Effect of Certificate of Need Law on the intensity of competition: The market for emergency care

PurposeThis article aims to contribute to the academic literature in better understanding the impact of Certificate of Need (CON) Law on Emergency Department (ED) care. Impact of CON Law on ED competition remains an unanswered empirical question.MethodsWe examine the impact of CON Law and its stringency on the intensity of competition (rivalry among competitors) between EDs measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). We then estimate the effects of CON Law on HHI by treating CON as an exogenous (endogenous) variable.FindingsOn average the CON legislation enhances ED competition. A possible reason is that the law hinders predatory behavior, and therefore acts as an effective anti-trust tool. Other findings indicate that competition is found to be positively related to a state's population size and median income and negatively related with the prevalence of employer provided insurance and magnitude of illegal immigration in a state.Practical implicationsThis article sheds some light on how political regulations could affect healthcare market and hence may provide public policy makers some insights on reducing healthcare cost.OriginalityOur analysis of the impact of CON regulation on ED competition significantly contributes to the healthcare and strategy literature. The law potentially serves as an anti-trust tool in the hands of the government. We extend the empirical literature by treating CON Law and its stringency as exogenous (endogenous). Our comprehensive analysis considers a host of control variables such as population demographics, their health status and access to health care, healthcare facilities, political environment, in addition to the CON features.     

Corporate Value, Managerial Stockholdings and Investments of Japanese Firms

We use a simultaneous equation model which treats firm value, investments and management ownership as endogenous to the firm. Our results show a feedback relation between corporate value and management ownership, i.e., corporate value is positively impacted by management ownership, which in turn is positively impacted by corporate value. Corporate value also affects investments made by the firm. We also find that the effect of the main bank on corporate value is positive but only up to a certain point; then, it turns negative. Supporting the argument that keiretsu firms have lower agency cost, we find that firms belonging to a keiretsu have higher valuations during the sample period. Finally, we find that management ownership increases as the ownership of the main bank, ownership of institutional holders and cross‐holdings decreases, suggesting a substitution effect among these monitoring forces. Our results indicate that ignoring the web of these relationships leads to incorrect inferences.     

Firm Productivity and the Foreign‐Market Entry Decision

We use Japanese firm‐level data to examine how a firm’s productivity affects its foreign‐market entry strategy. The firm faces a choice between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI). In the case of FDI, the firm has two options: greenfield investment or acquisition of an existing plant (M&A). If it selects greenfield investment, it has two ownership choices: whole ownership or a joint venture with a local company. Controlling for industry‐ and country‐specific characteristics, we find that the more productive a firm is, the more likely it is to choose FDI rather than exporting and greenfield investment rather than M&A.     

Robust firm pricing with panel data

Firms often have imperfect information about demand for their products. We develop an integrated econometric and theoretical framework to model firm demand assessment and subsequent pricing decisions with limited information. We introduce a panel data discrete choice model whose realistic assumptions about consumer behavior deliver partially identified preferences and thus generate ambiguity in the firm pricing problem. We use the minimax-regret criterion as a decision-making rule for firms facing this ambiguity. We illustrate the framework’s benefits relative to the most common discrete choice analysis approach through simulations and empirical examples with field data.     

Ownership structure,information asymmetry and growth of the firm: Implications from nonfinancial firms listed in S&P500

This paper investigates the association between growth of the firm and ownership structure under conditions of information asymmetry. The objective is to show the effects of information asymmetry (favorable vs. adverse selection) on the choice of the ownership structure that helps firms grow. Our sample includes nonfinancial firms listed in the S&P500 over the period 2000 to 2016. The dependent variable is growth of the firm measured by growth in sales. The independent variables are proxies for changes in ownership structure, individual investors, investment managers, and brokerage firms. Observations are grouped according to level of information asymmetry (high or low) using three proxies for information asymmetry: beta of return on equity (ROE), probability of default of ROE, and q ratio. The results conclude that (a) changes in ownership structure affect growth of the firm positively and (b) the effect of ownership structure is more significant and consistent at low level of information asymmetry. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, it extends the arguments of corporate governance by showing the impact of ownership structure on growth of the firm. Second, the paper offers robust evidence that growth of the firm is associated with low level of information asymmetry. Third, the paper shows that fundamental financial information can help lessen the level of information asymmetry and thus help firms grow.     

CEO ownership and firm value

This paper examines the hypothesis that the amount of CEO ownership has a dominating effect on the value of the firm. Using a diverse sample of firms, firm value as measured by Tobin's q is found to be a nonmonotonic function of CEO ownership. Specifically, Tobin's q rises when the CEO owns between 0 and 15% and declines as CEO ownership increases to 50%. Beyond 50%, the value starts to rise. Firm value also is found not to be a function of management ownership when CEO ownership is separated out, indicating that CEO ownership does have a dominating effect on firm value. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Employee ownership and firm performance: a meta‐analysis

Employee ownership has been an area of significant practitioner and academic interest for the past four decades. Yet, empirical results on the relationship between employee ownership and firm performance remain mixed. To aggregate findings and provide potential direction for future theoretical development, we conducted a meta‐analysis of 102 samples representing 56,984 firms. Employee ownership has a small, but positive and statistically significant relation to firm performance ( = 0.04). The effect is generally positive for studies with different sampling designs (samples assessing change in performance pre‐employee–post‐employee ownership adoption or samples on firms with employee ownership), different performance operationalisation (efficiency or growth) and firm type (publicly held or privately held). Suggesting benefits of employee ownership in a variety of contexts, we found no differences in effects on performance in publicly held versus privately held firms, stock or stock option‐based ownership plans or differences in effects across different firm sizes (i.e. number of employees). We do find that the effect of employee ownership on performance has increased in studies over time and that studies with samples from outside the USA report stronger effects than those within. We also find little to no evidence of publication bias.     

Connecting ‘talent’ meanings and multi-level context: a discursive approach

Abstract

Through an in-depth, multilevel case study of a professional services firm, this paper illuminates what stakeholders mean when they use the term ‘talent’. The paper underlines how various contextual factors including, workforce composition, ownership structures and individual perceptions influence talent meanings within an organisation. Our analysis of talent phenomena at a multiplicity of levels illustrates that it is not only about the words, phrases, and terms employed when talking about talent that requires examination. There is a need to deliberate on the meanings that underpin the talk because while stakeholders may talk the same way they may mean different things. The paper makes a key theoretical contribution through specific recognition of the importance of thoughtful reflection of how stakeholders discursively construct meanings because ‘talent’ is a concept, which requires translation via talk to become meaningful within the material world and these meanings are influenced by context. Thus, we cannot infer, that talent meanings radiate within organisations, nor across organisational boundaries, industries or countries because discourses arise and materialise within specific contexts and we must acknowledge that talent discourses can not be removed from the context in which they operate.     

Model selection in stochastic frontier analysis with an application to maize production in Kenya

This paper shows how to compute the standard errors for partial effects of exogenous firm characteristics influencing firm inefficiency under a range of popular stochastic frontier model specifications. We also develop an R²-type measure to summarize the overall explanatory power of the exogenous factors on firm inefficiency. The paper also applies a recently developed model selection procedure to choose among alternative stochastic frontier specifications using data from household maize production in Kenya. The magnitude of estimated partial effects of exogenous household characteristics on inefficiency turns out to be very sensitive to model specification, and the model selection procedure leads to an unambiguous choice of best model. We propose a bootstrapping procedure to evaluate the size and power of the model selection procedure. The empirical application also provides further evidence on how household characteristics influence technical inefficiency in maize production in developing countries.

Behavioral agency and corporate entrepreneurship: CEO equity incentives & competitive behavior

Scholars have long studied drivers of entrepreneurial behavior among established firms. Yet little is known about how individual factors shape a firm’s choice to pursue entrepreneurship. We draw on behavioral agency theory to explore the role of equity incentives in driving corporate entrepreneurship. Our findings suggest CEOs avoid corporate entrepreneurial behaviors as their option wealth increases. However industry dynamics also prove to be an important contingency when predicting the effects of both restricted stock and stock options on the likelihood that the CEO engages in corporate entrepreneurship. Our findings provide a theoretical platform for predicting dimensions of entrepreneurial behavior and highlight effects of CEO equity ownership.

     

Observability and Sorting in a Market for Names

Can firm names be tradeable assets when changes in name ownership are observable? Earlier literature focuses on trading of firm names when trading is not observable to the consumer. Yet, casual empiricism suggests that shifts in name ownership are often publicly known. This paper studies how firm names can be traded even under full observability. In equilibrium, even when consumers see a reputed name being divested they continue to trust it and so, these names are tradeable. I further demonstrate an appealing “sorting” property of these equilibria. Competent firms can separate themselves by buying valuable names, and incompetent firms can give themselves away by using worthless names.     

Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure under Threat of Audit

We develop an economic model of “greenwash,” in which a firm strategically discloses environmental information and an activist may audit and penalize the firm for disclosing positive but not negative aspects of its environmental profile. We fully characterize the model's equilibria, and derive a variety of predictions about disclosure behavior. We rationalize conflicting results in the empirical literature, finding a nonmonotonic relationship between a firm's expected environmental performance and its environmental disclosures. Greater activist pressure deters greenwash, but induces some firms to disclose less about their environmental performance. Environmental management systems discourage firms with poor expected environmental performance from greenwashing, which may justify public policies encouraging firms to adopt them.     

上市公司股权激励机制与政策思考

高级管理层股权激励是西方企业缓解代理冲突的重要的风险激励机制,但我国对管理层股权激励的作用还缺乏清晰的认识。本文对中外管理层股权激励的理论和经验进行比较分析后发现,我国上市公司管理层持股已从单纯的福利制度安排向激励制度安排过渡。基于此,公司应尊重内生性,以长效考核机制为基础推行适度的股权激励计划,但要注意降低股权激励过程中新的代理成本和防止股权激励后的“内部人交易“。     

Management ownership and corporate value

Existing literature on the relation between management ownership and firm value has provided competing hypotheses and conflicting evidence. Using samples of Fortune 500-sized firms in 1976, 1980 and 1984, we find that corporate value measured by Tobin's q is a function of management ownership. Specifically, the q rises when management ownership is between 0% and 5-7%, and falls as the ownership increases to 10-12%. Beyond this range, we find that the q continues to fall in the 1976 sample, and starts to rise in the 1980 and 1984 samples. The evidence supports the hypothesis that there is a nonmonotonic relation between management ownership and corporate value.     

Disability status,individual variable pay,and pay satisfaction: Does relational and institutional trust make a difference?

Although prior research suggests that disabled employees have different needs in the context of some HRM practices, we know little about their reactions to reward systems. We address this gap in the literature by testing a model using the 2011 British Workplace Employee Relations Survey (disabled employees, n = 1,251; nondisabled employees, n = 9,959; workplaces, n = 1,806) and find that disabled employees report lower levels of pay satisfaction than nondisabled employees, and when compensated based on individual performance, the difference in pay satisfaction is larger. We suggest that relational (derived from trust in management) and institutional (derived from firm‐wide policies and HRM practices, both intended to provide equitable treatment to disabled employees) forms of trust play important roles. The results of multilevel analyses show that when trust in management is high, the difference in pay satisfaction under variable pay is reduced. We find just the opposite for employees who work in organizations with a formal disability policy but without supportive HRM practices; the gap in pay satisfaction is exacerbated. However, the combination of the presence of a firm‐wide policy and HRM practices reduced the difference in pay satisfaction. Implications of the findings for theory, future research, and management practice are discussed.     

Dominant stockownership and profitability

Dominant stockholders can acquire variable amounts of control over a firm's performance. The amount of control depends largely on both the incentive and power to dominate the firm's decision-making process. Ceteris paribus, a dominant stockholder has more incentive and power to influence firm behavior when he owns larger amounts of the firm's stock. To capture properly the effects of the separation of ownership and control this study considers a continuous relation between stockownership and control. This formulation allows for variable degrees of stockholder control, and suggests a critical minimum percentage of stockownership necessary for constraining managerial behavior.     

Estimation in a generalization of bivariate probit models with dummy endogenous regressors

The purpose of this paper is to provide guidelines for empirical researchers who use a class of bivariate threshold crossing models with dummy endogenous variables. A common practice employed by the researchers is the specification of the joint distribution of unobservables as a bivariate normal distribution, which results in a bivariate probit model. To address the problem of misspecification in this practice, we propose an easy‐to‐implement semiparametric estimation framework with parametric copula and nonparametric marginal distributions. We establish asymptotic theory, including root‐n normality, for the sieve maximum likelihood estimators that can be used to conduct inference on the individual structural parameters and the average treatment effect (ATE). In order to show the practical relevance of the proposed framework, we conduct a sensitivity analysis via extensive Monte Carlo simulation exercises. The results suggest that estimates of the parameters, especially the ATE, are sensitive to parametric specification, while semiparametric estimation exhibits robustness to underlying data‐generating processes. We then provide an empirical illustration where we estimate the effect of health insurance on doctor visits. In this paper, we also show that the absence of excluded instruments may result in identification failure, in contrast to what some practitioners believe.     

Monitoring costs as a basis for the dispersion of firm ownership

This paper proposes a model of endogenous shareholder dispersion. We find ownership structure causes variance in firm value, not vice versa, and contra to Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Conditions are also identified where increases in ownership dispersion maximize firm value, contra to Shleifer and Vishny (1986). The model suggests that ownership dispersion is a dynamic phenomenon that may change with interest rates or the set of alternative uses of firm resources. The conclusion is that there is not likely to be one ‘best’ structure of firm ownership, either for an individual firm over time or for all firms at a single point in time.     

Information Technology and the Organization of Firms

This paper seeks to understand why improved information technology (IT) might strengthen the case for decentralization, as recent empirical work suggests. We study a firm with a headquarters and two managers, each of whom gathers information about her changing local environment. The firm earns a gross profit that depends on actions taken as well as the current local environments. More information permits better actions, and information‐gathering costs drop as IT improves. When the firm is centralized, information‐gathering expenditures are first best, but after the firm decentralizes, each manager becomes a self‐interested player of a “sharing game” in which she collects a share of gross profit and bears the cost of her chosen information‐gathering activities. The firm's actions are determined by the information gathered at the equilibria of the game. As a result, the firm experiences a decentralization penalty, namely the change in net profit (gross profit minus informational costs) after decentralizing. If the penalty is small, then it is outweighed by the advantages of decentralizing—the vanishing of monitoring costs and perhaps the improved motivation of a decentralized manager's staff. To gather information a manager chooses (once and for all) a partitioning of her possible local environments and then searches to find the set in which her current environment lies. Our main measure of a manager's information cost is a technology parameter, θ, times the number of sets in her chosen partitioning. A second measure is θ times the partitioning's “Shannon content,” which may be interpreted as average search time when search is efficient. We ask whether improved IT, i.e., a drop in θ, indeed lowers the decentralization penalty. We obtain a strongly affirmative answer to this question for both cost measures in a class of examples and a mixed answer when we generalize so as to preserve some of the key properties of those examples. In a parallel manner we explore another conjecture suggested in the empirical literature, namely that better IT raises the coordination benefit, which we define as the increase in net profit when the firm bases its actions on pooled information, rather than letting each action variable depend on the information gathered by just one manager.