A Methodological Note on Long-Period Positions

This brief paper seeks to overcome a number of methodologicaldisagreements among economists who use the long-period methodof analysis. In particular, it attempts to clarify the key distinctionsbetween convergence and stability, convergence and gravitationand chronological and theoretical persistence. The conclusionis that the theoretical soundness of the long-period methoddepends on the convergence of actual magnitudes towards theirlong-period counterparts, an empirical issue to which theoreticalconsiderations of stability are irrelevant.     

The stock market and investment: another look at the micro-foundations of q theory

This paper introduces a novel distinction between real q andfinancial q. The paper examines three versions of financialq developed by Brainard and Tobin, Minsky and Hayashi, respectively.These theories differ regarding the nature of stock market pricedetermination and their use of marginal productivity theory.It is shown that non-profit maximising behaviour by managersdoes not invalidate q theory. It is also shown that if managersand shareholders have different profit expectations, this leadsto an equilibrium value of q that differs from unity. Lastly,the implicit claims in q theory regarding the efficient roleof stock markets as regulators of capital accumulation are shownto depend on assumptions about stockholder behaviour.     

Labour employed in production and labour commanded: a Ricardian conjecture

This paper explains the origin of some important ambiguitiesin the analysis of value and prices put forward by Smith inhis Wealth of Nations by considering the possibility that theyreflect a previous draft of the book where the quantity of labouremployed in production was indicated as the sole determinantof real price and exchange ratios. This conjecture is evidencedindirectly by the way in which Smith presented his own analysisat the end of Book I, Chapter IV; by some passages containedin Book I and Book II which suggest that the quantity of labouremployed in production should play a crucial role within theanalysis of exchangeable value; and by the important modificationsintroduced by Smith in Book I, Chapter VI, after the first editionof the Wealth of Nations was published.     

Formal and Informal Labour Markets: Challenges and Policy in the Central and Eastern European New EU Members and Candidate Countries

The paper aims at comparing the formal and informal labour marketsin the Central and Eastern European new EU Member States andcandidate countries of the European Union. First, the currentsituation of the labour market is described, focusing on therecent developments since the breaking up of the East. Thenthe policy design of these labour markets is depicted and itseffects on formal and informal labour markets. The most importantchallenges for employment policy as well as the effects of enlargementon the labour markets are analysed. The paper ends with a shortsummary. (JEL J21, J23, H26, H11, O17, O57)     

Educating Europe: Should Public Education be Financed with Graduate Taxes or Income-contingent Loans?

The mobility of labor reduces national incentives to investin internationally applicable education. The European Unioncould overcome this by allowing member states to institute graduatetaxes or income-contingent loans, collected also from migrants.Graduate taxes or income-contingent loans result in higher welfarethan financing education with employment-based taxes. (JEL H24,H52, I28, F22)     

Does Partisan Heritage Matter? The Case of the Federal Reserve

Received evidence suggests that changes in appointer- and overseer-preferencesinfluence monetary policy (i.e., partisan heritage matters).Evidence presented here, on the other hand, is consistent withchanges in the cost of pursuing a common preference influencingpolicy. I draw this evidence from a panel of Federal Open MarketCommittee (FOMC) votes and find support for the following conclusions:(1) Federal Reserve Board (FRB) governors who were nominatedand confirmed by the same party (Republican or Democrat) prefersignificantly looser policy than do other FOMC members. (2)Monetary policy is significantly looser when either party controlsthe oversight mechanism (i.e., the presidency and Senate) thanwhen control is split. (3) Oversight acts less forcefully ondistrict bank presidents than on FRB governors. In short, thepresent evidence suggests that political agents from both partiesprefer loose money and pursue this preference more efficientlywhen their parties are aligned.     

Labor Market Institutions, Wages, and Investment: Review and Implications

Labor market institutions, via their effect on the wage structure,affect the investment decisions of firms in labor markets withfrictions. This observation helps explain rising wage inequalityin the US, but a relatively stable wage structure in Europein the 1980s. These different trends are the result of differentinvestment decisions by firms for the jobs typically held byless skilled workers. Firms in Europe have more incentives toinvest in less skilled workers, because minimum wages or unioncontracts mandate that relatively high wages have to be paidto these workers. I report some empirical evidence for investmentsin training and physical capital across the Atlantic, whichis roughly in line with this theoretical reasoning. (JEL E22,E24, J23, J24, J31)     

The Role of the Natural Rate of Interest in Monetary Policy

This paper examines the role of the natural rate of interestin the conduct of monetary policy. The natural rate figuresprominently in many theories of the business cycle and of inflationfluctuations, and therefore has the potential to play a keyrole in monetary policy given the current mandates of many centralbanks. However, the presence of financial imperfections andmeasurement uncertainty draw into question whether estimatesof the natural rate can be reliable indicators of excess demandpressures. Natural rate-based theories may, nonetheless, provideuseful guidance in the formulation of desirable monetary policies.(JELE21, E31, E43, E58)     

Computation and the Theory of Customs Unions

This paper reports on research that uses computational techniquesto assess whether or not various propositions that have beenadvanced as plausible in the literature on the theory of customsunions actually hold. This research blends theory and numericalsimulation to get insights into the likelihood that\ varioustheoretical propositions proposed in the customs union literaturehold. (JEL F10, F13, F15}     

Hollander, de Vivo and the 'further evidence' for the corn model interpretation of Ricardo: a conspiracy of silence?

This paper reconsiders the debate between de Vivo and Hollanderover the ‘further evidence’ in favour of Sraffa's‘corn model’ interpretation of Ricardo in the lightof Torrens's Letter to Lord Liverpool (1816). It is argued thatthe Letter provides unique evidence of the influence on Torrensof Ricardo's Essay on Profits (1815); and that, contrary tode Vivo, the evidence is not that of a ‘corn model’influence. It is further argued that the manner in which theLetter has been dealt with is unsatisfactory. The shortcomingsin Hollander's position are traced to peculiarities in his long-standinginterpretation of the early Ricardo.     

EU Enlargement, Migration and the New Constitution

The paper deals with the effects of migration resulting fromEU Eastern enlargement on the welfare states of Western Europe.Although migration is good in principle, as it yields gainsfrom trade and specialization for all countries involved, itdoes so only if it meets with flexible labour markets and ifit is not artificially induced by gifts of the welfare state.This is not the present state of affairs in Western Europe.In addition to measures that make labour markets more flexible,the introduction of delayed integration of working migrantsand the home country principle for nonworking migrants is arational reaction of the state. The proposed new EU constitution,which contains far-reaching rules for a European social union,should be amended accordingly. (JEL E2, F2, H0, J3, J6)     

Adam Smith and the division of labour: is there a difference between organisation and market?

The paper claims that, in The Wealth of Nations, the divisionof labour refers simultaneously to two different things: a socialdivision of labour and an organisational division of labour.The central point is that the organisation of work (the organisationaldivision of labour) in the firm is the logical counterpart ofthe social division of labour, and that these reflect two inseparableaspects of the process of the division of labour. Smith is thusconcerned with organisations as well as with markets, each functioningaccording to the same principle. Hence, Smith does not believethat the organisational and the social divisions of labour arefundamentally different, although he does recognise some variationbetween them and describes different states of the divisionof labour within the firm, liberal and capitalist.     

CURRENT PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: A REVIEW OF MACROECONOMIC AND MICROECONOMIC APPROACHES

Reviewing: R. Dornbusch, Dollars, Debts and Deficits, M.I.T.Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1986; and P. R. Krugman (ed.), StrategicTrade Policy and the New International Economics, M.I.T. Press,Cambridge, Mass., 1987     

Testing Goodwin: growth cycles in ten OECD countries

Following Desai (Desai, M. 1984. An econometric model of theshare of wages in national income: UK 1855-1965, pp. 253-77in Goodwin, R. M. et al. (eds), Nonlinear Models of FluctuatingGrowth, Berlin, Springer), Goodwin's simple 'predator-prey'growth cycle model of the economy (Goodwin, R. M. 1967. A growthcycle, pp. 54-8 in Feinstein, C. H. (ed), Socialism, Capitalism,and Economic Growth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press;reprinted in Goodwin, R. M. 1982. Essays in Economic Dynamics,Basingstoke, Macmillan, pp. 165-70) is tested, using post-wardata for ten OECD countries - Australia, Canada, Finland, France,Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, the UK and the US. At a quantitativelevel, Goodwin's model is found not to be adequate: (i) estimatedparameter values poorly predict the cycles' centres; and (ii)Goodwin's restrictive assumptions are not justified. However,at a qualitative level, the evidence presented here for theexistence of Goodwin-type cycles is extremely encouraging, justifyingboth existing theoretical extensions of Goodwin's model andfurther empirical work in this area.     

Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability

Despite its importance, the issue of financial sector regulatoryand supervisory independence (RSI) has received only marginalattention in literature and practice. However, experience hasdemonstrated that improper supervisory arrangements have contributedsignificantly to the deepening of several recent systemic bankingcrises. In this paper we argue that RSI is important for financialstability for the same reasons that central bank independence(CBI) is important for monetary stability. The paper lays outfour key dimensions of RSI-regulatory, supervisory, institutionalbudgetary - and discusses ways to achieve them. We also discussinstitutional arrangements needed to make independence workin practice. The key issue in this respect is that agency independenceand accountability need to go hand in hand. The paper discussesa number of accountability arrangements. (JEL G18, G28, K23,L50).