Market power versus efficiency under uncertainty: conventional versus Islamic banking in the GCC

In this article we estimate the effect of concentration on intermediation margins in Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) Islamic and conventional banking under the assumption that margins are uncertain. The empirical model, which we formally derive from an expected utility maximization problem, allows us to test for risk aversion as well as competitive conduct in loan and the deposit markets. The model also yields an expression showing that the effect of concentration on margins is the sum of its respective effects on market power, marginal cost of intermediation and marginal cost of uncertainty. The expression allows us to test whether concentration is welfare enhancing, reducing or neutral. We find Islamic banks to be risk-averse and conventional banks to be risk-neutral. We also find that concentration is welfare-neutral in Islamic loans and deposits, welfare-enhancing in conventional loans and welfare-neutral in conventional deposits. We used Nonlinear Two-Stage Least Squares (N2SLS) and Nonlinear Three-Stage Least Squares (N3SLS) to check for robustness.     

Market power and output stability

The conjectural variation elasticity is used in a comparative statics analysis to show that, contrary to a long-standing tenet of industrial organization, market power may destabilize output when cost and demand are stochastic, under other assumptions similar to those of recent empirical studies.     

Market power and exchange rate pass-through

In this paper we provide new empirical evidence on the relationship between market power, as measured by market share, and incomplete exchange rate pass-through. The role of market power is examined in the context of a Cournot model, which is estimated with data relating to Japan's presence in the US market. To test for the existence of possible aggregation biases due to sectoral heterogeneity, estimations are carried out on time series data for the total economy and the manufacturing sector and on panel data for five manufacturing industries at the three-digit level of classification, using the Johansen multivariate cointegration technique and the recently developed by [Larsson, R., Lyhagen, J., & Lothgren, M. (2001). Likelihood-based cointegration tests in heterogeneous panels. Econometrics Journal, 4, 109–142] multivariate panel cointegration technique. Hypotheses about the degree of pass-through are tested as restrictions on estimated equilibrium pricing equations and robustness tests are performed. The empirical results indicate that Japanese firms have market power and this validates the use of an imperfect competition model. However, it appears that market power is not the only element on which to base the analysis of the incomplete exchange rate pass-through by Japanese firms.     

Market efficiency,purchasing power parity,and the official and parallel markets for foreign currency in Latin America

This paper examines the purchasing power parity (PPP) theory from a long-run perspective in the presence of a parallel or ‘black’ market for U.S. dollars in four Latin American countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, using monthly data for the recent float. Johansen's full information maximum likelihood multivariate cointegration technique is applied. Recent developments associated with this procedure are considered. First, a formal test developed by Johansen [Econometric Theory 8 (1992) 188, Econometric Theory 11 (1995) 25, Scand. J. Stat. 24 (1997) 433] for the presence of I(2) and I(1) components in a multivariate context is applied along with the estimation of the roots of the companion matrix for the correct determination of the cointegration rank. Second, given that two significant cointegration vectors were found for any country, structural restrictions identifying the long-run relations of interest are specified as proposed by Johansen and Juselius [J. Econometrics 63 (1994) 7] and Johansen [J. Econometrics 69 (1995) 111]. Thus, the joint structure of PPP and long-run informational market efficiency could not be rejected for all countries. Furthermore, estimation of the error correction terms shows that the black market rate adjusts to eliminate any deviation from long-run PPP. Finally, stability tests proposed by Hansen and Johansen [Hansen, H., & Johansen, S. (1993). Recursive estimation in cointegrated VAR-models. Working Paper, University of Copenhagen, Institute of Mathematical Statistics; Econometrics J. 2 (1999) 306] are applied and it is shown that the dimension of the cointegration space is sample dependent while the estimated coefficients do not exhibit instability in recursive estimations.     

Market efficiency in agricultural futures markets

Market efficiency and unbiasedness are tested in four agricultural commodity futures markets - live cattle, hogs, corn, and soybean meal - using cointegration and error correction models with GQARCH-in-mean processes. Results indicate each market is unbiased in the long run, although cattle, hogs and corn futures markets exhibit short-run inefficiencies and pricing biases. Models for cattle and corn outperform futures prices in out-of-sample forecasting. Results also suggest short-run time-varying risk premiums in cattle and hog futures markets.     

Organizational choices for efficiency and market power

We examine the role of strategic consideration in the choice of organizational structures characterizing large corporations. These considerations bridge the gap between the research on transaction costs and organizational forms and the research on strategic entry deterrence and threats. An illustrative model is presented and we derive propositions which look promising for providing empirical benchmarks.     

Market power under income polarization

We study the reaction of a monopolistic firm to distributive shocks which lead to income polarization. We show that the movements in the set price and in the sold quantity depend on the served market share. In particular, we identify a region of parameters where the optimal markup moves in the opposite direction of market demand: in this respect, distributive shocks can provide an explanation for countercyclical movements of the markup.     

Market power in input purchase and trade

Market power in the input purchase is becoming increasingly common because of growing consolidation and mergers and also due to multinational firms establishing a stronghold in buying inputs in the developing countries. In this study, we formulate a general equilibrium model consisting of a competitive sector and an oligopsony sector which exercises market power over inputs. Our results indicate that if the oligopsony sector incurs a higher marginal factor cost for the intensive factor, basic results of the standard two-sector model continue to hold. But if the marginal factor cost is higher for the non-intensive factor, then factor intensities in the physical and value sense differ and traditional trade propositions such as the Stolper–Samuelson theorem do not hold.     

Market power and compliance with output quotas

This paper examines the compliance behaviour of a dominant firm in an output quota market when the firm is able to exercise market power in both the quota and the output markets. Provided the firm has an initial quota endowment which is strictly positive, under some circumstances the firm may find it profitable to comply or even over-comply in its quota demand, even in the absence of enforcement. The results are compared to those found in the pollution permit literature for a firm with market dominance only in the permit market, to which some additional observations are also added concerning efficiency outcomes under non-compliance.     

Market power of firms and exchange-rate fluctuations

This paper explores the potential of firms to restrict industry outputs (market power) in oligopolistically organized markets where domestic firms compete with foreign ones. Within a stochastic price-setting supergame framework, market power is shown to be lower in general with flexible exchange rates for the following reasons. (i) The conditions that the fully collusive outcome—oligopolists maximizing joint profits — is sustainable in equilibrium become stronger if the exchange rate fluctuates, provided that fluctuations are sufficiently small. (ii) Even if full collusion can be sustained, industry outputs will be higher on the average with flexible than with fixed exchange rates.     

Market discipline and corporate efficiency: evidence from Bulgaria

In this paper we investigate the impact of an increase in market discipline on total factor productivity (TFP) growth at the level of the firm in Bulgaria during 1991–95, focusing in particular on the effect of trade liberalization, corporatization and rationalization of conglomerates, and hard budget constraints. The data support the predicted relationship between increases in market discipline and subsequent productivity growth. Our results demonstrate the need to distinguish between exporting and non-exporting enterprises in assessing the impact of trade liberalization and the importance of taking into account other relevant policy changes. JEL Classification: F14, D24     

Market efficiency and international diversification: Evidence from India

This study evaluates one of the most important emerging markets, India (Bombay Stock Exchange and Indian National Exchange), for its efficiency and for its potential to offer diversification benefits to international investors. Market-wide tests include; 1) contemporaneous relationship, 2) Granger type causality and 3) day-of-the-week effect. Tests on individual Indian stocks include: 1) panel estimation of Granger causality, 2) stock-by-stock estimation of Granger causality and 3) runs test. In sum, Indian markets are well integrated with the international equity markets, a characteristic that lowers the international diversification benefits. While day-of-the-week effect is an international spillover, it may be possible to predict individual Indian stocks' returns through causality with international equity markets and through momentum trading techniques.     

Market efficiency and investors' adjustments to asset valuation errors

Market participants are hypothesized to form expectations of future earnings by a process of adjustments to new earnings information while taking into account the pattern of errors in past judgements. Using an ‘adaptive expectations’ model, 140 New York Stock Exchange sample firms were classified as over- or undervalued based on earnings on announcement date versus market expectations. Comparing the risk-adjusted returns of the over- and undervalued securities for two four-year test periods, the conclusion is drawn that the securities market reacts to earnings announcements efficiently.     

Market power and fiscal policy in OECD countries

We compute average markups as a measure of market power throughout time and study their interaction with fiscal policy and macroeconomic variables in a VAR framework. From impulse-response functions, the results, with annual data for a set of 14 OECD countries, show that the markup (i) depicts a pro-cyclical behaviour with productivity shocks and (ii) a counter-cyclical behaviour with fiscal spending shocks. We also use a PVAR, increasing the efficiency in the estimations, which confirms the country-specific results.     

Market maker competition and price efficiency: Evidence from China

We test the relationship between market maker competition and stock price efficiency. Using the number of market makers as a proxy for competition, the results show a strong positive correlation between competition and stock price efficiency. Moreover, price efficiency is higher when competing market makers have higher research ability. We suggest that market maker competition increases price efficiency through two channels: 1) Competition decreases transaction costs, and 2) Uninformed market makers learn from orders submitted by informed market makers through competition. The latter happens only in the group of market makers with higher experiences. The results imply that the price efficiency can be improved by enhancing the competition of market makers with high research ability and experiences.     

Market power and output-based refunding of environmental policy revenues

Output-based refunding of environmental policy revenues combines a tax on emissions with a production subsidy, typically in a revenue-neutral fashion. With imperfect competition, subsidies can alleviate output underprovision. However, when market shares are significant, endogenous refunding reduces abatement incentives and the marginal net tax or subsidy. If market shares differ, marginal abatement costs will not be equalized, and production is shifted among participants. In an asymmetric Cournot duopoly, endogenous refunding leads to higher output, emissions, and overall costs compared with a fixed rebate program targeting the same emissions intensity. These results hold whether emissions rates are determined simultaneously with output or strategically in a two-stage model.     

Market power in the Spanish electricity auction

Hourly data from the Spanish day-ahead electricity auction is used to obtain a lower bound measure of generators’ market power. Our method is not based on cost estimates but rather on the behavioral differences between strategic generators and more competitive producers. The results indicate that, despite the price cap effect of regulation in this market, the larger operators in the day-ahead market are able to increase significantly prices above the competitive benchmark. We also show that the two large generators do not exploit the full potential of their market power.     

Market efficiency and continuous information arrival: evidence from prediction markets

Two regularities in financial economics are that prices underreact to news events and that they display short term momentum. This article tests for the presence of these regularities in prediction markets offered by the betting exchange Betfair on the 2008 Ryder Cup Golf Competition. Betfair offered in play prediction markets on the individual match play pairings and on the Cup result, with trading being virtually continuous in all markets. Modelled probabilities of the Cup result were updated continuously using trades in the individual match play pairings. These probabilities were then compared with the probabilities of the Cup result implied by odds in that market. The odds in the market for the Cup result underreact to both good and bad news that is provided by changes in the odds in the markets for the individual pairings. Further, these modelled probabilities Granger cause changes in the probabilities of the Cup result implied by odds in the market on that outcome. In addition, economically and statistically significant evidence of momentum is found in the odds in the market on the Cup result.     

Hidden information,bargaining power,and efficiency: an experiment

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bargaining power on the design and the selection of contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between the contract menus offered by two principals. We first show theoretically how different ratios of principals and agents affect outcomes and efficiency. Informational asymmetries generate inefficiency. In an environment where principals compete against each other to hire agents, these inefficiencies may disappear, but they are insensitive to the number of principals. In contrast, when agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically, and it increases in the relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents’ informational monopoly power. However, this environment also generates a high inequality level and is characterized by multiple equilibria. In general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the theoretical predictions and the contract menus actually chosen in each treatment. There is, however, a tendency to choose more ‘generous’ (and more efficient) contract menus over time. We find that competition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade, and that, overall, competition between agents generates the most efficient outcomes.