Crop Insurance Valuation under Alternative Yield Distributions

Considerable disagreement exists about the most appropriate characterization of farm-level yield distributions. Yet, the economic importance of alternative yield distribution specifications on crop insurance valuation has not been well documented. The results of this study demonstrate that large differences in expected payouts from popular crop insurance products can arise solely from the parameterization chosen to represent yield distributions. The results suggest that the frequently unexamined yield distribution specification may lead to economically significant errors in crop insurance policy rating and assessment of expected payouts from policies.     

Is There a Viable Market for Area-Based Crop Insurance?

The performance of area yield insurance and farm-level multiple peril crop insurance is analyzed for cotton and soybean production in Georgia and South Carolina. The analysis improves on many previous studies by utilizing actual farm-level yield data and by comparing the two types of insurance products not only for actuarially fair premium rates but also for actual unsubsidized and subsidized premium rates. Results suggest that, even in heterogeneous production regions, area yield insurance may be a viable alternative to farm-level insurance when premium rates for farm-level insurance contain large positive wedges.     

PREMIUM RATEMAKING IN AN ALL RISK CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM1

Fluctuation in farm incomes resulting from variation in crop yield is one of the most significant features in agriculture. Crop insurance is a feasible method by which the farmer can protect his income and his investment from the disastrous effects of crop losses due to natural hazards. This study has attempted to cover two parts. First, it has examined the most important-factors influencing crop yields in connection with the premium rate scheme (i.e. the long-run average yield and the level of coverage). These factors include resource inputs, technology, weather, and stochastic variable. Second, it has developed a refined method of approximating the premium rate. The data used in testing normality were based on the Manitoba Crop Insurance Corporation's annual yield survey covering the years 1916 to 1964. The test shows that none of the annual yield distributions within the area surveyed was normally distributed, revealing that a cartful and exact delineation of a crop risk area is necessary. The findings also show that the cyclical pattern of weather and the upward trend in crop production due to technology were evidently important for the adjustment of the level of coverage and premium rate over time. Additional research relating the effects of weather and technology on crop yields would help to establish a more realistic insurance program. Other aspects should not be overlooked. These include (a) other possible levels besides the existing level of coverage and (b) a livestock or a combined crop-livestock insurance program along with the crop insurance program. The purpose of these additional aspects is to provide farmers with a fuller measure of protection.     

Climate and agricultural risk: measuring the effect of ENSO on U.S. crop insurance

Predictive models of climatic phenomena can aid in insurance program design and decision making. Extreme weather outcomes have been linked to the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), which globally impacts agricultural production. This study demonstrates that extreme ENSO events alter cotton yield distributions in the Southeastern United States. These impacts translate into economically meaningful effects on crop insurance premium rates. Commercial insurers can use publicly available information to determine if government‐set premium rates are mispriced, and in turn extract economic rents via the federally mandated Standard Reinsurance Agreement. By ceding underpriced policies in El Niño and La Niña years, we find that private insurance companies can reduce paid indemnities by 10–15% on average.     

Effects of subsidized crop insurance on crop choices

This study focuses on how subsidized crop insurance affects crop choices. Crop insurance may change farm investments by reducing risks and providing subsidies. First, actuarially fair insurance reduces risks in crop production and marketing, holding the expected return constant. Second, insurance subsidies encourage farms to purchase crop insurance, which increases the expected return to insured risky crops. Farms also have many self‐insurance mechanisms such as crop diversification or working off the farm. We derive conditions under which (1) unsubsidized and actuarially fair crop insurance or (2) insurance premium subsidies lead to more investment in a risky higher return crop. We then examine the role of self‐insurance for these conditions. The impact of premium subsidies is decomposed into a direct profit effect and an indirect coverage effect. These effects are explained by substitutions between market insurance and self‐insurance and between a risky crop and a safe crop. We discuss each effect as a combination of subsidy and risk effects. Numerical illustrations show that an insurance subsidy has a larger impact on risky crop investments compared to that of an input subsidy when farms are more risk‐averse and have high costs of self‐insurance. The framework provides a novel way to evaluate subsidized crop insurance programs.     

An Evaluation of the Actuarial structure of manitoba crop Insurance Program and its Implications

Very little research has been done in evaluating the basic principles and assumptions of the actuarial structure for premium ratemaking in crop insurance programs. Therefore, the objectives of this study are: (a) to examine the Pearson probability distribution of actual crop yields as compared with an application of normal-curve theory to crop yields as compared with an application of normal-curve theory to crop yield distributions and in turn to crop insurance ratemaking which was suggested by Botts and Boles in 1958 [1]; (b) to evaluate the pure premium rates derived from estimated Pearson probability distributions for wheat yields in 14 crop districts of the province of Manitoba; and to establish an experience rating system for the crop insurance program based upon the estimated Pearson distribution of actual crop yields on the individual farm.     

Warming temperatures will likely induce higher premium rates and government outlays for the U.S. crop insurance program

Likely climate change impacts include damages to agricultural production resulting from increased exposure to extreme heat. Considerable uncertainty remains regarding impacts on crop insurance programs. We utilize a panel of U.S. corn yield data to predict the effect of warming temperatures on the mean and variance of yields, as well as crop insurance premium rates and producer subsidies. While we focus on corn, we demonstrate that the subsidy impacts are likely to carry over to other major program crops. We find that warming decreases mean yields and increases yield risk on average, which results in higher premium rates. Under a 1°C warming scenario, we find that premium rates at the 90% coverage level will increase by 39% on average; however, there is considerable statistical uncertainty around this average as the 95% confidence interval spans from 22% to 61%. We also find evidence of extensive cross‐sectional differences as the county‐level rate impacts range from a 10% reduction to a 63% increase. Results indicate that exposure to extreme heat and changes in the coefficient of variation are large drivers of the impacts. Under the 1°C warming scenario, we find that annual subsidy payments for the crop insurance program could increase by as much as $1.5 billion, representing a 22% increase relative to current levels. This estimate increases to 3.7 billion (57%) under a 2°C warming scenario. Our results correspond to a very specific counterfactual: the marginal effect of warming temperatures under current technology, production, and crop insurance enrollments. These impacts are shown to be smaller than the forecasted impacts under a commonly used end‐of‐century general circulation model for even the most optimistic CO₂ emissions projection.     

内蒙古自治区森林保险优化策略

内蒙古自治区森林保险自2013年正式启动试点工作以来,虽然森林保险的覆盖率稳步增长,但仍存在森林保险发展极不均衡、商品林参保所占比例偏低、保险产品尚难以满足灾害恢复需要、部分市县配套保费补贴压力过大、现行招标模式未能形成有效市场竞争等问题,这些问题严重制约内蒙古自治区森林保险的发展。为了促进内蒙古自治区森林保险高质量发展,必须丰富和创新保险产品,提高商品林参保意愿;提升灾害风险区划和费率厘定的科学性;调整保费补贴标准,减轻地方财政压力;优化完善招标机制,提高保险服务质量。     

Developing Experience-Based Premium Rate Discounts in Crop Insurance

This article addresses the feasibility of implementing an experience-based premium rate discount system in crop insurance. While adverse selection and moral hazard in crop insurance have been extensively studied in the past, discount systems or bonus–malus incentives have not, to our knowledge, been investigated. Our empirical analysis indicates that a crop insurance discount system could be implemented based on a measure of favorable past insurance experience. The estimated average discounts based on the rating methods developed in this study ranged from 5% to 9% (depending on the crop being considered).     

Insuring Eggs in Baskets: Should the Government Insure Individual Risks?

The vast majority of crop and revenue insurance policies sold in North America are single‐crop policies that insure against low yields or low revenues for each crop grown on a particular farm. This practice of insuring one crop at a time runs counter to the traditional risk management practice of diversifying across several enterprises to avoid putting all of one's eggs in a single basket. This paper examines the construction of a whole‐farm crop revenue insurance program to include livestock price risk. The results show that at coverage levels of 95% or lower, the fair insurance premiums for this product on a well‐diversified Iowa farm are far lower than the fair premiums for the corn crop alone on the same farm. The calculation of premium rates for the whole‐farm insurance product is derived from a method for imposing correlations first proposed by Iman and Conover in 1982. The potential income transfer from crop insurance is also examined. We find that the income transfer due to the subsidization of single‐commodity policies is greater than the total premium for whole‐farm policies. La grande majorité de polices d'assurances de récolte et de revenu agricole vendues en Amérique du nord sont des polices de récolte individuelle qui assurent contre des rendements faibles ou bas revenu pour chaque récolte cultivée par une ferme particulière. Cette pratique de n'assurer une récolte à la fois fonctionne à l'opposé de la pratique traditionnelle de gestion des risques par la diversification à travers plusieurs entreprises pour éviter de mettre tous ses oeufs dans un seul panier. Cet article examine la construction d'un programme d'assurance agricole pour l'ensemble des récoltes produites par une ferme y compris le bétail évalue le risque. Les résultats montrent qu'aux niveaux d'assurance plus petits ou égaux à 95 pourcents, les primes d'assurance justes pour ce type de police pour une ferme bien diversifiée de l'Iowa sont bien inférieures aux primes justes pour une police de simple couvrant le maïs et ce pour la même ferme. Le calcul des taux de prime pour une police couvrant l'ensemble des récoltes est dérivé d'une méthode pour imposer des corrélations originalement proposée par Iman et Conover en 1982. Le transfert potentiel de revenu à partir de l'assurance de récolte agricole est également examiné. Nous trouvons que le transfert de revenu dûà la subvention des polices pour récolte singulière est plus grand que la prime entière pour une police couvrant l'ensemble des récoltes.     

Does crop insurance influence agrochemical uses under current Chinese situations? A case study in the Manasi watershed,Xinjiang

Government subsidy to crop insurance has been advocated as a policy alternative to support growth of agricultural production and farmers' income in China since the country joined the WTO. However, cautions have been raised as the crop insurance program may impact the environment negatively. This study tries to explore farmers' behaviors with regard to agrochemical use with household data applied to a simultaneous equation system consisting of disaggregated input models. It is found that decisions on fertilizer, pesticides, and agro‐film applications do have different impacts on crop insurance participation, and are influenced by the latter in different ways. It is also implied that encouraging farmers' participation in crop insurance under current low‐premium and low‐indemnity terms does not have a significantly negative impact on the environment.     

A Comparative Evaluation of Yield Risk Reductions with Alternative Crop Insurance Programs in Manitoba

Three crop insurance programs are evaluated in terms of their effectiveness of yield risk reductions for 371 Manitoba farms. The examination is first conducted with a proposed index method, with which the relative yield risk reduction magnitude is calculated and compared for each farm under each alternative program. The generalized stochastic dominance (GSD) methodology is also used to provide an alternative analytical framework in analyzing producers’relative preferences among those alternatives by comparing the net yield distributions generated by each program for each farm. The results suggest that, given an actuarially sound basis, the filly individualized crop insurance (FI) program is the most favorable choice for risk-averse producers. The area coverage and individual indemnity program (IA) is generally the second best option. The full area crop insurance program (FA) is least preferred by risk-averse farmers.     

The impacts of multiperil crop insurance on Indonesian rice farmers and production

This article analyzes the effect of multiperil crop insurance policy for risk‐averse Indonesian rice farmers located in Tuban and Gresik Regencies of the East Java Province. Based on the model, comparative static analysis of a change in policy variables (coverage levels and premium subsidies) on input use through the coupling, wealth, and insurance effects are presented. The comparative static results are largely ambiguous and left as empirical questions. Consequently, the model is numerically simulated to quantify the effects of different coverage levels and subsidy rates on input use, expected net insurance payments, and certainty equivalents. The empirical analysis shows that MPCI crop insurance results in a decline in expected yield for coverage levels above about 82.5% for both regencies. Furthermore, higher subsidy rates amplify the reduction in input use and yield. Therefore, incomplete coverage with relatively low premium subsidies is the best policy to minimize the impact on input use and yield. However, from the farmers’ perspective, the optimal policy combination results from the highest coverage level and subsidy, which offer the largest expected net insurance payments and certainty equivalent.     

The influence of crop insurance agents on coverage choices: The role of agent competition

We examine how competition among crop insurance agents affects coverage choice in the federal crop insurance program. Agents may influence producers’ insurance decisions to maximize their total compensation. We develop a theoretical model of producer–agent interaction to examine how loss potential, agent compensation mechanisms, and market competition affect the coverage level selected. Using crop insurance unit-level datasets from five states, we find evidence that agent market concentration and agents’ market share matter in the insurance coverage decisions of producers but that the economic significance of the influence is relatively small. Agent influence over coverage level, premium, and liability choice is generally positive but inconsistent across states, which may be attributable to differences in loss risk and agent compensation mechanisms.     

森林保险保费补贴政策林业产出激励效应评估

基于开展森林保险保费补贴政策的23个省(市、自治区)2014—2018年面板数据,在分析正向激励效应与负向抑制效应下的森林保险保费补贴政策产出效应传导机制的基础上,运用柯布-道格拉斯生产函数与面板数据模型从林业产出视角分别对全国层面、东部地区和中西部地区的森林保险保费补贴政策实施效果进行评估。结果表明:森林保险保费补贴政策存在产出激励效应,且存在1期滞后;同时,森林保险保费补贴对林业产出的促进效果受影响于林业风险,风险水平的上升会抑制保费补贴政策对林业产出的促进作用;森林保险保费补贴政策产出激励效应及林业风险对补贴政策产出激励效应的影响均存在区域差异性。最后,提出实施保费补贴差异化、逐步提升保障水平等建议。     

Producer Experience, Learning by Doing, and Yield Performance

Current crop insurance rating procedures consider only performance for the individual crop in question. Recent farm legislation has given producers considerable planting flexibility and, as a result, many have shifted to new crops. Producers without a production history for the new crop may be offered levels of insurance that do not accurately reflect their expected yields. Likewise, premium rates may not reflect a producer's actual risk for a new crop. We examine the extent to which information about expected yields may be gleaned from a consideration of historical performance on other crops. We also consider the extent to which yield performance exhibits learning by doing such that yields improve with experience. Though the results are mixed, we generally find that yield performance tends to improve with experience. However, when yields are conditioned on historical yield performance for other crops, the importance of experience is diminished significantly. Yield performance is related to a number of farm characteristics. Finally, we examine the extent to which yield variability is correlated across crops for individual farmers. Implications for crop insurance rating practices are discussed. The results demonstrate robust correlation between a farm's historical yield on other crops and a newly produced crop—a factor largely ignored in current crop insurance contracts.     

An Empirical Analysis of Acreage Effects of Participation in the Federal Crop Insurance Program

The extent to which crop insurance programs have resulted in additional land being brought into production has been a topic of considerable debate. We consider multiequation structural models of acreage response, insurance participation, CRP enrollment, and input usage. Our analysis focuses on corn and soybean production in the Corn Belt and wheat and barley production in the Upper Great Plains. Our results confirm that increased participation in insurance programs provokes statistically significant acreage responses in some cases, though the response is very modest in every case. In the most extreme cases, 30% decreases in premiums as a result of increased subsidies provoke acreage increases ranging from 0.2% to 1.1%. A number of policy simulations involving increases in premium subsidies are considered.     

An empirical analysis of the factors influencing farmer demand for forest insurance: Based on surveys from Lin’an County in Zhejiang Province of China

The lack of effective farmer demand is a major factor that restricts the development of China's forest insurance. To solve this problem, this study uses a Logit model to conduct an empirical analysis of relevant factors in the farmers’ demand for forest insurance, based on field survey data of Lin’an County, Zhejiang Province. The results show that the farmers’ understanding of forest insurance, the proportion of forestry revenues in the total household income, forest size, forest disaster frequency, forest insurance liability, insurance amount setup, and the farmers’ satisfaction regarding the premium subsidy policy, are the main factors that affect the farmers’ demand for forest insurance. Therefore, we propose to expand forest insurance promotion, raise the farmers’ income, rationally design insurance products, and optimize the forest premium subsidy policy to enhance the farmers’ willingness to participate in forest insurance.     

Farmers' Preferences for Alternative Crop and Health Insurance Subsidy

In addition to production risks, farmers desire to balance personal risks of health care. A theoretical framework is developed for holistic health and crop insurance products that provide the opportunity to switch a portion of existing crop insurance subsidy for greater health coverage. A random utility discrete choice experiment is used to assess farmers' stated preferences for holistic insurance products. Farmers prefer higher levels of coverage and are price sensitive. A sample of farmers did not prefer the subsidy switch. However, the subsidy switch is preferred by older farmers, those with higher health care spending, and farmers who have experienced major health problems.     

Demand for Crop Insurance in Developing Countries: New Evidence from India

Determining farmers’ real demand for crop insurance is difficult, especially in developing countries, where there is a lack of formal financial sector integration and a high reliance on informal risk mitigation options. We provide some new estimates of farmers’ willingness‐to‐pay for insurance in the context of a large‐scale subsidised programme in India. We conducted a discrete choice experiment with agricultural households across four states in India, enabling us to estimate preferences for specific insurance policy attributes such as coverage period, method of loss assessment, timing of indemnity payments and the cost of insurance. Our results suggest that farmers do value crop insurance under certain conditions and some are willing to pay a premium for such coverage in excess of the subsidised rates they are currently required to pay under this programme. In particular, farmers value the assurances that they will receive timely payouts when they incur losses, and may not have a strong preference for the method with which losses are assessed. On the other hand, farmers are quite sensitive to coverage periods. Our baseline assessment shows that when optimised to farmer requirements, there can be a sizeable demand for crop insurance by developing country farmers.