THE USE OF ACQUISITIONS AND JOINT VENTURES BY U.S. BANKS EXPANDING ABROAD

We examine international bank expansions, which are classified as banking (scale related) or nonbanking (complementary) moves into developed or developing markets. The market responds favorably to expansions through joint ventures by U.S. banks, and insignificantly to expansions through acquisitions. Accounting and operating performances (for joint venture banks) and long‐period holding returns (for acquisitions) show improvement in the two years following the announcement. Systematic risk declines for the sample overall, for acquisitions, and for expansions into developing countries. In general, scale or developing expansions are better pursued through acquisitions, whereas complementary or developed expansions are best pursued through joint ventures.     

THE INFLUENCE OF FIRM‐ AND CEO‐SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS ON THE USE OF NONLINEAR DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS

We examine why firms use nonlinear derivatives (e.g., options). Our results suggest that option characteristics in investment opportunities and debt, the payoff structure of incentive compensation, and free cash‐flow agency problems influence the firm's choice. Investment opportunities, internally generated cash flow, business risk, and option compensation positively influence the use of nonlinear currency derivatives. Option feature in bonds positively influence the use of nonlinear interest rate derivatives, whereas bonus and stock compensation, and CEO tenure have a negative influence. In sum, nonlinear cash flow characteristics in investment opportunity, debt, and executive compensation all relate positively to nonlinear derivative usage.     

CONVERTIBLE DEBT AND RISK‐SHIFTING INCENTIVES

I argue that convertible debt, in contrast to its perceived role, can produce shareholders’ risk‐shifting incentives. When a firm's capital structure includes convertible debt, every investment decision affects not only the distribution of the asset value but also the likelihood that the debt will be converted and thereby the distribution of the firm's leverage. This suggests that managers can engage in risk‐increasing projects if a higher asset risk generates a more favorable distribution of leverage. Empirical evidence using 30 years of data supports my argument.     

A THEORY OF UNWINDING OF CROSS‐SHAREHOLDING UNDER MANAGERIAL ENTRENCHMENT

In this article I examine corporate strategies regarding cross‐shareholding and the unwinding of cross‐shareholding, and I present a rationale for corporate managers to unwind cross‐shareholding from the perspective of managerial entrenchment. Although cross‐shareholding enhances managerial entrenchment, the increased agency costs associated with managerial opportunism increase the incentives for a hostile takeover. To avoid a takeover, managers have to unwind cross‐shareholdings. The unwinding of cross‐shareholdings implies that managers will relinquish their entrenchment and thus will act to increase shareholders' wealth in the future. The model proposed here explains why cross‐shareholdings among Japanese firms declined during the 1990s, a decade during which the cost of takeovers decreased because of financial market deregulation.     

INFORMATION ASYMMETRY,DIVIDEND STATUS,AND SEO ANNOUNCEMENT‐DAY RETURNS

We analyze the relation between the dividend‐paying status of a firm and the seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcement‐day return. Asymmetric information theory suggests there should be a positive relation: the larger the disagreement, particularly between managers and shareholders, the larger the price drop on the SEO announcement day. However, this theoretical result has not been supported by prior empirical research. In this article we reconcile the gap between the theory and extant empirical results by identifying a structural change in the way the stock market treats dividend‐paying firms. Since the mid‐1980s the difference in information asymmetry between dividend‐ and non‐dividend‐paying firms has increased sharply. As a result, before the mid‐1980s the market did not differentiate strongly between them, but subsequently the market has reacted less negatively to announcements by dividend payers.     

DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN BUSINESS START‐UPS: THE ROLE OF NONFINANCIAL STAKEHOLDER RELATIONSHIP COSTS

According to the finance literature, nonfinancial stakeholders (NFS), such as customers, suppliers, and employees, take into account their expected liquidation costs when dealing with a firm. In this framework, firms can influence their probability of liquidation by choosing an appropriate capital structure. Also, the literature suggests NFS bargaining power may affect firm financing decisions. In the current article we investigate these ideas for initial financing decisions by business start‐ups, where ex ante failure risk is high and NFS must decide whether to make relationship‐specific investments. We find that start‐ups imposing larger costs on their NFS following liquidation significantly reduce leverage. This effect is strengthened when suppliers have greater bargaining power. We also document a marginally negative effect of NFS liquidation costs on the proportion of bank loans. Finally, business start‐ups rely less on bank loans when customers and suppliers are in a powerful bargaining position.     

THE EFFECT OF CROSS‐LISTING ON TRADING VOLUME: REDUCING SEGMENTATION VERSUS SIGNALING INVESTOR PROTECTION

We examine the relation between cross‐listing on the U.S. and UK regulated and unregulated exchanges and trading volume for a sample of 500 foreign firms from 34 countries. We find that the increase in trading volume is a function of both reducing segmentation and signaling investor protection. In addition, we find that home market trading volume, firm size, firm returns, and analyst forecast accuracy are the major determinants of a firm's trading volume. We also show that U.S. and UK investors trade foreign securities that originate from low‐investor‐protection countries more than they trade those from high‐investor‐protection countries, which is consistent with the bonding hypothesis.     

DEBT FORGIVENESS AND STOCK PRICE REACTION OF LENDING BANKS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN

We provide a simple model for analyzing how debt forgiveness affects the stock price of a lending bank. Our model shows that although debt forgiveness increases shareholder wealth of a bank in healthy financial condition, it decreases shareholder wealth of a bank in unhealthy financial condition. We empirically investigate the announcement effect of debt forgiveness on bank stock prices in Japanese markets. On average, lending banks experience a significant negative announcement effect with respect to debt forgiveness. Consistent with the prediction of the model, we find a negative relation between the announcement effect and the net bad loan ratio as a proxy of the unhealthiness of the financial condition of the bank.     

MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP,TAKEOVER DEFENSES,AND DEBT FINANCING

We examine the effect of agency conflicts on debt financing and show that managerial ownership and its interaction with takeover defenses affect these decisions. We find that (1) the relation between leverage and takeover defenses becomes insignificant when we control for the interaction of these defenses with managerial ownership, and (2) firms with large managerial ownership operate at high debt levels unless they have a large number of takeover defenses. Therefore, a two‐dimensional aspect of governance that includes the interaction between managerial ownership and takeover defenses is useful in understanding the effect of agency conflicts on firms' debt financing decisions.     

TAKEOVER EXPOSURE, AGENCY, AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DEBT

We examine how governance characteristics are related to the corporate choice between public and private debt. We find that firms with fewer takeover defenses and larger outside blockholder ownership are more likely to borrow from banks and to issue 144A debt. We also document that public debt cost is more sensitive to takeover exposure than bank debt cost. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks mitigate the expected negative effect of takeovers on debt value through covenants and debt renegotiations. Moreover, we show that firms with weaker internal monitoring are less likely to borrow from banks.     

THE GRAMM‐LEACH‐BLILEY ACT OF 1999: RISK IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY

We document significant risk changes in the financial services industry following the passage of the Gramm‐Leach‐Bliley Act of 1999. Banks experience an increase in risk regardless of whether they have taken steps to participate actively in the investment banking business. Insurance companies also experience an increase in risk, whereas securities firms experience a decrease in risk. We attribute the increase in risk for banks and insurance companies to the fact that the securities business is relatively more risky, and the decline in risk for securities firms to the fact that they can now diversify into relatively less risky banking and insurance businesses.     

CREDIT SPREADS AND THE ZERO‐COUPON TREASURY SPOT CURVE

We examine the relation between credit spreads on industrial bonds and the underlying Treasury term structure. We use zero‐coupon spot rates to eliminate the coupon bias and to allow for a consistent study both within and across the different credit ratings. Our results indicate that the level and slope of the Treasury term structure are negatively correlated with changes in the credit spread on investment‐grade corporate bonds. We also find that the relation between credit spreads and the Treasury term structure is relatively stable through time. This is good news for value‐at‐risk calculations, as this suggests that the correlations among assets of different credit classes are stable; therefore use of historic correlations to model spread relations can be valid.     

BANK PRIVATIZATION AND CONVERGENCE OF PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

We trace the extent of performance deviation of privatized banks from established private banks in 30 countries from 1994 to 2005 and investigate the role of bank regulatory and supervisory norms, market competition, ownership structure, deposit insurance scheme, and governance structure affecting the deviation. Evidence shows that privatization does improve the performance of banks in the first year of being privatized, but performance gradually declines, which is consistent with the government restructuring argument before the privatization. Governance, foreign ownership, banking freedom (regulations), and the deposit insurance scheme in respective economies are found to affect performance deviation significantly.     

KEIRETSU AFFILIATION AND STOCK‐MARKET‐DRIVEN ACQUISITIONS

We examine misvaluation as a driver of takeover activity in Japan. Mirroring empirical results from the United States, we find that overvaluation is an important factor affecting the dichotomy between acquirers and nonacquirers in Japan. Being affiliated to a keiretsu group appears to reduce the probability that an overvalued firm will decide to acquire another firm. Misvaluation is also an important determinant of the likelihood of a firm becoming a target; however, there is no significant difference between keiretsu and nonkeiretsu firms in this regard. Shareholders of keiretsu‐affiliated acquirers do not gain from acquisitions, whereas acquisitions by nonaffiliated firms do seem to be value enhancing.     

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS ON FIRMS’ OPERATING PERFORMANCE AND FINANCING DECISIONS

We investigate the impact that the political connections of publicly traded firms have on their performance and financing decisions. Using a long‐term event study covering a sample of 234 politically connected firms headquartered in 12 developed and 11 developing countries from 1989 to 2003, we find that firms increase their performance and indebtedness after the establishment of a political connection. We also find that the political connection is more strongly associated with changes in leverage and operating performance for firms with closer ties to political power. Overall, our study confirms that politically connected firms gain easier access to credit and reap benefits in terms of performance from their ties with politicians.     

FINANCIAL CONTRACTING BETWEEN MANAGERS AND VENTURE CAPITALISTS: THE ROLE OF VALUE‐ADDED SERVICES,REPUTATION SEEKING,AND BARGAINING POWER

I analyze manager and venture capitalist bargaining over the financial contract in the face of double‐sided moral hazard problems. The allocation of cash flows depends on the combined effects of value‐added services, reputation seeking, and bargaining power. Welfare is maximized when the venture capitalist has high value‐adding capabilities, the market for reputation is informationally efficient, and the manager has bargaining power. Furthermore, I consider the effect of exit strategies on the financial agreement. I also consider bidding between venture capitalists of differing abilities. Generally, the superior venture capitalist wins with a lower bid, but in some cases the inferior venture capitalist can win.     

Are Expected Inflation Rates and Expected Real Rates Negatively Correlated? A Long‐Run Test of the Mundell‐Tobin Hypothesis

Some empirical evidence suggests that the expected real interest and expected inflation rates are negatively correlated. This hypothesis of negative correlation is sometimes known as the Mundell‐Tobin hypothesis. In this article we reinvestigate this negative relation from a long‐term point of view using cointegration analysis. The data on the historical interest rate on T‐bills and the inflation rate indicate that the Mundell‐Tobin hypothesis does not hold in the long run for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. We also obtain similar results using the real interest rate on index‐linked gilt traded in the United Kingdom.     

THE TIME‐VARYING EQUITY PREMIUM AND THE S&P 500 IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

I present a new hindcast stock market index for the United States over the twentieth century. This is constructed by calibrating a rational asset pricing model that allows for a time‐varying equity premium driven by heteroskedasticity in consumption growth. By incorporating this variation in risk, the mean square error of the generated index series, when compared to the observed levels of the S&P 500, is significantly reduced. The model also explains the broad magnitudes and timings of the major bull and bear markets of the twentieth century, particularly before 1973, and the excess volatility puzzle is largely resolved.