MUTUAL FUND DAILY CONDITIONAL PERFORMANCE

The empirical finance literature reveals that conditional models estimated with monthly data generally improve fund performance. Furthermore, it has been shown that using daily instead of monthly returns in an unconditional framework increases the proportion of abnormal performances relative to timing. In this article, we study conditional performance estimated with daily data in a bivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) framework. Our daily conditional alphas and global performances with GARCH are significantly better than those estimated with other parametrizations and they persist over time. Finally, the proportion of abnormal timing performances diminishes significantly when conditional parametrizations are used.     

INVESTOR REACTION TO MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM UK DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS

Existing work on the flow–performance relation in mutual funds focuses on the average U.S. investor, obscuring the contributions of different clienteles. We analyze UK data on monthly fund sales and purchases made via seven distinct distribution channels. We show that there exist marked differences in the reaction to fund performance between different types of retail and institutional investors. These differences can be understood by considering the incentives of parties involved in each channel. Our analysis indicates that the well‐documented aggregate net flow–performance convexity in mutual funds is driven by the extreme reaction of retail inflows to favorable performance, particularly from independently advised investors.     

HEDGE FUND SURVIVAL: NON-NORMAL RETURNS, CAPITAL OUTFLOWS, AND LIQUIDITY

We analyze the factors that influence the survival probability of hedge funds reported in the Lipper TASS database. Particular emphasis is placed on (1) non-normality of returns and assets under management (AUM), (2) short-term capital outflows, and (3) liquidity constraints associated with a hedge fund's cancellation policy. Estimation results using the Cox proportional hazards model and the panel logit model show that (1) funds with lower skewness in returns and AUM, (2) funds experiencing instantaneous rapid capital outflows, and (3) funds with a shorter redemption notice period and a higher redemption frequency have significantly higher liquidation probabilities, among others.     

MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE AND COMPETITION: A CROSS‐SECTOR ANALYSIS

Existing work on mutual fund performance persistence obtains diverse results, depending on the group of funds studied. We examine whether performance persistence within a peer group of competing mutual funds depends on the group's composition. The U.K. mutual fund industry is ideal for such an examination because funds compete within strictly defined sectors. We consider several attributes related to the intensity of competition within a sector and use them to explain sector‐level persistence. We find robust evidence that persistence is higher in sectors where concentration of assets under management is higher.     

UNITARY BOARDS AND MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE

A unique governance structure for mutual funds is unitary board—one board overseeing all funds in the entire family. We find strong evidence for unitary board as an effective governance mechanism. Funds with unitary boards are associated with lower fees, are more likely to pass the economies of scale benefits to investors, are less likely to be involved in trading scandals, and rank higher on stewardship. In contrast, funds with larger or more independent boards charge higher fees and rank lower on stewardship. Our findings indicate that unitary boards of small size, rather than independent boards, may be more beneficial to fund shareholders.     

MARKET VOLATILITY AND PERVERSE TIMING PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUND MANAGERS

Prompted by the recent volatility in equity markets, I investigate performance evaluation methods and the mutual fund managers' ability to select undervalued investments and time major market movements during the high-market-volatility period of the 1980s. Specifically, I examine mutual fund managers' stock-selection and market-timing abilities by employing a five-factor risk-adjusted model based on Carhart's four-factor loading model and Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer's quadratic timing model adjusted for perverse timing behavior. Individually, some managers persistently affect fund performance through the selection of undervalued investments, however, at the expense of timing performance. In addition, funds that demonstrate an ability to time major market movements showed persistence in timing performance before and after the October market crash of 1987.     

LIQUIDITY COMMONALITY BEYOND BEST PRICES

Previous market microstructure research focuses on commonality in liquidity at the inside spread. However, liquidity at the inside spread only determines the systematic liquidity risk of small and medium trades. We study commonality in displayed liquidity beyond best prices, which determines the systematic liquidity risk of large trades. We show that it is much larger than commonality at the inside spread. The deeper we look into the order book, the higher is the level of commonality. In addition, it rises in the morning and when markets fall.     

DO TRACKING STOCKS REDUCE INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES? AN ANALYSIS OF LIQUIDITY AND ADVERSE SELECTION

A firm's announcement that it intends to restructure based on tracking stock is usually associated with a positive stock price reaction, at least in the short run. Typically, this reaction is attributed to expected reductions in a diversification discount, through reduced agency costs or information asymmetries. We reinvestigate this latter hypothesis by focusing on the liquidity provided by market makers before and after a firm issues a tracking stock. Our results suggest that such restructurings are not effective at reducing information asymmetries. Rather, firms that issue tracking stocks exhibit less liquidity and greater adverse selection than comparable control firms.     

BANK PRIVATIZATION AND CONVERGENCE OF PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

We trace the extent of performance deviation of privatized banks from established private banks in 30 countries from 1994 to 2005 and investigate the role of bank regulatory and supervisory norms, market competition, ownership structure, deposit insurance scheme, and governance structure affecting the deviation. Evidence shows that privatization does improve the performance of banks in the first year of being privatized, but performance gradually declines, which is consistent with the government restructuring argument before the privatization. Governance, foreign ownership, banking freedom (regulations), and the deposit insurance scheme in respective economies are found to affect performance deviation significantly.     

WHEN‐ISSUED SHARES,SMALL TRADES,AND THE VARIANCE OF RETURNS AROUND STOCK SPLITS

The increases in volatility after stock splits have long puzzled researchers. The usual suspects of discreteness and bid‐ask spread do not provide a complete explanation. We provide new clues to solve this mystery by examining the trading of when‐issued shares that are available before the split. When‐issued trading permits noise traders to compete with a more homogenous set of traders, decreasing the volatility of the stock before the split. Following the split, these noise traders reunite in one market and volatility increases. Thus, the higher volatility after the ex date of a stock split is a function of the introduction of when‐issued trading, the new lower price level after the split date, and the increased activity of small‐volume traders around a stock split.     

TRADE SIZE AND INFORMED TRADING: WHICH TRADES ARE “BIG”?

We find adverse‐selection spread components increase sharply in the ratio of trade size to quoted depth, and spike when trade size equals quoted depth. We find that two previously documented and prominent indicators of informed trading, raw trade size and high‐trading volume half‐hours, offer almost no explanatory power for informed trading measures beyond trade size to quoted depth, and a third indicator, time of day, offers no explanatory power among trades with high trade size to quoted depth. Our results suggest trade size to quoted depth is perhaps the single most important indicator that a trade is informed.     

MARKET TIMING IN REGRESSIONS AND REALITY

We compare price‐to‐earnings ratios and dividend yields, which are indirect measures of sentiment, with the bullish sentiment index, which is a direct measure. We find that the sentiment index does better as a market‐timing tool than do P/E ratios and dividend yields, but none is very reliable. We do not argue that market timing is impossible. Rather, we observe that stock prices reflect both sentiment and value, both of which are difficult to measure and neither of which is perfectly known in foresight. Successful market timing requires insights into future sentiment and value, insights beyond those that are reflected in widely available measures.     

DISPOSITION EFFECT AND PUBLIC SECONDARY EQUITY OFFERINGS

Shareholders selling shares in public pure‐secondary equity offerings are affected by the disposition effect and tend to sell past winners. Selling shares in these offerings is associated with significant indirect offer costs. On average, shares are offered at a 5.5% discount from the market price. Moreover, shares of offering firms are about 8% underpriced. Offer discounts and underpricing are positively related to the proxy for the disposition effect. Our findings are consistent with the proposition that the disposition effect increases the supply of winning stocks and depresses their prices.     

AN ARBITRAGE PRICING APPROACH TO EVALUATING MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE

A test procedure, derived from arbitrage pricing theory, that permits the measurement of the security selection performance of professional portfolio managers is developed and applied to a sample of mutual funds over the period of the 1970's. The evidence indicates that more than one factor was present in the market during that interval as a systematic influence on the profile of securities returns. Consistent with prior studies, the evidence also suggests that mutual fund portfolios did not outperform a passive buy-and-hold investment strategy. A comparative analysis of the same data, using performance measures based on the single-factor market model, produces similar but less powerful results, both in the aggregate and at the individual fund level.