Engaging employees in health care can contain costs and improve quality

Employers need to do much more to change some of the deep-seated employee attitudes and behaviors that are driving health care costs. This article debunks common employer misconceptions about employees' attitudes and behaviors with regard to health care. It then discusses the results employers can obtain by taking specific initiatives that provide employees with the motivation and resources they need to effectively manage health risks and make informed health care decisions.     

Debt-reducing exchange offers

Announcements of debt-reducing exchange offers are associated with a negative average stock price reaction. We address two questions: Why do firms undertake debt-reducing exchange offers? And, what is the information conveyed by such offers? The answers are interrelated: Debt-reducing exchange offers are undertaken by financially weak firms in an effort to stave off further financial distress and, thereby, preserve value for shareholders. A successfully completed exchange offer significantly reduces the likelihood that a firm will enter Chapter 11. Announcements of debt-reducing exchange offers apparently contain two pieces of information: (1) the firm is financially weaker than would have been apparent from other publicly available information, and (2) management is attempting to preserve value for shareholders.     

Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?: An empirical examination of alternative theories

Many firms issue stock options to all employees. We consider three potential economic justifications for this practice: providing incentives to employees, inducing employees to sort, and employee retention. We gather data from three sources on firms’ stock option grants to middle managers. First, we directly calibrate models of incentives, sorting and retention, and ask whether observed magnitudes of option grants are consistent with each potential explanation. We also conduct a cross-sectional regression analysis of firms’ option-granting choices. We reject an incentives-based explanation for broad-based stock option plans, and conclude that sorting and retention explanations appear consistent with the data.     

Confidential marketing in seasoned equity offers

Confidentially marketed public offers (CMPOs) represent a popular innovation in the market for seasoned equity offers (SEO) despite large negative announcement reactions. We find that CMPOs are often used by small firms with negative operating cash flows to raise a relatively substantial amount of capital, which is used largely for R&D intensive investments. We argue that the confidential marketing associated with CMPOs has made them a popular way for small firms to make fast-paced public offers, which are known to have reduced price pressure, while sidestepping the problem of inelastic demand. These firms are willing to trade off more negative announcement reactions for the chance to privately assess their prospects for raising capital.     

Investor recognition and seasoned equity offers

We find that seasoned equity issuers who pay more in underwriting costs are associated with larger improvements in investor recognition, greater contemporaneous increases in firm value, and larger declines in illiquidity risk. We identify increased analyst following as an important channel through which these effects occur. The results are consistent with the prediction of Merton (1987) and imply that an equity issuing firm can actively manage its degree of investor recognition and thereby influence its valuation. Furthermore, equity issuers associated with greater improvements in investor recognition exhibit significantly more negative multi-factor alphas during the three years after issuance, suggesting that improved investor recognition can partially explain the appearance of post-issue stock underperformance.     

How to cultivate engaged employees

Everybody knows that an empowered team enhances everyone's performance, including the manager's. Vlachoutsicos, of the Athens University of Economics and Business, argues that the vital, particular ingredient in buoying employees is fostering a sense of mutual dependence, or "mutuality," every time you interact with subordinates. He offers six lessons in achieving mutuality: 1. Be modest. Specifically, avoid talking about your track record and instead focus on your people's present needs. 2. Listen seriously--and show it. Don't assume that folks recognize how attentive you are. Make sure the outward signs reflect it. 3. Invite disagreement. But deliver the invitation artfully so that people really do pipe up. 4. Focus the agenda. Don't let discussion run amok in the name of openness. Streamline it so that the progress is palpable to all participants. 5. Don't try to have all the answers. See yourself more as a catalyst for problem solving than as a problem solver per se. 6. Don't insist that a decision must be made. Give the decision-making process time to breathe, even if that sometimes means delaying a conclusion. The author richly illustrates each of these lessons with a compelling story from his lifelong experience.     

Managerial ownership with rent-seeking employees

In some cases, the incentives of the manager will affect the behavior of the firm’s employees. A manager with low-powered incentives will discourage employees from engaging in destructive rent-seeking activities. Union members will need to cooperate with this poorly compensated manager if the firm will have any chance to succeed. The elimination of rent-seeking costs can increase the value of owners’ stakes in the firm. Thus, value can be maximized by giving control to a CEO with an ownership stake strictly less than 100 percent.     

Bond tender offers in mergers and acquisitions

We explore the motives and consequences of bond tender offers announced in connection with mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We find merging firms use bond tender offers strategically to renegotiate with bondholders to gain financial flexibility by reducing leverage and eliminating covenants, and to curtail the coinsurance benefits associated with M&A. Moreover, we find bondholder wealth effects depend not only on the bond's own characteristics, but also on the characteristics of its sibling bonds. Finally, the use of bond tender offers in M&A is associated with increased likelihood of deal consummation and lower acquisition premiums.     

Hostile bank takeover offers : Analysis and implications

A comparison of the financial characteristics of banks involved in hostile takeover bids with a control group of nonhostile bank mergers indicates: (1) hostile targets experience abnormal returns that are significantly greater than for the targets of nonhostile bank mergers; (2) hostile bidders experience negative abnormal returns that are insignificantly different than for bidders involved in nonhostile bank mergers; (3) hostile bank acquisition announcements produce positive net wealth effects which are larger than the wealth effects of nonhostile acquisitions; (4) a Logit regression model using financial ratios, stock price data, and ownership data is able to distinguish between hostile and nonhostile targets.     

Offer pricing of Australian industrial initial public offers

In the present paper we examine the setting of offer prices for Australian industrial initial public offers (IPOs) by fixed price offers. Our investigation focuses on the associations between offer prices and both market prices and accounting based measures of intrinsic value. Fixed‐price offers are less likely to be influenced by the canvassing of market demand when compared to the US setting, where book‐builds are typically used. We conclude that while Australian industrial IPOs are underpriced, they are not systematically undervalued. Contrary to research undertaken by Purnanandam and Swaminathan in the US book‐build setting, we do not conclude that Australian IPOs are systematically overvalued. As part of our analysis, we develop an empirical model of offer prices based on interviews with several leading Australian stockbrokers involved in setting them. Finally, using the ratio of offer price to intrinsic value measure, we find some evidence that undervaluation is positively related to underpricing.     

Unconditional and conditional takeover offers: experimental evidence

This article compares the predictions of finite-shareholdermodels of conditional and unconditional takeover offers withthe outcomes of laboratory experiments. In addition to differentiatingbetween types of offers, the experimental designs span smalland large firms as well as different levels of offer premiums.It is found that in unconditional offers to large groups ofsubjects (28-40), the symmetric Nash equilibrium predicts observedtendering frequencies quite accurately. For other experimentaldesigns, the results are mixed. The analysis of shareholdertendering strategies from the experiment yields insights into(I) the effects of takeover offer designs, (ii) the appropriatenessof finite-shareholder models for research, and (iii) the costsof free riding when shareholders are nonatomistic.