The future international tax environment and European tax harmonization: a personal view

This study examines whether the decision to voluntarily (i.e. without a statutory obligation) employ two audit firms to conduct a joint audit is related to audit quality. We use separate samples and empirical designs for public and privately held companies in Sweden, where a sufficient number of companies have a joint audit on a voluntary basis. Our empirical findings suggest that companies opting to employ joint audits have a higher degree of earnings conservatism, lower abnormal accruals, better credit ratings and lower perceived risk of becoming insolvent within the next year than other firms. These findings are robust to the use of a propensity score matching technique to control for the differences in client characteristics between firms that employ joint audits and those that use single Big 4 auditors (i.e. auditor self-selection). We also find evidence that the choice of a joint audit is associated with substantial increases in the fees paid by the client firm, suggesting a higher perceived level of quality. Collectively, our analyses support the view that voluntary joint audits are positively associated with audit quality in a relatively low litigious setting both for public and private firms.     

Audit Services and Fees of Large Accounting Firms

In the audit literature, it was postulated that audit firms are differentiated due to their quality and, thus, the fees charged are a function of quality. We hypothesize that this may lead to audit firm specialization in different amounts of auditing, leading to a differential audit fee structure. This hypothesis is empirically tested by using a very large sample of audit fees paid to then Big Eight auditors. The results are consistent with the hypothesis in that three Big Eight auditors are observed to charge significantly different fees when compared with the other firms.     

The international firms as new entrants to the statutory audit market: an empirical analysis of auditor selection in Greece, 1993 to 1997

This paper investigates choice of statutory auditor in Greece in the five years subsequent to the 1992 liberalization of the audit market. We analyse auditor choices by 205 companies which, by 1997, represented almost 90% of companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange. We find that the level of shareholdings by foreign shareholders is positively associated with choice of a Big Six versus any other auditor both immediately after liberalization in 1993 and still in 1997, indicative of the role of the Big Six in providing audit credibility in the eyes of international investors. In addition, Big Six auditors strengthened their position in the finance sector and, outside the finance sector, among larger companies over the period studied. We also find that in both 1993 and 1997 Big Six firms were distinguished specifically from the second-tier international firms, consistent with the view that, in post-liberalization Greece, companies by their choice of auditor appear to be distinguishing Big Six firms from all others but not between second-tier international firms and local auditors. These findings shed light on the hitherto unresearched area of which companies Big Six auditors target in order to gain market share when they are new entrants in an environment radically changed by regulatory reform. In addition the research extends the auditor name brand reputation debate by its finding that, in post-liberalization Greece, second-tier international firms appear to be distinguished from the Big Six but not from the local audit firms.     

Loss Aversion,Audit Risk Judgments,and Auditor Liability

Abstract

I investigate how different legal regimes affect auditor's effort and investors' investment decisions when the auditor is subject to probability weighting and loss aversion, which are two important characteristics of Prospect Theory. Probability weighting encourages an auditor to overrate the audit risk and the likelihood of damages leading to inflated audit fees which could help to explain the BigN audit-fee premium. With loss aversion, an auditor is sensitive to the risk of damage compensation and, thus, tends to exert excessive caution which also generates excessive audit fees. Consequently, investors may choose not to hire an auditor and, as a result, may forego an otherwise profitable investment. These effects are more intense with a strict liability regime than with a negligence rule because with the latter, the auditor is not held liable when due care has been exerted. This removes the risk of incurring losses. The paper highlights the robustness of the negligence regime when preferences are unobservable.     

股权结构、治理结构与审计师选聘——基于委托代理理论的实证考察

本文以委托代理理论为基础,选择2002年深圳股市的484家上市公司为样本,考察了大股东控制的公司审计师选择行为。结果发现第一大股东持股比例越高,就越不聘请国际“四大”会计师事务所的境内合作所,以便实施其掏空行为;而设立审计委员会可以在一定程度上遏制大股东的审计师选择偏好;如果第一大股东是外资股,则更可能聘请国际“四大”会计师事务所的境内合作所,以求降低其代理成本。     

Audit Market Response to PCAOB Censures of US Big 4 Firms

Abstract

Subsequent to the first-ever Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) censure of a US Big 4 firm (Deloitte) in December 2007, there were two other PCAOB US Big 4 firm censures as of 2016 year-end. We examine whether these two post-2007 PCAOB censures of US Big 4 firms conveyed new information to the audit market. For both censures, we find little or no evidence of any change in the factual audit quality of the censured firm over a three-year window surrounding the censure. Our findings suggest that the quality control deficiencies (identified during inspection of specific audit engagements) that triggered the PCAOB censure were isolated occurrences rather than systemic to the firm at large, i.e., the censures do not imply an impairment in the US Big 4 firm's overall factual audit quality. We also find that the negative response of investors and audit committees documented in prior research for the 2007 Deloitte censure disappeared for the later US Big 4 firm censures. Given that the PCAOB inspects (and can censure) non-US auditors who audit US-listed foreign companies, our findings are of potential interest to regulators, investors and audit committees outside the US.     

Legal Liability,Government Intervention,and Auditor Behavior: Evidence from Structural Reform of Audit Firms in China

This paper investigates how legal liability influences audit quality and audit fees, particularly in the presence of government intervention. Since 2010, all Chinese audit firms were required to transform from a structure of limited liability company (LLC) to limited liability partnership (LLP), which removes the cap on the liability exposure of negligent auditors. By adopting this natural experiment, we document the following findings: first, after audit firms reorganize as LLPs, auditors are more likely to (1) issue modified audit opinions and going-concern opinions, (2) constrain clients’ earnings management, and (3) charge a premium in audit fees, which suggest that exerting unlimited legal liability on negligent auditors improves both audit quality and audit fees. Second, the effect of the LLP adoption is more pronounced when auditors are from local audit firms, and clients are controlled by local governments. Further analyses suggest that the stock prices of clients positively react to the reform event, which indicates that LLP adoption improves the overall value of audits. In summary, our empirical findings are consistent with the argument that legal liability is able to effectively shape auditor behavior in emerging markets where the other institutional mechanisms are relatively weaker and government intervention is heavy.     

Auditor Independence,Current and Future NAS Fees and Audit Quality: Were European Regulators Right?

Abstract

European Union adopted the Regulation (EU) No 537/2014, which in practice prohibits the joint provision of audit and most types of non-audit services (NAS). Regulators presume that NAS fees weaken auditor independence and, as a result, impair audit quality. As the evidence at the European level does not support this view, the question of whether the new regulation will enhance auditor independence remains open. We examine the association between future NAS fees and audit quality by distinguishing among tax, audit-related and other services. We base the analysis on a sample of Spanish listed companies for the period between 2005 and 2016, finding a consistent negative association between future other NAS fees and audit quality. This suggests that the expectation of future purchases of this type of NAS may impair auditor independence. Conversely, for tax and audit-related services results are not significant. Taken together, results suggest that European regulators should seek for further evidence before banning NAS, as some of them may in fact enhance audit quality.     

European Market Reaction to Audit Reforms

Abstract

This paper investigates European stock market reaction to events associated with the proposed EU audit reforms that were ultimately implemented in 2016. These include, inter alia, mandatory audit firm rotation, prohibition of non-audit services, and fee caps. We find that investors react positively to the proposals, lifting aggregate market value by approximately €108,630 million. In cross-sectional analysis at both country and firm level, we find that these net benefits arise from the prohibition of non-audit services and the placing of a cap on total fees charged by the auditor. Furthermore, we find investors in firms with low earnings quality appear to perceive the greatest benefits from the proposed reforms.     

会计师事务所合并、审计市场结构与审计定价

以2006年至2009年初发生的8起"强强联合"会计师事务所合并案为研究对象,分析合并发生前后审计市场结构与审计定价的变化后发现:随着会计师事务所合并案的增多,市场结构呈现出市场集中度增加以及大所之间竞争更为均衡的特点,国内本土所的市场力量在逐渐增强,但与国际"四大"之间还存在着十分明显的差距。从单变量检验来看,合并后会计师事务所对同一客户的审计收费较合并前显著增加,但在控制其他影响审计定价的因素后,合并因素对审计定价虽仍有正向作用,但是在统计上并不显著。     

审计定价与“中签者之祸”及其思考

鉴于对低价进入式审计定价策略的关注,本论文评述了一个审计市场二阶段竞价模型。在这个模型中,审计成本包括两个部分:对所有可能的审计人员一致的共同审计成本和因具体审计人员而异的个别审计成本。正是由于这部分共同审计成本的存在,导致了“中签者之祸”情况的产生。论文认为,经验丰富的审计者通过改变审计竞价策略,以补偿“中签者之祸”带来的损失。这一点,对于“低价进入式竞价策略”(第一阶段审计价格的降低)的程度和审计人员的变更,起着重要的作用。在二阶段审计竞价模型中,“低价进入式竞价策略”与审计质量损失无关。基于上述分析框架,作者简要地陈述了我国审计服务市场的收费情况并做出了相关评论。     

External Auditor Reassessment of Client Business Risk Following the Issuance of a Comment Letter by the SEC

Abstract

Following Arthur Andersen's conviction for obstructing justice, auditors faced a one-time significant change in their regulatory environment because it was clear that (i) major audit partnerships could be closed and (ii) post Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), regulators would take a far more attentive (aggressive) role. In response auditors considered whether the pricing of audits should be revised to take account of the increased risk of regulatory intervention and litigation. Obviously such re-pricing would need to be targeted at those firms for which the risks were greatest. One early warning signal of such events occurring is the issuance by the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) of a Comment Letter (CL). We investigate whether there is any evidence that if a client receives a CL this is used to re-price audit services. Specifically, we investigate whether issuance resulted in upward pressure on audit fees, and whether this effect was simply transient around the issuance period or alternatively persisted some years into the future. This research finds that after a client receives a CL, auditors adjust audit fees upwards in the period in which the CL is received. In addition it is shown that for subsequent periods in which the auditor does not spend time assisting the client respond to a specific CL, an initial rise in audit fee persists. This is consistent with the hypothesis that auditors reassess the reputation and litigation risk of the client on the basis of the SEC issuance of a Comment Letter.     

审计关系错配、盈余质量与整合审计收费

以2012—2015年沪深主板A股执行整合审计的上市公司为研究样本，基于整合审计背景探讨审计关系错配与整合审计收费，研究发现大所对小规模客户给予整合审计收费折扣；小所对大规模客户给予整合审计收费折扣。进一步研究发现，基于财务报表审计与内部控制审计的知识溢出效应及联动机制，执行整合审计有助于审计师识别公司管理层的盈余管理行为。     

Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality

In a setting where mandatory audit firm rotation has been effective for more than 20 years (i.e. Italy), we analyse changes in audit quality during the auditor engagement period. In our research setting, auditors are appointed for a three-year period and their term can be renewed twice up to a maximum of nine years. Since the auditor has incentives to be re-appointed at the end of the first and the second three-year periods, we expect audit quality to be lower in the first two three-year periods compared to the third (i.e. the last) term. Assuming that a better audit quality is associated with a higher level of accounting conservatism, and using abnormal working capital accruals as a proxy for the latter, we find that the auditor becomes more conservative in the last three-year period, i.e. the one preceding the mandatory rotation. These results are confirmed using Basu's [1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(1), 3–37] timely loss recognition model. In an additional analysis, we use earnings response coefficients as a proxy for investor perception of audit quality, and we observe results consistent with an increase in audit quality perception in the last engagement period.     

Enforcement Actions and Auditor Changes

In this paper, we examine whether the uncovering of erroneous financial statements by German enforcement agencies is related to subsequent auditor changes. We argue that enforcement actions are likely to reveal information about the client or its auditor, which might affect auditor choice by initiating an update of mutual expectations. Our empirical findings indicate that firms with erroneous financial statements indeed have an increased probability of subsequent auditor changes. Firms also tend to change from a non-Big4 auditor to a Big4 auditor in this situation, suggesting that clients increasingly seek the reputation and services of Big4 auditors. Big4 auditors in turn do not appear to refrain from taking over error-firms as new clients in the German setting, which is characterized by limited auditor liability. Additionally, auditor changes are more likely to occur before the public announcement of an error, indicating that firms take action as soon as the uncovering of an accounting error becomes sufficiently certain.     

The impact of litigation risk on the association between audit quality and auditor size: Evidence from China

We examine whether audit quality varies across different sizes of CPA firms under high or low auditor‐specific litigation risk exposure. We measure audit quality by the issuance of modified audit opinions and the audit fees charged to clients, and we use the organizational form of CPA firms as the proxy for auditors’ litigation risk exposure, where a partnership (limited liability) CPA firm represents a high (low) litigation risk exposure. Built on Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic's (2008) theoretical framework, we hypothesize that the litigation risk exposure of CPA firm moderates the association between auditor size and audit quality. Our results show that when the auditor's liability is capped (i.e., registered as a limited liability form of CPA firm), larger size CPA firms are associated with higher audit quality when compared to smaller size CPA firms. However, this positive association between auditor size and audit quality disappears for audit firms that are subject to high litigation risk exposures (i.e., registered as a partnership form of CPA firm). Our research provides new insights on the impact of auditor‐specific litigation risks on the relation between audit quality and auditor size. In particular, we show that only when auditor‐specific litigation risk is limited, do large CPA firms appear to perform higher quality audits than small CPA firms.     

Discretionary Accruals and Auditor Behaviour in Code-Law Contexts: An Application to Failing Spanish Firms

This study examines the relationship between earnings management and auditor behaviour in the pre-bankrupt client segment of the Spanish audit market. As proxies for auditor behaviour, we use type of audit firm (Big N/non-Big N) and type of audit report. In contrast to the USA, audit reports in Spain often include modifications other than a going-concern opinion. This allows us to study the relationship in more detail than is possible with US data. The results of our study show that discretionary accruals are negatively related to going-concern opinions but are positively related to reports modified for reasons other than going-concern problems. However, unlike Butler et al. (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37, pp. 139–165, 2004) the negative relationship is explained not by liquidity survival tactics but by auditor conservatism. We find this conservatism not only in the value of discretionary accruals but also in the qualifications that accompany a going concern. In these cases GAAP violations have a much greater income effect and a stronger relationship with the reversal of manipulation accumulated over the years than with the manipulation introduced during the last year. Finally, our results suggest that Big N differentiation in a code-law country is context-specific and depends on the business risk parameter of the ‘audit risk model’. In particular, for high-risk firms, Big N auditors show a significantly lower level of discretionary accruals and a greater propensity to issue a going-concern opinion.     

事务所转制效果存在差异吗？——原因与后果

借助理论模型将会计师事务所转制对审计质量及审计收费的影响纳入一个整合的分析框架,推导出影响转制效果的关键因素：除审计师法律责任的增加程度以外,客户经营风险以及转制前审计质量水平也同样影响审计质量及审计收费的提高。基于2007—2015年中国A股上市公司数据,在控制了客户经营风险之后进行实证研究,结果表明审计质量及审计收费的提升确实在初始审计质量较低的中小型事务所样本中更加显著。进一步研究发现,在事务所转制的过程中及完成后,更多的审计客户从中小型事务所转换为前十大事务所,且这种客户流动趋势在异常审计收费较高的样本中更加显著。     

The Effects of Auditor Social and Human Capital on Auditor Compensation: Evidence from the Italian Small Audit Firm Market

Abstract

This study examines whether social and human capital influence the compensation of individual auditors in the small audit firm market. We employ a sample of Italian auditors and use measures from the network and auditing literatures to capture their professional connections, representing social capital, and their industry expertise, representing human capital. Our findings show a positive and economically meaningful association between these individual attributes and auditor compensation. We run several tests to address potential endogeneity issues in our research design. Our results suggest that, in the small audit market, clients perceive as valuable those auditors with higher social and human capital, and as a result, are willing to pay a premium for these specific auditor attributes.     

Consequences of the Abandonment of Mandatory Joint Audit: An Empirical Study of Audit Costs and Audit Quality Effects

This paper focuses on the unique Danish setting in examining the consequences of abandoning a mandatory joint audit regime. We study the effects on audit costs (measured by audit fees) and audit quality (measured by abnormal accruals) of the abandonment of the mandatory joint audit in Denmark in 2005. We perform our analysis on non-financial listed Danish companies for the 2002–2010 period. Our results show that a joint audit is associated with higher fees, but that the association between joint audit and abnormal accruals is insignificant. This suggests that the higher audit fees cannot be explained by higher audit quality. Our results are robust to alternative measurements of fees and audit quality. Additional analyses show that the fee premium related to a joint audit decreases over time and that the Big 4 concentration in our sample has increased since the switch from mandatory to voluntary joint audit. Our results are consistent with the motivations driving the regulatory change in Denmark and are of interest to regulators and actors in the audit market.