合谋和风险投资合约设计的关系探讨

风险企业独特的所有权结构值得研究。给出了一个理论框架，在这个框架里，风险企业的控制权和现金流量权安排都得到了说明。在风险企业里，风险资本家的主要功能是监督。要保证监督的有效性，必须赋予其对风险企业的控制权。为了发挥其监督功能，风险投资合约必须防止合谋。     

Staged financing: a trade-off theory of holdup and option value

This paper investigates financial contract design in venture capital investments and shows that staged financing is the implementation of optimal contracts. In designing contracts, venture capitalists consider the value of real options and the costs of holdup. This consideration boils down to contract rigidity and flexibility: rigid contracts mitigate the holdup problem of entrepreneurs, but have little option values, whereas flexible contracts create real options for venture capitalists in corporate decision-making, but yield weak bargaining power when ventures appear promising. In optimal contracts, venture capitalists choose flexibility by separating capital into stages and then strategically allocating control rights at each stage. This strategy creates option value in corporate governance, and can protect sunk investments in distress while capturing the potential benefits of good outcomes.     

不完全契约视角下的财务治理机制分析

作为公司治理的重要内容,在本质上,财务治理是对公司财权进行的一整套制度安排。具体地说,这一套制度安排必须通过与企业有直接利益关系的各当事方缔结财务契约来实现。本文提出,构成财务治理基础的财务契约是一种不完全契约,这种契约的不完全性将会产生激励不足和约束失控两个主要影响。因此,我们的财务治理机制应该针对财务契约的不完全性来进行设计,力争最大限度地降低不完全财务契约造成的负面影响,提高财务治理的效率。     

Microfinance Beyond Group Lending

Microlending is growing in Eastern Europe, Russia and China as a flexible means of widening access to financial services, both to help alleviate poverty and to encourage private-sector activity. We describe mechanisms that allow these programmes to successfully penetrate new segments of credit markets. These features include direct monitoring, regular repayment schedules, and the use of non-refinancing threats. These mechanisms allow the programmes to generate high repayment rates from low-income borrowers without requiring collateral and without using group lending contracts that feature joint liability.     

Grandstanding and New Stock Speculation: Evidence from Private Venture Capitals in China

Reputation is of vital importance to venture capitals (VCs). Emerging young VCs may have more incentives to grandstand through initial public offerings (IPOs) in the stock market. We examine grandstanding and IPOs on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges between 5 June 2006 and 10 May 2012 when deregulation allows explosive growth of VCs in China. We find that grandstanding is mainly by the private VCs and has noticeable impact on the two stock exchanges. Furthermore, private VCs heavily grandstand through speculation of newly listed stocks rather than through underpricing among early IPOs. Joint investment by private and non‐private VCs may effectively inhibit the speculation of new stocks. Our findings have policy implications in the largest emerging market's context.     

A Solution to Two Paradoxes of International Capital Flows

International capital flows from rich to poor countries can be regarded as either too small(the Lucas paradox in a one-sector model)or too large(when compared with the logic of factor price equalization in a two-sector model).To resolve the paradoxes,we introduce a non-neoclassical model which features financial contracts and firm heterogeneity.In our model,free trade in goods does not imply equal returns to capital across countries.In addition,rich patterns of gross capital flows emerge as a function of financial and property rights institutions.A poor country with an inefficient financial system may simultaneously experience an outflow of financial capital but an inflow of FDI,resulting in a small net flow.In comparison,a country with a low capital-to-labor ratio but a high risk of expropriation may experience an outflow of financial capital without a compensating inflow of FDI.     

An analysis of the length of labour and financial contracts: a study for Spain

This study investigates the connection between the duration of financial contracts and that of labour contracts. Workers with long–term contracts have incentives to invest in training. This makes them attractive to the entrepreneur. Furthermore, this behaviour will be reinforced if financial contracts are long–term, because it reduces the probability of an early liquidation as well as the dismissal of trained workers. As a conclusion, significant increases in the length of financing contracts should be accompanied by corresponding increases in the length of labour contracts. Support for this theoretical contention is found by testing it on a dataset composed of Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 1991–2000.     

Inefficient Credit Booms

This paper studies the welfare properties of competitive equilibria in an economy with financial frictions hit by aggregate shocks. In particular, it shows that competitive financial contracts can result in excessive borrowing ex ante and excessive volatility ex post . Even though from a first-best perspective the equilibrium always displays under-borrowing, from a second-best point of view excessive borrowing can arise. The inefficiency is due to the combination of limited commitment in financial contracts and the fact that asset prices are determined in a spot market. This generates a pecuniary externality that is not internalized in private contracts. The model provides a framework to evaluate preventive policies, which can be used during a credit boom to reduce the expected costs of a financial crisis.     

Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature

We first point out that the recent property-rights literature is based on three assumptions: (1) that contracts are always subject to renegotiation; (2) that the exercise of a property right confers a private benefit and (3) that parties are risk-neutral. Building on Hart–Moore (1999), we provide conditions under which an optimal contract consists of nothing more than an assignment of property rights.
We also examine the robustness of some of the literature's standard predictions about asset ownership to the introduction of mechanisms for eliciting parties' ex post willingness to pay for the assets (such as options or financial markets). To illustrate the issue, we revisit the Hart–Moore (1990) proposition that joint ownership is suboptimal, and argue that ownership by a single party is dominated by joint ownership with put options.     

Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetaryincentives in automobile franchise contracts. All of these contractssubstantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grantmanufacturers extensive rights to specify and enforce dealers'duties. The allocation of decision rights and incentive intensitydiffers across brands, however. This variation is explainedby the incidence of moral hazard. In particular, when the costof dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers hold more rights to determinethe performance required from their dealers and to use mechanismssuch as monitoring, termination, and monetary incentives toensure that such performance is provided.     

Expectation driven business cycles with limited enforcement

We explore shocks to expected future productivity in a model with limited enforcement of financial contracts. A microfounded collateral constraint implies that good news about future productivity yield an increase in stock prices, available credit and a general economic expansion.     

三大财务理论范式的比较

本文依据拉卡托斯的科学研究纲领方法论，对财务理论范式进行梳理，发现财务理论始终根植于经济学的发展进程和语境中，进而将财务理论划分为经典财务理论、财务契约理论和行为财务理论3大理论范式。经典财务理论研究给定财务制度、组织或契约下对财务资源的配置；财务契约理论探讨公司财务治理、组织或契约的选择，行为财务理论以有限理性为基本假设，构建心理决策模型来解释微观财务现象。本文对3大财务理论范式进行了比较分析，并强调了科学研究方法论的重要性。     

Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance

We introduce a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. This measure, called contract-intensive money or CIM, is based on citizens decisions regarding the form in which they choose to hold their financial assets. Country case studies show that CIM varies over time in response to political events in ways predicted by our arguments. We also show that CIM is positively related to investment and growth rates, and to the relative size of contract-dependent sectors of the economy.     

创业企业IPO靠自己还是靠"风投"?——基于双边选择效应视角的经验证据

风险投资的增值职能对创业企业至关重要,是风险投资领域最重要的研究问题之一.现有文献侧重于风险投资增值职能与单边选择效应的分离识别.文章提出双边选择效应与风险投资增值职能的区分,研究了风险投资增值职能对企业IPO结果的作用机制.文章利用1999-2009年风险投资机构投资中国创业企业的1 623个样本,以及截至2016年6月30日被投资企业IPO成功与否的数据,考察了风险投资机构是否发挥了增值职能.文章在充分考虑"好风投"与"好企业"更容易结合的双边选择效应基础上,同时考察了风险投资机构和创业企业自身在IPO过程中可能存在的"增值效应".实证分析和稳健性检验均表明,"好风投"未能充分发挥对创业企业的增值效应,在推动IPO方面的影响并不显著,而创业企业的自身优势才是其更容易成功IPO的主要决定因素.文章的研究为理解风险投资机构的增值职能提供了新的视角,有助于正确认识风险投资机构和创业企业的行为特征及其经济效率.     

Credit spread and monetary policy

We show that the spread-adjusted Taylor rule including a response to the credit spread is a theoretically optimal monetary policy under heterogeneous loan contracts. However, the optimal response to the credit spread is ambiguous, given the financial market structure.     

Backing out of private pension provision: lessons from Germany

Financing pensions in the EU is a challenge. Many EU countries introduced private pension schemes to compensate declining public pension levels due to reforms made necessary by demographic change. In 2001, Germany introduced the Riester pension. Ten years after introduction the prevalence rate of this voluntary private pension scheme approximates 37 %. However, numerous criticisms raise doubts that the market for Riester products is transparent. Using the 2010 German SAVE survey, this article investigates terminated and dormant Riester contracts on a household level for the first time. Respectively 14.5 and 12.5 % of households who own or have owned a Riester contract terminated or set dormant their contract. We find that around 45 % of terminated or dormant Riester contracts are caused at least partly by product-related reasons, which is significantly higher than for endowment life insurance contracts. The uptake of a new contract after a termination is more likely if a termination is product-related. Nevertheless, after a termination 73 % of households do not sign a new contract, which can have serious long-term consequences for old-age income. Households with low income, low financial wealth or low pension literacy are more likely to have terminated or dormant contracts. Low income and low financial wealth households also have the lowest prevalence rate of Riester contracts and are at higher risk of old-age poverty.     

风险投资对我国创业板公司业绩增长的影响

本文以2010年10月30日前在深交所创业板上市的134家公司为研究样本,实证检验了风险投资对创业板公司业绩增长的影响。研究发现:有风险投资背景的公司业绩增长显著高于无风险投资背景公司,表明风险投资的介入对创业板公司的业绩增长起到一定促进作用;但随着风险投资参与度的增大,创业板公司的业绩增长并未出现明显提升,相反,当风险投资持股比例超过30%后,创业板公司的业绩增长状况明显变差,这表明我国风险投资的运营与发展尚未成熟,创业企业对风险投资的引入应当适度。     

Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Incentives and Personality Traits

Decision-makers often face incentives to increase risk-taking on behalf of others (e.g., they are offered bonus contracts and contracts based on relative performance). We conduct an experimental study of risk-taking on behalf of others using a large heterogeneous sample, and we find that people respond to such incentives without much apparent concern for stakeholders. Responses are heterogeneous and mitigated by personality traits. The findings suggest that a lack of concern for others’ risk exposure hardly requires “financial psychopaths” in order to flourish, but it is diminished by social concerns.     

风险投资背景与公司IPO:市场表现与内在机理

本文研究风险投资背景对公司在股票市场表现的影响。研究发现:相对于政府背景风险投资支持的公司,外资和混合型背景风险投资支持的公司IPO抑价率较低,股票市场累计异常回报率较高,民营背景风险投资支持的与政府背景支持的无显著差异;如果仅划分为有、无外资背景风险投资参与两类,那么外资背景风险投资参与支持的公司相对于那些非外资背景风险投资支持的公司IPO抑价率更低,股票回报率更高。对影响机理进一步剖析发现:相对于那些非外资背景的风险投资,外资背景风险投资倾向更加谨慎的投资策略,投资之后对公司治理结构安排会更加合理,并且公司具有较好的盈利能力,这些最终导致公司股票IPO抑价率较低和回报率较高。     

A transaction cost model of contract choice: The case of petroleum exploration

The growing literature on transaction costs posits that the structures of contracts involving exchange under uncertainty are influenced by the costs incurred by the contracting parties prior to, as well as after, a contract is signed. This research investigates the contractual responses to the substantial uncertainty attending the exchange of rights to underground petroleum deposits. It develops a transaction cost model to explain the payment structure found in these contracts. The model identifies the major transaction costs associated with the payment types used in oil and gas exploration contracts, including ex ante measurement costs and ex post production inefficiencies, and explains their effect on contract structure. Testable implications concerning variations in the payment structure of petroleum exploration contracts are generated and tested using data from private oil and gas mineral rights leasing contracts in four western states. The study has direct public policy significance in that it delineates the implications of different payment structures of oil and gas leasing contracts. These implications can be used to evaluate proposals to reform federal oil and gas leasing policies. In addition, while there has been considerable analysis of federal offshore oil and gas leasing contracts, there has been a dearth of research on private onshore oil leasing practices. This study helps to fill this empirical void.