经理人股票期权会计确认的探讨

经理人股票期权的确认问题是亟待解决的会计理论和实践问题。经理人股票期权的经济实质是企业经理人参与企业剩余索取权的分享。经理人股票期权是一项无形资产,应在经理人提供劳动期间内,将其平均摊销。应改革现行的财务会计观念与模式,增设“待转股本准备”科目,以适应企业经理人参与现代企业剩余索取权分享的现实。     

再论经理人股票期权的会计确认

谢德仁和刘文(2002)提出了经理人股票期权会计确认的利润分配观。本文在此基础上进行进一步论证,认为经理人股票期权赠予交易的经济实质是股东为激励经理人而将部分剩余索取权(在财务会计意义上就是利润分配权)让渡给经理人,而不是经理人直接用服务来交换股票期权,经理人股票期权赠予并不以经理人服务的投入为必备前提,经理人股票期权赠予交易内含的价值运动是具有一定价值的剩余索取权(所有者权益)从现有股东那里来,流到经理人处去。因此,在经理人股票期权赠予交易的会计确认上,应将经理人股票期权的对应项目确认为企业的利润分配。     

经理人股票期权的会计归属研究

从经理人股票期权的性质角度分析，经理人股票期权不是企业的负债，而应是企业的权益．但是不符合现有会计模式权益的定义。因此，主张把经理人股票期权纳入现有的报表要素中，如此处理-应增强所有者权益定义的独立性，突出权益的剩余索取权的经济实质；二应拓宽所有者权益的内涵，建立“或有权益”概念。     

对经理人股票期权会计确认问题的探讨

本文在现代企业理论框架内对股票期权会计确认问题进行了探讨。作为经营者分享企业剩余的契约安排,股票期权实质上是经理人的专有性投入,应当确认为企业的资产,并确认经营者的权益。同时,随着知识经济的发展,现有的会计反映模式应当由业主权益观变更为企业主体观,以更好地反映利益相关者的投入及企业的价值。     

经理人股票期权理论及其模型分析

经理人股票期权是为了适应现代企业制度的需要,对经理人员实行的行之有效的约束激励机制,其本质就是让拥有控制权的经理人员一方面能够拥有一定的剩余索取权,另一方面还要承担相应的风险,从而激励经理人最大限度地维护企业所有者的利益。本文通过阐述经理人股票期权的激励作用,提出了期权理论模型,进而使经理人建立长期激励的良性循环具有指导意义。     

论现行会计模式下经理人股票期权会计确认

经理人股票期权会计确认复杂的原因在于现行财务概念框架对一些经济现象的实质无法合理确认.为了使经理人股票期权能够在表内较为恰当的反应,为会计信息的使用者提供相对可靠的会计信息,有必要对财务会计概念框架、经理人股票期权的经济性质及表现形式综合考虑,使经理人股票期权会计确认在现行会计模式下相对合理有效.     

经理人股票期权会计确认问题研究

自安然、世通事件爆发以来 ,经理人股票期权的会计确认问题再一次成为争论的焦点。目前 ,关于经理人股票期权的会计确认存在两种观点 :“利润分配观”和“费用观”。本文从财务会计概念框架的角度以及对经理人股票期权经济实质的探讨出发 ,主张经理人股票期权报酬成本应当确认为费用。     

论股票期权的会计处理

20世纪70年代以来,在国外企业广泛实施的经理人股票期权计划(ESOP),在90年代后期被逐渐引入我国.随着我国越来越多的企业准备实施经理人股票期权,规范其会计处理成为保障经理人股票期权激励计划实施的关键问题之一,确定股票期权会计处理原则和规范股票期权会计处理已经提到必须解决的日程上.本文在借鉴美国会计规范的基础上,根据我国国情,从经理人股票期权的会计确认、计量和报告等三个方面,研究在规范我国经理人股票期权会计过程中应注意的一些问题.     

关于在股份合作制企业设置劳动股的思考

现代企业理论认为 ,在市场经济条件下 ,企业的本质是一个“人力资本与非人力资本的特别和约” ,在这个和约里 ,非人力资本所有者（传统意义上的资本所有者）通过向企业投入货币、机器设备等物质生产要素 ,获得企业所有者的地位 ,成为企业的股东 ,享有企业的剩余索取权 ;人力资本所有者向企业投入劳动力这一特殊生产要素 ,理应具有与资本所有者同等的地位和权利 ,成为企业的劳动股东 ,分享企业的经济剩余。但长期以来 ,人力资本所有者（劳动者）的力量明显弱于资本所有者 ,使其不可能得到与资本所有者同等的地位 ,而成为企业的雇工。随着经济…     

借晋商智慧结晶 创新企业管理体制——金融机构股权激励探析

股权激励是一种通过经营者获得公司股权形式给予企业经营者一定的经济权利,使他们能够以股东的身份参与企业决策、分享利润承担风险,从而勤勉尽责地为公司的长期发展服务的一种激励方法.股权激励机制的种类多样,典型的模式有：股票期权、股票增值权、限制性股票、虚拟股票、账面价值股票、特定目标奖金、业绩股份、储蓄-股票参与计划、股票无条件赠予、影子股票、延期支付、经理人收购等等.     

Pension roulette: have you bet too much on equities?

In the 1990s, funding pension obligations by investing in stocks looked smart. By 1999, the bull market had poured a collective $260 billion surplus into the pension coffers of the S&P 500, permitting the companies to record the year-to-year increases as additional income. But just two years later, the bear market had obliterated those gains, replacing them with a cavernous $240 billion deficit--which had to be offset by the unlucky firms' ongoing cash flows, wreaking havoc on their earnings, debt levels, and stock prices. Corporate executives may be blamed for this debacle. But they were only following the rules. Current accounting guidelines keep companies from recording pension liabilities and assets on their balance sheets, instead relegating them to the footnotes. That makes it hard to see the risk that market drops expose companies to. Board members and top executives need to look beyond distorted accounting numbers to the economic realities of pension plans. Once they do, they may be surprised to find that they would gain far greater value and flexibility by passively investing their pension funds entirely in bonds. A bond portfolio can be designed to meet precisely, and with virtual certainty, a company's pension obligation, thus eliminating the chance of a funding gap. The predictability of bond investments also stabilizes earnings and cash flow. The expanded corporate debt capacity that results can then be used to fuel growth or reduce the firm's overall cost of capital. Even without an overhaul of today's misguided accounting rules, there's little reason for companies' pension funds to hold anything other than bonds.     

GOODWILL ACCOUNTING: EVERYTHING HAS CHANGED AND NOTHING HAS CHANGED

In issuing Statements No. 141 and No. 142, the FASB has attempted to make accounting statements better reflect the economics of the exchange of value that takes place in business combinations. At the very least, requiring a single method of accounting reduces the costs of accounting, puts all acquirers on an equal accounting footing, and removes the incentive to incur significant costs to be able to report on a pooling-of-interests basis.
But if the FASB rules have changed significantly, investors' expectations for acquiring companies have not. Therefore, accounting rules should have no impact on acquisition pricing or structuring unless they affect cash flows. Recorded goodwill and return on capital are the artificial result of accounting rules, and largely without economic content. However, understanding the growth value implicit in the price paid is key to helping ensure that acquisitions create value. Boards of directors and executives must understand the minimum annual performance targets they have set for themselves by paying a premium to acquire a company.
The ideal measure of goodwill, which has not been contemplated by the FASB, would capture the premium of the current acquisition price over the value of the target firm's current operating value—that is, the discounted NPV of its current operating cash flows. Using such an economist's definition of goodwill, financial analysts could then come up with the variable that is of greatest interest to investors-namely, the expected improvements in operating performance that are necessary to justify the acquirer's investment in the target company. The economic framework and future growth value analysis based on EVA can be used to answer this question, regardless of the accounting rules du jour.     

On the Relation between Conservatism in Accounting Standards and Incentives for Earnings Management

This paper studies the role of conservative accounting standards in alleviating rational yet dysfunctional unobservable earnings manipulation. We show that when accounting numbers serve both the valuation role (in which potential investors use accounting reports to assess a firm's expected future payoff) and the stewardship role (in which current shareholders rely on the same reports to monitor their risk‐averse manager), current firm owners have incentives to engage in earnings management. Such manipulation reduces accounting numbers' stewardship value and leads to inferior risk sharing. We then show that risk sharing, and hence contract efficiency, can be improved under a conservative accounting standard where, absent earnings management, accounting earnings represent true economic earnings with a downward bias, compared with under an unbiased standard where, absent earnings management, accounting earnings represent true economic earnings without bias.     

基于广义资本的财务报告

随着经济形态从工业经济到知识经济的转变、发展观念从无限增长观到可持续增长观的转变、企业从"经济人"到"社会生态经济人"的转变,企业资本呈现出一种泛化的趋势,即从传统财务会计中的财务资本转变为了包括财务资本(债务资本、权益资本)、人力资本、组织资本、社会资本、生态资本等在内的广义资本。广义资本共同创造了企业价值,都应在企业享有相应的权益。所以,新经济时代的财务报告应为广义资本所有者提供其产权价值实现和保障情况的个性化的信息。     

会计信息可比性与劳动收入份额北大核心

利用2006-2019年沪深A股数据,本文考察了会计信息可比性对企业劳动收入份额的影响。研究发现,会计信息可比性的增强显著提高了企业的劳动收入份额,表明会计信息质量的提高有助于员工更好地分享企业的发展成果。进一步研究结果表明,(1)降低资本成本及增大自主研发强度是会计信息可比性提高企业劳动收入份额的两大作用路径;(2)会计信息可比性的增强主要提高了普通雇员的劳动收入份额,对高管劳动收入份额的影响并不显著;(3)会计信息可比性对劳动收入份额的影响存在一定异质性,当企业自身融资约束程度较高、信息透明度较低,或可比公司的会计盈余质量较强时,会计信息可比性与劳动收入份额的正相关关系更强;(4)会计信息可比性通过提高劳动收入份额,提升了企业的价值创造能力。     

Accounting for Intangible Investments

The traditional categorisation of expenditures evident in many firms' charts of accounts and financial statements does not identify and measure expenditures on intangible investment separately from tangible investment and operating expenditures. This contrasts with the accounting for tangible investment, which separately accounts for all expenditures as assets unless the future benefits are consumed in a single accounting period. Further, in searching for better ways to account for intangibles, regulators and researchers have focused on the accounting choice problem relating to the existence and recognisability of intangible assets. In this paper, we argue that identifying and separately reporting the expenditures on intangible investment is the logical first step in accounting for intangible investments. Learning about the firm's categories of value driving (and sometimes potentially value destroying) expenditures has important implications for understanding aspects of the value chain, performance measurement, valuation, corporate governance and the external audit.     

基于知识的企业性质与收益分配模式

本文从知识视角重新审视了新经济下的企业性质及由此决定的收益分配模式.分析认为,新经济下企业是财务资本所有者与人力资本所有者订立的特别契约,企业拥有或控制的财务资本和技术性、管理性等知识以及聚合财务资本与各种知识的能力决定着企业的效率边界;股票期权制不仅仅是一种激励制度,而是企业所有权范式基于知识的转换,进而导致收益分配制度变迁的必然结果.文章最后对以净利润为基础的收益分配模式进行了澄清,提出新经济下的企业收益分配应以EVA为基础,以真正体现人力资本价值的大小及其创值能力的高低.     

企业内部薪酬差距与人力资本结构调整

本文考察薪酬差距如何影响企业内部的人力资本结构变动。基于员工不同教育程度划分人力资本层次,本文研究发现:(1)薪酬差距的增加显著降低了大学学历员工的比例,同时提升了高中及以下学历员工的比例;(2)通过构造工具变量和基于全球性经济危机的场景设定,我们发现薪酬差距和人力资本结构之间存在显著的因果关系;(3)在薪酬差距水平较高的情况下,薪酬差距的增加显著吸引了更有可能进入企业中高层的高学历员工。在薪酬差距水平较低的情况下,扩大薪酬差距显著提升(降低)了高中及以下学历(大学学历)员工比例,一个可能原因在于不同学历员工的议价能力存在差异。(4)薪酬差距与人力资本结构变化之间的相关性主要体现在规模较大、管理者平均年龄较低的企业。(5)人力资本结构在薪酬差距影响创新的过程中发挥了显著的中介效应,薪酬差距提升了研究生和本科学历员工比例,促进了企业创新。     

Return on investment and corporate capital expenditures: Empirical evidence

It is well known (e.g., Gordon 1996, Chapter 8) that maximizing a firm's ROI is not equivalent to maximizing the value of the firm. This fact notwithstanding, it is often claimed that many managers use ROI in making capital expenditure decisions. The purpose of our paper is to empirically examine this claim. The primary findings presented in this paper offer substantial evidence demonstrating the positive association between ROI and capital expenditures. The positive association between ROI and capital expenditures occurs even where the interests of owners and managers are apparently in conflict.