Financial and economic determinants of firm default

This paper investigates the relevance of financial and economic variables as determinants of firm default. Our analysis covers a large sample of medium-sized limited liability firms. Since default might lead, through bankruptcy or radical restructuring, to firm’s exit, our work also relates to previous contributions on industrial demography. Using non parametric tests we assess to what extent defaulting firms differ from the non-defaulting group. Bootstrap probit regressions confirm that economic variables, in addition to standard financial indicators, play both a long and short term effect. Our findings are robust with respect to the inclusion of Distance to Default and risk ratings among the regressors.     

Determinants of corporate default risk in China: The role of financial constraints

Corporate default risk can affect financial stability and the macroeconomy. However, the determinants of corporate default risk in China are not well defined in the literature. We address this issue by using a rich credit event dataset of 981 Chinese listed firms over the period 1998–2013 and study the factors that affect default risk. We demonstrate that leverage, liquidity, firm size are the key firm-specific factors in determining default risk in China, along with macroeconomic factors like interest rate and stock return. Moreover, ‘Too big to fail’ only applies to non-SOEs, as default risk of SOEs is not affected by the firm size. We further find that high liquidity fails to reduce firms default risk, because small-sized firms which are financially constrained have limited cash to prevent financial distress, whereas large firms with greater cash holdings are able to mitigate their default risk as they are unconstrained.     

Effects of main bank switching on new business bankruptcy

This paper examines the effects of main bank switching on the probability of bankruptcy of new small businesses using a propensity score matching estimation approach. We use a unique firm-level dataset of approximately 1,000 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) incorporated in Japan; these SMEs are young and unlisted just after incorporation. We find that switching main bank relationships increases the probability of firm bankruptcy. In addition, the result holds only when the relationship between the firm and its main bank is terminated. Specifically, the probability of bankruptcy increases when firms switch their main banks to financial institutions with which they have not previously transacted, and when the ex-post main banks are not affiliated financial institutions of their ex-ante main banks. These results may be because such switching worsens the financial condition of client firms, and thus, it leads to bankruptcy.     

Severe or gentle bankruptcy law: Which impact on investing and financing decisions?

This research investigates how legal sanctions prevailing under bankruptcy may impact on debt contracting and on investing decision. We model firms having the opportunity to engage (or not) faulty management. In case of default, the firms may escape costly bankruptcy by reaching a private agreement with the bank. We show that such renegotiation process may depend on the level of severity of bankruptcy law.Our approach helps in answering the following key questions: can bankruptcy costs always be internalized? Who benefits from accrued severity? Should the creditors accept a certain level of moral hazard from their debtors? Should bankruptcy law be extremely severe in order to ensure ex-ante efficiency? Does such severity depend on the financial environment?The model focuses on three equilibriums. The first equilibrium describes honest firms that choose the best investment project (ex-ante efficiency). Here, we show that bankruptcy costs can be avoided through private renegotiation (ex-post efficiency). Yet, the legislator cannot directly implement this equilibrium as it does not depend on the level of legal sanctions. A second equilibrium describes tricky firms turning to the less profitable and riskiest project. Here, default is still privately resolved: the occurrence of such equilibrium can be avoided owing to a minimal amount of legal sanctions that depend on the level of interest rate. Last, we consider firms that adopt mixed strategies regarding their investment policy. Here, two post-default bargains prevail (pooling or separating) and costly bankruptcy may occur.Simulations illustrate how the bank finally chooses between these equilibriums while the legal environment becomes more severe. For moderate levels of legal sanctions, banks may accept a certain level of faulty management, expecting to take advantage of bankruptcy punishment. An increase in sanctions, however, has a compelling effect on the companies towards honoring their commitments. Once the optimal equilibrium prevails, any additional increase in sanctions is ineffective as the players' strategies no longer depend on the legal environment. As a result, extreme severity is not required to ensure both ex-ante and ex-post efficiencies. Last, we find that a more severe bankruptcy law increases the protection of banks and may result in reduction of the contractual interest rate, which on the other hand benefits the debtors.     

The formal sector wage premium and firm size

We show theoretically that when larger firms pay higher wages and are more likely to be caught defaulting on labor taxes, then large-high wage firms will be in the formal and small-low wage firms will be in the informal sector. The formal sector wage premium is thus just a firm size wage differential. Using data from Ecuador we illustrate that firm size is indeed the key variable determining whether a formal sector premium exists.     

Intra‐firm trade,exporting, importing,and firm performance

Abstract This paper examines firm heterogeneity in terms of size, wages, capital intensity, and productivity between domestic and foreign‐owned firms that engage in intra‐firm trade, firms that export and import, firms that import only, and firms that export only. As previously documented, heterogeneity between different groups of trading firms is substantial. Taking into account intra‐firm trade in addition to exporting and importing yields new insights into the productivity advantage previously established for exporting firms. The results presented here show that this premium accrues only to exporters that also import and to exporters that also engage in intra‐firm trade, but not to firms that export only. Using simultaneous quantile regressions, the paper illustrates that heterogeneity within different groups of trading firm is equally large. Some of this within‐group heterogeneity can be attributed to differences in trading partners.     

Importing,Exporting, and Innovation in Developing Countries

This study shows the persistent differences in evolution of firms when they are grouped according to their trade orientation as: two‐way traders (both importing and exporting), “exporters‐only”, “importers‐only”, and nontraders. Extending the existing models of firm evolution into an open economy setup by incorporating the importing decision, a simple model is presented and it is empirically shown that: (i) globally engaged firms are larger, more productive, and grow faster than nontraders; (ii) two‐way traders are the fastest growing and most innovative group who are followed by exporter‐only firms; and (iii) estimating the export premium without controlling for import status is likely to overestimate the actual value by capturing the import premium. Robustness of the results is shown by providing evidence from the panel data constructed from the original dataset and controlling for variables that are likely to affect firm evolution.     

Analyzing the role of mutual guarantee societies on bank capital requirements for small and medium-sized enterprises

This paper analyzes the impact of the guarantee provided by mutual guarantee societies (MGSs) on the risk premium that banks should charge for small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) loans under the new Basel Capital Accords (Basel II and III). We also examine whether the foreseeable decrease in the theoretical credit risk premium would be compensated by the cost of the MGS guarantee. To do so, we develop a rating system for SMEs that uses a large sample of Spanish firms over the period from 2005 to 2009. We find that the final effect of the guarantee on the SME risk premium depends on the values taken by the credit variables of the MGS (essentially, the probability of default).     

Multinational Firms and Technology Transfer

We construct an oligopoly model in which a multinational firm has a superior technology compared to local firms. Workers employed by the multinational acquire knowledge of its superior technology. The multinational may pay a wage premium to prevent local firms from hiring its workers and thus gaining access to their knowledge. In this setting, the host government has an incentive to attract FDI due to technology transfer to local firms or the wage premium earned by employees of the multinational firm. However, when FDI is particularly attractive to the multinational firm, the host government has an incentive to discourage FDI.
JEL classification : F 13; F 23; J 41; L 13; O 14; O 33; O 38     

Advancing Loss Given Default Prediction Models: How the Quiet Have Quickened

We describe LossCalc™ version 2.0: the Moody's KMV model to predict loss given default (LGD), the equivalent of (1  −  recovery rate). LossCalc is a statistical model that applies multiple predictive factors at different information levels: collateral, instrument, firm, industry, country and the macroeconomy to predict LGD. We find that distance‐to‐default measures (from the Moody's KMV structural model of default likelihood) compiled at both the industry and firm levels are predictive of LGD. We find that recovery rates worldwide are predictable within a common statistical framework, which suggests that the estimation of economic firm value (which is then available to allocate to claimants according to each country's bankruptcy laws) is a dominant step in LGD determination. LossCalc is built on a global dataset of 3,026 recovery observations for loans, bonds and preferred stock from 1981 to 2004. This dataset includes 1,424 defaults of both public and private firms – both rated and unrated instruments – in all industries. We demonstrate out‐of‐sample and out‐of‐time LGD model validation. The model significantly improves on the use of historical recovery averages to predict LGD .     

An agency theory of the bankruptcy law

What is the purpose of bankruptcy law? Existing views focus on the need of coordinating creditors' conflicting claims. In this paper the authors argue that the bankruptcy law helps reduce agency costs in financially distressed firms by forcing managers to disclose information on the viability of the firm. The authors' theory explains a number of empirical observations of financial distress that cannot easily be explained by existing theories of bankruptcy law.     

Nationalizations,bailouts and efficiency

ABSTRACT

We develop a theoretical model in which there are public and private firms and a government. When firms become insolvent, the government can intervene with bailouts or nationalizations. The government only intervenes when the bankruptcy of a firm entails social costs. In this setting, we analyze how government interventions affect allocative and productive efficiency. Nationalizations of private firms after unprofitable investments lead to increased allocative efficiency despite private ownership. The effort level chosen by the managers and employees working for a firm is also affected by the possibility of government interventions, reducing the productive efficiency advantage of private firms.     

Quantitative easing and default probability of corporate social responsibility in US

The US Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing (QE) policies lowered the cost of servicing corporate debt and enhanced firms’ ability to borrow. This article seeks to improve the accuracy of default probability calculations as proposed by Merton (1974) under conditions of lower interest rates resulting from QE. By modifying the long-term debt ratio, we find distance to default is undervalued. Specifically, we find that the distance to default is more stably for firms with excellent corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance, but those with poor CSR performance are significantly undervalued. Our results show that improved CSR performance correctly estimates the firm’s default risk, even during QE when the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet expanded by nearly $4.5 trillion.     

A Model of a Price-setting Duopoly with a Wage-rise Contract

This paper considers a wage-rise contract between a firm and its employees as the firm's strategy, and suggests a wage-rise-contract policy. The policy is a promise by the firm that it will announce a certain output level and a wage premium rate, and if it actually produces more than the announced output level, then it will pay each employee a wage premium uniformly. First, this paper examines the case in which one of two firms unilaterally offers the wage-rise-contract policy by using a two-stage price-setting duopoly model. It is then shown that there exists an equilibrium which coincides with the Stackelberg solution where the firm adopting the policy is the leader. Next, this paper examines the case in which both firms can offer the wage-rise-contract policy in the model. It is then shown that there exists an equilibrium which is more profitable for both firms than in the unilateral case.     

Does default point vary with firm size?

This article aims to improve the predictive ability of KMV model by distinguishing firm size. The evidence suggests that default point would vary with firm size. Using the method of particle swarm optimization, we obtain the optimal default point separately for large firms and small firms. Several statistical tests such as the model confidence set methodology show that our relatively tractable model is more likely to have the strongest predictive ability.     

Insolvency regimes and firms' default risk under economic uncertainty and shocks

One of the arguments often advanced for implementing a stronger insolvency and bankruptcy framework is that it enhances credit discipline among firms. Using a large cross-country firm-level dataset, we empirically test whether a stronger insolvency regime reduces firms' likelihood of defaulting on their debt. In particular, we examine whether it reduces default risk during increased economic uncertainty and various external shocks. Our results confirm that a stronger insolvency regime moderates the adverse effects of economic shocks on firms' default risk. The effects are more pronounced for firms in the top half of the size distribution. We also explore channels through which improved creditor rights influence firms' default risk, including dependence on external finance, corporate leverage, and managerial ethics. Our main results are robust to an alternative measure of default risk, inclusion of currency and sovereign debt crisis episodes, and alternative estimations.     

我国困境企业财务恶化趋势的实证分析

在我国现行的破产与重组制度下,一方面,破产软约束使得没有继续经营能力的财务困境企业不能及时破产清算,另一方面,对于有继续经营能力的财务困境企业又没有在相关制度上创造重组再生的良好条件.在这种制度背景下,困境企业将在财务困境成本的推动下,其业绩和财务状况都将持续恶化,该"破"的和该"立"的都难以摆脱困境.本文从困境企业重组后是否恢复盈利能力和支付能力两个角度进行实证研究,结果发现除被借"壳"的企业外,未实施重组和实施了其他重组的困境企业,业绩普遍下降.而从支付能力来看,困境企业的资产负债水平呈现逐年上升的态势,均值都已达到资不抵债的境地,且75%以上的困境企业都没有摆脱困境.     

WHY FOREIGN OWNERSHIP MAY BE GOOD FOR YOU*

We develop a two‐country model with heterogeneous producers and rent‐sharing at the firm level. We identify two sources of a multinational wage premium: A composition effect because multinational firms are more productive, make higher profits, and pay higher wages, and a firm‐level wage effect, because a firm makes higher global profits and thus pays higher wages in its home market when becoming multinational. With two identical countries, the wage premium is fully explained by firm characteristics. Allowing for technology differences between countries, a residual wage premium exists in the technologically backward country but not in the advanced country.     

Risk sharing and export performance with firm heterogeneity

We investigate how market uncertainty affects the export performance of a firm through financial frictions. We first extend Melitz's (2003) heterogeneous firm trade model by incorporating demand shocks, linking the demand uncertainties to the financing costs of firms. In this extension, the default probability is endogenously determined by a firm's productivity and demand uncertainty. Hence, firms with higher productivity or lower market uncertainty are offered lower interest rates and thus show better export performance. As an application, we also show that a risk-sharing mechanism, that pools default risk for a certain group of firms, lowers the default risk. This mechanism allows banks to charge lower interest rates to the member firms and therefore ultimately improves their export performance in both extensive and intensive margins. We find a real-world example of such a mechanism from business groups in Korea. Using Korean firm-level data, we show that the more diversified the business group, the greater the likelihood that its member firms export and the bigger their export revenues. We also show that our results are robust to alternative explanations for Korean business groups’ export competitiveness.     

ST公司生命轨迹的实证分析

本文对上市公司进入ST行列及进入之后的整个生命轨迹进行了全面研究。要进一步完善上市制度．避免短命公司的出现。退市机制要更加彻底．对恢复上市公司的资产重组方案的审核要更加严格,否则重组后迟早要爆发危机;上市公司进入ST以后资产重组现象普遍存在,对公司命运产生了实质性影响;审计报告在评价ST公司业绩时具有显著作用。