WINDOW DRESSING IN BOND MUTUAL FUNDS

We examine portfolio credit quality holding and daily return patterns in a large sample of bond mutual funds and document evidence of window dressing. Using portfolio credit quality holdings data, we find that bond funds on average hold significantly more government bonds during disclosure than nondisclosure, presumably to present a safer portfolio to shareholders. Multiple‐index market models estimated with daily returns data corroborate these findings. We detect differences in factor loadings on days surrounding disclosure dates that indicate systematic tilting of the portfolio toward higher quality instruments.     

INVESTOR REACTION TO MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM UK DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS

Existing work on the flow–performance relation in mutual funds focuses on the average U.S. investor, obscuring the contributions of different clienteles. We analyze UK data on monthly fund sales and purchases made via seven distinct distribution channels. We show that there exist marked differences in the reaction to fund performance between different types of retail and institutional investors. These differences can be understood by considering the incentives of parties involved in each channel. Our analysis indicates that the well‐documented aggregate net flow–performance convexity in mutual funds is driven by the extreme reaction of retail inflows to favorable performance, particularly from independently advised investors.     

EVIDENCE ON THE COMPENSATION OF PORTFOLIO MANAGERS

We surveyed 396 portfolio managers about the structure of their compensation. Overall, more compensation packages are subjective/discretionary than objective/formula based. Firm success factors such as firm profitability have more effect on bonuses than do client success factors such as investment performance. Differences in the structure of compensation across firms, clients, job types, and manager characteristics reflect likely differences in the underlying contracting environments, especially differences in the difficulty of monitoring performance and exerting control.     

MUTUAL FUND DAILY CONDITIONAL PERFORMANCE

The empirical finance literature reveals that conditional models estimated with monthly data generally improve fund performance. Furthermore, it has been shown that using daily instead of monthly returns in an unconditional framework increases the proportion of abnormal performances relative to timing. In this article, we study conditional performance estimated with daily data in a bivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) framework. Our daily conditional alphas and global performances with GARCH are significantly better than those estimated with other parametrizations and they persist over time. Finally, the proportion of abnormal timing performances diminishes significantly when conditional parametrizations are used.     

OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO SELECTION WITH A SHORTFALL PROBABILITY CONSTRAINT: EVIDENCE FROM ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS

We propose a new approach to optimal portfolio selection in a downside risk framework that allocates assets by maximizing expected return subject to a shortfall probability constraint, reflecting the typical desire of a risk-averse investor to limit the maximum likely loss. Our empirical results indicate that the loss-averse portfolio outperforms the widely used mean-variance approach based on the cumulative cash values, geometric mean returns, and average risk-adjusted returns. We also evaluate the relative performance of the loss-averse portfolio with normal, symmetric thin-tailed, symmetric fat-tailed, and skewed fat-tailed return distributions in terms of average return, risk, and average risk-adjusted return.     

THE BROKERAGE FIRM EFFECT IN HERDING: EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA

We examine herding behavior of domestic and foreign investors in the Indonesian stock market. We document that both domestic and foreign investors from a particular brokerage firm tend to herd. The foreign investors exhibit a greater propensity to herd than domestic investors. However, when examining investor trading across brokerage firms, we find only weak evidence of herding by domestic investors and no herding by foreign investors. Our overall findings suggest a strong brokerage firm effect on herding but a weak marketwide effect. Moreover, we find evidence that the strong brokerage effect on herding is likely driven by acting on common information.     

SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING AND PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION

I use a sample of socially responsible stock mutual funds matched to randomly selected conventional funds of similar net assets to investigate differences in characteristics of assets held, portfolio diversification, and variable effects of diversification on investment performance. I find that socially responsible funds do not differ significantly from conventional funds in terms of any of these attributes. Moreover, the effect of diversification on investment performance is not different between the two groups. Both groups underperform the Domini 400 Social Index and S&P 500 during the study period.     

MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE AND COMPETITION: A CROSS‐SECTOR ANALYSIS

Existing work on mutual fund performance persistence obtains diverse results, depending on the group of funds studied. We examine whether performance persistence within a peer group of competing mutual funds depends on the group's composition. The U.K. mutual fund industry is ideal for such an examination because funds compete within strictly defined sectors. We consider several attributes related to the intensity of competition within a sector and use them to explain sector‐level persistence. We find robust evidence that persistence is higher in sectors where concentration of assets under management is higher.     

IMPORTANCE OF THE FUND MANAGEMENT COMPANY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE MUTUAL FUNDS

We compare the performance of a sample of U.K.‐based socially responsible investment (SRI) funds with similar conventional funds using a matched‐pair analysis based on size, age, investment universe, and fund management company (FMC). We find that both the SRI and conventional funds outperform the market index about 50% of the time, even after fees. Subsample tests show that the SRI funds in our sample perform better in the pre‐ and postfinancial crisis periods but underperform during the financial crisis period. Importantly, we find that the FMC plays a major role in the outperformance of both SRI and conventional funds.     

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT,INTERNALIZATION, AND U.S. ACQUIRER GAINS IN FOREIGN TAKEOVERS

In examining takeovers of foreign targets by U.S. firms, we investigate the effect of the target country's legal environment on acquiring firm value. Our results indicate that acquirers of target firms located in civil law countries experience significant positive abnormal returns, especially when the acquirer possesses a high level of intangibles. Furthermore, we find that acquirers with high levels of intangibles are more likely to acquire target firms in civil law countries. These findings suggest that the transfer of intangibles overseas provides relatively larger efficiency benefits for multinational corporations in cases where the alternative, contracting in external markets, is more difficult.     

EVIDENCE ON THE MARKET FOR PROFESSIONAL DIRECTORS

Using the temporary increase in the supply of directors associated with successful tender offers, we examine characteristics of directors who are valuable in the market for board seats. We find that after a takeover, professional directors are three times more likely to receive new appointments than other types of directors released from their respective boards. We find that the proportion of professional directors in above‐average performing targets is significantly greater than that in underperforming targets. Our results indicate that professional directors generally have valuable general human capital that more than offsets the costs of multiple directorships.     

TAKEOVER EXPOSURE, AGENCY, AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DEBT

We examine how governance characteristics are related to the corporate choice between public and private debt. We find that firms with fewer takeover defenses and larger outside blockholder ownership are more likely to borrow from banks and to issue 144A debt. We also document that public debt cost is more sensitive to takeover exposure than bank debt cost. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks mitigate the expected negative effect of takeovers on debt value through covenants and debt renegotiations. Moreover, we show that firms with weaker internal monitoring are less likely to borrow from banks.     

Agency costs,governance, and organizational forms: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

Using a comprehensive sample of mutual funds and fund families for the period 1992–2004, this study examines the impact of fund management companies’ organizational forms on the level of agency costs within mutual funds. We find that, all else being equal: (1) funds managed by public fund families charge higher fees than those managed by private fund families; (2) public fund families acquire more funds than private fund families; and (3) funds of public fund families significantly underperform funds of private fund families. Collectively, these findings suggest that agency costs are higher in mutual funds managed by public fund families. Our results are consistent with the idea that the agency conflict between the fund management company and fund shareholders is more acute for public management companies because of their shorter-term focus.     

DIRECT EVIDENCE ON THE MARKET‐DRIVEN ACQUISITION THEORY

We provide direct empirical evidence that share overvaluation is an important motive for firms to make stock acquisitions. We find that more overvalued firms are more likely to acquire with stock, and acquirers are more overvalued in successful stock mergers than in withdrawn mergers. Acquirers' overvaluation, on average, exceeds the targets' premium‐adjusted overvaluation. Shareholders of stock acquirers, whose overvaluation is greater than their targets' premium‐adjusted overvaluation, realize sustained wealth gains from one day before the merger announcement up to three years after the merger completion, as compared with a matching sample of similarly overvalued but nonacquiring firms.     

CEO EQUITY PORTFOLIO INCENTIVES AND LAYOFF DECISIONS

CEOs with higher equity‐based compensation are widely believed to be more likely to act in shareholders' interests. Unlike less common acquisitions, voluntary liquidations, or seasoned equity offerings, layoffs are comparatively common elements of firms' operating strategies. We find that CEOs with at least one year of tenure who possess greater incentives from portfolios of restricted stock and stock option grants are more likely to announce layoffs, and that these layoffs create shareholder value. We conclude that accumulated portfolios of restricted stock and stock option grants encourage CEOs to adopt operating strategies that improve operating profits and stock performance.     

Mutual fund skill and the performance of corporate acquirers

We show that the commonly observed correlation between institutional investor ownership and the success of mergers is partly driven by active stock picking. Several mutual fund stock selection skill measures strongly predict the post-merger performance of corporate acquirers even after controlling for possible shareholder monitoring. These findings are stronger for funds with characteristics more indicative of active stock picking. Moreover, firms held by funds with higher stock selection skills are more likely to subsequently become acquirers, suggesting that the mutual fund skill set includes the ability to identify acquirers with value-enhancing acquisition opportunities.     

Cross-ownership,returns, and voting in mergers

We show that institutional shareholders of acquiring companies on average do not lose money around public merger announcements, because they hold substantial stakes in the targets and make up for the losses from the acquirers with the gains from the targets. Depending on their holdings in the target, acquirer shareholders generally realize different returns from the same merger, some losing money and others gaining. This conflict of interest is reflected in the mutual fund voting behavior: In mergers with negative acquirer announcement returns, cross-owners are significantly more likely to vote for the merger.     

INFORMATION AND NOISE IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM THE E‐MINI INDEX FUTURES

I examine the informational contributions and effects on transitory volatility of trades initiated by different types of traders in three actively traded index futures markets. The results show that trades initiated by exchange member firms account for more than 60% of price discovery during the trading day. These institutional trades appear to be more informative than trades of individual exchange members or off‐exchange traders. I also find that off‐exchange traders introduce more noise into the prices than do exchange members. My findings provide new evidence on the role of different types of traders in the price formation process.     

SHORT SELLING AND PRICE DISCOVERY: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN DEPOSITARY RECEIPTS

The underlying shares of some American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) can be short sold in their home markets, and others cannot. This institutional feature offers a unique opportunity to investigate the relation between short selling and price discovery. We hypothesize and confirm that ADR short selling on a U.S. exchange is more informative when the ADRs’ underlying shares cannot be short sold in the home market. These and related results suggest that short sellers make a significant contribution to price discovery. Short sellers’ trading activity, representing more than 20% of total ADR share volume, increases the benefits of cross‐listing on U.S. exchanges.