再论经理人股票期权的会计确认

谢德仁和刘文(2002)提出了经理人股票期权会计确认的利润分配观。本文在此基础上进行进一步论证,认为经理人股票期权赠予交易的经济实质是股东为激励经理人而将部分剩余索取权(在财务会计意义上就是利润分配权)让渡给经理人,而不是经理人直接用服务来交换股票期权,经理人股票期权赠予并不以经理人服务的投入为必备前提,经理人股票期权赠予交易内含的价值运动是具有一定价值的剩余索取权(所有者权益)从现有股东那里来,流到经理人处去。因此,在经理人股票期权赠予交易的会计确认上,应将经理人股票期权的对应项目确认为企业的利润分配。     

经理人股票期权的会计归属研究

从经理人股票期权的性质角度分析，经理人股票期权不是企业的负债，而应是企业的权益．但是不符合现有会计模式权益的定义。因此，主张把经理人股票期权纳入现有的报表要素中，如此处理-应增强所有者权益定义的独立性，突出权益的剩余索取权的经济实质；二应拓宽所有者权益的内涵，建立“或有权益”概念。     

经理人股票期权会计确认的探讨

经理人股票期权的确认问题是亟待解决的会计理论和实践问题。经理人股票期权的经济实质是企业经理人参与企业剩余索取权的分享。经理人股票期权是一项无形资产,应在经理人提供劳动期间内,将其平均摊销。应改革现行的财务会计观念与模式,增设“待转股本准备”科目,以适应企业经理人参与现代企业剩余索取权分享的现实。     

经理人股票期权会计确认问题研究

自安然、世通事件爆发以来 ,经理人股票期权的会计确认问题再一次成为争论的焦点。目前 ,关于经理人股票期权的会计确认存在两种观点 :“利润分配观”和“费用观”。本文从财务会计概念框架的角度以及对经理人股票期权经济实质的探讨出发 ,主张经理人股票期权报酬成本应当确认为费用。     

对经理人股票期权会计确认问题的探讨

本文在现代企业理论框架内对股票期权会计确认问题进行了探讨。作为经营者分享企业剩余的契约安排,股票期权实质上是经理人的专有性投入,应当确认为企业的资产,并确认经营者的权益。同时,随着知识经济的发展,现有的会计反映模式应当由业主权益观变更为企业主体观,以更好地反映利益相关者的投入及企业的价值。     

浅析经理人股票期权的会计问题

经理人股票期权属于期权分类中股票期权的一种,它是指企业根据股票期权计划的规定,授予其高层管理人员（本文简化称其为经理人）在某一规定的期限内（通常在5至10年内）,按约定的价格购买本企业一定数量股票的权利（一般在10万元以上）,持有这种权利的经理人可以在规定的时间内行权或弃权。作为现代薪酬结构中的一环,在对职业经理人的长期激励方面扮演着重要的角色。     

论现行会计模式下经理人股票期权会计确认

经理人股票期权会计确认复杂的原因在于现行财务概念框架对一些经济现象的实质无法合理确认.为了使经理人股票期权能够在表内较为恰当的反应,为会计信息的使用者提供相对可靠的会计信息,有必要对财务会计概念框架、经理人股票期权的经济性质及表现形式综合考虑,使经理人股票期权会计确认在现行会计模式下相对合理有效.     

浅谈我国股票期权会计确认的有关问题

随着股票期权在公司激励中的作用日益显著,其会计确认也逐步成为一个富有争议的热点问题.本文在查阅相关文献资料的基础上,首先对股票期权的经济实质进行了简要分析,然后归纳了理论界目前关于股票期权会计确认的几种主要观点,并对其进行了分析评价,浅谈我国股票期权会计确认的有关问题.     

报酬的索取还是激励的必然?——小议经理人股票期权的会计确认问题

在委托代理理论下经理人殴票期权的出现满足了经理人决策的过程控制与企业利润剩余的结果控制之间的统一在将经营者与所有者的效用函数趋于一致的同时,实现股东利益的最大化.     

Executive Stock Options

Abstract

As a part of the compensation package many companies provide executives with executive stock options, which are call options with additional restrictions. They provide some financial advantages to the executives and help the company retain the service of the executives who improve the company’s earnings and management.

Until recently the values of the executive stock options were not required to be disclosed in the company?s financial reports. But recent statements from the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have made it necessary to value these executive stock options. The valuation of executive stock options is also required for investors and financial practitioners. This paper considers the award of performance-based executive stock options when the stock price at the time of stock option award exceeds a given preassigned value. It is assumed that the stock price follows a geometric Brownian motion, and that the number of stock options awarded at any time depends on the stock price at that time.

A valuation formula is derived using the method of Esscher transforms for a multiyear award plan. The closed-form formula derived is similar to the Black-Scholes formula for options and utilizes the standard bivariate normal distribution function, which is available in statistical software. In this paper the number of stock options awarded is assumed to be in a specific form, but the theory presented can be modified to suit other forms of award structure. Moreover, by suitable choice of parameters, a valuation formula is also presented for the award of fixed-value executive stock options grants; this formula is also in a closed form and involves cumulative distribution values of the standard normal random variable. Numerical illustrations of the use of the valuation formulas are presented.     

American-style Indexed Executive Stock Options

This paper develops a new pricing model for American-style indexed executive stock options. We rely on a basic model framework and an indexation scheme first proposed by Johnson and Tian (2000a) in their analysis of European-style indexed options. Our derivation of the valuation formula represents an instructive example of the usefulness of the change-of-numeraire technique. In the paper's numerical section we implement the valuation formula and demonstrate that not only may the early exercise premium be significant but also that the delta of the American-style option is typically much larger than the delta of the otherwise identical (value-matched) European-style option. Vega is higher for indexed options than for conventional options but largely independent of whether the options are European- or American-style. This has important implications for the design of executive compensation contracts. We finally extend the analysis to cover the case where the option contracts are subject to delayed vesting. We show that for realistic parameter values, delayed vesting leads only to a moderate reduction in the value of the American-style indexed executive stock option.     

探析激励型股票期权的会计处理

激励型股票期权,是由企业所有者向员工提供激励的一种报酬制度,意在促使员工对工作全心投入,激发员工未来的工作效能,是一种长期性的激励工具。通常做法是企业根据股票期权计划的规定,给予员工在某一规定的期限内,按约定的价格(一般不低于给予期权时的股票市价)购买本企业一定数量股票的权利。股票期权产生于20世纪七八十年代的美国,到90年代,激励型股票期权已经在美国与西方其他国家得到快速发展。现在,激励型股票期权的实施已成为我国建立现代企业制度过程中的热点问题。一、激励型股票期权的履约方式及会计处理激励型股票期权的履约方式…     

The Effect of Executive Stock Options on Corporate Innovative Activities

This study investigates whether the implicit optionality of executive stock options (ESOs) induce managers to undertake innovative activities associated with various types of risk. We find ESO risk incentive (vega) to be positively correlated with all types of corporate innovations. We also find greater ESO risk incentive effects for the product‐related innovative activities that are associated more with systematic risk than idiosyncratic risk. Finally, we document the following pecking order for the ESO risk incentive effects: improved product, new product, alliance, and new research and development. Our results suggest that executives have more incentive to invest in projects with higher systematic risk.     

美国股票期权会计准则比较及借鉴

美国股票期权会计制度的发展 美国两个最主要的股票期权会计准则为会计原则委员会(AccountingPrinciples Board，以下简称APB)在1972年订立的APB第25号意见书和财务会计准则委员会(Financial Accounting……