Industry equilibrium with random exit or default

An industry consisting of a large number of small price taking firms subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks is considered. At the moment of entry, a firm takes on debt. We show that in a competitive equilibrium, some firms exit and pay out their debt while others choose to default. The outcome depends on the realization of firm‐specific shocks. The paper demonstrates that if the firms self‐select between exit with debt repayment and default, then the default region is disconnected from the exit region. The methodological contribution of the paper is the analytical characterization of the long‐run equilibrium for two scenarios of the initial distribution of productivity shocks. We consider two public policy mechanisms—contract enforcement and creditor protection. Our policy recommendation is that regulators need to reduce the contract enforcement if they want to decrease the long‐run default rate.     

Bankruptcy and firm finance

This paper analyzes how an enforcement mechanism that resembles a court affects firm finance. The court is described by two parameters that correspond to enforcement costs and the amount of creditor/debtor protection. We provide a theoretical and quantitative characterization of the effect of these enforcement parameters on the contract loan rate, the default probability and welfare. We analyze agents’ incentive to default and pursue bankruptcy and show that when the constraints that govern these decisions bind, the enforcement parameters can have a sharply non-linear effect on finance. We also compute the welfare losses of “poor institutions” and show that they are non-trivial. The results provide guidance on when models which abstract from enforcement provide good approximations and when they do not.      

Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management

Summary This paper considers a problem in which an agent is hired to manage a capital investment and subsequently receives private information regarding the productivity of the capital investment. The capital manager must decide whether to invest capital supplied by the firm (the principal), or to divert these investment funds to perquisite consumption. If the manager decides to invest, the manager must then select the level of operating efficiency (productivity) of the capital investment, this latter choice being unobservable and constrained by the (maximal) productivity of the investment. In this setting we demonstrate that the optimal employment contract, from the perspective of the firm hiring the manager, is the contract whichminimizes the dependence of the manager's compensation on firm output. This contract pays the manager a fixed wage whenever output from the investment exceeds the wage and provides the manager with all of the projects rents whenever output falls below this level. Thus, we provide a setting in which fixed wage contracts are the optimal incentive contract even when agents are risk neutral and contracts can be costlessly written on future output.We would like to thank the participants in the Princeton Economics and Finance Workshop and the Ohio State University Finance Workshop for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The second author gratefully acknowledges the research support of the Georgia State College of Business Administration Research Council.     

Optimal contract theory with time-inconsistent preferences

This paper incorporates managers' time-inconsistent preferences into the classical DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) contract model to study corresponding impacts on the optimal contract, corporate financial policies, and the optimal capital structure. The extended model shows that the impatience of the time-inconsistent agent has positive effects on the optimal payout decision which is opposite to DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and consequently provides a guideline to tailor the contract between investors and the agent. It also shows in the optimal capital structure, the total debt capacity shrinks with the degree of the agent's time inconsistency, and the long-term one shrinks more. In addition, our model predicts that the agent's time inconsistency not only imposes significant limits on the use of long-term debt but also has great effects on firms' capital structures. Thus our finding can potentially explain observed cross-sectional differences in firms' capital structures.     

非正规金融契约治理的微观理论

基于对非正规金融契约治理机制的剖析,文章为非常不完备的非正规金融契约与低违约率并存的现象提供了一个分析解释视角。非正规金融契约执行主要是依靠契约的私人治理机制来实现,这主要表现为五种形式,即抵押品化的“社会资本”的治理效应、重复博弈与信誉机制、关联交易与违约成本、联合贷款与连带责任和非法暴力机制。     

SHOULD YOU ALLOW YOUR EMPLOYEE TO BECOME YOUR COMPETITOR? ON NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS*

We discuss a principal–agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a noncompete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal, as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the agent. The principal prefers to impose such a clause if and only if the value created is sufficiently small relative to the agent's outside option. If the principal can use an option contract for retaining the agent, she will never prefer a strict noncompete agreement.     

How does ownership structure affect capital structure and firm value?Recent evidence from East Asia1

The present paper examines the effects of ownership structures on capital structure and firm valuation. It argues that the effects of separation of control from cash flow rights on capital structure and firm value also depend on the separation of control from management as well as on legal rules and enforcement defining investors’ protection. We obtain firm‐level panel data (three stage least squares, 3SLS) estimates from four of the East Asian countries worst affected by the last crisis. There is evidence that the general wisdom that higher control than cash flow rights may lower firm value may be reversed among owner‐managed family firms in the sample countries.     

Matching Bankruptcy Laws to Legal Environments

We study a model of optimal bankruptcy law in an environmentwhere legal quality can vary along two dimensions: the expertiseof judges and the quality of contract enforcement. We analyzea model in which a judicially influenced bankruptcy processcan enhance the efficiency of incomplete contracts by conditioningthe allocation of control rights in bankruptcy on firm quality.We consider the optimal balance of debtor and creditor interestsas a function of the legal environment and show that the optimaldegree of "creditor-friendliness" in the bankruptcy code increasesas judicial ability to recognize firm quality falls and as thequality of contract enforcement deteriorates. Our model showsthat a bankruptcy law that attempts to preserve going-concernvalue, such as US Chapter 11, requires judicial expertise tobe effective. Where such expertise is unavailable, a law thatfocuses more on creditor recovery is preferred. (JEL D86, G33,G34, K22)     

Tax collection,the informal sector,and productivity

An important determinant of informality in a country is its tax enforcement capacity, which some authors argue further distorts the decisions of firms and creates inefficiency. In this paper, I assess the quantitative effect of incomplete tax enforcement on aggregate output and productivity using a dynamic general equilibrium framework. I calibrate the model using data for Mexico, where the informal sector is large. I then investigate the effects of improving enforcement. I find that under complete enforcement, Mexico's labor productivity and output would be 19% higher under perfect competition and 34% higher under monopolistic competition. The source of this gain is the removal of the distortions induced by incomplete enforcement of taxes. These distortions affect the economy in three ways: by reducing the capital–labor ratios of informal establishments; by allowing low-productive entrepreneurs to enter; and by misallocating resources towards low-productive establishments. As a result, TFP and capital accumulation are reduced, and hence output. I decompose the gains following the guidelines of five leading papers in the literature of resource misallocation across plants. I isolate the effects of pure factor misallocation, distorted occupational choices, capital accumulation, and complementarities. I also study marginal improvements in enforcement and find that there is an inverted-U relationship between the size of the informal sector and output. This reflects the fact that improving enforcement entails a tradeoff: more taxes vs. fewer distortions.     

从控制到协调：企业治理目标的演进

企业的治理目标可以理解为企业的价值取向,即企业应该为谁服务,为谁而存在？企业治理目标也体现在维护企业内创造价值的关键性资源的完整性,并通过价值分配来激励这些关键性资源。传统的物质资本密集型企业其关键性资源具有产权特性,控制企业产权便可以维持企业的价值创造能力,同时也可以获得相应的价值分配权,因此物质资本密集型企业的治理目标便是控制企业的关键性物资资本,并为其服务。而在人力资本密集型企业中,创造价值的关键性资源无法通过产权加以控制,需要凭借关系型契约来协调。此时,只有妥善协调企业内的关键性资源,才能维持企业的价值创造能力,所以人力资本密集型企业的治理目标由控制转变为协调企业内的关键性资源。企业家通过关系型契约协调关键性人力资本的关键是让人力资本感知与企业合作的收益要大于不合作的收益,切实保证人力资本有权参与分享与企业合作所产生的收益,从而提高关系型契约自我实施的能力。     

私募基金的管理规模与最优激励契约

私募基金是一种新兴的资产管理模式,其本质上也是一种委托代理契约。本文利用Tirole(2006)的公司融资分析框架和思想,研究了私募基金管理者与基金外部投资人的委托代理关系,求解出私募基金的最优管理规模和分成比例,并用数值计算方法对理论结果进行了讨论。理论模型和数值计算表明:私募基金的最优管理规模和分成比例是存在的;只有在某些特定的参数组合下,现实中广泛使用的"2—20"合同才具有某种合理性,且并非最优;业绩表现费有助于降低私募基金管理者的道德风险。     

Constitutional democracy and the theory of agency

A unanimously adopted democratic constitution is a contract between the people as principal and the government as agent. However, none of the incentive devices employed in private principal-agent contracting assure enforcement of a constitution. Under majority voting, candidates for the job of agent cannot win the job without promising tobreak the contract, and the agent cannot be re-elected unless he keeps that promise. We thank Joseph Haslag for his comments and Beverly Young for her valuable assistance.     

Efficient contract enforcement

We study how the efficient choice of contract enforcement interacts with the efficient allocation of capital in a simple production economy. Contract enforcement makes trade possible but requires an aggregate investment of capital that is no longer available for production. In such an economy, more dispersion in ex-ante marginal products makes it optimal to invest more resources in enforcement. Furthermore, implementing the optimal allocation requires a specific distribution of the cost for enforcement across agents that is not monotonic and results in a redistribution of endowments. At the efficient solution, agents at the bottom of the endowment distribution benefit the most from investment in enforcement and these investments lead to a reduction in consumption and income inequality.     

Monitoring,Appeal, and Investigation: The Enforcement and Legal Process

In this article, I consider a model of law enforcement in which a regulatory agency faces the following problem: To induce firms which are required to adopt a certain level of environmental care, the agency can make spot checks. This monitoring, however, measures a firms degree of protection only with error. On the basis of the observed signal, the agency then has to decide whether or not to fine a firm for taking insufficient protection. If it fines a firm which has actually met the level of environmental protection, the firm has the right to lodge an appeal. To plead the cause, the agency then is required to investigate at high cost the actual degree of the firms protection.In this context we ask how the regulatory agency allocates resources between different enforcement activities. We show how the structure of the optimal enforcement policy depends on the cost of the enforcement activities, on the uncertainty of observation, on its enforcement budget and other factors.     

Message-contingent delegation

The paper studies the role of delegation and authority in a principal-agent relation in which a non-contractible action has to be taken. The agent has private information relevant for the principal, but has policy preferences different from the principal. Consequently, an information revelation problem arises. I consider a partially incomplete contracting environment with contractibility of messages and decision rights and with transferable utility. I contribute to the literature by allowing for message-contingent delegation and by deriving the optimal partially incomplete contract. It is shown that message-contingent delegation creates incentives for information revelation and may outperform unconditional authority and unconditional delegation.     

Credit rationing, interest rates and capital accumulation

A simple endogenous growth model is developed to characterize credit rationing through the capital accumulation process. The model shows that credit rationing on investment loans decreases as capital accumulates and the enforcement cost decreases. We find that the evolution of the interest rate factor (lending interest rate/depositing interest rate) has a similar pattern to the credit rationing probability. However, simulations show that the evolution of the interest rate spread through the capital accumulation process depends on the degree of the enforcement cost. In the empirical part of the paper, we consider fifty-two countries, at different stages of development, over the period 1995–2005. We confirm the theoretical findings relative to the evolution of the interest rate spread and interest rate factor with capital accumulation. These results suggest that, for economies endowed with costly contract enforcement, the interest rate factor could be a better proxy of credit rationing than the interest rate spread.     

Veto-based delegation

In a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers, I establish the veto-power principle: the principal can implement an optimal outcome through veto-based delegation with a properly chosen default decision. This result demonstrates the exact nature of commitment powers required by the principal: to design the default outcome and to ensure that she has almost no formal control over the agent's decisions.     

契约执行效率与地区出口绩效差异-基于行业特征的经验分析

生产率差异是比较优势的重要来源,而契约执行效率又是决定行业生产率的制度因素之一.本文利用中国省区28个行业数据检验了契约执行效率对出口贸易的影响.实证结果显示,契约执行效率高的地区更倾向于专业化生产和出口契约密集度较高、物质资产专用性较强和人力资产专用性较弱的产品.在控制比较优势的其他影响因素及变量内生性之后,上述结论依然稳健.本文进一步指出,企业的一体化程度差异是解释上述结论的关键因素.     

Skew Selection: Nature Favors a Trickle-Down Distribution of Resources in Ants

Synopsis: According to skew selection, ant queens are neither ruthlessly selfish nor blindly altruistic; they are shrewd investors. The goal of shrewd investors is not to win the game, but to continue play over evolutionary time. Skew selection describes a set of investment strategies employed by players such as ant queens to keep the game going. First, ant queens acquire excess resources—more than they need for immediate survival and reproduction. Second, queens invest a portion of their excess resources in personal capital to maintain dominant status. Third, queens also invest a portion of excess resources in low-quality offspring to gain group capital. Fourth, when investing in group capital, resources are distributed in a trickle-down fashion to maintain the largest number of diminishing-quality offspring possible. The trickle-down redistribution allows the shrewd queen to increase group size (safety in numbers) and, at the same time, maintain individual status (safety in position). According to skew selection, queens invest in low-quality offspring (sterile workers) to buffer hereself and her high-quality offspring from agents of death such as war, predation or disease. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

私募基金合伙人契约研究*

本文借助委托代理理论框架研究私募基金的合伙人契约。有限合伙制下普通合伙人（代理人）拥有人力资本,而有限合伙人（委托人）拥有货币资本。人力资本相对稀缺,使得普通合伙人在博弈中处于相对有利地位,并获得设计合伙人契约的权利,从而博弈流程与公司制具有质的不同。本文首先给出与公司制下米里斯霍姆斯特姆罗杰森条件相对应的有限合伙制下的最优契约决定条件,将两种机制进行比较,从理论上解释私募基金的运营实践。有限合伙制下的激励程度更高,普通合伙人有动力实现更好的业绩。本文最后讨论线性契约并进行相应的函数模拟。