Trade-diverting free trade agreements,external tariffs,and feasibility

There has been a proliferation of preferential trade agreements within the last two decades. This paper analyzes the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on external tariffs in small economies where protection decisions are made politically. Our model determines tariff rates endogenously instead of assuming they are fixed during or after the formation of FTAs as commonly done in the literature. We show that when an FTA is established, the tariff rates that apply to non-members essentially decline. More importantly, we investigate the interaction between endogenous tariff determination and the feasibility of an FTA. We find that the expectation of tariff reductions under endogenous tariffs could make an otherwise feasible FTA if tariffs were fixed become infeasible. However, if domestic import-competing sectors are relatively smaller and the government places a significant weight on political contributions relative to social welfare, an FTA with endogenous tariffs may be more likely to be feasible than an FTA assumed to fix external tariffs.     

中美经贸摩擦如何影响了大豆进口——基于贸易转移与创造效应视角

中美经贸摩擦背景下,中国对美国大豆进行反制,加征25%关税,那么,中国对美豆加征关税,会对中国大豆来源布局和产业产生怎样影响。文章利用寡头竞争理论,使用2002年1月~2020年3月中国海关数据,利用进口需求模型(AIDS),分析了加征关税对农产品贸易可能发生的贸易损害、贸易转移和贸易创造效应。实证结果表明,中国对美国大豆并不存在刚性依赖,对美加征关税将发生显著贸易转移效应和创造效应。即对美关税每增加1%,将会导致其对中国大豆出口下降1.29%,对巴西大豆进口上涨0.67%,对阿根廷大豆进口上涨0.66%,对其他国家进口上涨1.03%。中国市场增长和加征关税,将会造成国际大豆贸易创造效应,并激发非传统国家进入大豆贸易市场。     

Friends like this: The impact of the US–China trade war on global value chains

This paper considers the indirect impact the recent tariff increases between the United States and China can have on third countries through links in global supply chains. We combine data from input–output relationships, imports and tariffs, to calculate the impact of the tariff increases by both the United States and China on cumulative tariffs paid by third countries. We show that the tariff hikes increase cumulative tariffs for other countries and thus hurt trade partners further downstream in global supply chains. We also show that this is particularly important for tariff increases on Chinese imports in the United States. These are likely to be used as intermediates in production in the United States, which are then re-exported to third countries. The most heavily hit third countries are the closest trade partners, namely the EU, Canada and Mexico. We estimate that the tariffs impose an additional burden of around 500 million to 1 billion US dollars on these countries. China's tariffs on US imports have less of an effect.     

Free trade areas,the limit of Rules of Origin,and optimal tariff reductions under international oligopoly: A welfare analysis

In this article we analyze the economic effects associated with preferential Rules of Origin (RoO) in a free trade area (FTA). By presenting a stylized three-country model of trade under oligopoly, we show that there exists a maximum limit of RoO below which forming an FTA is welfare-improving. In examining external tariff reductions under FTA, we take into account the constrained conditions that optimal tariffs set by member countries effectively induce the intrabloc exporters to comply with RoO. This approach rules out trade regime switches and helps identify the economic determinants of establishing an effective and welfare-improving FTA with RoO. We further examine whether an FTA with RoO increases total trade or whether the extra trade arises at the expense of nonmembers. Our simple model has implications for economic factors that foster or impede regional economic integration under imperfect completion.     

The potential of African trade integration – Panel data evidence for the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite

ABSTRACT

The COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite FTA, formed in 2011, is supposed to be a milestone towards Africa's continental trade integration. This study analyzes the impact of regional integration among the Tripartite countries on their bilateral imports before that date to evaluate the latest integration efforts. We estimate an extended gravity model on a large panel of 51 African countries using yearly observations from 1995 to 2010. We proxy existing formal trade barriers by sample average tariff data on imports from the world as well as indicator variables for the membership in regional FTAs. We consider different estimation techniques and discuss distinct sets of fixed effects. The PPML regression results indicate that remaining tariffs are significantly negatively correlated with imports throughout the preferred multiplicative models. An FTA status does not show a clear-cut import enhancing effect. In the specifications that control for country-year effects, the EAC coefficient is positively correlated with imports, and the COMESA and SADC FTA membership show a positive relation to imports within some reduced-sample robustness checks.     

Do free trade agreements actually increase members' international trade?

For over 40 years, the gravity equation has been a workhorse for cross-country empirical analyses of international trade flows and — in particular — the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on trade flows. However, the gravity equation is subject to the same econometric critique as earlier cross-industry studies of U.S. tariff and nontariff barriers and U.S. multilateral imports: trade policy is not an exogenous variable. We address econometrically the endogeneity of FTAs. Although instrumental-variable and control-function approaches do not adjust for endogeneity well, a panel approach does. Accounting econometrically for the FTA variable's endogeneity yields striking empirical results: the effect of FTAs on trade flows is quintupled. We find that, on average, an FTA approximately doubles two members' bilateral trade after 10 years.     

Free trade agreements in a small,open country: The case of Norway

Negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) has been a high political priority for Norway. Today, it has agreements with 41 countries outside the European Union (EU)/the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), resulting in one of the world's most extensive FTA networks. FTAs cover about 10% of Norway's trade—a share likely to increase in the future. These agreements eliminate tariffs on a substantial number of traded products and have gradually become more comprehensive, covering an expanding range of non‐tariff areas. Hence, they may have trade‐promoting effects beyond tariff reductions as such. On the other hand, the non‐tariff provisions often do not go further than what has already been dealt with in other international agreements or practised domestically, so their overall effect may be limited.     

中国与南部非洲关税同盟建立自由贸易区的经济效应——基于GTAP的模拟分析

通过分析中国与南部非洲关税同盟的贸易现状,文章发现双方贸易关系日益紧密且贸易结构为互补关系,中国与南部非洲关税同盟建立自由贸易区具有良好的贸易基础。文章运用全球贸易分析项目（GTAP）模型（GTAP7.1版）模拟建立该自由贸易区的结果显示：自由贸易区的建立使各成员国互利共赢,经济福利提高,经济增长,实际进出口总量增加,各成员国比较优势产业产出和实际出口增加,而且自贸区外国家（如欧盟27国、美国等）也会受到不同程度影响。因此,文章认为中国应积极促进中国-南部非洲关税同盟关税削减谈判及自由贸易协议签署,促进成员国宏观经济发展,实现成员国优势产业互补,同时,还应积极应对南非或南部非洲关税同盟与其他国家如欧盟、美国等国的自贸谈判。     

The biggest losers (and winners) from US trade liberalization

Many development experts worry that continuing reductions of tariff levels in high-income countries will limit trade flows from developing countries that benefit from preferential trade programs because of ‘preference erosion.’ Using a panel of US import data between the years of 1997 and 2005, I find that reductions in preference margins will significantly diminish imports of some products, particularly from lower-middle and low income countries; for example, a 1% reduction in the US tariff on a product that is currently imported duty-free from developing countries will decrease imports of that product from lower-middle income countries by an average of 2.6%. However, many products produced by developing countries fail to qualify for preferential tariffs, thus a gradual reduction in all US tariff rates is expected to have only a modest impact on trade flows from developing countries.     

Foreign direct investment and customs union: Incentives for multilateral tariff cooperation over free trade

The present article examines the implications of a customs union (CU) on the pattern of tariffs, welfare and the prospects for free trade when the non-member firm has an incentive to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). First, I show that upon the formation of a bilateral CU, the non-member firm has greater incentives to engage in FDI. However, when FDI becomes a feasible entry option for the non- member firm under a CU, member countries have incentives to strategically induce export over FDI by lowering their joint external tariff. When fixed set-up cost of FDI is sufficiently low, this tariff falls below Kemp–Wan tariff and CU leads to a Pareto improvement relative to no agreement. Moreover, using an infinite repetition of the one-shot tariff game under a CU, I show that the presence of FDI incentive of the non-member firm makes the member countries more willing to cooperate multilaterally over free trade while the opposite is true for the non-member country. Finally, I find that, unless fixed cost of having an additional plant is sufficiently low, multilateral cooperation over free trade is easier to sustain when FDI incentive is present.     

Multilateral,Regional and Bilateral Trade‐Policy Options for the United States and Japan

We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to simulate the economic effects on the United States, Japan, and other major trading countries/regions of the Doha Round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations and a variety of regional/bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) involving the United States and Japan. We estimate that an assumed reduction of post‐Uruguay Round tariffs and other barriers on agricultural and industrial products and services by 33 per cent in the Doha Round would increase world welfare by $686.4 billion, with gains of $164.0 billion for the United States, $132.6 billion for Japan, and significant gains for all other industrialised and developing countries/regions. If there were global free trade with all post‐Uruguay Round trade barriers completely removed, world welfare would increase by $2.1 trillion, with gains of $497.0 billion (5.5 per cent of GNP) for the United States and $401.9 billion (6.2 per cent of GNP) for Japan. Regional agreements such as an APEC FTA, an ASEAN Plus 3 FTA, and a Western Hemisphere FTA would increase global and member country welfare but much less so than the Doha multilateral trade round would. Separate bilateral FTAs involving Japan with Singapore, Mexico, Chile and Korea, and the United States with Chile, Singapore and Korea would have positive, though generally small, welfare effects on the partner countries, but potentially disruptive sectoral employment shifts in some countries. There would be trade diversion and detrimental welfare effects on some non‐member countries for both the regional and bilateral FTAs analysed. The welfare gains from multilateral trade liberalisation are therefore considerably greater than the gains from preferential trading arrangements and more uniformly positive for all countries.     

Tariffs and formation of free trade agreements networks

This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) on the basis of country heterogeneity in the tariff level. We demonstrate that a country's unilateral incentive to form an FTA depends on the relative magnitudes of the (negative) market concession effect and the (positive) market expansion effect, both of which are determined by the tariff levels of the two FTA partner countries. Global welfare is maximised when all country pairs form FTAs. Two countries in equilibrium are more likely to form an FTA when their tariff gap is smaller or when their tariff levels are neither very high nor very low. This finding is robust to several extensions of the model. Our preliminary empirical analysis provides some evidence for the finding.     

Endogenous free trade agreements and the multilateral trading system

I evaluate in this paper the impact of free trade areas (FTAs) on the world trading system. I use an oligopolistic-political-economy model where the external tariffs of FTA members, as well as the decision to form FTAs, are endogenously determined. In this context, I show that FTAs are primarily beneficial to the multilateral trading system. This conclusion is based, first, upon the finding that FTAs induce their member governments to lower their external tariffs, and to do so deeply enough to enhance trade even between FTA members and non-members. While this ensures gains for the latter, in general FTA members may not gain. I show, however, that governments will endorse only welfare-improving arrangements, in spite of their political motivations; as a result, FTA members benefit from ratified arrangements as well. Finally, I find that FTAs, by reducing the role of special interests criteria in governments' trade regime decisions, also tend to enhance support for further liberalization at the multilateral level.     

自由贸易与贸易保护主义——公平与效率问题

当今世界 ,贸易自由化成为世界经济发展的主流 ,降低关税和非关税壁垒成为各国双边和多边谈判的主要议题。自由贸易与贸易保护主义的争论由来已久 ,自由贸易的效率以及产生的不公平问题用“补偿原则”来解决是存在局限性的 ,所以 ,自由贸易和贸易保护主义之间政策的权衡十分必要。解决贸易自由化中不公平的问题应从政府制定规则、完善社会保障和建立社会道德标准三方面加以着手。     

Optimal Rules of Origin with Asymmetric Compliance Costs under International Duopoly

We examine the optimal rules of origin (ROO) in a free trade area/agreement (FTA) by employing a stylized three-country partial equilibrium model of an international duopoly. We incorporate compliance costs of the ROO into the model. In particular, compliance costs are higher for a firm located in a non-member country of the FTA than for a firm (an internal firm) located in an FTA member country, whereas marginal production costs are lower for the former. The FTA member countries set the optimal level of ROO to maximize their joint welfare. An importing country within the FTA imposes tariffs on imports that do not comply with the ROO. We show that the optimal ROO may have a protectionist bias in the sense that they are set for only the internal firm to comply. ROO may also cause low utilization of FTAs when they are set such that even the internal firm does not comply with them. These cases arise depending on parameter values.     

Multilateral stability and efficiency of trade agreements: A network formation approach

We study the endogenous network formation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements by means of hypergraphs and introduce the equilibrium concept of multilateral stability. We consider multicountry settings with a firm in each country that produces a homogeneous good and competes as a Cournot oligopolist in each market. Under endogenous tariffs, we find that a multilateral trade agreement governing the rules and norms of tariff setting, that is the WTO/GATT regime itself, together with a bilateral preferential trade agreement (PTA) is multilaterally stable. We also find that the existence of the WTO is necessary for the stability of the trading system. We further analyse the impact of PTAs on multilateral tariffs within the WTO. We find that the formation of PTAs increases countries' incentives for multilateral tariff reduction.     

Free-trade areas and special protection

This paper investigates the impact of free-trade-area (FTA) agreements on the ability of countries to multilaterally cooperate within an economic environment characterized by trade-flow volatility. We show that the parallel formation of different FTAs leads to a gradual but permanent easing of multilateral trade tensions. In particular, we demonstrate that the emergence of the FTAs will be accompanied by a decline in global ‘special’-protection activity, such as safeguard or anti-dumping initiations, but will have less significant implications for most-favored-nation tariffs, or ‘normal’ trade protection.     

Preferences,rent destruction and multilateral liberalization: The building block effect of CUSFTA

If a free trade agreement (FTA) is characterized by the exchange of market access with a large and competitive trading partner, the agreement can cause a leakage of protectionist benefits to domestic industry from lobbying against external tariff cuts. This rent destruction effect of an FTA can free policy makers to be more aggressive in multilateral tariff cuts. We argue that the Canadian–US free trade agreement (CUSFTA) provides an ideal policy experiment to link this mechanism to the data. Exploring the determinants of Canada's tariff cuts at the 8-digit HS product level, we find that CUSFTA acted as an additional driver of Canadian multilateral tariff reductions during the Uruguay Round.     

Third‐country Effects of Regional Trade Agreements

Does regionalism negatively impact non‐members? To answer this question, we examine the effect of regional trade agreements (RTAs) on imports from non‐members and the tariffs that they face. Using data from six RTAs in Latin America and Europe, we do not find evidence that implementation of the regional agreements is associated with trade diversion from third countries to regional members. Using detailed industry data on preference margins and most‐favoured nation (MFN) tariffs for three trade agreements in Latin America over 12 years, we find that greater preference margins do not significantly reduce imports from third countries. We also look at the effect of preferences on external tariffs. We find evidence that preferential tariff reduction tends to precede the reduction of external MFN tariffs in a given sector, offering evidence of tariff complementarity. Overall, the results suggest that regionalism does not significantly harm non‐members.     

US–China rivalry: The macro policy choices

Stylised representations of recent US and Chinese tax reforms, tariffs against imports and alternative Chinese monetary targeting are examined using a calibrated global macro model that embodies both trade and financial interdependencies. For both countries, unilateral capital tax relief and bilateral tariffs are shown to be ‘beggar thy neighbor’ policies. As large economies, both enjoy ‘optimal tariffs’, even bilaterally, though net outcomes are shown to depend on the allocation of revenues. Bilateral tariffs are most advantageous for the US if the additional revenue finances indirect tax relief. Once US bilateral tariffs are imposed, China is a net loser irrespective of its policy response, though a currency float is shown to cushion the effects on its GDP in the short run. Equilibria in normal form non-cooperative tariff games have the US imposing tariffs while China liberalises.