Family Control,Socioemotional Wealth and Earnings Management in Publicly Traded Firms

We examine the unique nature of agency problems within publicly traded family firms by investigating the earnings management decision of dominant family owners relative to non-family. To do so, we draw upon literature demonstrating that family owners are loss averse with respect to the family’s socioemotional wealth, or the affective endowment derived from firm ownership and control. Our theory and findings suggest that potential reputational consequences of earnings management lead family principals to engage in less of this practice relative to non-family firms, and that founder family firms are less likely than non-founder family firms to use earnings management. Moreover, the family-firm effect varies with the firm size, the degree of CEO entrenchment, and the firm’s stock structure. We provide important insights regarding differences between family and non-family principals in the use of unethical accounting practices, thereby extending agency theory and advancing an underdeveloped research area.     

Why Architecture Does Not Matter: On the Fallacy of Sustainability Balanced Scorecards

This study focuses on CEO hubris and its detrimental effect on corporate financial performance along with an examination of critical corporate governance contingencies (CEO power and board vigilance) that may moderate the negative effect. From 654 observations of 164 Korean firms over the years 2001–2008, we found that CEO power exacerbated the negative effect of CEO hubris on corporate financial performance, whereas board vigilance mitigated it. This study provides empirical evidence that entrenchment problems arising from CEO hubris would be exacerbated as CEOs become more powerful, but weakened as board of directors become more vigilant. Theoretical contributions and practical implications will be discussed.     

Flying Too Close to the Sun? Hubris Among CEOs and How to Prevent it

Hubris among CEOs is generally considered to be undesirable: researchers in finance and in management have documented its unwelcome effects and the media ascribe many corporate failings to CEO hubris. However, the literature fails to provide a precise definition of CEO hubris and is mostly silent on how to prevent it. We use work on hubris in the fields of mythology, psychology, and ethics to develop a framework defining CEO hubris. Our framework describes a set of beliefs and behaviors, both psycho-pathological and unethical in nature, which characterize the problematic relationship of the hubris-infected CEO towards his or her own self, others and the world at large. We then demonstrate how the development of authentic leadership may contribute to preventing or attenuating hubris by addressing its psycho-pathological nature through the true self and meaningful relationships with others. In addition to its psycho-pathological dimension, CEO hubris also contains an ethical dimension. We therefore propose that the development of the virtue of reverence might contribute to the prevention or attenuation of CEO hubris, because reverence makes the individual aware of his or her place in the world order and membership of the community of humans.     

Ethics and Disclosure: A Study of the Financial Performance of Firms in the Seasoned Equity Offerings Market

In this article, we examine the association between ethics and disclosure and the impact of this association on the long-term, post-issue performance of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We argue that firms with extensive disclosure are less likely to face information problems, and more likely to lead to an active shareholder monitoring, and therefore, engage in fewer unethical activities, such as aggressive earnings manipulation, and have better long-term, post-issue performance. Consistent with these predictions, this study presents evidence that disclosure is negatively related to unethical earnings manipulation and positively associated with long-term, post-issue performance. In particular, we find that long-term, post-issue SEO underperformance is significantly less for firms with extensive disclosure and conservative earnings management than firms with less disclosure and aggressive earnings management. We interpret this evidence to mean that over the long run, the capital market values ethical financial reporting and corporate efforts to incorporate social responsibility into their decision-making processes, for example, by enhancing information transparency through voluntary disclosure.      

Successful Psychopaths: Are They Unethical Decision-Makers and Why?

Successful psychopaths, defined as individuals in the general population who nevertheless possess some degree of psychopathic traits, are receiving increasing amounts of empirical attention. To date, little is known about such individuals, specifically with regard to how they respond to ethical dilemmas in business contexts. This study investigated this relationship, proposing a mediated model in which the positive relationship between psychopathy and unethical decision-making is explained through the process of moral disengagement, defined as a cognitive orientation that facilitates unethical choice. The results of the study supported this model, and implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

Earnings Quality in Private SMEs: Do CEO Demographics Matter?

This study investigates the impact of CEO demographics on earnings quality for private SMEs. Using a 2012 sample of 30,476 French firms, we first find strong empirical support for a gender effect: female‐run firms engage in less earnings management than do male‐run firms. This result is consistent with female CEOs being more risk averse than their male counterparts are when making financial decisions. Second, CEO age is negatively correlated with the magnitude of discretionary accruals, and the relationship between gender and earnings quality is stronger for older CEOs. Overall, our findings suggest that CEO demographics affect the quality of accounting information.     

The effect of formalism on unethical decision making: The mediating effect of moral disengagement and moderating effect of moral attentiveness

This study examined the relationship between formalism and unethical decision making among Chinese working adults. A total of 316 Chinese adult employees completed measures of ethical predispositions, unethical decision making, moral disengagement, and moral attentiveness. The results showed that formalism was related to a weaker propensity to morally disengage. Moral disengagement positively predicted unethical decision making and mediated the relationship between formalism and unethical decision making. Further, perceptual moral attentiveness negatively moderated the relationship between formalism and moral disengagement. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are presented.     

Ethics Sensitivity and Awareness Within Organizations in Kuwait: An Empirical Exploration of Epoused Theory and Theory-in-Use

This article explores the ethics sensitivity and awareness of a sample of employees in six organizations in Kuwait. We identify which sorts of questionable organizational behaviors are believed to be most unethical by these employees, as well as which behaviors are reported to occur most often within the organizations. On the whole, the employees evidence a high level of ethical sensitivity, perceiving the moral hazards of all of the behaviors presented to them. At the same time, the reported occurrence of these behaviors within the sampled organizations is relatively high. We produce conclusions about the correspondence between moral theory and moral practice within the Kuwaiti workplace. We find a basic correspondence between what is believed to be wrong within these organizations, and the types of unethical behavior reported within them. In general, behaviors thought to be most unethical occur less frequently within the organizations.     

Nonfinancial Goals,Governance, and Dividend Payout in Private Family Firms

This paper uses insights from behavioral economics to explain dividend policy in private family firms. Based on a sample of 501 Belgian firms, our results indicate that dividend payout is low when a family chief executive officer (CEO) leads the business and in the presence of a family‐dominated board. The tendency of a family CEO or family‐dominated board to retain earnings appears to be stronger in earlier generational stages compared with later generational stages. The findings are consistent with (1) socioemotional objectives being important drivers of funding decisions in private firms where families possess important decision and control power and (2) these objectives being more predominant in early generational stages.     

Impact of employees’ perceived threat of market competition on unethical marketing and selling practices: Moral disengagement and ethical leadership

This study draws on the social cognitive theory to examine the effect of perceived market competition on employees’ unethical marketing and selling practices. The boundary conditions associated with this relationship were examined, and we posit that perceived market competition is related to unethical marketing and selling practices through the mediating mechanism of moral disengagement. We further propose that ethical leadership moderates the relationship between the perceived threat of market competition, moral disengagement, and tendency toward unethical marketing and selling practices. We tested our hypotheses with a sample of 387 employees working in the banking sector in Pakistan. Our results suggest that moral disengagement had a full mediation effect between the perceived threat of market competition and tendency of employees toward unethical marketing and selling practices. Moreover, ethical leadership moderated the relationship between moral disengagement and the tendency of employees toward unethical marketing practices. The research findings indicate that when field employees encounter threat perceptions due to market competition, they have a propensity toward engaging in unethical marketing and selling practices when they can activate moral disengagement. This study also found that ethical leadership negatively moderates the relationship of moral disengagement with employees’ tendency toward unethical marketing and selling practices.     

Is the Optimism in CEO’s Letters to Shareholders Sincere? Impression Management Versus Communicative Action During the Economic Crisis

In this study, we explore the sincerity of the rhetorical tone of 664 annual letters to shareholders (CEO letters). Prior studies adopt Impression Management theory to predict that firms obfuscate failures and emphasize successes to unfairly enhance their image and maintain organizational legitimacy. Yuthas et al. (J Bus Ethics 41:141–157, 2002) challenged such a view, showing that firms reporting earnings surprises engage in ethical discourse with shareholders. We adopt the methodology of Yuthas et al. (J Bus Ethics 41:141–157, 2002) to explore the association between firm performance and the rhetorical features of CEO letters in a large sample of Fortune 500 firms in the wake of the global economic crisis. In contrast to most prior research, we find that optimistic tone is congruent with both past and future performance. We conclude that under tough macroeconomic conditions, incentives to distort public information strategically are low. Rather, firms tend to engage in communicative action aimed at dialoguing with shareholders through sincere disclosure. However, in our conclusions, we warn about the impact of accounting and rhetorical manipulation on the congruence between optimistic tone and financial performance.     

CEO regulatory focus and myopic marketing management

This study details the mechanisms on how CEO regulatory focus affects the salience of the gains versus losses involved in myopic marketing decision-making, and how such CEO psychological attributes interact with internal equity-based compensation, external pressure from equity analysts, and environmental turbulence to affect firms’ myopic marketing management propensities. We find that when faced with short-term earnings pressure to meet earnings expectations and when time is no longer a resource, predominantly promotion-focused are more likely to engage in myopic marketing management to benefit from the temporary stock price increase, which comes from meeting or beating earnings expectations. Conversely, predominantly prevention-focused CEOs are less prone to such short-termist actions which results in long-term value loss. For the moderating variables, we find that: (1) equity-based compensation tends to attenuate myopic marketing tendencies of promotion-focused CEOs but have no impact on prevention-focused CEOs, (2) whether equity analysts improve monitoring or aggravate short-term earnings pressure depends on the CEO’s regulatory focus, and (3) environmental turbulence does not increase the myopic marketing management tendencies of predominantly promotion-focused CEOs but rather intensifies the relunctance of prevention-focused CEOs to take short-termist actions. We further find that myopic marketing management mediates the impact of CEO regulatory focus on future firm performance. These findings have important implications for firms and boards when selecting new CEOs and structuring the compensation of existing CEOs. Firms need to simultaneously consider the fit between the CEOs’ regulatory focus, firms’ needs, the business environment, as well as CEO compensation structure.     

Macroeconomic Fluctuations as Sources of Luck in CEO Compensation

Macroeconomic fluctuations in interest rates, exchange rates, and inflation can be considered sources of good or bad “luck” for corporate performance if management is unable to adjust operations to these fluctuations. Based on a sample of 2,091 US firms, we decompose the impacts of macroeconomic fluctuations on three measures of CEO compensation. Our study provides empirical support for the importance of considering macroeconomic fluctuations in designing CEO incentive schemes. It adds to the managerial power literature on moral hazard and CEO compensation by pinpointing the obvious risk that the CEO in an asymmetric and non-linear reward system will be inclined to prioritize his/her own cash flow at the expense of fulfilling an assumed agency role. The policy conclusion for remuneration committees and board of directors is to filter out macroeconomic influences on performance to be rewarded whenever an asymmetric compensation scheme has been opted for.     

Why Do Firms Enter into a New Niche Market? An Integrated View of Objective and Subjective Antecedents of Strategic Decisions

This study is based on behavioral theories and has the purpose of determining the predictors and contingencies of strategic decision making within the strategic tripod framework and CEO age effect. Furthermore, we focus on the effect of the interaction of these aspects on strategic decisions. Multiple theories and concepts are applied in this paper, such as the institution-, industry-, and resource-based view, upper echelons theory, socio-emotional wealth, empathy, and so on. Specifically, we focus on why Chinese real estate firms decide to enter the aged housing market. By conducting an empirical study using panel data from 134 listed Chinese real estate companies, we make the following conclusions: Institutional pressure and competitor numbers positively affect, whereas slack harms, the likelihood of entry. Ceteris paribus, the resource effect is strongest when the institutional effect is the most significant. When facing institutional pressure, a firm with a CEO older than 50 is significantly more likely to enter the aged housing market than firms with a CEO that is younger.Relieving institutional pressure and avoiding cutthroat competition are helpful in making strategic decisions but not for digesting slack resources. The CEO makes strategic decisions by replying to institutional pressure but likely not from engagements in resource or competitive affairs.     

Corporate hierarchies and international trade: Theory and evidence

Corporate organization varies within countries and between countries. We develop a theory which explains the variation in levels of decentralization across firms and links it to the trade environment that firms face. We introduce firms with internal hierarchies in a Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model of international trade. We show that international trade increases the conflict of interest between CEO/owners and middle managers within firms and these eventually lead to decentralized corporate hierarchies. We test the theory with original data on the internal organizations of 2200 Austrian and German firms and find that the empirical evidence is consistent with the model's predictions.     

Moral Differentiation: Exploring Boundaries of the “Monkey See,Monkey Do” Perspective

Research in ethical decision making has consistently demonstrated a positive relationship between others’ unethical behavior and observers’ unethical behavior, providing support for the “Monkey See, Monkey Do” perspective (e.g., Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly, Acad Manage J 41:658–672, 1998). However, the boundaries of this relationship have received little research attention. Guided by theory and research in interpersonal distancing, we explore these boundaries by proposing and examining “moral differentiation,” the set of individual and situational characteristics that affect the degree to which one is willing to be influenced by others’ unethical behavior. Using data from 655 undergraduate business students in two U.S. universities, we test moderating hypotheses regarding the influence of moral differentiation characteristics on the relationship between others’ unethical behavior and observers’ unethical behavior. Results suggest that strong moral identity, low need for affiliation, and extraversion weaken the relationship between others’ unethical behavior and observers’ unethical behavior. Implications for managers and future research are discussed.     

Americanization as a driver of CEO pay in Europe: The moderating role of CEO power

This paper examines the relationship between Americanization and CEO pay levels in Europe and how this relationship is moderated by CEO power. Based on neo-institutional theory, our study provides empirical support for a link between Americanization and CEO pay levels. Drawing on a sample of large listed European firms, our results suggest that various dimensions of Americanization, i.e., Americanization of the CEO, of the firm and of the industry, can be associated with higher CEO pay. Combining neo-institutional approaches with managerial power perspectives, we show that Americanization can have an even stronger effect on pay when the CEO is powerful.     

Schadenfreude: The (not so) Secret Joy of Another’s Misfortune

Despite growing interest in emotions, organizational scholars have largely ignored the moral emotion of schadenfreude, which refers to pleasure felt in response to another’s misfortune. As a socially undesirable emotion, it might be assumed that individuals would be hesitant to share their schadenfreude. In two experimental studies involving emotional responses to unethical behaviors, we find evidence to the contrary. Study 1 revealed that subjects experiencing schadenfreude were willing to share their feelings, especially if the misfortune was perceived to be deserved (i.e., resulting from unethical behaviors). Study 2 extends this work by incorporating schadenfreude targets of different status (CEO versus employee). Consistent with the “tall poppy syndrome,” subjects were more willing to share schadenfreude concerning high status targets than low status targets when the perceived severity of the target’s misconduct was low. This status effect disappeared at higher levels of perceived deservingness, however. Reported willingness to share schadenfreude was strongest at these levels but did not differ significantly between high and low status targets. These findings build on the social functional account of emotions, suggesting that sharing schadenfreude may signal normative cues to others regarding workplace behaviors that are deemed to be unethical.     

The Effects of Thought Suppression on Ethical Decision Making: Mental Rebound Versus Ego Depletion

Although thought suppression is a commonly used self-control strategy that has far-reaching consequences, its effect on ethical decision making is unclear. Whereas ironic process theory suggests that suppressing ethics-related thoughts leads to mental rebounds of ethicality and decreased unethical behavior, ego depletion theory suggests that thought suppression can lead to reduced self-control and increased unethical behavior. Integrating the two theories, I propose that the effect of thought suppression on unethical behavior hinges on the content of the suppressed thoughts. Participants who suppressed ethics-related [-unrelated] thoughts engaged in less [more] cyber bullying (Experiment 1), cheating (Experiments 2–3), and dishonesty (Experiment 4) compared to participants in the control conditions. Explicit (Experiment 3) and implicit (Experiment 4) moral awareness was found to mediate this moderated effect. Experiment 4 further demonstrated that suppressing ethics-related thoughts reduces self-control performance on a subsequent amoral task, but not on subsequent ethical decision making.     

Executive Compensation and Earnings Persistence

Governing boards utilize executive compensation contracts in an attempt to align executive actions with corporate goals. The objective is to ensure that executive performance provides value to the organization in terms of successful outcomes. A key performance criteria typically specified in CEO compensation contracts is earnings targets. However, using earnings as a performance evaluation may be problematic because some firms exhibit robust and sustained earnings over time (high earnings persistence), and other firms, such as high growth oriented firms, exhibit weak or sometimes negative earnings over time (low earnings persistence). Our study reveals that the effect of high earnings persistence results in firms that focus more heavily on cash compensation (salary and bonus) rather than on equity compensation (stock options, etc.) to compensate executive performance. Additionally, for firms characterized by low earnings persistence, our study indicates that cash flows from operations act as a supplementary performance measure to accounting earnings, and become increasingly important as a means to justify executive cash compensation.