Vertical integration, raising rivals’ costs and upstream collusion

This paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear. As a first step, the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated. It turns out this is the joint-profit maximum of the colluding firms. The discount factor needed to sustain this equilibrium is then shown to be unambiguously lower than the one needed for collusion in the separated industry. While the previous literature has found it difficult to reconcile raising-rivals’-costs strategies following a vertical merger with equilibrium behavior in the static game, they are subgame perfect in the repeated game studied here.     

Export market participation with sunk costs and firm heterogeneity

In this article we investigate the importance of sunk costs, firm characteristics and spillovers from nearby exporters on a firm's decision to participate in exporting. The empirical analysis involves the estimation of a nonstructural, discrete choice, dynamic model with firm heterogeneity. By using panel data for Estonian companies from 1994 to 1999 we find that: (i) both sunk costs and observable firm characteristics are important determinants of export market participation; (ii) previous history matters, in that, if a firm has been exporting the previous period or the period before, it significantly increases the likelihood of the firm exporting in the current period; (iii) larger firms with high capital intensity and foreign ownership are more likely to be exporters; (iv) operating in an export-oriented industry increases a firm's likelihood of exporting.     

Exit, sunk costs and the selection of firms

Summary. This paper aims to identify the cost characteristics of exiting firms whenever firms are playing an infinite horizon supergame with time-invariant cost and demand functions. With more than two firms, the problem of which firms exit is quite similar to a coalition formation one. Solving this coalition formation problem, we obtain that the exiting firms are those with higher average cost functions whenever reentry is costless while, whenever reentry is unprofitable, the exiting firms are those with lower marginal (and possibly average) cost functions. Since reentry costs are typically sunk, our analysis points out that the presence of sunk costs affects not only the size (as it is well known) but also the composition of the industry. Received: April 5, 1995; revised version: January 28, 1998     

Are sunk costs in exporting country specific?

Abstract Previous studies have shown that there are significant sunk entry costs in exporting. However, the empirical literature has not addressed whether these costs are global or country specific. In this paper, I show that both are present and estimate that country‐specific costs are about three times the magnitude of global costs. Furthermore, I show that international standards harmonization has strong positive effects on imported variety in small and remote markets. Calibration of a modified Chaney (2008) model indicates that these markets will gain access to 3–4% more imported varieties when global costs increase by 10%, holding total entry costs constant.     

Modelling economic hysteresis losses caused by sunk adjustment costs

Transition from one economic equilibrium to another as a consequence of shocks is often associated with sunk adjustment costs. Firm-specific sunk market entry investments (or sunk market exit costs) in case of a reaction to price shocks are an example. These adjustment costs lead to a dynamic supply pattern similar to hysteresis. In analogy to “hysteresis losses” in ferromagnetism, the authors explicitly model dynamic adjustment losses in the course of market entry and exit cycles. They start from the micro level of a single firm and use explicit aggregation tools from hysteresis theory in mathematics and physics to calculate dynamic losses. The authors show that strong market fluctuations generate disproportionately large hysteresis losses for producers. This could give a reason for the implementation of stabilizing measures and policies to prevent strong (price) variations or, alternatively, to reduce the sunk entry and exit costs.     

Vertical integration and supplier finance

This paper studies access to finance by suppliers that are linked to a multinational enterprise. The theoretical framework consists of a property rights model featuring suppliers that are either vertically integrated or sell to the multinational at arm's length, which in turn affects the availability of different sources of credit. Integrated suppliers are predicted to cover a relatively larger share of their costs using internal sources, consisting of initial wealth plus funds from the multinational parent. In addition, due to the diminished dependence on external funds (local bank credit), integrated suppliers' funding shares are less responsive to changes in their home country's level of financial development. We test the model's predictions using firm survey data from over 50 developing and emerging countries and find broad support.     

Aggregate demand,sunk costs and discontinuous adjustments in an amended new consensus model

In standard new consensus macroeconomics models, the impact of shocks disappears until the economy reaches a time-independent steady-state equilibrium. Introducing sunk costs and capital indivisibilities in capacity adjustment decisions implies the rejection of asymptotic stability and a reconsideration of the relevance and usefulness of traditional steady-state analysis based on a fixed and exogenous ‘center of gravity’. Moreover, effective demand and Keynesian discretionary policies regain a central role in economic policy by determining the transient equilibriums that emerge endogenously.     

Vertical integration and investor protection in developing countries

The industrial organization of developing countries is characterized by the pervasive use of subcontracting arrangements among small, financially constrained firms. This paper asks whether vertical integration relaxes those financial constraints. It shows that vertical integration trades off the benefits of joint liability against the costs of rendering the supply chain more opaque to external investors. In contrast to the commonly held view that pervasive input and capital market imperfections are conducive to vertical integration, the model predicts that the motives for vertical integration are not necessarily higher in developing countries. In particular, vertical integration is more likely to arise at intermediate levels of investor protection and better contract enforcement with suppliers reduces vertical integration only if financial markets are sufficiently developed. Evidence supporting both predictions is discussed.     

Vertical integration and profitability in the oil industry

Several economists have argued that considerations of efficiency in production and transactions favor vertical integration in the oil industry. Others maintain the vertical integration enhances market power. To simultaneously test the implications of both arguments, data are assembled on the structure and performance of a sample of the large U.S. in companies over a twenty five year period. No support is found for the hypothesis that profit rates are increased by the degree of vertical integration between crude oil production and refining, but there is weak evidence that the variability of profits is reduced. The paper goes on to examine evolutionary evidence, concluding that the present pattern of vertical integration was largely shaped by adaptations to unique circumstances during historical periods when vertical integration was temporarily favored on efficiency grounds.     

Vertical integration, market foreclosure and quality investment

We study incentives to vertically integrate in an industry with vertically differentiated downstream firms. Vertical integration by one of the firms increases production costs for the rival. Increased production costs negatively affects quality investment both by the integrated firm and the unintegrated rival. Quality investment by both firms decreases under any (vertical integration) scenario. The decrease in quality invesment by both firms softens competition among downstream firms. By integrating first, a firm always produces the high quality good and earns higher profits. A fully integrated industry, with increased product differentiation, is observed in equilibrium. Due to increase in firm profits, social welfare under this structure is greater than under no integration.     

Vertical integration and investor protection in developing countries

The industrial organization of developing countries is characterized by the pervasive use of subcontracting arrangements among small, financially constrained firms. This paper asks whether vertical integration relaxes those financial constraints. It shows that vertical integration trades off the benefits of joint liability against the costs of rendering the supply chain more opaque to external investors. In contrast to the commonly held view that pervasive input and capital market imperfections are conducive to vertical integration, the model predicts that the motives for vertical integration are not necessarily higher in developing countries. In particular, vertical integration is more likely to arise at intermediate levels of investor protection and better contract enforcement with suppliers reduces vertical integration only if financial markets are sufficiently developed. Evidence supporting both predictions is discussed.     

Credibility costs in the monetary integration game*

Euro candidates are expected to maintain the value of their currency within the fluctuation band of the new exchange rate mechanism for at least two years. This paper highlights some unpleasant macroeconomic effects that could occur during this interval. The problem is cast as a two‐stage sequential game between private agents and the government of the applicant country. The policy‐maker decides whether to devaluate the domestic currency or not at two distinct dates; it makes a last choice just before accession to the monetary union. Under an assumption of incomplete information of private agents about the government's priorities on inflation and economic activity, the game presents a hybrid perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In the pooling configuration, an initial policy of zero devaluation does not signal the final devaluation decision. As private agents cannot completely rule out the risk of a ‘last devaluation’, a premium adds to interest rates and entails a systematic output loss.     

Backward integration and collusion in a duopoly model with asymmetric costs

This paper formalizes the idea that input transactions might be used to implement side payments among colluding firms. A model is proposed to analyze the effect of backward integration on collusive outcomes in a downstream duopoly with asymmetric marginal costs. Vertical integration expands the set of collusive outcomes that are sustainable for a given realization of the discount factor. This is an additional effect of vertical integration that antitrust authorities should consider. Side payments implemented by input sales are more relevant the larger the difference in marginal costs, since they allow for the shifting of production towards the relatively more efficient firms, while maintaining firms’ incentives to collude. A price of the input above that posted by an alternative source or sales of the input below cost may be observed, depending on the realization of downstream firms’ costs.      

Market thickness,sunk costs,productivity, and the outsourcing decision: an empirical analysis of manufacturing firms in France

Abstract This paper presents an empirical analysis of outsourcing behaviour by French manufacturing industries. It focuses on the effects of market thickness, sunk costs, and the productivity of firms on the outsourcing decision. I estimate a dynamic probit model where outsourcing decision is linked to past outsourcing behaviour. The results show that outsourcing is a persistent strategy adopted by large firms and suggest the presence of significant sunk costs associated with outsourcing. The results also show that market thickness reduces search costs and enhances the establishment of outsourcing relationships.     

Searching for the sunk cost fallacy

We seek to isolate in the laboratory factors that encourage and discourage the sunk cost fallacy. Subjects play a computer game in which they decide whether to keep digging for treasure on an island or to sink a cost (which will turn out to be either high or low) to move to another island. The research hypothesis is that subjects will stay longer on islands that were more costly to find. Eleven treatment variables are considered, e.g. alternative visual displays, whether the treasure value of an island is shown on arrival or discovered by trial and error, and alternative parameters for sunk costs. The data reveal a surprisingly small sunk cost effect that is generally insensitive to the proposed psychological drivers. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . Jel Classification C91, D11     

Vertical separation versus vertical integration in a macroeconomic model with imperfect competition

This paper develops a monopolistic competition macroeconomic model, and uses it to discuss the determination of relevant macro variables under both vertical separation and vertical integration regimes. Several main findings emerge from the analysis. First, in the market equilibrium aggregate output and consumption under the vertical integration regime are greater than under the vertical separation regime, while the product price index under the vertical integration regime is lower than that under the vertical separation regime. Secondly, the level of real aggregate profits under the vertical integration regime will be higher (lower) than that under the vertical separation regime if the degree of monopoly power is relatively large (small). Third, the welfare level under the vertical integration regime will be higher than that under the vertical separation regime regardless of the degree of monopoly power.     

Intra-industry differences in vertical integration, heterogeneous costs and pricing: the case of web hosting

In many differentiated product industries, both traditional and “new economy” activities, vertically integrated firms also supply inputs to apparent rivals in the downstream business. This generates heterogeneity between low- and high-sunk cost suppliers with implications for entry and competitive conduct. The web hosting market is typical with primary suppliers operating alongside resellers who rent server space from them. We explore the impact of competition in US hosting using a unique dataset covering 15,000 packages offered by 3,500 firms. The results suggest price is sensitive to competitor clustering in quality space; an outcome consistent with easy entry for resellers with ultra-low fixed costs.

The psychology of sunk cost: A classroom experiment

Abstract

Economics and business students are taught that sunk costs are irrelevant to their decisions. Yet, there is ample evidence that managers fail to integrate this simple rule and fall prey to what is known as the sunk-costs bias. To mitigate cognitive biases, such as the sunk-cost bias, educators must raise students’ awareness of these common judgment errors. In this article, the author proposes a classroom activity that actively engages students and allows them to identify this bias in their own judgments. The activity builds on a series of experiments from the psychology literature. The author discusses how these experiments have been adapted for classroom use and presents evidence suggesting that the activity increased students’ awareness of the sunk-cost bias and improved their decision-making skills.     

历史沉淀成本与经济转型的路径依赖及其超越

本文旨在突破新古典理性选择的经济转型研究方法,再次阐述计划经济体制下历史沉淀成本对经济转型的锁定效应。由新古典经济理论和规范决策理论可知,以前投资的历史或沉淀成本已经支付过了,因其不构成机会成本,所以不应该影响当前或未来的经济转型决策。然而,在经济转型时期,决策者并不能够根据经济转型的预期边际收益和边际成本进行理性决策,不仅需要考虑因资产专用性,以及由此产生的交易成本的阻碍影响,还需要考虑过去发生的历史沉淀成本的阻碍影响。因此,为了加快计划经济体制向市场经济体制转型的进程,制度或政策制定的基本原则应着眼于历史沉淀成本管理,从而切断路径依赖。