Real Exchange Rate Targeting,Macroeconomic Performance and Sectoral Income Distribution in Developing Countries

This paper uses a two-sector general equilibrium model to analyse both steady-state and stochastic dynamic effects of two real exchange rate targeting policies: a constant-target, and a band-target rule. In the model, targeting is implemented by imposing a stochastic fully-rebatable tax on the consumption of non-traded goods. The first result is that when comparing only steady states, a real exchange rate appreciation favours labour and capital in the non-traded sector, while factors in the traded sector are favoured by depreciations. A second result is that both rules reduce the volatility of investment and the trade balance. The third key result is that in the stochastic economy sectoral income distribution outcomes depend on the design of the constant and band-target rules. In particular, a variety of outcomes may be generated depending on the magnitude of the constant target, or the amplitude of the band, relative to the volatility of productivity shocks.     

A reappraisal of strategic trade policies with the endogenous mode of competition under vertical structures

This paper examines the endogenous choice of competition mode with strategic export policies in vertically related markets when each upstream firm located in each country determines the terms of the two-part tariff contract by maximizing generalized Nash bargaining. We show that (i) choosing Cournot (Bertrand) competition is the dominant strategy for both downstream firms when goods are substitutes (complements), which leads Pareto superior regardless of the nature of goods under the optimal trade policies; (ii) irrespective of rival’s competition mode, the optimal trade policy is an export subsidy under Cournot competition and an export tax under Bertrand competition; and (iii) trade liberalization may give rise to changes of competition mode and increase of social welfare.     

The impact of trade facilitation on poverty and inequality: Evidence from low- and middle-income countries

This paper using a trade model of imperfect competition and product differentiation, examines the welfare effects of two popular tariff-tax reforms: (i) a tariff cut combined with an equal increase in the consumption tax and (ii) a tariff cut combined with an increase in the consumption tax that leaves the consumer price of the imported good unchanged. It is shown that if tax revenues are lump-sum distributed and firms compete over prices, then coordinated tariff-tax reforms improve welfare for a low degree of product differentiation, whereas these reforms are welfare-reducing for any degree of product differentiation under Cournot competition. When, instead, revenues are used to finance the provision of public goods, then the total effect of these reforms on welfare depends, under plausible assumptions, on the strength of the consumer's valuation of the public good.     

Exchange rates,money, and relative prices: The dollar-pound in the 1920s

This paper applies the monetary approach to exchange rate determination to the analysis of the monthly dollar/pound exchange rate during the period preceding the return of Britain to gold in 1925. The analytical framework emphasizes that the exchange rate is influenced by real and monetary factors. Special attention is given to the relationship between the exchange rate and the relative price of traded to non-traded goods. The estimated elasticity of the exchange rate with respect to this relative price is shown to be about 0.4 which provides an independent measure of the relative share of spending on non-traded goods.     

Tariff and Consumption Tax Reforms in a Developing Tourism Economy

This paper examines the effects of a coordinated tax reform by replacing import tariffs with point-by-point increases in consumption taxes for a small-open developing tourism economy. Foreign tourists demand for the non-traded goods provided in the informal sector of the host economy, resulting in a tourism-induced terms-of-trade effect. The presence of inbound tourism lends a support to positive tariffs even for a small open economy. The indirect tax reform of this kind can increase residents’ welfare and government revenue when the initial tariffs are relatively larger to the consumption taxes.     

Using survey data to assess the distributional effects of trade policy

This paper develops a method to estimate the general equilibrium distributional effects of trade policies using household survey data. Trade reforms cause the domestic prices of traded goods to change and this, in turn, triggers a series of general equilibrium effects. Among these, I estimate the impacts of trade on the prices of traded goods, non-traded goods, and wages. By combining the estimates of the consumption impacts and the labor income impacts, I am able to assess how trade policies affect households across the entire range of the income distribution. An application of the procedure to the study of the distributional effects of Mercosur shows that the average poor and middle-income family in Argentina has benefited from the trade agreement.     

A trade theoretic analysis of outward capital flows: with special reference to Hong Kong

This paper sets up a trade theoretic model to explain the output, price and welfare consequences of the outward investment from Hong Kong to the Pearl River Delta. A four-good trade theoretic model is set up to incorporate some special features of the Hong Kong Economy. We assume that the economy produces four goods: an exportable good, an importable good and two non-traded goods. A special feature of the model is that one of the non-traded goods (locally produced) is also consumed by foreigners and produced under the assumption of non-competitive market framework. As tourist or business-centre trade is of great significance to Hong Kong, this model allows us to capture this phenomenon. First, precise conditions are derived regarding the decline in manufacturing output in Hong Kong. Second, it is shown that, in spite of the supply side determination of the relative price of non-traded goods, income effects in this market are of great significance in both income (welfare) and output movements. These income effects cannot be captured in industrial organization type applied work. Third, it is shown how outflow of capital affects labour productivity. A surprising result obtained for this part of the analysis is that a fall in productivity (outflow of capital and de-industrialization) creates a favourable terms-of-trade effect in the monopolized sector. The welfare effect consists of four terms: (1) a terms-of trade effect via the price of non-traded goods consumed by tourists/foreigners; (2) the loss (gain) in productivity due to an outflow of capital; (3) repatriation payments; and (4) the gains from exporting from the Special Economic Zones as well as other Pearl River Delta cities. Our decomposition has two very important features in contrast to traditional models: a terms-of-trade effect from the consumption of services and productivity gains or losses. The last point is exceedingly important for policy makers specifically if outward flow of capital affects productivity negatively.     

Trade policy in a “super size me” world

When a foreign monopolist sets a single market clearing price for its product, the sign of the optimal tariff is determined by the extent of pass through (also known as the terms of trade effect). However, when a foreign monopolist employs a second degree price discrimination mechanism in the domestic market the calculus of welfare maximization is very different. While there are still terms of trade effects from the imposition of a tariff, the existence of such effects are neither necessary nor sufficient to determine the sign of the optimal tariff. Instead the distribution of valuations within the population is the key determinant of the nature of policy intervention. This result differs significantly from the uniform price case and is driven by the incentive compatibility constraint which places the distribution of types at the center of the analysis. If there is a relatively large fraction of high valuation types in the population, then domestic information rents may be increased by subsidizing imports thereby increasing the consumption of the low valuation types and moving the incentive constraint in favor of the high valuation types. However, if the share of high types in the population is relatively small then the increase in information rents will also be small but the fiscal implications of a subsidy will be large. Consequently, the optimal policy will be to impose a trade tax.     

Openness and optimal monetary policy

We show that the composition of international trade has important implications for the optimal volatility of the exchange rate, above and beyond the size of trade flows. Using an analytically tractable small open economy model, we characterize the impact of the trade composition on the policy trade-off and on the role played by the exchange rate in correcting for price misalignments. Contrary to models where openness can be summarized by the degree of home bias, we find that openness can be a poor proxy of the welfare impact of alternative monetary policies. Using input–output data for 25 countries we document substantial differences in the import and non-tradable content of final demand components, and in the role played by imported inputs in domestic production. The estimates are used in a richer small-open-economy DSGE model to quantify the loss from an exchange rate peg relative to the Ramsey policy conditional on the composition of imports. We find that the main determinant of the losses is the share of non-traded goods in final demand.     

US–China rivalry: The macro policy choices

Stylised representations of recent US and Chinese tax reforms, tariffs against imports and alternative Chinese monetary targeting are examined using a calibrated global macro model that embodies both trade and financial interdependencies. For both countries, unilateral capital tax relief and bilateral tariffs are shown to be ‘beggar thy neighbor’ policies. As large economies, both enjoy ‘optimal tariffs’, even bilaterally, though net outcomes are shown to depend on the allocation of revenues. Bilateral tariffs are most advantageous for the US if the additional revenue finances indirect tax relief. Once US bilateral tariffs are imposed, China is a net loser irrespective of its policy response, though a currency float is shown to cushion the effects on its GDP in the short run. Equilibria in normal form non-cooperative tariff games have the US imposing tariffs while China liberalises.     

Trade patterns,unemployment and growth

This paper analyses the implications of a minimum wage in an open economy two-sector model where the effect of growth on trade and unemployment is explicitly determined. The first-best policy is a wage subsidy to all employment while the second-best policy is a production tax cum subsidy. In the absence of policy intervention it is shown that growth in the short run results in decreasing unemployment for the home country if it is specialized in consumption goods or incompletely specialized provided that the minimum wage is binding. If the economy is specialized in investment goods, then unemployment may increase initially but as growth continues the minimum wage no longer remains binding and full employment is restored. In the long run by examining the dynamic interaction between trade and growth it is possible for the economy to be incompletely specialized with unemployment. If the economy specializes in consumption goods, it is possible for the economy to attain full employment.     

The economics of taxes with equivalent effects to tariffs

Developing countries are faced with the issue of tariff replacement at an early stage of their development, due to their increased commitments through Free Trade Arrangements with developed countries. As tariff replacement through VAT, or more sophisticated tools such as income tax, is neither practically nor economically desirable in these economies, this paper investigates the effects of an alternative replacement tax that only affects categories of goods not produced locally. This tax, denominated tax with equivalent effects to tariffs (TEET), is indeed a consumption tax as it concerns all goods, whether imported or potentially produced in the country. Based on a simple diagrammatic approach, the study shows that this tool tends to generate more welfare than tariffs if final prices of goods are left unchanged. It shows that a government can continue to maintain its revenues and increase the welfare of consumers through this fiscal replacement. Additionally, the political and economic reserves associated with this tool are discussed. The TEET are therefore useful mainly for small and non-diversified economies. It also remains that the use of this tool is, in practice, conditioned by the level of tolerance of developed countries, which tend to prohibit it in bilateral agreements with developing countries.     

Welfare-optimal trade and competition policies in small open oligopolistic economies

Standard trade theory claims that free trade is welfare-enhancing. We show that this is not the case if at least one sector of the economy is a Cournot oligopoly. In a simple small open economy with one oligopolistic and one competitive sector, welfare is an inverted U-shaped function of tariffs. Hence, an optimal tariff rate can be determined. The optimal rate depends on the number of firms in the oligopolistic sector. Below the optimal level, the competitive sector overproduces, i.e. oligopolistic good have a higher marginal effect on welfare. Increasing tariff rates stimulate the production of the oligopolistic sector by dampening imports. Under balanced trade, this reduces exports and production in the competitive sector, thus shifting resources to oligopolistic goods production. We also find that given certain levels of protection, perfect competition is not welfare maximal and, hence, not desirable. The finding explains why developing economies with imperfect competition are often reluctant to embrace trade liberalization and why, conversely, countries with high levels of external protection may be unenthusiastic about competition theory.     

Preference Erosion,Government Revenues and Non‐tariff Trade Barriers

Developing countries benefiting from developed country unilateral trade preferences fear that Doha Round tariff cuts will erode the value of those preferences. That these programmes confer significant benefits, however, is not clear. Studies indicate that the impact of preference erosion would be minimal for most developing countries. But for a small subset of middle‐income and least‐developed countries, concern may be warranted. WTO members, should address affected countries’ concerns, perhaps by tailoring WTO tariff negotiations to lessen adjustment pressures and providing development assistance. Developing countries also are anxious that lower tariffs will reduce government revenues. Dependence on tariff revenue is diminishing and trade liberalisation need not result in lower total tax revenues or even lower customs revenues. Much depends on a country's current tariff and trade regime, its tax structure and its overall economic structure. At some point, a country does need to broaden its tax base and look to other revenue sources to offset declining tariff revenues. Tax reform, therefore, complements trade reform. A third area of developing country concern is non‐tariff barriers (NTBs), which may limit market access even after tariffs are reduced. Despite prior WTO work in this area, NTBs remain a thorny issue for all WTO members.     

APEC环境产品清单对中国的影响及其战略选择

2013年10月亚太经合组织(APEC)领导人非正式会议在印度尼西亚举行,根据近年惯例,环境产品将是重要内容。本文遵循APEC环境产品清单环境影响的逻辑,根据2012年APEC提出的54个6位税号环境产品清单及其降税情景,对中国税率、经贸、环境及政策的影响进行了分析并得出了相关结论,同时结合未来趋势对中国的战略选择提出了相关建议。     

Tariff and tax reform: Dynamic implications

In an endogenously growing small open economy with a capital good and a consumption good, we characterize the optimal combination of an import tariff and consumption taxes under the revenue neutrality constraint. Focusing on the case in which the economy imports the capital good, we obtain two main results. First, consumption of the capital good is distorted more than the consumption good at the optimum. Second, the optimal tariff rate is positive, implying that free trade is not optimal even for a small open economy with no market failure.     

Local costs of distribution,international trade costs and micro evidence on the law of one price

This paper connects trade flows to deviations from the law of one price (LOOP) in a structural model of trade and retailing. It accounts for the observed cross-country dispersion in prices of goods, based on retail price survey data, by focusing on two sources of goods market segmentation — (i) international trade costs, and (ii) non-traded input costs of distribution. I find that a multi-sector Ricardian trade model, ala Eaton–Kortum, augmented with a distribution sector, can account for the average price dispersion for a basket of goods fully and generates 70% of the variation in price dispersion across goods within the basket. While tradability of goods is important in explaining the average price dispersion for the basket of goods, distribution costs are important in explaining why, within the basket, some goods show more price dispersion than others.     

Interindustry flows, non-traded intermediate goods and the theory of effective protection : A general equilibrium analysis

This paper examines the response of net and gross outputs of tradeable goods to changes in tariff structure in the context of a comprehensive general equilibrium model with interindustry flows and non-traded, as well as imported, intermediate goods. There are two major results. First, the nominal rate of tariffs on a tradeable good is shown to correctly indicate the movements of its net output under most general conditions. Second, the (modified and) generalized Corden index of effective protection for a tradeable good is revealed to be in a close relationship with the behavior of its gross output under certain restrictions on the input substitutability of industries.     

Tourism Promotion,Increasing Returns and Domestic Welfare

This paper compares the effect of tourism promotion funded by commodity tax and income tax on domestic welfare in an open economy with increasing returns in the tourism and the non‐tourism sector. A promotion may overcome the under‐production of tourism goods through taking account of the implications of increasing returns, but at the same time, the taxation may have an adverse impact on the rest of the economy. Employing a general equilibrium analysis, we find that the cost of tourism promotion overcomes the benefit, reducing local residents' welfare. Furthermore, commodity tax on tourism consumption is relatively more efficient than income tax in a monopolistic competition, with less adverse impact on the variety of non‐tourism goods. We also clarify the condition for deteriorating ‘terms of trade’, which only happens when the country has a small allocation of factor endowments.     

Differentiated products and evasion of import tariffs

An emerging literature has demonstrated some unique characteristics of trade in differentiated products. This paper contributes to the literature by postulating that differentiated products may be subject to greater tariff evasion due to the difficulties associated with assessing their quality and price. Using product-level data on trade between Germany and 10 Eastern European countries during 1992-2003, we find empirical support for this hypothesis. We show that the trade gap, defined as the discrepancy between the value of exports reported by Germany and the value of imports from Germany reported by the importing country, is positively related to the level of tariff in 8 out of 10 countries. Further, we show that the responsiveness of the trade gap to the tariff level is greater for differentiated products than for homogeneous goods. A one-percentage-point increase in the tariff rate is associated with a 0.4% increase in the trade gap in the case of homogeneous products and a 1.7% increase in the case of differentiated products. Finally, the data indicate that tariff evasion takes place through misrepresentation of the import prices rather than underreporting of quantities or product misclassification.