International capital mobility and commercial policy in an economic region

If two small countries are linked by capital movements then, at low tariff levels, any increase in capital flows induced by the commercial policy of either country will harm that country and benefit the other country, while at low levels of international investment a tariff increase always harms the country levying the tariff. Nevertheless, an increase in one country's tariff could benefit both countries by alleviating regional distortions in factor allocation. If the countries liberalize factor movements within a customs union, then conflicts must arise in choosing the level of the common external tariff.     

Trade liberalisation and labour shares in China

We estimate the extent to which firms responded to tariff reductions associated with China's WTO entry by altering labour's share of value. Firm‐level regressions indicate that firms in industries subject to tariff cuts raised labour's share relative to economy‐wide trends, both through input choices and rent sharing. Our estimates suggest that, on average, an industry that experienced no reductions in output or input tariffs would have a 15.7% lower labour share of value in 2007 than it actually did, assuming the same economy‐wide trends. There is significant variation across firms: the impact attenuates with geographic remoteness and union presence and strengthens with foreign ownership.     

The growing shadow economy: Implications for stabilization policy

Not only has the shadow economy obviously been growing much more rapidly than the official economy in the Western industrialised countries, it also appears to have a growth cycle of its own, running counter to the official economy's growth cycle. This raises a number of important questions for stabilization policy.     

Economic policy uncertainty,non-financial enterprises' shadow banking activities and stock price crash risk

At present, the structural contradiction between Economic Financialization and the real economy's long-term weakness has become increasingly prominent. As China enters a “new normal” stage of economic growth, the real investment rate drops, non-financial enterprises continuously allocate resources to the shadow banking system. The financial economy becomes increasingly divorced from reality. This leads us to the questions: will the shadow banking behavior of non-financial companies exacerbate the risk of stock price crash risk? How does the increase in economic policy uncertainty affect the relationship between non-financial companies' shadow banking activities and stock price crash risk?This article uses non-financial listed companies' data from 2007 to 2017 and conducts empirical analysis to answer this question. The study finds that companies engaged in high-leverage, high-risk shadow banking business exacerbate stock crash risk. This effect is only pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and low social trust regions. The increase in the degree of economic policy uncertainty positively impacts the relationship between non-financial companies' shadow banking business and stock price crash risk. The theoretical mechanism is as follows: the rise in economic policy uncertainty amplifies the positive relationship between shadow banking activities of non-financial companies and stock price crashes by increasing bank loans, investors' sensitivity to external information, risk cross-contagion, and inefficient investment mechanisms. Various robustness tests do not change the research conclusion. This paper has important theoretical and policy guidance significance for reviewing the existing diversified shadow banking system and preventing systemic risks.     

The distribution of gains from bilateral tariff reductions

A two-good, two-country model is used to analyse the distribution of gains from proportionate, bilateral tariff reductions It is shown that the distribution of gains is given by the solution to a rather complicated quadratic equation which exhibits multiple real roots. The country with the more elastic offer surface will be the relative gainer, for example, if it has either a very large or a very small tariff relative to the other country's tariff and relative to its own ‘optimal’ (Nash-equilibrium) tariff.     

Factor tariffs and income

This article examines a tariff on an imported factor of production in a small, open economy with two domestic factors. Suppose the imported factor is intensive in export production, and labor in import competing production. The factor tariff would reduce export production and trade, but raise the wage. The flexibility afforded by the three factors raises the possibility that import spending might fall more than the decrease in output. That is, the factor tariff could raise income. Inelastic demand for the imported factor and a high labor share of income favor increased income.     

The Political Economy of the Media: Coverage of the Lumber Tariff Dispute

The political economy of groups suggest that policies are more likely to be implemented if the benefits are concentrated and the costs are dispersed. The importance of the role of media in society changes the classic models. Media can awaken the sleeping masses to the dispersed costs of a policy and raise resentment towards the group who benefits. Thus, the content of media coverage can affect policy. Strömberg's (2001) model shows that the amount of newspaper space devoted to an issue should rise as the square of the number of people affected. This paper finds empirical support for Strömberg's theoretical findings with content analysis of newspaper coverage of the lumber tariff dispute.     

Tariff evasion in global trade data

ABSTRACT

We find evidence of pervasive tariff evasion in the global data on trade from 1988 to 2015. Using over 35 million observations of data on import and export flows at the HS6 product category level, we find evidence of substantial underreporting of imports relative to export data on average and particularly when tariffs on product categories are high. These effects are stronger in more corrupt destination countries, as measured by the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators [World Bank. 2016. Worldwide Governance Indicators. September 25, 2016]. In addition, evidence of tariff evasion increases significantly in economic downturns. We document these patterns in the global data and explore the welfare effects of this evasion by (1) putting a lower bound on the extent to which there are revenue losses from tariff evasion, and by (2) estimating the effects of corruption as measured by this indicator on global trade in a simple gravity model. We estimate that in total, revenue losses from tariff evasion are currently likely to exceed 400 to 670 million USD globally per year, and find that the effects of corruption on trade flows are ambiguous overall but change from weakly positive (‘grease the wheels’) to largely negative over the years in our sample.     

The ranking of alternative tariff and quota policies in the presence of domestic monopoly

Bhagwati demonstrated the nonequivalence between tariffs and quotas in the presence of monopoly. This paper also assumes domestic production to be monopolized and shows that giving import licenses or tariff revenues to the domestic producer may raise or lower the welfare cost of protection and the price paid by consumers from the price under other tariff and quota arrangements which maintain the same market share for the domestic producer. However, if the monopolist realizes that commercial policy is an instrument used to maximize the policymaker's welfare function, instead of being a goal in itself, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas re-emerges.     

The national defense tariff argument reconsidered

What is a country's optimal trade policy when embargoes and other trade interruptions are threatening? In addressing this issue, the paper emphasizes the nature of adjustment impediments when an effective embargo forces the economy to alter its production pattern abruptly. A production subsidy on the imported good represents the optimal policy choice, a tariff being a second-best instrument. The tariff's superiority to free trade implies, in turn, that the conventional classification of the national defense tariff as a noneconomic argument is inappropriate since economic efficiency criteria alone can justify the tariff.     

Trade Reform and Poverty: The Case of Mexico

We use a two‐step computationally simple procedure to analyse the effects of Mexico's's potential unilateral tariff liberalisation on real incomes. First, we use the CGE model provided by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) as the new price generator. Second, we apply the price changes to Mexican household data in order to assess the effects of the policy simulation on poverty and income distribution. Although Mexico widely liberalised most of its imports by the mid 90s, one salient feature is its membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and United States. By choosing GTAP as the price generator, we are able to model the differential tariff structure. Even starting with a low level of tariff protection, simulation results show that the impact of tariff reform on welfare will be positive in general for all expenditure deciles. We find that, when we assume non‐homothetic individual preferences, trade liberalisation benefits people in the poorer deciles more than those in the richer ones.     

Optimal trade,industrial, and privatization policies in a mixed duopoly with strategic managerial incentives

Abstract

This paper examines optimal trade, industrial, and privatization policies in a home-market model of mixed international duopoly with strategic managerial incentives. Under linear demand and constant marginal costs, the optimal degree of privatization is shown to depend crucially on cost and demand parameters and on the availability of strategic trade and industrial policies. If both firms are equally efficient, optimal trade and industrial policies drive out the foreign firm and the privatization policy loses its effect on national welfare; however, if the home firm is less efficient, then full privatization combined with an import tariff and a production subsidy is optimal for the home country, while an export subsidy is optimal for the foreign country. If trade and industrial policies are unavailable and if both firms are equally efficient, full state-ownership, which drives out the foreign firm, becomes optimal; however, if the home firm is less efficient, only partial privatization is optimal, The state-ownership share is increased if either the market size grows, the home firm's efficiency increases, or the foreign firm's efficiency decreases. Further, the paper demonstrates the potential conflict between privatization and trade liberalization policies.     

Lobbying and tariff formation: A deadweight loss consideration

This paper presents a model in which two organized groups spend real resources to influence a country's tariff policy. Being ‘small’ is shown to be advantageous in lobbying activities. The size of a group is measured by its share of national income. A small group bears only a small share of the deadweight loss which its lobbying and consequent deviation from free trade creates. Under plausible conditions, this advantage enables the smaller group engaged in lobbying to obtain trade restrictions which it views as beneficial.     

The spillover effects of China's monetary policy shock: Evidence from B&R countries

This paper examines the international spillover effects of China's monetary policy shock on macro and financial variables in 26 countries along the Belt and Road (B&R) from 2000 to 2019. We find that a surprise Chinese monetary tightening brings about a widening in the short-term interest rate spread, a drop in the equity price, nominal depreciation against the RMB and real depreciation, and an improvement in the trade balance, on average, across the 26 B&R countries. Moreover, substantial heterogeneous effects emerge in the responses of the foreign real exchange rate and the trade balance in different groups in terms of the 26 countries' trade weights with China, capital openness, and national income levels. Finally, all the empirical evidence reveals that the expenditure switching effect plays an important role in facilitating the international transmission of China's monetary policy shock.     

Is the Global Economy Headed for a Lost Decade? A European Perspective

In the 15 years leading up to the recent crisis, the world economy's exceptional performance was driven by globalisation, rapid, export-driven growth in emerging markets, debt-fuelled consumption in major advanced economies, and a benign financial and macroeconomic environment. These, however, sowed the seeds for the financial crisis by creating unsustainable imbalances and distortions. Obstacles to future growth are likely to be retrenchment in consumption, dampened investment, and unsustainable fiscal balances. Going forward, there must be a renewed commitment to medium-term, rule-based, policies for maintaining fiscal sustainability, price stability, and financial stability. The international imbalances between savings and consumption must also be addressed through a global reform agenda discussed in the paper. Even with reform, the challenges to growth will be daunting. Without reform, however, it is likely that the global economy will suffer a lost decade.     

Adjustment Problems in Developing Countries and the U.S.-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement

Abstract

In this study, MERCOSUR's past exports to the EU under the protectionist environment of the period between 1988 and 1996 are examined and an attempt is made to determine MERCOSUR's exports' growth potential in a liberalized EU market. A sectoral study is considered indispensable since tariff and non-tariff trade barriers vary strongly among sectors. The influence of the macroeconomic environment on MERCOSUR's exports is examined in a dynamic panel analysis. A simulation study based on a quite comprehensive evaluation of EU trade barriers is performed for the Argentinean case to evaluate the impact of EU trade liberalization.     

Sustaining imperfectly credible trade liberalization: Do the rate of tariff reduction and the degree of labour mobility matter?

Abstract

Imperfectly credible trade liberalization can lead to balance of payment deterioration and a subsequent reversal of the reform. Therefore, this paper examines whether the likelihood of policy reversal depends on the rate of tariff reduction or the degree of labour mobility. The analysis shows that transitory unemployment increases the likelihood of policy reversal. Furthermore, a gradual reduction in the tariff rate is found to extend the life of the liberalization episode, but does not necessarily increase the likelihood of sustained liberalization.     

Preferences,rent destruction and multilateral liberalization: The building block effect of CUSFTA

If a free trade agreement (FTA) is characterized by the exchange of market access with a large and competitive trading partner, the agreement can cause a leakage of protectionist benefits to domestic industry from lobbying against external tariff cuts. This rent destruction effect of an FTA can free policy makers to be more aggressive in multilateral tariff cuts. We argue that the Canadian–US free trade agreement (CUSFTA) provides an ideal policy experiment to link this mechanism to the data. Exploring the determinants of Canada's tariff cuts at the 8-digit HS product level, we find that CUSFTA acted as an additional driver of Canadian multilateral tariff reductions during the Uruguay Round.     

Trade policy under firm-level heterogeneity in a small economy

We explore the effect of trade policy on productivity and welfare in the now standard model of firm-level heterogeneity and product differentiation with monopolistic competition. To obtain sharp results, we restrict attention to an economy that takes as given the price of imports and the demand schedules for its exports (a “small economy”). We first establish that welfare can be decomposed into four terms: productivity, terms of trade, variety and curvature, where the last is a term that captures heterogeneity across varieties. We then show how a consumption subsidy, an export tax, or an import tariff allows our small economy to deal with two distortions that we identify and thereby reach its first-best allocation. We also show that an export subsidy generates an increase in productivity, but given the negative joint effect on the other three terms (terms of trade, variety, and curvature), welfare falls. In contrast, an import tariff improves welfare in spite of the fact that productivity falls.     

McKinnon互补性假说在中国成立吗?——基于1980—2010年数据的分析

通过建立向量自回归(VAR)模型,运用Johansen多变量协整和向量误差修正方法,利用中国1980—2010年的样本数据对McKinnon互补性假说进行实证检验。研究结果表明,McKin-non互补性假说在中国成立,即货币需求与资本形成为互补关系。其政策含义是:中国应继续大力推进金融改革特别是利率市场化改革;同时,采取各种有效措施提高实体经济的回报率,鼓励商业银行向中小企业贷款,以此促进企业的资本积累和经济的持续增长。