Strategic managerial delegation and cross-border mergers

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship between the market structure in equilibrium and the most preferred structure with respect to each country’s social welfare and/or total social welfare, when all existing firms can freely merge with each other in an international oligopoly under the segmented market assumption in three cases: the case wherein all the firms are entrepreneurial and the cases wherein they use two different types of managerial delegation contracts. We focus our attention on the coincidence/non-coincidence between the equilibrium market structure (EMS) and the most socially preferred structure with respect to each country’s social welfare and/or total social welfare, as each firm’s production efficiency varies. When each firm’s production efficiency is relatively low, in all the three cases, the EMS coincides with the most socially preferred structure with respect to each country’s social welfare and total social welfare in a large area of the physical trade cost. On the other hand, when each firm’s production efficiency is relatively high, in the cases wherein they use the two different types of managerial delegation contracts, there exists an area of each firm’s production efficiency such that the EMS does not coincide with the most socially preferred structure with respect to each country’s social welfare and total social welfare. Therefore, as each firm’s organizational structure proceeds from entrepreneurial to managerial delegation, a more active merger policy is needed with respect to each country’s social welfare and total social welfare.     

Systemic financial distress and auction-based bankruptcy reorganization

Most bankruptcy procedures try to reorganize a financially-distressed firm's debts to a serviceable level through negotiations overseen by courts. Markets are an alternative to such negotiations. This paper develops a market-based approach that is appropriate if claimants are severely cash-constrained and there is merit in having existing owners-managers remain in control.This approach was developed in response to the 1997 Asian Crisis, where the sheer numbers of over-indebted firms, creditors with poor incentives, and inexperienced courts stymied negotiated resolution. The scheme, however, can be applied to other crisis settings that exhibit particular characteristics. One such setting could be the resolution of external sovereign debts, a situation where creditors obviously cannot take possession of a country.The scheme arranges creditors in a queue to be serviced in sequence from the firm's operating cash flows. Creditors bid for their position in this queue, and those accepting a greater proportionate reduction in the face value of their claims are placed ahead of the others. Any existing hierarchy of claims is honored by having claimants bid for their positions within the relevant segment of the queue. No one in the queue (including owners who are last) is paid anything until the (reduced) debts of the first in line are fully discharged using the firm's operating cash surpluses. The queue then moves up and the next claimant in line is serviced.The paper shows that, in equilibrium, the aggregate debts of the firm are reduced enough to provide a positive expected residual return to the owner-managers, which improves their incentives to efficiently operate the firm and can result in an outcome that is Pareto superior to other bankruptcy procedures. We discuss the efficiency properties of this scheme and its appropriateness to situations of systemic financial distress.     

Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly

This paper examines the nature of optimal managerial incentives in the context of a duopoly marked by competition between the firm's managers in a dynamic production environment. If the marginal cost of production falls moderately over time or remains unchanged, there exists an equilibrium where one owner requires her manager to maximize profit, whereas the rival-owner requires her manager to maximize sales revenue. The profit-maximizing manager turns his firm into a Stackelberg-leader, while the sales-revenue-maximizing manager turns his firm into a Stackelberg-follower. Further, the profit-maximizing manager may generate a larger firm profit relative to the sales-revenue-maximizing manager.     

Forecasting financial distress for French firms: a comparative study

The aim of this paper is to compare three statistical methods predicting corporate financial distress. We use discriminant analysis, logistic regression and random forest (RF) methods. These approaches are evaluated based on a sample of 800 companies, composed of 400 healthy companies and 400 failed companies. This study covers the period from 2006 to 2008 using 33 financial ratios. The results show the superiority of the RF approach, which gives better results in terms of classification. It allows for better forecast accuracy because it minimizes type I and type II errors.     

Financial distress,financial constraint and investment decision: Evidence from Brazil

This paper analyses the presence of financial constraint in the investment decisions of 367 Brazilian firms from 1997 to 2004, using a Bayesian econometric model with group-varying parameters. The motivation for this paper is the use of clustering techniques to group firms in a totally endogenous form. In order to classify the firms we used a hybrid clustering method, that is, hierarchical and non-hierarchical clustering techniques jointly. To estimate the parameters a Bayesian approach was considered. Prior distributions were assumed for the parameters, classifying the model in random or fixed effects. Ordinate predictive density criterion was used to select the model providing a better prediction. We tested thirty models and the better prediction considers the presence of 2 groups in the sample, assuming the fixed effect model with a Student t distribution with 20 degrees of freedom for the error. The results indicate robustness in the identification of financial constraint when the firms are classified by the clustering techniques.     

The managerial response to regulation of financial reporting for segments of a business enterprise

To properly assess the performance and monitor the management of industrially diversified firms, investors and other stakeholders may want companies to report separate financial data for each of their lines of business. In the mid-1970s, following a major increase in diversification of American firms, private and public regulators began requiring firms to disclose financial data for individual industry segments. Company managers, however, were given the authority to determine the degree to which data reported to outsiders was disaggregated. This article examines the managerial response to segmented financial disclosure regulations. Analysis of longitudinal data reveals that the extent of segmentation in reporting has been both low and declining, relative to the true extent of industrial diversification. In 1985, the fraction of companies with more than one reported segment was only 29.7 percent, whereas the fraction of companies operating in more than one line of business (assigned more than one SIC code by Compustat) was 83.5 percent. In 1977, about half of the included companies reported at least two industry segments, and a third reported at least three; by 1987, these fractions had declined to about one-quarter and one-seventh, respectively. A potential explanation of these findings is that managers perceive minimal disclosure of segmented information to be in their own self-interest.     

加强企业风险管理,降低财务困境成本

公司通过风险管理可以降低从银行贷款的成本,可以降低债券发行的融资成本,可以降低通过股票发行融资的成本.显然,公司进行风险管理可使公司融资更加容易,并且可降低公司各种融资方式下的融资成本.     

企业战略经营业绩评价的核心财务指标

企业战略经营的目标就是要实现长期利益最大化。为此，企业战略经营业绩的评价应侧重于企业在实现长期利益最大化方面的评价。要实现企业战略经营目标，关键是企业创新能力和核心竞争力的形成和保持，而企业持续盈利能力和持续人力资本能力较集中地体现了企业的创新能力和核心竞争力，因而构成了企业战略经营业绩评价的核心财务指标。     

Strategic analysis of the competitive exercise of certain financial options

Warrants and convertible bonds are claims on the firm which change the outstanding number of common stock shares when exercised or converted. Exercise of such claims in competitive circumstances is modeled here as a noncooperative game played by a continuum of players. First, equilibria of the game are shown to exist by applying results of Schmeidler. Second, the game's equilibria are compared to outcomes that come about when one individual controls the exercise of all the claims, but is constrained to exercise them in one block. The results are analogues of earlier results by one of the authors on the competitive pricing of such claims.     

Prediction of financial distress for multinational corporations: Panel estimations across countries

This research predicts ex-ante financial distress and analyses the link between financial distress, performance, employment, `and research and development (R&D) investment in the case of multinational companies (MNCs). The conditional logit and hazard models are employed to predict financial distress, while a conditional mixed process model is employed to obtain consistent and efficient estimates. Financial distress generates contractions in performance, employment, and R&D investment. Hedging against risk mitigates the effect of financial distress on R&D. Our findings vary across countries, for example, we find MNCs in Canada, Israel and the U.S. benefit from hedging against risk. The findings also indicate that ex-ante financial distress is detrimental to employment for Canada, the U.K., the Netherlands and the U.S. The findings indicate the MNCs play different roles across countries in contributing jobs, investment in R&D during the distress period.     

Persuasion,binary choice,and the costs of dishonesty

We study the strategic interaction between a decision maker who needs to take a binary decision but is uncertain about relevant facts and an informed expert who can send a message to the decision maker but has a preference over the decision. We show that the probability that the expert can persuade the decision maker to take the expert’s preferred decision is a hump-shaped function of his costs of sending dishonest messages.     

Cartel formation and managerial incentives

We study the formation of cartels within two different contexts. First, we consider internal–external stability based models which, due to firms’ free-riding incentives, lead to the inexistence of stable cartels. Second, we introduce the dynamic aspect of coalition formation. That is, when considering a cartel we consider also any cartel that can be reached through a succession of moves. Despite firms’ free-riding incentive, the dynamic process predicts that the collusion of the whole industry can occur with some regularity. We show that free-riding incentives decrease and incentives to merge increase when firms’ owner delegate production decisions to managers.      

Stock options and managerial optimal contracts

Summary. In this paper we are concerned with the performance of stock option contracts in the provision of managerial incentives. In our simple framework, we restrict the space of contracts available to the principal to those conformed by a fixed payment and a call option on the firms stock. As compared to the fixed payment and the option grant, we find that the strike price plays an intermediate role in the provision of insurance and incentives. We also develop some methods for the calibration of a standard principal-agent model based upon observed CEO earnings schedules and the volatility of the firms value in the stock market. These methods are useful to address some important issues such as the performance of stock option contracts, the degree of risk aversion compatible with current earnings profiles and the sensitivity of compensation to changes in firms characteristics.Received: 9 April 2003, Revised: 13 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C6, D83. Correspondence to: Manuel S. SantosWe have benefitted from helpful discussions with Marco Celentani, Hector Chade, Alejandro Manelli and Ed Schlee. We are especially grateful to an anonymous referee for very detailed comments.     

Financial innovations and managerial incentive contracting

Abstract.  The top executives' demands for financial instruments that enable them to hedge the risk exposure in their compensation has increased drastically in the last decade. We analyse the implications of a manager's hedging ability for effort incentives. We show that if the manager's hedging opportunity is limited to a known fixed number of trading rounds with risk‐neutral third parties, then the equilibrium effort is not affected at all. If the manager has the opportunity to hedge without committing to a last trading round, however, she hedges completely and no effort incentives can be sustained. Therefore, limiting the manager's opportunity to hedge to a fixed known number of trading rounds is crucial for sustaining incentives. JEL classification: G30, G32     

Debt, managerial compensation and learning

Using a dynamic model with uncertainty and asymmetric information, we study the impact of debt and bankruptcy on managerial compensation and learning. In this model, compensation has two roles to play—providing incentives to the manager and learning about his type. We show that debt, through bankruptcy, acts as a substitute of compensation in both dimensions and derive conditions under which debt lowers average compensation, pay-performance sensitivity and increases learning. We also examine the choice of debt and show that firm value can be increased due to debt's effect on managerial compensation, abstracting from other costs and benefits of debt. Finally, we conduct comparative statics with respect to the underlying parameters.     

Openness, managerial incentives, and heterogeneous firms

This paper examines the effects of trade openness on managerial incentives and firm-level productivity by incorporating the principal-agent mechanism into the heterogeneous firm trade framework inter alia Melitz (Econometrica 71:1695?C1725, 2003). We show that opening up to trade generally leads to a steeper optimal managerial incentive scheme (and hence, higher firm productivity) via a new mechanism by which selection of heterogeneous firms into the export market plays a key role. This is because trade openness unambiguously increases the variation of firm profits by reallocating profits towards ex post low-cost exporters, leading to a higher stake of the market game faced by the principals. Interestingly, it is further shown that, whilst falling variable trade costs unambiguously increase managerial incentives, a reduction in fixed trade costs could possibly lead to weaker incentives and thus generate productivity losses due to an adverse inter-firm reallocation effect. Hence, the model establishes a causal link between the Melitz-type reallocation effect and the within-firm productivity changes, both of which have been identified as important sources of aggregate productivity gains from trade by recent empirical studies.     

Distortions,endogenous managerial skills and productivity differences

We develop a span-of-control model where managerial skills are endogenous and the outcome of investments over the life cycle of managers. We calibrate this model to U.S. plant-size data to quantify the effects of distortions that are correlated with the size of production units, and how these effects are amplified by managerial investments. We find a quantitatively important role for managerial investments. Distortions that consist of a tax rate of 20% on the top 50% managers reduce steady-state output by about 14.6% in our benchmark model. When skills are exogenous the reduction is about 9.2%.     

战略计划与战略思维简析

战略计划在战略管理中占有重要地位,但这一思想后来受到了许多管理学家的批评,有关战略计划与战略思维的关系,是理论界长期争辩的一个问题。本文对战略计划的批判性观点,以及战略计划与战略思维的关系的主要观点进行了梳理。在此基础上,从理论上分析了战略管理者应具有辩证思维,战略计划与战略思维是辩证统一的关系,并提出了在实践中保持二者辩证统一的机制。     

浅谈集团企业财务战略及财务管理

财务战略。是指为谋求企业资金均衡有效的流动和实现企业整体战略,为增强企业财务竞争优势,在分析企业内外环境因素对资金流动影响的基础上,对企业资金流动进行全局性、长期性与创造性的谋划,并确保其执行的过程。财务管理则是在一定的整体目标下,关于资产的购置,资本的融通和经营中现金流量,以及利润分配的管理。财务战略主要是考虑财务领域全局的,长期的发展方向问题,而财务管理则是为企业财务战略提供资金支持,是为提高经营活动的价值而进行的管理。财务管理对于企业的长期生存和健康发展具有重要意义。