Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure of Sales in Small Private Companies in Belgium

Small businesses are the backbone of the economy in many countries. In Europe, for example, small companies represent more than 90 per cent of all companies (e.g., Lukacs, 2005 ). Although these companies represent such an important portion of the economy, few studies have examined their voluntary disclosure decisions. Because small companies have certain unique characteristics compared with their larger counterparts, the general applicability of past voluntary disclosure studies to small companies is questionable. Drawing on agency and proprietary cost theory, this study investigates whether ownership, competition, and accountant factors influence the decision to disclose financially sensitive information on a voluntary basis. Our results (using an e‐mail questionnaire to small private companies in Belgium, n = 1,068) indicate that nearly 40 per cent of the responding companies are not aware of their disclosure behavior. For companies that are aware of their disclosure behavior, the logistic regression analysis demonstrates that factors relating to the separation of ownership and control, namely the type of ownership and number of shareholders, are among the most important determinants in the voluntary disclosure decision of small private companies. Companies with at least one legal entity as an owner of a company are less likely to disclose, while companies with more shareholders are more likely to disclose. We also provide evidence that perceived competition and the default setting of the accounting software used have a significant influence on the voluntary disclosure behavior.     

自愿披露客户信息影响了债券违约风险吗？

以2010—2021年沪深A股上市公司发行的公司债为样本,实证检验了自愿披露客户信息对债券违约风险的影响。研究发现,自愿披露客户信息产生的额外风险加剧了债券违约风险,这种影响在高专有成本和高融资约束的企业中表现更为显著,但企业发行的绿色债券并未受到影响。机制检验表明,经营风险增加和机构投资者持股降低是自愿披露客户信息影响债券违约风险的重要途径。研究表明,企业需要慎重考虑披露客户信息带来的风险,审慎制定信息披露策略。     

Voluntary Corporate Disclosure by Swedish Companies

Sweden is of interest because of the rapid growth in the Stockholm Stock Exchange and because of the country's disproportionate number of multi-national enterprises. This paper reports on the extent of voluntary disclosure in the corporate annual reports of unlisted and listed Swedish companies. A wide-ranging definition of voluntary disclosure is adopted because of the flexibility of approach accepted in Sweden. This should not be construed that Swedish accounting is largely unregulated, rather it reflects a problem of interpretation of what constitutes generally accepted accounting principles in Sweden. In addition, the paper assesses whether there is a significant association between a number of independent variables and the extent of disclosure.     

Director Ownership and Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Hong Kong Evidence

Weakness of corporate governance and lack of transparency are often considered causes of or contributors to the Asian Financial Crisis. Publicly listed companies in Hong Kong, like other Asian firms, have concentrated director ownership. The study uses voluntary segment disclosure above the benchmark minimum as a proxy for transparency and examines its relationship to the ownership structure and composition of corporate boards in Hong Kong. We find that: (1) high (concentrated) board ownership explains the extent of low voluntary segment disclosure and this negative relationship is stronger when firm performance is very poor; (2) the contribution of non‐executive directors to enhance voluntary segment disclosure is effective for firms with low director ownership but not for concentrated‐ownership firms. These results have implications for policy makers and regulators in the Asia‐Pacific region striving to improve governance and transparency.     

The influence of company characteristics and accounting regulation on information disclosed by Spanish firms

Accounting information is subject to two different influences: market pressures and pressure from regulatory bodies. This paper provides an empirical analysis of the influence of both these forces on information disclosure by Spanish firms. To test hypotheses concerning the influence of regulation, annual reports of three different years for 49 companies have been analysed. Given that new Spanish accounting rules have been in force since 1990, annual accounts of a sample of quoted companies have been analysed for the period 1989–1991. In order to consider the influence of positive accounting theory, several characteristics relating to company attributes were selected and tested empirically for the sample of 49 companies. The information disclosed by the sample companies was measured through an information index, based on a list of 50 items of information, and it was regressed on the variables related to company characteristics. The influence of regulation was analysed through a panel data analysis including time effects. The results suggest that time as a surrogate for regulation explains the level of information disclosure, although it does not influence the amount of voluntary information disclosed. However, several firm characteristics were also found to influence the level of disclosure, namely size, auditing and stock exchange.     

Disclosure Regulation in Duopoly Markets: Proprietary Costs and Social Welfare

Abstract

The argument of proprietary costs is commonly used by firms to object against proposed disclosure regulations. The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of the welfare consequences of disclosure in duopoly markets and to identify market settings where proprietary costs are a viable argument for firms to remain silent. We, therefore, solve the optimal disclosure strategies and distinguish two different potentially costly effects of disclosing private information: the strategic information effect and the market information effect. We identify the market settings for which a regulator prefers to impose disclosure regulation so as to maximise consumer surplus or total surplus. Regulation may be necessary because (i) the increase in welfare outweighs proprietary costs to the firms, or (ii) firms are trapped in a prisoners' dilemma. The first primarily applies to Bertrand competition with demand uncertainty and, to a lesser extent, to Cournot competition. The second applies primarily to Cournot competition and Bertrand competition with cost uncertainty.     

How cultural dimensions,legal systems,and industry affect environmental reporting? Empirical evidence from an international perspective

Past research has paid little attention to the impact of stakeholder engagement, cultural, legal, and industrial contexts on environmental disclosure. Thus, the aim of this paper is to explore how these three institutional factors affect the reporting of environmental information by companies in different countries. This research draws on institutional theory: normative isomorphism, coercive isomorphism, and mimetic isomorphism. This study uses the generalised method of moments procedure. The findings show that the legal system and certain cultural dimensions such as individualism, uncertainty avoidance, long‐term orientation, and indulgence are determinants of voluntary disclosure of environmental information (individualism and indulgence—negatively; uncertainty avoidance and long‐term orientation—positively), particularly when companies belong to industries with high environmental risk.     

Artificial Intelligence Measurement of Disclosure (AIMD)

Empirical research on voluntary disclosure lacks an appropriate measurement technique for quantifying the intensity of a firm's disclosure. In this paper, I introduce artificial intelligence measurement of disclosure (AIMD), a computerised technique for measuring disclosure using artificial intelligence, which derives disclosure proxies from English-language annual reports for 10 different information dimensions without human involvement. Criterion validity tests indicate that, controlling for a robust set of covariates and multiple statistical techniques, AIMD is negatively associated with information asymmetry as proxied by spreads and PIN. Furthermore, AIMD has construct validity when compared to the AIMR disclosure rating, Standard & Poor's Transparency and Disclosure Rating, several proprietary manual disclosure scorings and companies’ own assessment of their level of disclosure as indicated by a survey. I also demonstrate the applicability of AIMD as a cost-effective technique for measuring disclosure using a sample of 127,895 firm-year observations of companies regulated by the SEC.     

Voluntary Disclosure in the Annual Reports of New Zealand Companies

New Zealand is currently experiencing a liberal and competitive economic environment which has led to a greater investment interest in corporate securities. Likewise, New Zealand firms are also developing strategies to attract investors, for example, through voluntary disclosure of information. Therefore, the level of information voluntarily disclosed by New Zealand companies is of interest to prospective investors. The purpose of this study is to examine empirically the relationship between five firm-specific characteristics and the general level of accounting information voluntarily disclosed by companies listed on New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE). In this study the a priori expectations are based on agency theory. The five firm-specific characteristics examined are: firm size, leverage, assets-in-place, type of auditor, and foreign listing status. The results obtained from cross-sectional regression show that firm size, foreign listing status and leverage are significantly related to the extent of voluntary disclosure. In contrast assets-in-place and type of auditor are not significant explanatory variables. A study of this type would be of particular relevance to accounting policy makers because, inter alia, it helps them in (a) understanding corporate disclosure behaviour, (b) explaining why firms adopt certain disclosure strategies, and (c) developing a coherent and acceptable set of mandatory disclosure requirements.     

经营分部信息披露对权益资本成本的影响——基于分析师关注视角

以制造业上市公司2014—2019年数据为样本,首先从分部划分确定性、会计信息完整性和经济特征差异性三个维度逐层深入检验经营分部信息披露对企业权益资本成本的影响,然后探究分析师关注的调节作用,最后以是否产能过剩为标准分组进行异质性检验。研究发现：(1)经营分部信息披露的三个维度均无法直接影响权益资本成本,但在分析师关注下,分部划分确定性、会计信息完整性可以降低企业权益资本成本,经济特征差异性则会提高权益资本成本,说明目前我国投资者对经营分部信息处理成本较高,分析师关注是该信息能够发挥效能的必要条件。(2)异质性检验结果显示,产能过剩企业提升分部划分确定性、会计信息完整性可以有效降低权益资本成本,而非产能过剩企业采取该措施会产生相反结果;尽管分析师关注可在一定程度上抑制非产能过剩企业提升分部划分确定性、会计信息完整性对权益资本成本的正向影响,但同时也会加剧产能过剩企业突出经济特征差异性带来的专有成本。     

上市公司自愿性披露信息若干问题研究

随着我国资本市场的发展,上市公司自愿性披露信息将呈增长趋势,加强自愿性披露信息的研究,有利于推动和引导我国上市公司自愿性披露信息工作的开展。本文对自愿性披露信息进行了价值分析,总结了影响上市公司自愿性披露信息的主要因素,并提出提高上市公司自愿性披露信息质量政策的若干建议。     

The Association between Board Composition and Different Types of Voluntary Disclosure

Abstract

This study examines the association between board composition and voluntary disclosure in annual reports. In particular, it addresses the incentives within the agency theory framework for both inside and independent directors to disclosure additional information voluntarily. Further, it provides evidence on the relation between the overall total voluntary disclosure and the components of voluntary disclosure, such as forward looking, strategic, non-financial and historical financial disclosures and board composition. Our sample is based on 181 Australian companies. We have developed and hand-collected 67 items from annual reports to develop the total voluntary disclosure index and the sub-indices of voluntary disclosure. Using two-stage multivariate analyses, our results provide some important insights. First, we find that there is a positive association between board composition and the voluntary disclosure of information in annual reports. Second, we also find that independent boards provide more voluntary disclosure of forward looking information and strategic information. However, board structure has no bearing on the voluntary disclosure of non-financial and historical financial information. Our findings are enhanced by different empirical specifications and sensitivity tests.     

公平和效率为导向的内部控制信息披露方式的转变

自《萨班斯--奥克斯利法案》颁布以来,美国上市公司内部控制信息披露方式由自愿性披露转变为强制性披露。而在2008年我国五部委联合发布的《企业内部控制基本规范》标志着我国上市公司内部控制信息也开始向强制性披露方式转变。论文试图用经济学的公平与效率理论分析内部控制信息由自愿性披露方式转变为强制性披露方式背后的原因,经过分析发现披露方式的转变是促进资本市场效率向保障资本市场公平的转变。     

上市公司自愿性披露信息影响因素研究——基于沪、深上市公司的实证检验

本文在文献综述和理论研究的基础上,运用多元回归建立模型,对上市公司自愿性披露信息影响因子进行了实证分析。结果发现,上市公司自愿性披露信息与盈利能力、发行股票类型、会计师事务所规模、公司规模和资产负债率等因素成显著正相关,而与股权集中度及行业类型没有显著相关关系,并对结论进行了相关分析。     

Fostering Stakeholder Engagement: The Role of Materiality Disclosure in Integrated Reporting

This paper studies the determinants of materiality disclosure among International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) Pilot Program companies implementing the IIRC Framework. In other words, it studies which variables influence the way in which such companies provides information about their materiality determination process. In order to test our hypotheses we performed a number of statistical analyses on a unique hand‐collected dataset including IIRC and non‐IIRC Pilot Program companies for the 2012 and 2013 fiscal years. Our results indicate that industry and some firm‐level characteristics (board size and diversity) do play a significant role in the determination of materiality disclosure, whereas the legal environment in which companies operate does not. Also, we found that IIRC Pilot Program companies disclosed more information about materiality than their competitors that did not join the program. This paper provides interesting insights for policy makers (in particular, the IIRC) and extends previous academic literature on integrated reporting. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

上市公司自愿性信息披露行为动因的经济学分析

本文运用交易成本理论、有效市场理论、投资行为理论、比较优势理论、信号传递模型、声誉机制模型、“深口袋”理论、代理契约理论等为上市公司自愿性信息披露行为动因构建了一个理论解释框架,同时在管理当局与投资者之间进行了博弈分析,并得出结论:应大力倡导上市公司自愿性信息披露,构建以适度的强制性信息披露为主,自愿性信息披露作为重要补充的信息披露机制才是治理上市公司虚假信息披露的根本之策。     

The Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Independent Directors in the Presence of a Dominant Shareholder

Abstract

Differently from prior studies that examine the role of stand-alone control systems within the relationship between owners and managers, our study investigates the correlation between two control mechanisms – voluntary disclosure and independent directors – in companies characterized by the presence of a dominant shareholder that is supposed to mitigate the classical agency problem. Based on agency theory, we hypothesize that the two mechanisms tend to coexist, since the presence of either one reduces the costs of introducing the other. Two further effects – the reputation and the domino effect – contribute to determine a positive relationship between the two mechanisms. We carried out the empirical analysis on 175 non-financial Italian listed companies, all controlled by a dominant shareholder. Voluntary disclosure is measured through three alternative disclosure indexes. Independent directors are identified not only according to a formal/legal definition, but also through stricter criteria. The empirical test is based on a multivariate analysis controlling for size, residual ownership diffusion, leverage, profitability and labour pressure. Results support our hypothesis and are robust to alternative criteria to identify dominant shareholders. Our study contributes to a better understanding of the relationship between different control mechanisms in particular agency settings.     

衡量上市公司信息披露程度研究综述

在对近半个世纪以来(1961-2008)国内外相关文献研究的基础上,文章着重论述了西方国家研究者所采用的衡量上市公司信息披露程度的研究方法,分析了区分自愿性、强制性或混合性披露的研究选择、衡量披露程度的指数构造以及对披露指数的加权(或不加权)与赋值处理等,归纳了有关衡量上市公司信息披露程度的研究在内容、范围和数据来源等方面的发展态势以及未来可能的研究方向。     

上市公司自愿性披露信息监管体系构建

上市公司自愿性披露信息是指除强制性披露的信息外,上市公司基于公司形象、投资者关系、回避诉讼风险等动机主动披露的信息,是企业披露信息的重要组成部分,也是上市公司展示核心竞争力的有效途径。本文在分析我国上市公司自愿性披露信息中存在问题的基础上,提出了构建上市公司自愿性披露信息监管体系的建议。     

The Influence of the Keiretsu on Japanese Corporate Disclosure

This paper represents a contribution to testing whether the extent of disclosure in Japanese corporate annual reports varies according to group structure. Consideration is given to keiretsu (group interfirm networks) classification and the mechanism for monitoring by a main bank or main company. This topic is of interest because the Japanese system of corporate governance is fundamentally different from those prevailing in Anglo-Saxon countries and this distinction may impact on corporate disclosure policy. Attention is focused on the exclusionary theory of corporate disclosure in which information is disseminated within group members but specifically excludes others. Regression analysis is undertaken to assess the importance of group structure in explaining variability in the extent of disclosure after controlling for known factors such as size, stock market listing, industry, borrowings, and type of business. The results suggest that companies within a keiretsu with a main-bank or main-company monitor and which are therefore less subject to capital market discipline do not disclose less information than other companies in their annual reports. It appears that whatever type of corporate governance mechanism is adopted in Japan there exists a monitor that places approximately equal demands on information disclosure in corporate annual reports.