimum-welfare tariff will be higher than the maximum-revenue tariff; thirdly, if the degree of privatization is sufficiently high and the domestic firm is highly ineffective in production, under Stackelberg public leadership, the optimum-welfare tariff is low and then it is more possible that the optimum-welfare tariff is lower than the maximum-revenue one.     

Does trade globalization induce or inhibit corporate transparency? Unbundling the growth potential and product market competition channels

Trade globalization may affect corporate transparency via multiple channels, with potentially opposite signs. We aim to empirically disentangle these channels by tracking evolution of corporate transparency for 4061 listed firms in tradable sectors in 49 countries during 1992–2005. By using detailed tariff schedules, we measure changes in growth opportunities and product market competition enabled by foreign and domestic trade liberalizations, respectively. On the one hand, higher growth opportunities engendered by foreign trade reforms are disproportionately associated with better corporate transparency in industries that depend more heavily on external financing. On the other hand, greater product market competition engendered by domestic tariff reductions has no significant impact on corporate transparency.     

STRATEGIC MANDATORY LABELING OF BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS IN THE ABSENCE OF QUALITY DIFFERENCE

This article examines the strategic use of mandatory labeling of biotechnology products, such as genetically modified food. A foreign dominant firm produces a biotechnology product and foreign competitive firms produce a conventional one. It is shown that if other trade measures such as tariffs are also available, the government of an importing country may impose mandatory labeling even in the case where there is no quality difference between biotechnology and conventional products. A combination of a discriminatory tariff on the biotechnology product and mandatory labeling shifts rents from the foreign dominant firm to the domestic economy.     

外国直接投资对我国税收贡献及影响的实证分析

在实证分析外国直接投资对我国各项税收总额及关税的定量贡献的基础上,采用行业分析的方法分析了外国直接投资对我国税收贡献的现状及存在的问题。本文认为虽然外国直接投资极大地促进了我国涉外税收、各项税收总额以及关税的增长,但给予其税收优惠也在一定程度上侵蚀了我国的税基,减少了税收收入。有必要分步骤地进行现有税收制度改革,最终统一内外资企业的税收制度。     

Optimal trade policy with quality-differentiated goods

In this article we apply the model of vertically differentiated products to international trade. A foreign firm competes with a domestic firm in the latter's market, producing products of varying quality. We examine the nature of the equilibrium in this case, assuming the firms compete in prices. Contrary to the popular belief, we show that a protectionist policy of imposing a tariff on the foreign firm raises overall welfare in the domestic economy, as well as induces the domestic firm to upgrade the quality of its product, if it produces the lower quality product. Furthermore, if minimum quality standards are imposed on the foreign firm, the domestic firm upgrades quality, and overall welfare in the domestic economy is higher.     

Foreign entry and domestic welfare: lessons for developing countries

This paper examines the effects of foreign entry, in the form of either imports or direct foreign investment, into an oligopolistic market. Incorporating a possible divergence between private and social costs, it first derives simple conditions under which foreign entry reduces welfare relative to autarky. Then, in a multi-firm Cournot model with linear demand and international cost asymmetries, it shows that foreign entry reduces welfare unless it captures a very large share of the home market. However, it also shows that an optimal tariff can prevent this welfare decline. Some suggestive empirical evidence and extensions to differentiated products and to merger analysis are offered. The paper concludes with implications for trade and investment liberalization, as well as for domestic and international competition policy.     

The Effect of Aggregation Bias: An NTB‐modelling Analysis of Turkey's Agro‐food Trade with the EU

We explore how different data aggregation levels affect the gravity estimates of non‐tariff barriers (NTBs) in the agro‐food sector, and we examine their related impacts on policy simulations of an expansion to the European Union (EU) that would include Turkey. We calculate two sets of ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of NTBs using the gravity approach to disaggregated and aggregated Central Product Classification data for 15 Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) agro‐food sectors. We find that the AVEs of NTBs vary substantially across products and that using aggregated data primarily results in greater effects of NTBs. In a second step, we incorporate the AVEs of NTBs into the GTAP model to evaluate Turkey's EU membership and conclude that aggregation bias has considerable effects on both the estimation of NTBs and the general equilibrium simulation results. Utilising different data aggregation levels leads to a great variability of trade costs of NTBs and, hence, to misleading trade and welfare effects.     

Preference Utilisation and Tariff Reduction in EU Imports from ACP Countries

Despite the long relationship between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries aimed at encouraging their exports while stimulating growth and investment, the ACP states still face difficulties in integrating into the world economy. This paper examines the non‐least developed ACP countries preferential trade with the EU using data on EU member states’ imports eligible for preferences under the Cotonou agreement for the period 2001 at the 8‐digit level. Using data on tariffs and preferential quota applicable on each 8‐digit product for the year 2001 ad‐valorem tariff rates were calculated. The paper also investigates the existence of a threshold in the offered duty reduction under which traders have no incentives to ask for preferences since the costs of obtaining these exceeds their benefits. Our results showed that the higher the value of preferences offered, the higher the probability that preferences are requested. Using endogenous threshold estimation techniques we also provided evidence that there exists a minimum value of preferences needed for traders to request preferences. More specifically, if the difference between preferential and third country tariff rates are lower than 4 per cent, there are no incentives for traders to request preferences since the costs of obtaining the preferences are expected to be higher than the benefits from obtaining the preferences. Our results additionally indicate that country specificities also play an important role in the decision whether requesting preferences or not and how much to import.