Internet auctions with a temporary buyout option

Using data on 17 industrial countries from 1982 to 2003 and controlling for a wide array of factors, this paper finds that higher exchange rate volatility increases the unemployment rate. The magnitude of the effect is small. The results are robust to variations in specification.     

Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option

We characterize the optimal selling mechanism for a seller who faces demand demarcated by a high and a low end and who can access an (online) auction site (by paying an access cost) in addition to using his own store that can be used as a posted price selling venue. We first solve for the optimal mechanism of a direct revelation game in which there is no venue-restriction constraint. We find that the direct optimal mechanism must necessarily incorporate a certain kind of pooling. We then show that even with the venue constraint, the seller can use a two stage indirect mechanism that implements the allocation rule from the optimal direct mechanism, and uses the venues in an optimal fashion. The first stage of the indirect mechanism is a posted price at the store. If the object is not sold, we move to stage two, which involves an auction at the auction site. A feature of this auction is a buy-now option which is essential for implementing the pooling feature of the optimal direct mechanism. We also show that the buy-now option in the optimal mechanism is of a “temporary” variety, and that a “permanent” buy-now option, in contrast, cannot implement the optimal mechanism. Auctions with a temporary buy-now option are in widespread use on eBay. We thank the Associate Editor, George Deltas, for his insightful comments. We also thank seminar participants at the University of Basel and the SAET conference 2007.     

Optimal risk adoption: a real options approach

Summary. This study develops a real options approach for analyzing the optimal risk adoption policy in an environment where the adoption means a switch from one stochastic flow representation into another. We establish that increased volatility does not necessarily decelerate investment, as predicted by the standard literature on real options, once the underlying volatility of the state variable is made endogenous. We prove that for a decision maker with a convex (concave) objective function, increased post-adoption volatility increases (decreases) the expected cumulative present value of the post-adoption profit flow, which consequently decreases (increases) the option value of waiting and, therefore, accelerates (decelerates) current investment.Received: 12 October 2001, Revised: 4 December 2002, JEL Classification Numbers: O32, G30, D92, C61. Correspondence to: Luis H.R. AlvarezConstructive comments from an anonymous referee are acknowledged. The financial support from the Foundation for the Promotion of the Actuarial Profession (Aktuaaritoiminnan Kehittämissäätiö) to Luis H. R. Alvarez is gratefully acknowledged. Both authors are grateful for the financial support from The Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation.     

The role of optimal threats in auction design

This paper studies revenue-maximizing auctions when buyers' outside options depend on their private information and are endogenously chosen by the seller. We show that the revenue-maximizing assignment of the object can depend crucially on the outside options that the seller can choose as threats. Depending on the shape of outside options, sometimes an optimal mechanism allocates the object in an ex-post efficient way, and, other times, buyers obtain the object more often than is efficient.     

The multiple unit auction with variable supply

Summary. The theory of multiple unit auctions traditionally assumes that the offered quantity is fixed. I argue that this assumption is not appropriate for many applications because the seller may be able and willing to adjust the supply as a function of the bidding. In this paper I address this shortcoming by analyzing a multi-unit auction game between a monopolistic seller who can produce arbitrary quantities at constant unit cost, and oligopolistic bidders. I establish the existence of a subgame-perfect equilibrium for price discriminating and for uniform price auctions. I also show that bidders have an incentive to misreport their true demand in both auction formats, but they do that in different ways and for different reasons. Furthermore, both auction formats are inefficient, but there is no unambiguous ordering among them. Finally, the more competitive the bidders are, the more likely the seller is to prefer uniform pricing over price discrimination, yet increased competition among bidders may or may not enhance efficiency. Received: June 18, 1998; revised version: January 13, 1999     

The sale of small firms: a multidimensional analysis

Summary. This paper endogeneizes the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell a small firm. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives which are not mutually consistent. If the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. At the opposite, if he wants to sell his firm to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares. Received: July 4, 2001; revised version: October 31, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The paper has benefited from a number of comments from the anonymous referees. Correspondence to: C. At     

Gender gap in self‐employment: The role of risk attitudes

This paper examines the link between the willingness to take risk and the gender gap in self‐employment in the transition economy, where for decades entrepreneurship was considered a crime. Using rich data on risk preferences and entrepreneurial activities, we show that male–female risk tolerance differential is the main determinant of the gender gap in self‐employment in Ukraine. The decomposition results indicate that up to 38% of the gap can be attributed to this factor. Robustness tests support the validity of the baseline findings by suggesting that the results are not confounded by such factors as being unemployed before starting a current job, having a self‐employed household member, or living in a relatively wealthy household before transitioning to self‐employment.     

Effectiveness of the reserve option mechanism as a macroeconomic prudential tool: evidence from Turkey

This article assesses the effectiveness of a novel macroprudential tool – the reserve option mechanism (ROM) – which Turkey’s central bank developed during the post-2008 period and has employed to control the risk associated with excessive capital flows. We assess how capital flows have affected economic variable changes since the introduction and usage of the ROM. Empirical evidence gathered from Turkey suggests that the tool decreases the effect of capital flow on capital flow (positive shock to capital flow dies out faster or becomes less persistent) and diminishes the effects of capital flow shocks on exchange and interest rates.     

Laboratory Testbeds and Non-Market Valuation: The Case of Bidding Behavior in a Second-Price Auction with an Outside Option

Researchers now use the lab to examine the behavioral underpinnings of valuation before the field application which some argue has less experimental control. But lab valuation work raises its own set of concerns when it uses private goods to explore non-market valuation behavior because private goods have substitutes often unaccounted for in the lab. Therefore, the lab as a tool to testbed field valuation work may be limited. Herein we design an induced valuation experiment to explore bidding behavior in a second-price auction with an outside option that is a perfect substitute for the auction commodity. Theory predicts that rational bidders will consider the prices of outside options when formulating bidding strategies, and will reduce their bids whenever their resale value exceeds the price of the outside option. Our results suggest that bidders account for outside options when formulating bids with behavior following comparative static predictions. In addition, we provide evidence concerning hypothetical versus actual behavior with induced values – the data suggesting a hypothetical bias in the level of bids but not in bid shaving.     

Intragroup competition in public good games: The role of relative performance incentives and risk attitudes

We analyze a public good game (PGG) with intragroup competition in which, generally but not always, the dominant strategy is to not contribute; therefore, free riding is the unique Nash equilibrium, not achieving Pareto efficiency. We propose a PGG setup where subjects' contributions are rewarded with different individual returns following a rank‐order voluntary contribution mechanism. It is found that the resulting competition for a better return significantly increases contributions. This effect is sensitive to the salience of return differences rewarding higher contributions. Furthermore, the positive effect of return differences on contribution levels depends on an individual's return‐to‐risk sensitivity as elicited through an independent risk elicitation task.     

The price of owning a car: an analysis of auction quota premium in Singapore

Faced with dilemmas parallel to countries besieged by road congestions and limited land resources, Singapore has chosen to adapt a Vehicle Quota System (VQS) whereby car owners are required to bid for a licence in an auction before their vehicles are allowed onto the road. In this study, the behaviour of VQS auction prices is examined using a structural time series approach. For outliers that are not observable from innovations, auxiliary residuals with dummy variables are used to supplement the analysis. In general, prices exhibit a fairly constant seasonal pattern. The inclusion of monthly VQS quotas released by the transport regulatory body and the national stock market index is not useful in explaining the observed price behaviour. Interestingly, a basic structural model with stochastic components seems to fit the data best.     

Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs

We investigate whether efficient collusive bidding mechanisms are affected by potential information leakage from bidders' decisions to participate in them within the independent private values setting. We apply the concept of ratifiability introduced by Cramton and Palfrey [Cramton, P.C., Palfrey, T.R., 1995, Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement, Games Econ. Behav. 10 (2), 255–283] and show that when the seller uses a second-price auction with participation costs, the standard efficient cartel mechanisms such as pre-auction knockouts analyzed in the literature will not be ratified by cartel members. A high-value bidder benefits from vetoing the cartel mechanism since doing so sends a credible signal that she has high value, which in turn discourages other bidders from participating in the seller's auction.     

A Hotelling–Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit

We study a variant of the multi-candidate Hotelling–Downs model that recognizes that politicians, even after declaring candidacy, have the option of withdrawing from the electoral contest before the election date and saving the cost of continuing campaign. We find that this natural variant significantly alters equilibrium predictions. We give conditions for the existence of an equilibrium for an arbitrary finite number of candidates and an arbitrary distribution of single-peaked preferences of voters. We also provide a partial characterization of the equilibrium outcomes that addresses whether policy convergence can be a feature of equilibrium outcomes when more than two candidates enter the electoral contest.     

Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction

In second price Internet auctions with a fixed end time, such as those on eBay, many bidders submit their bids in the closing minutes or seconds of an auction. We propose an internet auction model, in which very late bids have a positive probability of not being successfully submitted, and show that late bidding in a fixed deadline auction can occur at equilibrium in auctions both with private values and with uncertain, dependent values. Late bidding may also arise out of equilibrium, as a best reply to incremental bidding. However, the strategic advantages of late bidding are severely attenuated in auctions that apply an automatic extension rule such as auctions conducted on Amazon. Field data show that there is more late bidding on eBay than on Amazon, and this difference grows with experience. We also study the incidence of multiple bidding, and its relation to late bidding.     

The role of risk aversion in public goods dilemmas with environmental uncertainty: an experimental analysis

The purpose of this study is to extend earlier research on environmental uncertainty in public goods dilemmas. The present paper reports the results of an experiment designed to examine the effect of risk aversion on public goods provision. A von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function with constant coefficient of relative risk aversion is used to investigate the impact of risk attitudes within a threshold public goods environment. The outcome of the threshold public goods experiment shows that subjects are indifferent to the changes in environmental conditions. Additionally, the analysis indicates that risk aversion is a significant determinant of voluntary public goods contribution level.     

The option of joint purchase in vertically differentiated markets

Summary. Within the framework proposed by Mussa and Rosen (1978) for modelling quality differentiation, consumers are assumed to make mutually exclusive purchases. A unique pure strategy equilibrium exists in this case. In this note, we allow consumers to buy simultaneously different variants of the differentiated good. We call this the “joint purchase option”. The paper proposes a detailed analysis of price competition when this option is opened: first, we show that either uniqueness, or multiplicity, or absence of price equilibrium arise, depending on the utility derived from joint purchase relative to exclusive purchase. Second, we characterize these equilibria, whenever they exist. Received: July 25, 2001; revised version: October 21, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The second author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from Interuniversity Attraction Pole Program- Belgian State- Federal Office for Scientific, Technical and Cultural Affairs under contract PAI 5/26. Correspondence to: X.Y. Wauthy     

Accounting for the impact of higher order moments in foreign equity option pricing model

This paper investigates the pricing of foreign equity option whose value depends on foreign equity prices and exchange rate. We assume that the underlying asset returns of foreign equity option is not a Brownian motion, and use the Gram-Charlier series expansion to augment a normal density with two additional terms to capture the effects of skewness and kurtosis. The empirical study shows that the higher order moments (skewness and kurtosis) clearly affect the estimated prices of foreign equity options. This approach enables us to capture more accurately the foreign equity option prices.     

The role of risk in contract choice

Structuring contracts to share risk in light of incentive problemsis the central premise of contract theory, yet the risk-sharingimplications have rarely been thoroughly tested using micro-levelcontract data. In this article we test the major implicationsof a principal-agent model of contracts using detailed dataon more than 4000 individual contracts from modern North Americanagriculture. On a case-by-case basis, our evidence fails tosupport the standard principal-agent model with risk aversionas an explanation of contract choice in modern North Americanfarming. At the same time, we find some support for models thatassume risk-neutral contracting parties and stress multiplemargins for moral hazard and enforcement costs.     

The optimal initial allocation of pollution permits: a relative performance approach

The initial allocation of pollution permits is an important aspect of emissions trading schemes. We generalize the analysis of Böhringer and Lange (2005, Eur Econ Rev 49(8): 2041–2055) to initial allocation mechanisms that are based on inter-firm relative performance comparisons (including grandfathering and auctions, as well as novel mechanisms). We show that using firms’ historical output for allocating permits is never optimal in a dynamic permit market setting, while using firms’ historical emissions is optimal only in closed trading systems and only for a narrow class of allocation mechanisms. Instead, it is possible to achieve social optimality by allocating permits based only on an external factor, which is independent of output and emissions. We then outline sufficient conditions for a socially optimal relative performance mechanism.     

The role of sentiment in global risk premia

This article examines the role of sentiment for global risk premia. We analyse whether the global risk premia on macroeconomic fundamentals can be estimated more thoroughly if sentiment is included as additional conditioning information. The analysis is performed in the framework of a conditional multiple beta pricing model. The focus of analysis is the asset excess returns of the G-7 stock markets in the period from February 1999 to February 2012. The obtained results indicate that sentiment as conditioning information is able to contribute to the explanation of the general macroeconomic risk premia.