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1.
Summary. Models of spatial competition are typically static, and exhibit multiple free-entry equilibria. Incumbent firms can earn
rents in equilibrium because any potential entrant expects a significantly lower market share (since it must fit into a niche
between incumbent firms) along with fiercer price competition. Previous research has usually concentrated on the zero-profit
equilibrium, at which there is normally excessive entry, and so an entry tax would improve the allocation of resources. At
the other extreme, the equilibrium with the greatest rent per firm normally entails insufficient entry, so an entry subsidy
should be prescribed. A model of sequential firm entry (with an exogenous order of moves) resolves the multiplicity problem
but raises a new difficulty: firms that enter earlier can expect higher spatial rents, and so firms prefer to be earlier in
the entry order. This tension disappears when firms can compete for entry positions. We therefore suppose that firms can commit
capital early to the market in order to lay claim to a particular location. This temporal competition dissipates spatial rents
in equilibrium and justifies the sequential move structure. However, the policy implications are quite different once time
is introduced. An atemporal analysis of the sequential entry process would prescribe an entry subsidy, but once proper account
is taken of the entry dynamics, a tax may be preferable.
Received: April 26, 1999; revised version: September 22, 1999 相似文献
2.
Yasuhito Tanaka 《Economic Theory》2001,17(3):693-700
Using a model according to Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Bonanno and Haworth (1998) we consider a sub-game perfect equilibrium
of a two-stage game in a duopolistic industry in which the products of the firms are vertically differentiated. In the industry,
there are a high quality firm and a low quality firm. In the first stage of the game, the firms choose their strategic variables,
price or quantity. In the second stage, they determine the levels of their strategic variables. We will show that, under an
assumption about distribution of consumers' preference, we obtain the result that is similar to Singh and Vives (1984)' proposition
(their Proposition 3) in the case of substitutes with nonlinear demand functions. That is, in the first stage of the game,
a quantity strategy dominates a price strategy for both firms.
Received: April 23, 1999; revised version: May 31, 2000 相似文献
3.
Summary. The results previously obtained on the finiteness property in vertically differentiated markets, with cost functions having increasing or decreasing returns, are extended to a much larger class of cost functions with local properties in a vicinity of the zero output. Moreover, existence results are provided to prove that the demonstrated properties have cases of application.Received: 11 June 2001, Revised: 18 February 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
L1, D43.Grateful thanks are due to Jacques-François Thisse, Jean-Jaskold Gabszewicz, an anonymous referee and especially to Jean-Marc Bonnisseau and Xavier Wauthy for very helpful suggestions and discussions. The revision took place partly when the author was visiting CERMSEM, Université de Paris-I, Paris then CORE, Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium. Hospitality of both institutions is also acknowledged. 相似文献
4.
Tito Pietra 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):649-659
Summary. I consider the set of equilibria of two-period economies with S extrinsic states of nature in the second period and I assets
with linearly independent nominal payoffs. Asset prices are variable. If the number of agents is greater than (S-I), the payoff
matrix is in general position and S 2I, the set of equilibrium allocations generically (in utility function space) contains a smooth manifold of dimension (S-1).
Moreover, the map from states o
f nature to equilibrium allocations (restricted to this manifold) is one-to-one at each equilibrium.
Received: February 23, 1998; revised version: June 1, 2000 相似文献
5.
The evolution of debt and equity markets in economic development 总被引:11,自引:0,他引:11
Summary. As noted by Gurley and Shaw, there is a typical pattern of economic development in which the evolution of the financial system
is an essential aspect of the growth process. We focus on one component of this evolution: the increasing importance of equity
markets as an economy grows. We develop a growth model where capital accumulation is financed externally through a combination
of debt and equity. We illustrate why equity market activity might grow – often very rapidly – as an economy develops. We
also illustrate why access to equity markets may not be needed in the early stages of economic development.
Received: December 30, 1997; revised version: May 26, 1998 相似文献
6.
Boiteux's solution to the shifting-peak problem and the equilibrium price density in continuous time
Summary. Bewley's condition on production sets, imposed to ensure the existence of an equilibrium price density when is the commodity space, is weakened to allow applications to continuous-time problems, and especially to peak-load pricing
when the users' utility and production functions are Mackey continuous. A general form for production sets with the required
property is identified, and examples are given of technologies which meet the weakened but not the original condition: these
include industrial use and storage of cyclically priced goods. This gives a framework for settling Boiteux's conjecture on
the shifting-peak problem. To make clear the restriction implicit in Mackey continuity, we interpret it as interruptibility
of demand; and we point out that, without this assumption, the equilibrium can feature pointed peaks with singular, instantaneous
capacity charges. The general equilibrium results are supplemented by results for prices supporting individual consumer or
producer optima.
Received: February 16, 2000; revised version: July 7, 2001 相似文献
7.
Kevin X.D. Huang 《Economic Theory》2002,20(1):189-198
Summary. We develop a theory of valuation of assets in sequential markets over an infinite horizon and discuss implications of this
theory for equilibrium under various portfolio constraints. We characterize a class of constraints under which sublinear valuation
and a modified present value rule hold on the set of non-negative payoff streams in the absence of feasible arbitrage. We
provide an example in which valuation is non-linear and the standard present value rule fails in incomplete markets. We show
that linearity and countable additivity of valuation hold when markets are complete. We present a transversality constraint
under which valuation is linear and countably additive on the set of all payoff streams regardless of whether markets are
complete or incomplete.
Received: March 9, 2000; revised version: February 13, 2001 相似文献
8.
Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Summary. Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopolies require the assumption that firms observe the
precision of information chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. This paper analyzes secret information
acquisition as a one-stage game. Relative to the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policy implications
based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes or too low subsidies for research activities. For the case of
heterogeneous duopoly we briefly discuss comparative statics results.
Received: August 9, 1999; revised version: May 31, 2000 相似文献
9.
The multiple unit auction with variable supply 总被引:9,自引:0,他引:9
Yvan Lengwiler 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):373-392
Summary. The theory of multiple unit auctions traditionally assumes that the offered quantity is fixed. I argue that this assumption
is not appropriate for many applications because the seller may be able and willing to adjust the supply as a function of
the bidding. In this paper I address this shortcoming by analyzing a multi-unit auction game between a monopolistic seller
who can produce arbitrary quantities at constant unit cost, and oligopolistic bidders. I establish the existence of a subgame-perfect
equilibrium for price discriminating and for uniform price auctions. I also show that bidders have an incentive to misreport
their true demand in both auction formats, but they do that in different ways and for different reasons. Furthermore, both
auction formats are inefficient, but there is no unambiguous ordering among them. Finally, the more competitive the bidders
are, the more likely the seller is to prefer uniform pricing over price discrimination, yet increased competition among bidders
may or may not enhance efficiency.
Received: June 18, 1998; revised version: January 13, 1999 相似文献
10.
On the efficiency of markets for managers 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Ján Zábojnik 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):701-710
Summary. This paper examines the efficiency of the outside labor market in inducing optimal managerial behavior in the presence of
learning. It shows that the incentives provided by the market can be more efficient than the original analysis of Holmstr?m
[6] would suggest. Moreover, under a mild additional assumption, the existence of an -efficient equilibrium can be guaranteed if a manager is patient. This result supports Fama's [4] original idea that the outside
labor market can be efficient in disciplining top managers. These results also suggest that the empirically documented low
levels of explicit incentives for managers might be due to the presence of implicit incentives provided by the outside market.
Received: March 18, 1997; revised version: April 19, 2000 相似文献
11.
Jean-Marc Bottazzi 《Economic Theory》2002,20(1):67-82
Summary. In a multiperiod economy with incomplete markets and assets with payoff depending on the price history (e.g., asset and derivatives),
we show that in order to get endowment generic existence of an equilibrium it is not needed to alter settlement features such
as when payments are made and when the asset is traded. This is non-trivial as each such characteristic introduces a non-generic
subclass of financial instruments. We show essentially that expiry date payments are the only payments that one needs perturbing
(if at all). For previous periods - the P&L discovery map - is the one relevant for wealth transfers. This map transfers wealth
between one period and the next by associating to each portfolio next period potential profit and losses as a function of
the revealed information at the node. All present values involved can in general - because of backward induction pricing structure
- be appropriately controlled via expiry payoffs only. This enables us to extend two-period work and introduce Transverse
Financial Structures for multiperiod economies, where one cannot identify the payoffs of financial instruments to the P&L
discovery map (in other words we introduce some financial ingeneering for Transverse Financial Structures). We capitalize
on that difference using unexploited “maturity payout degrees of freedom” and rolling back the uncertainty tree. As an application
of this approach we prove a conjecture by Magill and Quinzii that commodity forward contracts lead to endowment generic existence
of an equilibrium in a multiperiod set-up.
Received: June 25, 1999; revised version: April 4, 2001 相似文献
12.
Felix Kubler 《Economic Theory》2001,18(1):73-96
Summary. There are a wide variety of theoretical general equilibrium models with incomplete security markets. In this paper we give
a general recipe for using homotopy algorithm to compute equilibria in these models. In many models, taxes, transaction-costs
or other market frictions introduce the additional difficulty that equilibrium prices or choices (but not equilibrium allocations)
may be undetermined. In order to demonstrate how these difficulties can be dealt with, we develop a globally convergent algorithm
to compute equilibria in a model with cash-in-advance constraints, several goods and incomplete financial markets. Furthermore
we describe how to implement the algorithm using a publicly available suite of subroutines for homotopy-pathfollowing.
Received: October 1, 1999; revised version: December 16, 2000 相似文献
13.
Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search
to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In
equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with
the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes
under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter
values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used
to achieve separation.
Received: August 24, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000 相似文献
14.
Summary. We prove that locally, Walras' law and homogeneity characterize the structure of market excess demand functions when financial
markets are incomplete and assets' returns are nominal. The method of proof is substantially different from all existing arguments
as the properties of individual demand are also different. We show that this result has important implications and is part
of a more general result that excess demand is an essentially arbitrary function not just of prices, but also of the exogenous
parameters of the economy as asset returns, preferences, and endowments. Thus locally the equilibrium manifold, relating equilibrium
prices to these parameters has also no structure.
Received: September 17, 1996; revised version: November 7, 1997 相似文献
15.
Reiko Aoki 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):653-672
We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product
market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally
on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible
commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition,
higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater
with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus
credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition.
Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai
and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve
Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments
from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this
work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee. 相似文献
16.
Frederic Palomino 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):683-700
Summary. The paper studies informational properties of three types of imperfectly competitive markets: a one-signal speculative market
(OSS market) in which agents have only private information about the fundamental value (v) of the risky asset traded, a two-signal speculative market (TSS market) in which agents have private information about both
v and the asset supply, and a market in which agents are endowed with both information about v and shares of the risky asset traded. In this last market (JA market), agents have joint activities: they trade for both
speculative and hedging purposes. It is shown that (i) the JA market and the OSS market are the most and the least efficient, respectively, and (ii) the levels of informational efficiency in the three markets are inversely correlated with the intensities with which traders
use their private information about the fundamental value of the asset.
Received May 28, 1999; revised version: May 28, 1999 相似文献
17.
A model of vertically differentiated education 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We analyze the allocation of students who differ in their ability to two school types. We assume that there are peer effects (students learn more the better their classmates) and that the expected income after school also depends on the average productivity of peers. We derive the allocation under free school choice and decentralized determination of the academic level; we show that, compared to the social optimum, the level is suboptimal and too many students attend the better school type. A social planner can improve on the allocation under free school choice by prescribing a higher academic level. 相似文献
18.
Summary. We consider a Lucas asset-pricing model with heterogeneous agents, exogenous labor income, and a finite number of exogenous
shocks. Although agents are infinitely lived, endowments and dividends are time-invariant functions of the exogenous shock
alone and are thus restricted to lie in a finite-dimensional space; genericity analysis can be conducted on sets of zero Lebesgue
measure. When financial markets are incomplete, that is, there are fewer financial securities than shocks, we show that generically
in individual endowments all competitive equilibria are Pareto inefficient.
Received: November 22, 1999; revised version: March 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to an anonymous referee for very insightful comments on earlier drafts. 相似文献
19.
Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs.
Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through
a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit
outcomes.
Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000 相似文献
20.
Summary. This note deals with Cournot type oligopolies in which the market clearing price occasionally may be non-unique. A Stackelberg
leading producer is present. Given that setting we explore continuity properties of the followers' reaction and provide sufficient
conditions for existence of equilibrium.
Received: June 20, 2000; revised version: April 24, 2001 相似文献