Supporting Students' Learning: The Use of Formative Online Assessments

This paper investigates the impact of online multiple choice questions (MCQs) on students' learning in an undergraduate Accounting module at a British university. The impact is considered from three perspectives: an analysis of how students use the MCQs; students' perceptions expressed in a questionnaire survey; and an investigation of the correlation between MCQ usage and examination performance. The study reveals a number of interesting findings. First, students use the MCQs in different ways, indicating that MCQs are suitable for different learning styles. Second, the MCQs are perceived as being useful by virtually all students. Third, the statistical analysis shows a statistically significant correlation between regular MCQ usage and higher examination performance while controlling for a number of other confounding variables. These findings lead to the conclusion that MCQs are useful tools that can effectively support students' learning. Therefore the use of MCQs on other Accounting and Business modules is encouraged.     

The Performance Effect of Feedback Frequency and Detail: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Customer Satisfaction

This paper presents the results from a field experiment that examines the effects of nonfinancial performance feedback on the behavior of professionals working for an insurance repair company. We vary the frequency (weekly and monthly) and the level of detail of the feedback that the 800 professionals receive. Contrary to what we would expect if these professionals conformed to the model of the Bayesian decision maker, more (and more frequent) information does not always help improve performance. In fact, we find that professionals achieve the best outcomes when they receive detailed but infrequent (monthly) feedback. The treatment groups with frequent feedback, regardless of how detailed it is, perform no better than the control group (with monthly and aggregate information). The results are consistent with the information in the latest feedback report being most salient and professionals in the weekly treatments overweighting their most recent performance, hampering their ability to learn.     

Performance of Private to Public MBOs: The Role of Venture Capital

Abstract:   Using a unique dataset, we examine financial performance, and venture capital involvement in 167 MBOs exiting through IPOs (MBO‐IPOs) on the London Stock Exchange, during the period 1964 –1997. VC backed MBOs seem to be more underpriced than MBOs without venture capital backing, based on average value‐weighted returns. MBOs backed by highly reputable VCs tend to be older companies, and exit earlier than MBOs backed by less reputable VCs. The results contradict 'certification' and 'grandstanding' hypotheses supported by US data ( Megginson and Weiss, 1991 ; and Gompers, 1996 , respectively). We found no evidence of either significant underperformance, or that VC backed MBOs perform better than their non‐VC backed counterparts in the long run. However, MBOs backed by highly reputable venture capital firms seem to be better long‐term investments as compared to those backed by less prestigious venture capitalist firms. The results remain robust after using different methods to measure performance, and after controlling for sample selectivity bias.     

序数空间中企业战略风险与企业绩效关系研究——基于中国纺织业面板数据分析

依据序数空间中的熵理论,将战略风险转化为企业在战略参考系统内收益排名的下降带来的负面不确定信息,构建序数战略风险度量模型度量企业战略风险,克服了传统的均值方差等度量方法的局限性。运用2001～2009的中国纺织业相关数据,构建面板数据随机效应模型对企业战略风险与绩效关系进行分析,结果表明战略风险和企业的净资产收益率及总资产周转率呈负相关关系,企业非流动资产周转率和股息支付率对企业战略风险正向影响较小。     

金融危机背景下基金家族绩效与风险关系研究——基于面板数据模型的实证分析

以中国基金市场32家基金管理公司旗下的103只开放式偏股型基金作为样本,选择恰当的面板数据模型形式,分别建立金融危机之前、危机期间和危机之后三个时期基金家族绩效与风险关系模型,以剖析不同经济形势下两者之间的关系。结果表明,金融危机之前和危机期间基金家族绩效与风险显著负相关,而危机之后两者关系不显著,在金融危机期间和危机之后基金业绩效状况持续恶化,危机之后基金业整体风险水平降低;金融危机后,为弥补金融危机中造成的损失,各基金家族倾向于采取"打造明星基金"的投资策略以充分利用有限资源、提升家族整体绩效。     

Trends in Organizational Form and their Relationship to Performance: The Case of Foreign Securities Subsidiaries of U.S. Banking Organizations

Debate about the effects of permitting U.S. commercial banks to expand their range of activities has intensified in recent years. Some observers worry that banks with access to a federal safety net have strong incentives to use new opportunities to take greater risks and increase their likelihood of failure at possible cost to the FDIC and taxpayers. Others fear that the safety net might give banks a competitive advantage relative to nonbank rivals. A key element of this debate is whether a holding company structure does a significantly better job of mitigating against these potential problems than a bank subsidiary alternative and should be made mandatory for banking organizations that want to engage in nontraditional activities. Unfortunately, hard, current empirical evidence on the benefits and costs of alternative structures generally is lacking. The purpose of this paper is to provide this sort of evidence. In the study, annual financial data for the 1987–1997 period for an unbalanced panel of foreign securities subsidiaries of U.S. banking organizations are used to investigate two questions: What factors influence how bank holding companies organize securities activities when they have a choice? And are the observed differences in organizational form related to significant differences in key measures of subsidiary performance? This sort of study is possible because U.S. banking organizations can and do engage in securities activities through subsidiaries of the bank as well as holding company affiliates. These subsidiaries also file financial reports with bank regulators. A probit model is used to empirically identify important factors influencing structural choice. Univariate and multivariate statistical techniques are used to determine whether or not differences in subsidiary structure are related to differences in subsidiary risk, funding costs, and efficiency. Simultaneity is investigated to a limited extent. In brief, the empirical results do not support the position of the holding company proponents. Safety net subsidy incentives don’t appear to be a primary determinant of structural choice. The evidence does not indicate that bank-owned securities subsidiaries tend to be more risky than holding company securities subsidiaries. Bank securities subsidiaries also do not appear to enjoy any funding advantage relative to holding company subsidiaries. These two results are particularly noteworthy because section 23A and 23B restrictions on intracompany funding currently do not apply to transactions between banks and their direct and indirect bank subsidiaries. Finally, some evidence indicates that bank subsidiaries tend to be more efficient.