Die Grewinnbeteiligung bei hohen Versieherungssummen

Es ist üblich, den Gewinnplan für gemischte Versicherungen mit Gewinnbeteilung nach der Formel aufzustellen. Dabei ist die Versicherungssumme S = 1 angenommen. P bedeutet den Tarifprämiensatz. α, β, γ sind die Erwerbskosten-, Inkassokosten- und Verwaltungskostensätze, wie sie für die üblichen Rechnungsgrundlagen II. Ordnung Verwendung finden. d ist der Diskontsatz des Rechnungszinsfusses II. Ordnung. U hat die symboliscbe Bedeutung des Gewinnplanes. (Ia) ist der Barwert der “Einheit” des Gewinnplanes ¹ (Ia) hat hier und im Folgenden nieht die sonst übliche Bedeutung und ist der gewöhnliche temporäre vorsehüssige oder stetige Leibrentenbarwert. ² Eintrittsalter x und Versicherungsdauer n spielen hier nur die Kolle vou Parametern. Sie sind für jede einzelne Versicherung unveränderlich und werden daher, und um die Formeln nicht mit zuviel Indizes zu belasten, konsequent weggelassen. Aber auch die Versicherungssumme S, die im Folgenden als selbständiges Argument von gewissen Funktionen auftritt, wird, wo kein Missverständnis möglich ist, weggelassen. Sowohl (Ia) als auch a sind nach den Rechnungsgrundlagen II. Ordnung gerechnet.     

Die ökonomische Funktion von Haftungsregeln bei Risikoaversion und Haftpflichtversicherungsmöglichkeiten

Most of the literature on the economic analysis of liability law reduces the economic importance of liability regulations to their prevention or incentive function. This is due to the premise of risk neutral decision behavior or to the assumption of ?costless“ insurance that is very often used in this context. In this paper the case of risk neutrality is discussed briefly. Then the relevance of risk aversion is explained, and results are presented from an analysis which integrates risk averse behavior and employs a more adequate modeling of the insurance supply, such that the risk allocation function of liability rules is given emphasis in addition to the aspect of loss prevention. An important result is that for large numbers of potential victims an ideal solution can be approximated by a negligence rule. This insight is particularly interesting in light of the fact that liability risks which are characterized by large numbers of victims usually are regulated by strict liability.     

Die Ermittlung von Risikozuschlägen bei der Zeitwertbewertung von Verpflichtungen aus Schadenversicherungsgeschäften

The IASB proposes fair value accounting of insurance liabilities in the new IFRS on insurance contracts. These liabilities are not systematically traded in markets. Therefore the estimation of a fair value is only possible by simulating a market transaction. This simulation can be carried out by using financial models like the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Economic Capital Model. In order to determine the fair value it has to be tested if those models can realistically calculate the insurance risk of the liabilities. This includes analysing the nature and extent of risk measurement as well as the assumptions the models are based on. The particular problem of the Capital Asset Pricing Model consists in measuring the risk by betas. An insurance beta can only be determined by relating it to other directly measurable betas. Those relationships can only be developed by putting forward special assumptions which increases the likelihood of a subjective valuation. The Economic Capital Model on the opposite is able to measure the insurance risk. The analysis of the models is carried out under simplified assumptions. Therefore it remains to be proven that the Economic Capital Model can also handle a more specific view of the insurance risk.     

Die Öffnung der Versicherungsmärkte bei OECD,EU und WTO — Mühsamer Abschied vom Finanzmarktprotektionismus der Bretton Woods Periode

The liberalization of international insurance trade has been pursued since 1948 by the OEEC, the EEC, the GATT and its successor organizations the OECD, the EU and the WTO. Modern multilateral trade policy was however not as successful for international insurance trade as it was for international merchandise trade. Significant progress was not made until the 1990s with the EU’s Single Market program. Likewise, negotiations currently being conducted by the WTO on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) have so far not led to any noticeable progress in the international insurance markets. Furthermore, the GATS framework agreement shows weaknesses that are characteristic of the liberalisation efforts of the immediate post-war years.     

认输还是死亡

对于华尔街的投资银行来说,现在的问题不是要不要改革,而是怎么改革. 除了证券交易委员会(SEC)的详细调查之外,政府的监管机构、司法部和国会也将对这些投资银行采取行动.两家自律性组织--纽约证交所和纳斯达克--也有可能做出纪律处分.说来奇怪,国会是惟一一家不积极寻求对华尔街进行监管的机构.共和党人,众议院金融服务委员会主席麦克·奥克斯利不久前对一些公司董事宣布于7月底通过的、针对公司治理的<萨班斯-奥克斯利法案>会是一段时期内的最后一项立法行动.     

Mittelbare Diskriminierungen bei Unisex-Versicherungstarifen

The article drafts a concept for applying the prohibition of indirect gender discrimination in the specific situation of insurance tariffs. In order to reveal indirect discrimination it has to be shown that each gender is affected differently by a differentiating factor to a significant extent. The basis is a statistical comparison between the total group and the disadvantaged subgroup (among potential insurance holders). Because of Art. 5 (1) of Council Directive 2004/113/EC a statistically verifiable risk difference cannot justify indirect discriminations by itself. The provision prohibits not only direct discrimination but also the use of differentiating factors highly correlated with one gender as the correlation leads to the inclusion of a higher gender-specific risk. Therefore only distinctions which are based on the individual insurance record can be justified as their aim is to influence future behaviour. In other cases it is necessary to separate the risk difference causally linked to the differentiating factor from the incorporated gender-specific risk difference.     

Die einjährige Ausschlussfrist bei Invaliditätsleistungen gem. § 7 Abs. 1, S. 3 AUB 88/94 und die Einbindung des Arztes

§ 7 para. 1 phrase 3 AUB 88/94, according to which the invalidity, that has occured within a years time, must be medically determined and enforced within 15 months after the accident, contravenes § 307 para. 2 no. 2 BGB, § 307 para. 1 phrase 1 BGB and § 307 para. 1 phrase 2 BGB. The 15 months’ deadline excludes many policy holders from their insurance claims in advance. This endangers the contracts intention. Secondly: via the above clause the insurer would be enabled to transfer the risk of a wrong medical prognosis completely onto the policy holder which will lead to an improper disadvantage. A possibly endangered healing process and conflicts of interest caused by § 7 para. 1 phrase 3 AUB 88/94 do emphasize this disadvantage. This clause finally is incomprehensible due to the unusual legal consequences and thus contravenes the principle of transparency.     

External Triggered Herding bei Rentenmarkt-Analysten

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Die offene Mitversicherung als Outsourcing

Transfer of tasks to the leading insurer when establishing a co-insurance is common. German insurance supervision law classifies this delegation as an outsourcing and provides legal requirements regarding its performance. After the full installation of the Solvency II-regime this form of outsourcing will have to meet changed legal requirements. Fulfillment of legal requirements needs to be harmonized with the legal specifities of co-insurance, which evolve from the legal relationships of the co-insurers with each other.     

Betriebsunterbrechungsversicherung bei kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen

The business interruption caused by a property claim is an existential risk both for large industrial companies and for small to medium enterprises (SME). It is especially relevant for companies working on a more complex sales and production infrastructure. Statistics show that in case of a large property claim the cost of the accompanying business interruption claim frequently exceeds the property claim. In Germany, however, the share of companies opting for business interruption insurance is much smaller than those opting for property insurance. This is especially true for SME that can hardly cover the risk themselves. The goal of this paper is to analyze the insurance decision for a business interruption policy with a special focus on SME. As a database we use the results of a representative survey among 1802 German SME with up to 100 employees. Our results show that the decision for a business interruption policy is not only dependent on hard factors such as company size and industry, but also driven by the so-called “insurance mentality”, which includes risk aversion, insurance know-how and price-sensitivity.