Do managerial behaviors trigger firm exit? The case of hyperactive bidders

This paper investigates the effects of managerial mergers- and acquisitions-related investment strategies on the exit risk of firms. Using a sample of hyperactive bidders, I show that managerial excessive acquisitiveness can precipitate firm exit. Overbidding is associated with weak corporate governance and lower disclosure quality within firms. I find that hyperactive bidders take more risk compared to conservative bidders. Such bidders also misallocate firms’ resources and dent firms’ reputational capital. Eventually, the external corporate control market is more effective compared to mechanisms such as bankruptcy reorganization, forced liquidation, leveraged buy-out, and expulsion from stock exchanges in disciplining hyperactive bidders by turning them into targets of takeover. These results suggest that a hyper acquisition-induced growth strategy is, on average, detrimental to the long-term survivability of firms and that the internal and external corporate-control mechanisms may not be effective enough to forestall falling value of an excessively acquisitive firm.     

Managerial shareholdings, firm value, and acquired corporations

Prior research on the relationship between managerial shareholdings and firm value provides conflicting evidence. We take a different approach to its analysis and focus on managerial shareholdings in acquired firms. We argue that in a relatively unfettered market for corporate control, prior evidence of a nonlinear relationship between moral hazard costs and managerial shareholdings suggests that acquired corporations can be segmented according to managerial shareholdings, and that these segments will differ according to the source of wealth gains, managerial resistance, who acquires the company, and how target shareholders are paid. We find evidence consistent with these predictions.     

Integration or disintegration? Human resource implications of a common corporate language decision in a cross-border merger

The primary purpose of introducing a common corporate language in cross-border mergers is to integrate two previously separate organizations and facilitate communication. However, the present case study of a cross-border merger between two Nordic banks shows that the common corporate language decision may have disintegrating effects, particularly at organizational levels below top management. We identify such effects on performance appraisal, language training and management development, career paths, promotion and key personnel. Our findings show that top management needs to work through the consequences of the language decision upon those who are expected to make such a decision work.     

管理者过度自信对企业跨行业并购的影响

管理者作为企业的最高决策层,是制定企业发展战略、实施投融资决策、进行企业日常经营活动以及执行企业日常经营管理的主体,其在决策过程中的过度自信心理对企业的发展至关重要.而跨行业并购交易作为公司市值管理的重要手段之一,研究管理者的过度自信与企业跨行业并购对公司价值最大化的影响十分重要.     

行业视阈下企业“并购或联盟”的选择偏好研究

企业并购和联盟的行为并不仅仅是特定的企业层面的问题,很多行业内都出现了大规模并购或联盟的风潮,这已成为了一种显著的行业性现象。在一个既定的行业中,大部分的企业都面临着相似的技术要求和市场态势。行业对于企业选择其外部成长战略的偏好有着重要的影响。在本文中,作者将提出三个行业层面的影响维度,通过两分法,将行业分为八种情景,分别讨论在不同行业情景下企业对兼并收购或战略联盟的选择偏好。     

基于COBIT的企业并购中信息系统整合风险分析

信息系统整合是企业并购中的重要内容,分析与控制企业并购中信息系统整合存在的风险是当今研究的一个新课题。COBIT体系目前已成为国际上公认的IT管理与控制标准,它可以指导企业有效地利用信息资源,有效地管理、控制与信息相关的风险。文章将信息系统整合活动映射到COBIT体系下,给出企业并购中信息系统整合风险模型,并利用该模型对企业并购中信息系统整合风险进行了识别与分析。     

我国文化企业跨区域并购应注意的问题研究

跨区域并购是我国文化企业做大做强的一个恰当的战略选择。文化企业具有意识形态性,边际成本递减、边际效用递增性,公众参与性和高衍生性四个特定属性。我国文化企业在跨区域并购时要考虑并购规划的周密性和目标企业信息完全性;要熟悉相关法规政策,促进人才整合,讲究并购绩效评价的综合性和长期性。     

The impact of reshoring decisions on shareholder wealth

Interest in reshoring, defined as the return of manufacturing and service operations from previously offshored locations to the U.S., has gained momentum recently. Yet, there is no academic evidence on the shareholder value implications of reshoring decisions. This paper analyzes the shareholder wealth effects of 37 reshoring decisions announced by U.S. firms during 2006–2015. Our results indicate that reshoring announcements result in positive abnormal stock returns. Mean (median) abnormal stock returns on reshoring announcements are 0.45% (0.29%), corresponding with a mean (median) market value change of $322.57 million ($31.60 million). Our findings imply that the benefits associated with the reshoring tend to outweigh the costs. This finding is relevant for firms faced with the decision of whether to move business activities from offshore to domestic locations. It is also of interest to policy makers who may seek to further stimulate the reshoring phenomenon.     

上市公司财务重述公告的市场反应研究

本文利用事件研究法对发布财务重述公告的上市公司在公告日前后的市场反应进行了检验,并对比分析了不同类型重述公告引发的市场反应的差异。研究发现,上市公司的财务重述具有显著的负面市场反应,且不同类型重述公告的市场反应各异。由收入确认问题引发的财务重述,其负面市场反应大于由其他问题导致的财务重述的市场反应;当重述公告涉及范围广、重述发起人为外部监管机构、重述涉及核心会计指标以及重述导致盈余调减时,其负面市场反应更为显著。     

循证管理在跨国并购中的应用

在经济全球化的背景下,企业之间的并购重组成为突破企业发展瓶颈、提高企业经营能力的一种行之有效的方式。现阶段,我国并没有非常完善的并购理论,而并购中情况的复杂性也使依靠经验的传统管理方式很难发挥作用。为实现并购的有效进行,论文将循证管理的理念引入跨国并购理论中,分析并购中可能产生的风险,并以循证管理的角度给出解决方法,为并购理论提供新的完善思路。     

企业并购的动态博弈分析

本文在博弈论的基础上将企业并购行为抽象为并购企业和被并购企业之间的动态博弈,在假设各博弈方理性行为的前提下,从不完全信息的角度对并购双方在并购活动中的策略选择以及所涉及的变量进行了动态博弈分析。本文只考虑了并购双方,没有把政府、中介机构和债权人引入博弈范围之内。     

The effect on stockholder wealth of product recalls and government action: The case of Toyota's accelerator pedal recall

We analyze the effect of Toyota's faulty accelerator pedal on stockholder wealth. Using the event study methodology, we show that a major recall in January of 2010 is associated with a 19% fall in the company's cumulative abnormal returns. Continued concerns that Toyota was unable to identify and adequately fix the problem prompted the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to conduct its own investigation in March, 2010. The results of this government investigation exonerated the company and Toyota's cumulative abnormal returns rose by almost 9%. The Toyota case provides an opportunity to study a product recall with both company error and a government action that addressed concerns about the safety of the product.