Effects of Target Timing and Contract Frame on Individual Performance

Abstract

This study experimentally examines the effects of target timing and contract frame on individual performance. We study four target-based incentive contracts, categorised by when participants learn the performance target (ex ante, or before production starts, vs. ex post, or after production ends) and how the incentive contract is framed (bonus vs. penalty). The performance target in this study is determined by a peer group's average productivity. We find that performance is significantly higher for bonus-framed contracts when the performance target is revealed ex post, as opposed to ex ante. In contrast, revealing the peer-based performance target ex ante or ex post has no impact on performance for penalty-framed contracts. We also find that the ex post, bonus-framed contract significantly outperforms the other three contracts. This finding supports practitioners' claim that employers should reward (as opposed to punish) individuals based on their performance, relative to that of their peers, ex post.     

On the Role of Receivables in Managing Salesforce Incentives

ABSTRACT

Despite the obvious problems associated with collections, firms routinely sell on credit. Conventional wisdom suggests offering credit is a necessary evil when dealing with insistent cash-constrained customers. This paper provides a more positive view of trade credit. We find that offering credit can enhance the efficiency of incentive contracts with sales personnel. In effect, with a credit sale, a client gets a second chance to generate enough cash. The client's second chance gives the sales agent another opportunity to demonstrate his past diligence to the firm. Moreover, to limit the risk associated with the fact that even a high-quality client may fail to eventually come up with funds, the firm relies on the accrual system. In particular, the agent's (discretionary and early) choice of the bad debt allowance conveys his private information regarding client quality; the payments associated with subsequent collections/default keep such reporting in check.     

ECB tapering: beware of global consequences

• ? The ECB's scaling back of its QE programme in 2018 could be more disruptive to global financial markets than the Federal Reserve's ongoing balance sheet unwinding. ECB bond purchases led Eurozone private investors to inject a massive amount of funds into global debt markets over the last few years. As the ECB reduces its stimulus, Eurozone investors will gradually pare back the build‐up of their foreign debt exposures. The full unwinding of ECB QE will see investors rebalance toward domestic debt securities .
• ? We expect Eurozone investors to continue injecting funds into global debt markets as the ECB proceeds to wind down its QE, but they will do so at a much slower pace. Based on our projections, European purchases of foreign debt securities this year will total €200 billion – down by half from the average €400 billion over the last three years. Such a large reduction raises the risk of disruption in some markets.
• ? How did we get here? Spillovers from the ECB's QE were much more pronounced than during Fed's. European private investors that sold bonds to the ECB during its QE programme faced a commensurate shortage of domestic debt assets. In contrast to the US experience, ECB buying far exceeded new domestic issuance, inducing private investors to sharply increase purchases of overseas debt securities.
• ? Ultimately, we expect European investors to seek to restore the share of domestic debt securities in their portfolios to a level in line with the historical norm, after the proportion of their domestic debt holdings fell by 7pp since the programme began. The rebalancing is likely to start in earnest once the ECB stops buying (and eventually starts selling) securities. As a result, the global debt issuance boom is likely to lose steam, given the extent to which it has relied on the support of European investors.

     

Robust bubbles with mild penalties for default

Limited enforcement of debt contracts and mild penalties for default can lead to low equilibrium interest rates, to ensure debt repayment. Low interest rates, in turn, create conditions for bubbles. I show that bubbles in unsecured private debt exist when the punishment for default is a permanent or a temporary interdiction to trade. Bubbles are an inefficient source of liquidity, as they lower interest rates and reduce welfare by discouraging saving.     

CEO Contract Design Regulation and Risk-Taking

Abstract

Since 2009, the European Commission (EC) requires firms to incorporate an array of new elements into CEO compensation contracts, such as bonus caps, claw back provisions, bonus deferral, performance-vesting, and minimum shareholding guidelines. This paper examines whether CEO contract design in line with the EC principles reduces risk-taking and its economic consequences. Using hand-collected contract design data of 763 firm-years from European listed non-financial firms, we construct an index that reflects a firm's contract fit with the EC principles. Complemented by hand-collected data of national regulatory changes consistent to the EC principles, we employ the regime shift as quasi-experiment. We find that CEOs rewarded under contracts more in line with the principles choose lower risk profiles with respect to their country peers by divergent reductions of idiosyncratic and systematic risk-taking. Moreover, intensity of change of the regulatory environment negatively affects systematic risk-taking. Furthermore, we find CEOs compensated under contracts more adhering to the principles lead to increased subsequent risk-adjusted performance.     

The Effect of Aggregation of Accounting Information via Segment Reporting on Accounting Conservatism

In a sample of U.S. multiple-segment firms, we document a negative association between aggregation via segment reporting and timely loss recognition. A higher level of aggregation, as reflected in a firm’s reported organizational structure (the definition and characteristics of its segments), causes a multiple-segment firm to exhibit less cross-segment variation in profitability than a matched control portfolio of single-segment firms. We find that firms that engage in more aggregation report accounting numbers that provide less timely information about economic losses. We also observe that firms that provide more disaggregated segment data subsequent to adopting SFAS 131 experienced an increase in timely loss recognition. This result implies that higher quality segment reporting leads to an increase in timely loss recognition, which, per extant research, is associated with better governance. Our results complement results in Berger and Hann [2003. The impact of SFAS No. 131 on information and monitoring. Journal of Accounting Research, 41, 163–223] that show a decline in inefficient internal-capital-market transfers subsequent to the adoption of SFAS 131. Overall, we provide evidence supporting Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther’s [2010. The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50, 296–343] contention that accounting conservatism is, in part, a function of managers’ aggregation choices.     

Motivate and select: Relational contracts with persistent types

We develop a model of relational contracts with moral hazard and asymmetric persistent information about an employee's type. We find that the form of the optimal contract depends on the job characteristics and the distribution of employees' talent. Bonus contracts are more likely to be adopted in complex jobs and when high talent is not too common or too rare. Firms with “normal” jobs are more likely to adopt termination contracts. In labor market equilibrium, different contracts may be adopted by ex ante identical firms. Hence, we offer an explanation for the coexistence of different employment systems within the same industry.     

企业数字化转型与高管薪酬契约有效性

以2008—2020年沪深A股非金融类上市公司为研究对象,实证检验企业数字化转型对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响。结果显示,企业数字化转型显著降低了高管薪酬-业绩敏感性,并增加了企业高管的超额薪酬。机制检验发现,企业数字化转型赋予了管理层集中的决策自主权,弱化了外部对管理层经营管理行为的监督力度,增强了管理层利用其高度集中的权力影响董事会薪酬契约制定的能力,获得了更多与企业业绩不匹配的私有收益,从而降低了高管薪酬契约有效性。异质性分析发现,在内部控制质量或信息披露质量较高的企业,企业进行数字化转型对高管薪酬契约有效性的负面效应会得到抑制。研究结论为全面认识企业数字化转型的经济后果提供了经验证据,同时也为数字化转型公司高管薪酬契约的制定提供了一定的参考。     

The Effects of IFRS Adoption on Observed Earnings Smoothness Properties: The Confounding Effects of Changes in Timely Gain and Loss Recognition

Ball and Shivakumar [(2006), The role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and loss recognition. Journal of Accounting Research, 44, 207–242] show that the observed smoothness of earnings (i.e. negative contemporaneous correlation between accruals and cash flows) is the joint product of the role of accruals in smoothing out transitory fluctuations in operating cash flows (noise reduction role) and the role of accruals in providing timely recognition of economic gains and losses (contracting role). These two roles of accruals have opposite effects on earnings smoothness properties. Using a regression framework that allows us to simultaneously consider both roles, we show that failing to control for changes in timely gain and loss recognition as firms shift to IFRS can lead to erroneous inferences regarding the effects of IFRS adoption on earnings smoothness, and consequently on researcher’ conclusions about how IFRS adoption has affected accounting quality. Our results are consistent with mandatory (2005) IFRS adoption resulting in a change in the contracting role rather than the noise reduction role (or smoothness role) of accruals. A decrease in timely loss recognition, an increase in timely gain recognition, and a net decrease in asymmetric timely loss recognition are what drives the change in observed smoothness properties of earnings around mandatory IFRS adoption.     

Private debt, unused credit lines, and seasoned equity offerings

We study a sample of SEOs to examine the impact of private debt and unused credit lines on SEO underpricing and long-run stock and operating performance. We do not find significant effects of private debt financing on SEO underpricing and long-run stock underperformance. However, firms with more bank debt and unused lines of credit exhibit significantly better pre-issue operating performance. Changes in operating performance from the pre-issue year to the post-issue period are negatively related to the size of unused credit lines. Capital spending decreases with the size of unused credit lines in the year prior to SEOs, but increases following SEOs. Our overall evidence suggests that the post-issue operating performance we observed may be a result of overinvestment, which is enhanced by unused credit lines.     

Long-run consequences of debt

Empirical evidence suggests that both public and private debt may have long-run detrimental effects on the economy. However, theoretical works have not provided a unique explanation to the issue. In this paper, therefore, we propose a framework that is able to describe the long-run effects of different kinds of debt. We introduce a stock-flow consistent dynamic model where the economy is represented as a network of trading relationships among agents. Debt contracts are one of such relationships. The model is characterized by a unique and stable steady-state and predicts that: (i) aggregate income is always limited from the above by the money supply; (ii) debts cause in the long-run a redistribution of borrowers’ wealth and income in favor of lenders; (iii) the redistribution is magnified by the level of the interest rate and (iv) by the degree of debt persistence. In the aggregate this may also lower the average marginal propensity to spend and nominal income, providing therefore a clear-cut explanation to the empirical evidence.     

Financing constraints and the use of performance-sensitive debt

Performance-sensitive debt (PSD) is a popular financial instrument in the corporate private debt market. In a real-options setting, this paper aims to clarify how PSD impacts on investment policy, capital structure, and agency cost of financing constraints when the firm faces the upper limit of debt issuance. We show that the constrained leverage hardly depends on the performance sensitivity. In particular, our conclusions predict that PSD can decrease the severity of financing constraints relative to the fixed-coupon debt case and the loss of firm value arising from investment and financing distortions due to the presence of financing constraints. The higher the performance sensitivity, the less likely that the firm is financially constrained. These findings provide a novel investment-based explanation for issuance of PSD.     

Can Two Wrongs Make a Right? State Ownership and Debt in a Transition Economy

Existing literature suggests that both state ownership and debt have detrimental performance consequences in transition economies. Paradoxically, however, we contend that the confluence of these two conditions may not be harmful. By considering the interactions between the governance properties of state ownership and debt, interpreted in light of the institutional context of China (i.e. the interplay between local governments, managers, and central banks), we argue that state ownership and debt can potentially offset each other's detrimental effects. We test our hypotheses with a sample of over 1300 Chinese firms that were listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock exchanges between 2003 and 2005. Results of the tests confirm that while debt and state ownership each have a negative impact on firm performance when used in isolation, their interaction has a positive impact on firm performance.     

Securing a Better Deal From Investors in Public Infrastructure Projects

Abstract

The return on capital is a major contributor to the cost of design, build, finance and operate (DBFO) contracts, under which public infrastructure is financed and delivered by private companies. The article presents a method for evaluating the rates of return targeted by bidders and applies this to 10 contracts commissioned by the UK National Health Service. The presence of significant excess returns is identified in each case. We argue that, if the rate of return projected by an investor exceeds a benchmark cost of capital, derived using standard capital budgeting techniques, then a reduction in the fee to be paid by the public authority is justified.     

Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay

We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and linear individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is nonobservable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. Thus, the two incentive schemes need to be combined to serve both incentive and selection purposes. If harder working agents respond less to intensified effort incentives, we find that the principal puts less emphasis on individual performance pay when selection becomes more important. Thus, we provide a possible explanation as to why, in practice, individual performance pay is less prevalent than promotion‐based incentives.     

The great rotation in global credit risks

• ? The pattern of global credit risks looks very different today than in 2007. Risks are now mostly centred in China and emerging markets. “Excess” private debt in China is as high as $3 trillion compared with $1.7 trillion in the US a decade ago. Yet some pockets of significant risk still exist in advanced economies, which not only implies vulnerability to rising interest rates, but also that the scope for rate rises may be limited.
• ? With policy normalisation underway in the US and the scaling back of asset purchases expected to start soon in the Eurozone, we focus on assessing vulnerabilities across global credit markets. This article explores the topic using a top‐down, cross‐country approach. We find that although private debt and debt service ratios look more benign in advanced economies than a decade ago, they have deteriorated markedly in many emerging markets in recent years.
• ? Based on a measure of excess private debt – comparing private credit‐to‐GDP ratios with their trend – China, Hong Kong and Canada are the riskiest. When comparing debt service ratios relative to their long‐term averages, risks are also mainly concentrated in emerging countries. But Canada, Australia and some smaller European countries also have high debt service ratios that have failed to drop since 2007, despite the slump in global interest rates.
• ? Overall, aggregate private debt indicators look less worrying than in 2007. We would also argue that the concentration of excess private debt levels in China reduces the risk of a sudden financial crisis based on massive credit losses, such as the one in 2007–2010. But with corporate debt levels in the US, Canada and some other G7 countries above their long‐term trend, investors need to be attentive to these considerable pockets of risk.

     

Do institutional investors monitor management? Evidence from the relationship between institutional ownership and capital structure

We examine the dynamic relations between institutional ownership and a firm's capital structure. We find that a firm's leverage decreases when institutional ownership increases. This result implies that a firm reduces its debt level as institutional investors substitute for the monitoring role of debt. More importantly, we find that a firm's suboptimal leverage decreases when the institutional ownership increases, and institutional ownership decreases when a firm's suboptimal leverage increases. This finding shows that institutions not only effectively monitor a firm's capital structure but they also passively sell their shares when dissatisfied with it. In addition, we find that the monitoring evidence on a firm's leverage and suboptimal leverage are more pronounced when the institutional investors are less likely to have business relationships with a firm or the information asymmetry is high in the market.     

The relationship between private investors and small firms: an agency theory approach

Many small firms in Sweden are characterized by a lack of equity capital. For several years measures to increase the equity capital have been discussed. In this discussion the private investors' market has received virtually no attention. This study presents some preliminary results of the private investors in Sweden.

The research in small firms financing is characterized by a lack of theoretical framework. One basic assumption in the study is that agency theory can provide an essential framework to explain the interaction between the private investor and entrepreneur. Twenty-five hypotheses generated from agency theory are formulated and tested on 62 small unlisted firms in Sweden. Multiple regression analysis is used for the causal analyses.

The empirical results in the study show inter alia that the geographic distance and the private investor's knowledge about the portfolio firm's transformation process seem to be the most influential factors for determining the private investor's involvement in the portfolio firms. It is also interesting to notice that none of the variables, frequency of contacts and the private investor's operational work in the portfolio firm affect the performance of the firm. Contrary to conventional wisdom, private investors do not add value to their portfolio firms through their interaction with the entrepreneurs.

The theoretical conclusion is that agency theory does not provide any satisfactory framework to explain the private investor - entrepreneur relationship. Some of the basic assumptions in agency theory seem to be invalid. A model for the relationship between private investors and entrepreneurs is developed in which four interaction strategies are identified. The model gives implications on two levels: the portfolio level and the individual case level.     

Political contestability and public contract rigidity: An analysis of procurement contracts

Are public contracts less adaptable than private contracts? Using a comprehensive set of contracts for a standard product, we compare procurement contracts in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private corporation. We find that public‐to‐private contracts feature more rigidity clauses than private‐to‐private contracts and that the use of rigidity clauses in public contracts rises when political risks are more salient. We argue that a significant part of the increased rigidity of public contracts is a contractual adaptation to limit political hazards from political opponents and interested third parties.     

Risk‐weighting debt implies more fiscal space

• ? Markets are more tolerant of fiscal expansion than governments typically fear. The composition of major economies' government debt has become safer and this is reflected in our estimates of a new indicator – risk‐weighted debt (RWD). Using RWD to measure debt provides a relatively benign indication of risks to sustainability in the major economies since 2004.
• ? Our RWD measures consist of six categories of debt holders, with weights allocated to their risk‐to‐flight potential. Debt holders range from riskier foreign banks and non‐banks (highly weighted), which would be most inclined to sell when times get tough, to safer entities such as central banks (zero weight).
• ? RWD looks less alarming than unweighted measures. Major economies' total public debt rose by 10% of GDP on average since 2011; RWD was up by just 1% of GDP.
• ? Japan and Italy show the biggest relative improvements when the focus shifts to RWD from debt‐to‐GDP. The two countries' RWD has fallen significantly since 2011.
• ? RWD improvements limit the extent to which indebtedness threatens sustainability.