Galloping,creeping, or receding internationalization

Using a simple two-period linear durability choice trade model, we examine strategic trade policy in terms of taxes or subsidies levied on duopolistic firms in sales markets. In contrast to earlier parametric durability studies we show that the optimal export policy is not necessarily a tax when product durability is endogenously determined. Our analysis indicates that with endogenous adjustment of durability either a tax, subsidy, or laissez-faire policy (zero subsidy) may be optimal. In addition, we find that any trade policy (tax or subsidy) has the unforeseen effect of changing the firms' product durability. For example, future expected subsidies tend to decrease the domestic firm's product durability while increasing the foreign firm's chosen durability.     

Optimal industrial policy in vertically related markets

This paper examines the optimal industrial policy for an industry with a vertical market structure. A home firm and a foreign firm both import an intermediate good from a third country to produce a final good. How the home country government sets the optimal industrial policy has to take account of both profit shifting between the two final good producers and between the intermediate good producer and the home firm. We explain how the optimal industrial policy depends on the slope of the demand curve, the levels of technology spillover and product differentiation. In particular, there exists a critical level of technology spillover at which investments of the firms are neither strategic substitutes nor complements and the optimal industrial policy is always investment tax.     

Rivalry in uncertain export markets: commitment versus flexibility

This paper examines optimal trade policy in a two-period oligopoly model, with a home and a foreign firm choosing capital and output. Demand uncertainty, resolved in period two, gives rise to a trade-off between strategic commitment and flexibility in the firms’ investment decisions. Firms’ investment timing is endogenous and can be manipulated by the home government, which sets a subsidy before firms decide when to invest. We show that when the government wishes to manipulate investment timing, it will choose its policy to deter investment commitment by the home or the foreign firm.     

Tariffs and capacity utilization by monopolistically competitive firms

This paper examines the effect of a tariff imposed on a monopolistically competitive (MC) sector on firm output in a 2 × 2 × 2 model with nonhomothetic technology. If the MC sector is capital intensive, then a tariff will improve the terms of trade, lower home firm demand elasticity, but raise firm output relative to foreign firms. If the MC sector is labor intensive, then excess supply for firm output may be decreasing in price, so the tariff may worsen the home country's terms of trade. Home firm demand elasticity falls but firm output rises relative to the partner country. These results qualify conclusions based on single-sector and single-country models.     

Strategic trade policies with first-mover and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure

With strategic trade policies, we consider first- and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure given the two-part tariff contract (composed of the input price and the fixed fee) of an upstream firm, where a home and a foreign final-good firms export to a third-country market. We find that the upstream firms’ and governments’ preference orderings over sequential versus simultaneous play and over free trade versus a regime of subsidies contrast with early results in the strategic trade policy. Thus, the endogenous market structure is that (i) the potential leader chooses the Leader role with quantity strategies, and the equilibrium trade regime is unilateral subsidy regardless of the nature of goods; (ii) with price strategies, the potential leader chooses the simultaneous timing, and the equilibrium trade regime is bilateral taxes (free trade) when goods are substitutes (complements).     

A reappraisal of strategic trade policies with the endogenous mode of competition under vertical structures

This paper examines the endogenous choice of competition mode with strategic export policies in vertically related markets when each upstream firm located in each country determines the terms of the two-part tariff contract by maximizing generalized Nash bargaining. We show that (i) choosing Cournot (Bertrand) competition is the dominant strategy for both downstream firms when goods are substitutes (complements), which leads Pareto superior regardless of the nature of goods under the optimal trade policies; (ii) irrespective of rival’s competition mode, the optimal trade policy is an export subsidy under Cournot competition and an export tax under Bertrand competition; and (iii) trade liberalization may give rise to changes of competition mode and increase of social welfare.     

Inter-firm R&D collaboration within and across national borders

We set up a model to investigate the strategic aspect of a firm's incentive to collaborate in cost-reducing R&D with either a local or a foreign partner. We argue that collaboration with a foreign firm is preferred to collaboration with a local firm if the extra profits generated by a foreign collaboration exceed the additional cost of coordinating collaboration across national borders. We show that foreign collaboration is more likely the bigger the home market size of the foreign firm and, given certain conditions, the higher the international trade cost. We also show that whenever a foreign collaboration arises in equilibrium, it is efficient (i.e., world-welfare-maximising) and that there are cases where (a) a foreign collaboration would be efficient but a local collaboration emerges in equilibrium, and (b) an efficient foreign collaboration emerges in equilibrium, but one of the countries would prefer a local collaboration. We briefly consider the policy implications of these findings.     

Strategic Trade Policy through the Tax System

If conventional instruments of strategic trade policy are unavailable, the system of foreign profit taxation and transfer price guidelines may serve as surrogate policy instruments. In this paper, I consider a model where firms from two countries compete with each other on a market in a third country. Both firms have affiliates in the third country where (part of) the production takes place. I analyse optimal policy choices of the firms' residence countries aiming at strategically manipulating the competitiveness of their firms. I show that, first, countries prefer the tax exemption system over the tax credit system if there is no intra‐firm trade. Second, if the headquarters provide inputs for production in the affiliate, countries prefer the tax exemption system if the transfer price for these inputs is close to the headquarters' variable cost and if the residence country's tax rate is high. However, if transfer prices are high and the residence country's tax rate is low, I show that the tax credit system is an optimal tax policy choice for both countries. From a policy perspective, the view that the tax exemption system is generally the best policy response if domestic firms' competitiveness is a policy goal has to be qualified.     

Taxation of Foreign Profits with Heterogeneous Multinational Firms

This paper analyses optimal taxation of foreign profits using a model with heterogeneous multinational firms that serve a foreign market through exports or foreign direct investment (FDI). If a firm switches from exporting to FDI, domestic activity and tax payments may decrease, stay constant or even rise because of intra‐firm trade. It turns out that, in contrast to recent claims, in all three cases, the optimal tax system implies full taxation after deduction of foreign tax payments. If the country accounts for the effects of its policy on the foreign price level, the case for taxing foreign income becomes even stronger. However, the globally optimal tax system may require exemption of foreign income from tax.     

R&D policies, trade and process innovation

We set up a simple trade model with two countries hosting one firm each. The firms invest in cost-reducing R&D, and each government may grant R&D subsidies to the domestic firm. We show that it is optimal for a government to provide higher R&D subsidies the lower the level of trade costs, even if the firms are independent monopolies. If firms produce imperfect substitutes, policy competition may become so fierce that only one of the firms survives. International policy harmonization eliminates policy competition and ensures a symmetric outcome. However, it is shown that harmonization is not necessarily welfare maximizing. The optimal coordinated policies may imply an asymmetric outcome with R&D subsidies to only one of the firms.     

Cross Hedging with Currency Forward Contracts

This study examines the behavior of a competitive exporting firm that exports to a foreign country and faces multiple sources of exchange rate uncertainty. Although there are no hedging instruments between the home and foreign currencies, there is a third country that has well‐developed currency forward markets to which the firm has access. The firm's optimal cross‐hedging decision is shown to depend both on the degree of incompleteness of the currency forward markets in the third country, and on the correlation structure of the random spot exchange rates. Furthermore, the firm is shown to be more eager to produce and expand its exports to the foreign country when the missing currency forward contracts between the home and foreign currencies can be synthesized by the existing currency forward contracts. In this case of perfect cross hedging, the separation theorem holds but the full‐hedging theorem may or may not hold. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark     

Potential FDI causing large distortions in domestic production

When a foreign firm enters a domestic market, either via exports or through foreign direct investment (FDI), one factor determining the most favourable entrance mode is the profitability of the market, which may not be directly observed by the foreign firm. If the domestic trade protection policy is within a certain range that causes the foreign entrant's decision to swing between the two entry modes, the final choice will depend on the foreign firm's belief about the profitability. In such a situation, a domestic incumbent firm wishing to prevent FDI will heavily distort its production downward to convince the foreign competitor that the market is not profitable. When making trade policy, such strategic behaviour on the part of the domestic firm should be taken into account.     

Foreign affiliates' knowledge sourcing from parent firms

This study investigates the factors that influence the extent to which foreign research and development affiliates source knowledge from their parent firms, by developing theoretical hypotheses that predict patterns of foreign affiliates' knowledge sourcing according to their technological capabilities at multiple levels (firm, industry, and country). We use cross‐border mergers and acquisitions and patent citation data from Fortune Global 500 firms to test our theoretical arguments. The findings suggest that a parent firm's foreign affiliate ownership, industry‐level R&D intensity, and home–host country differences in technological capabilities increase foreign affiliates' knowledge sourcing from their parent firms.     

Induced clean technology adoption and international trade with heterogeneous firms

This paper introduces an environmental externality and factor-biased technology adoption into a trade model with heterogeneous firms. This study explores how firms’ decisions of technology adoption and of exports are affected by openness to trade and the stringency of environmental regulations. It shows that: (1) these decisions induced by tightened environmental policies depend upon whether the upgraded technology is labor-biased or emission-biased; (2) the environmental impact of trade cost reductions on the aggregate emissions and price of emissions permits varies with the factor-biased feature; and (3) regardless of the factor-biased feature, the trade cost reduction induces firms to export and to upgrade the factor-biased technology, while it forces the least productive firms to exit the market. Moreover, the model is further calibrated to simulate policy scenarios of bilateral and unilateral variations in trade variable costs and environmental policies. The bilateral reduction of emissions cap may contribute to welfare gains in both home and foreign countries. The unilateral action of tightening environmental policy in the home country may hurt the home country, but makes the foreign country better off.     

STRATEGIC MANDATORY LABELING OF BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS IN THE ABSENCE OF QUALITY DIFFERENCE

This article examines the strategic use of mandatory labeling of biotechnology products, such as genetically modified food. A foreign dominant firm produces a biotechnology product and foreign competitive firms produce a conventional one. It is shown that if other trade measures such as tariffs are also available, the government of an importing country may impose mandatory labeling even in the case where there is no quality difference between biotechnology and conventional products. A combination of a discriminatory tariff on the biotechnology product and mandatory labeling shifts rents from the foreign dominant firm to the domestic economy.     

Trade patterns,unemployment and growth

This paper analyses the implications of a minimum wage in an open economy two-sector model where the effect of growth on trade and unemployment is explicitly determined. The first-best policy is a wage subsidy to all employment while the second-best policy is a production tax cum subsidy. In the absence of policy intervention it is shown that growth in the short run results in decreasing unemployment for the home country if it is specialized in consumption goods or incompletely specialized provided that the minimum wage is binding. If the economy is specialized in investment goods, then unemployment may increase initially but as growth continues the minimum wage no longer remains binding and full employment is restored. In the long run by examining the dynamic interaction between trade and growth it is possible for the economy to be incompletely specialized with unemployment. If the economy specializes in consumption goods, it is possible for the economy to attain full employment.     

Environmental Policy,North-South Trade and FDI

We analyze trade between two countries, called the North and the South. There is one firm in each country and production costs are lower in the South. To serve foreign markets firms may export or engage in FDI. Both countries set tariffs on imported goods. We find that the implementation of an environmental policy by the South may affect the location decision of the Southern firm. When only the North sets an environmental tax, firms engage in FDI if the difference in costs between the two countries is low, otherwise the South exports and the Northern firm engages in FDI. If the South also sets an environmental tax, this does not restrict FDI by Northern firm, encourages FDI by the domestic firm, reduces its environmental damage and increases joint welfare. Finally, in equilibrium the South decides to implement an environmental policy and both firms engage in FDI.     

不完全竞争市场上的贸易和产业政策——以合成橡胶行业为例的经验分析

战略性贸易政策理论研究不完全竞争市场的贸易政策和产业政策。本文将该理论作为分析框架，以合成橡胶行业为分析对象，使用2003年的数据对我国在该行业实施贸易政策和产业政策进行经验分析。文章分析比较了4种不同的政策或政策组合，即自由贸易政策、进口关税政策、生产补贴政策、进口关税与生产补贴结合使用。研究发现，相对于自由放任政策，各种干预政策可增加国民福利，但幅度不大；而干预政策对不同行业厂商利润和政府收入的影响则要大得多，并使合成橡胶的数量和价格发生明显变化。最后，笔者考察了进口关税政策在多期的实施效果。研究结果支持传统幼稚工业保护论：贸易保护程度应随时间减弱，并且政策将在多期中不断降低厂商的市场力量。     

MARKET STRUCTURE,CAPITAL INFLOWS,AND HOME WELFARE

The welfare implications of foreign capital inflows in an economy with an imperfectly competitive product market and a capital-intensive import-competing sector are analyzed. If the market structure is exogenous with a fixed number of firms, then a capital inflow improves welfare of the host country. However, if the market structure is endogenous, then a capital inflow tends to be immiserizing because it increases entry and reduces per firm output, thus driving firms up their average cost schedule. In addition, the welfare implications of capital inflows in the presence of trade restrictions are also studied, generating some new insights.     

Is certification an effective legitimacy strategy for foreign firms in emerging markets?

This study explores the effect of certification on profitability in a transition economy. Obtaining a certification is a strategic legitimacy action that positively affects a firm’s profitability, specifically for a foreign firm in a transition economy, where institutions are less developed and stable. However, we argue that certification is particularly effective if legitimacy based on adaptation to local circumstances is weak. An analysis of data from 319 MNE subsidiaries in China over the period 1998–2009 largely supports our hypotheses. Certification is an effective strategic action which improves profitability. However, the strength of this effect is influenced by the level of marketization of the host region, the institutional quality in the home country, the density of the foreign firm community in the host country, the number of years the foreign firm has been in the host country, and the size of the foreign firm. These findings throw light on the role certification can play in helping firms overcome the liability of foreignness in a transition economy.