Globalization, Poverty, and Inequality since 1980

One of the most contentious issues of globalization is the effectof global economic integration on inequality and poverty. Thisarticle documents five trends in the modern era of globalization,starting around 1980. The first trend is that growth rates inpoor economies have accelerated and are higher than growth ratesin rich countries for the first time in modern history. Developingcountries’ per capita incomes grew more than 3.5 percenta year in the 1990s. Second, the number of extremely poor peoplein the world has declined significantly—by 375 millionpeople since 1981—for the time in history. The share ofpeople in developing economies living on less than $1 a dayhas been cut in half since 1981, though the decline in the shareliving on less than $2 per day was much less dramatic. Third,global inequality has declined modestly, reversing a 200-yeartrend toward higher inequality. Fourth, within-country inequalityin general is not growing, though it has risen in several populouscountries (China, India, the United States). Fifth, wage inequalityis rising worldwide. This may seem to contradict the fourthtrend, but it does not because there is no simple link betweenwage inequality and household income inequality. Furthermore,the trends toward faster growth and poverty reduction are strongestin developing economies that have integrated with the globaleconomy most rapidly, which supports the view that integrationhas been a positive force for improving the lives of peoplein developing areas.      

REFORMING FINANCE IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIALIST ECONOMIES

Financial reforms initiated in most transitional socialist economiesdo not yet adequately provide many of the financial servicesassociated with market-oriented financial systems. Such services—mobilizingresources, selecting firms and allocating capital, monitoringfirm managers, and facilitating the management of transactionsand risk—are a necessary condition for economic reformto improve living standards. This article envisages four central strategies to guide reformof the financial sector: • Building an infrastructure based on clear and enforceableproperty rights, modern accounting and auditing standards, reliablepayments systems, sound prudential and enforcement regulations,and professionals trained in finance • Ending the shell game of trying to hide the losses ofstate-owned enterprises, and separating government decisionsto finance "priority" firms from the allocation decisions ofindependent financial institutions • Privatizing some financial institutions early—althoughnot necessarily precipitously—in concert with the privatizationof firms and supervisory capabilities, meanwhile cleaning upbank loans to maximize the chances that firms and banks willsucceed as private entities • Improving the tax system and stressing a prudent interestrate policy to reduce uncertainty, distortions, and excessiverepression of the financial sector.      

Crisis, Adjustment, and Reform in Thailand's Industrial Firms

New data on Thailand's industrial firms shed light on the originsof the East Asian financial crisis and on the response of themanufacturing sector to the structural adjust-ment program supportedby the international financial institutions. Before the crisis,Thai firms had declining profitability, but they neverthelessmaintained high levels of investment, often in domesticallyoriented areas (notably the auto sector). Thai firms financedthese investments with short-term borrowing from financial institutions,which in turn borrowed short term on foreign markets. That only40 percent of firms provided audited financial statements totheir banks meant that the financial sector had poor informationfor assessing the true riskiness of these investments. The financialstructure was thus vulnerable even to small shocks. How well did the adjustment program deal with the crisis? Thaifirms had difficulty increasing their exports quickly becauseof investment in the wrong sectors, a decline in regional demand,and bottlenecks that included red tape and poor customs administration.Because of the poor export response, the brunt of adjustmenthad to come through compression of demand and of imports. Inretrospect, the macroeconomic program— which assumed quickexport recovery— was too tight.      

Competition and Scope of Activities in Financial Services

This article analyzes the costs and benefits of different degreesof competition and different configurations of permissible activitiesin the financial sector and discusses the related implicationsfor regulation and supervision. Theory and experience demonstratethe importance of competition for efficiency and confirm thata competitive environment requires a contestable system—meaningone that is open to competition—but not necessarily alarge number of institutions. A competitive banking system canimprove the distribution of consumer credit, enhance the corporatesector's access to financing, and mitigate the risks of financialcrises. In an open market, in which services and products areprovided in response to market signals, financial institutionsrespond by offering a wider scope of financial services. Theoptimal institutional design for supervisory functions is lessobvious.      

Insights on Development from the Economics of Happiness

The literature on the economics of happiness in developed economiesfinds discrepancies between reported measures of well-beingand income measures. One is the so-called Easterlin paradox:that average happiness levels do not increase as countries growwealthier. This article explores how that paradox—andsurvey research on reported well-being in general—canprovide insights into the gaps between standard measures ofeconomic development and individual assessments of welfare.Analysis of research on reported well-being in Latin Americaand Russia finds notable discrepancies between respondents’assessments of their own well-being and income- or expenditure-basedmeasures. Accepting a wide margin for error in both types ofmeasures, the article posits that taking such discrepanciesinto account may improve the understanding of development outcomesby providing a broader view on well-being than do income- orexpenditure-based measures alone. It suggests particular areaswhere research on reported well-being has the most potentialto contribute. Yet the article also notes that some interpretationsof happiness research—psychologists’ set point theory,in particular—may be quite limited in their applicationto development questions and cautions against the direct translationof results of happiness surveys into policy recommendations.      

PRIVATIZATION: LESSONS FROM MARKET ECONOMIES

In the past decade governments all over the world have begunprivatizing state enterprises—indeed, it is becoming quitehard to find a country without a program of privatization underway or at least on the policy agenda. This striking reversalof the push to expand state ownership in the 1960s and 1970sresults from generally poor performance of state enterprisesand a disappointing record of past reform efforts that fellshort of ownership change. This article examines the objectives of privatization and thestrategies for achieving them, documenting recent trends andreviewing the experience with privatizing state-owned commercial,manufacturing, and service enterprises in both competitive andnoncompetitive markets. The authors analyze the various tacticsthat can be or have been employed, in relation to scope, pace,sequencing, and methods of implementation. The evidence showsthat privatization produces benefits of efficiency and innovation—ifdone right. The lessons of experience discussed in the articleoffer guidance on how to realize the promise of privatizationwhile minimizing the risks and costs.      

WHEN DO HETERODOX STABILIZATION PROGRAMS WORK?: Lessons from Experience

What advantages and disadvantages does the heterodox strategyoffer to stabilization programs in countries with chronic highinflation? Heterodox stabilization programs, in our definition,are those that support orthodox policies— that is, tightfiscal policy and a fixed exchange rate—with the initial,temporary use of incomes policies— that is, price andwage controls. This evaluation, based on several heterodox programs,successful and unsuccessful, from the 1960s and 1980s in LatinAmerican countries and Israel, affords four principal lessons: * The rapid reduction in inflation at the beginning of heterodoxprograms (which usually comes about at small cost) is the easypart; the problem is to maintain price stability over time. * Incomes policies in heterodox stabilization programs are justifiedonly in countries with high chronic inflation, where persistentinflation is more pervasive and problematic. * There is a case for a bigger fiscal adjustment in heterodoxthan in orthodox programs because of the risk that a programwith price controls may be misperceived as a populist devicefor achieving price stability without adjusting. * The failure of a heterodox program is more likely to destabilizeinflation than is the failure of an orthodox program.      

The Evolution of Poverty and Inequality in Indian Villages

This paper examines the evolution of poverty and inequalityin rural India by reviewing longitudinal village studies. Itexplores the main forces of economic change—agriculturalintensification, changing land relations, and occupational diversification—froma wide range of disciplinary perspectives, and it considersthe roles of various institutions as conduits of change. Althoughmost village studies support the survey-based judgment thatrural poverty declined in India during the 1970s and 1980s,they find that progress has been slow and irregular and thatinequalities within villages have persisted. These continuedinequalities may constrain both the scope for further povertyreduction from economic growth and the impact of policy interventions.      

ORGANIZED LABOR, POLITICS, AND LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Organized labor is usually viewed as an obstacle to labor marketadjustment. But unions' responses to adjustment programs infact range from militant opposition to acquiescence or evenexplicit cooperation. Three sets of variables shape these responses:the strength and characteristics of the union movement itself;economic cycles; and political institutions and their ties tounions. •Strength of the labor movement: In industrial democracies,an aggressive stance on wages tends to be associated with moderatelystrong unions. Small or weak unions are less militant, as mightbe expected; more surprisingly, large and powerful unions alsotend to be more moderate, primarily because of their greaterparticipation in consultation and decisionmaking at the nationallevel. The experience in developing countries is somewhat different:only a few of these have strong labor movements, and among these,militancy is common. The large share of wage labor in the publicsector complicates comparisons with industrial nations, sincegovernments as employers clearly behave differently from privateemployers, particularly in hard times. •Economic cycles: Depression almost invariably reducesmilitancy in developing as well as industrial nations. •Political institutions: The nature of the political regime—democraticor authoritarian—is only roughly associated with how governmentshandle labor relations, and correspondingly with the optionsavailable to unions. More important in shaping unions' behaviorare the nature of the political party system and how unionsare connected with parties. The conditions needed to gain workers'cooperation are analogous to those which encourage businessto invest: political stability, a voice in policy that affectstheir interests, and arising from these, the confidence thatcurrent sacrifices will ultimately yield a fair share of futurebenefits.      

Principles of Financial Regulation: A Dynamic Portfolio Approach

Economists seeking explanations for the global financial crisisof 1997–99 are reaching consensus that a major factorwas weak financial institutions, which resulted in part frominadequate government regulations. At the same time many developingcountries are struggling with an overregulated financial system—onethat stifles innovation and the flow of credit to new entrepreneursand that can stunt the growth of well-established firms. Inparticular, too many countries are relying excessively on capitaladequacy standards, which are inefficient and sometimes counterproductive.The author argues that financial systems can be reformed successfullyusing a "dynamic portfolio approach" aimed at managing the incentivesand constraints that affect not only financial institutions'exposure to risk but also their ability to cope with it. Thearticle sets out general principles of financial regulationand shows how the dynamic portfolio approach can help countriesdeal with the special problems that arise during the transitionto a more liberalized economy as well as those that arise indealing with a financial crisis similar to the 1997 crisis inEast Asia.      

USING RANDOMIZED CONTROL DESIGNS IN EVALUATING SOCIAL SECTOR PROGRAMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Seven case studies—from Bolivia, Colombia, Indonesia,Mexico, Nicaragua, Taiwan (China), and Turkey—demonstratethe feasibility of conducting rigorous impact evaluations indeveloping countries using randomized control designs. Thisexperience, covering a wide variety of settings and social programs,offers lessons for task managers and policymakers interestedin evaluating social sector investments. The main conclusions are: first, policymakers interested inassessing the effectiveness of a project ought to consider arandomized control design because such evaluations not onlyare feasible but also yield the most robust results. Second,the acute resource constraints common in developing countriesthat often make program rationing unavoidable also present opportunitiesfor adopting randomized control designs. Policymakers and programmanagers need to be alert to the opportunities for buildingrandomized control designs into development programs right fromthe start of the project cycle because they, more than academicresearchers or evaluation experts, are in the best positionto ensure that opportunities for rigorous evaluations are exploited.      

Managing Oil Price Risk in Developing Countries

This article presents a simple framework for understanding theimpact of oil dependence on growth in terms of an optimal savingsand investment strategy. Among the more important factors underlyingthis strategy is the extent to which oil price changes are temporaryor permanent. This in turn determines whether a country shouldrely on stabilization and savings funds or the use of financialinstruments to manage oil revenues—or both. Country experienceswith stabilization and savings funds are surveyed, and the caseis presented for using financial instrument to manage oil pricerisk. Policy implications for enhancing the use of financialinstruments are explored, including an expanded role for internationalfinancial institutions.      

Counting the World's Poor: Problems and Possible Solutions

As recent discussions have made clear, the apparent lack ofpoverty reduction in the face of historically high rates ofeconomic growth—both in the world as a whole and in specificcountries (most notably India)—provides fuel for the argumentthat economic growth does little to reduce poverty. How confidentcan we be that the data actually support these inferences? Atthe international level, the regular revision of purchasingpower parity exchange rates plays havoc with the poverty estimates,changing them in ways that have little or nothing to do withthe actual experience of the poor. At the domestic level, theproblems in measuring poverty are important not only for theworld count but also for tracking income poverty within individualcountries. Yet, in many countries, there are large and growingdiscrepancies between the survey data—the source of povertycounts—and the national accounts—the source of themeasure of economic growth. Thus economic growth, as measured,has at best a weak relationship with poverty, as measured.      

FINANCIAL MARKETS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE

Many factors contributed to the rapid growth of the economiesof East Asia in the past quarter century. This article examinesone important aspect of that growth—commonly referredto as the "East Asian miracle"—public policies affectingthe financial markets. East Asian governments intervened extensivelyin financial markets at all stages of their development. Whatsets their actions apart from those of other developing countriesthat have not fared as well? We do not have the informationto answer conclusively what effect particular actions had (thatrequires a counterfactual test of what growth would have beenwithout the particular intervention). But we can identify themarket failures the East Asian governments addressed, assesssome of the theoretical reasons why each policy might be growthenhancing, and provide some data attesting to the impacts ofthe policy. Several characteristics of financial sector interventionsin East Asia stand out: they incorporated design features thatimproved the chances of success and reduced opportunities forabuse; interventions that did not work out were dropped unhesitatingly;and policies were adapted to reflect changing economic conditions.      

INTERPRETING RECENT RESEARCH ON SCHOOLING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Policymakers in developing countries have long been troubledby the undesirable, but apparently unavoidable, choice betweenproviding broad access to education and developing high-qualityschools. Recent evidence, however, suggests that this is a badway to think about human capital development. Grade repetitionand high dropout rates lead to a significant waste of resourcesin many school systems. Students in quality schools, however,respond in ways that reduce such inefficiencies, perhaps evensufficiently to recoup immediately investments in quality. Promoting high-quality schools, however, is more difficult thanmany have thought, in part because research demonstrates thatthe traditional approach to providing quality—simply providingmore inputs—is frequently ineffective. Existing inefficienciesare likely to be alleviated only by the introduction of substantiallystronger performance incentives in schools and by more extensiveexperimentation and evaluation of educational programs and schoolorganizations. Incentives, decentralized decisionmaking, andevaluation are alien terms to education, in both industrialand developing countries, but they hold the key to improvementthat has eluded policymakers pursuing traditional practices.      

Comment on "Evaluating Recipes for Development Success": The Policy Usefulness of Institutional and Political Analyses of Development

In "Evaluating Recipes for Development Success" Avinash Dixitcriticizes recent efforts to identify the "fundamental" causesof development and to distill policy recommendations from theseefforts. This comment focuses on the strand of that literaturerelated to institutions and development. Two arguments are important:that the rule of law and the security of property rights areimportant for growth and that they are the product of politicalinstitutions. Professor Dixit argues that identification andother concerns undermine the second argument and inhibit theformulation of policy recommendations. While these concernsare valid, research has begun to disaggregate broad politicalinstitutions (democracy and autocracy) and to look at the detailsof political competition, such as voter information and politiciancredibility, which are both more robust determinants of politicaldecision-making and more susceptible to policy interventions. JEL codes: O43, O17, O20, P30, P48     

DEVELOPMENT, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND THE SOCIAL RATE OF DISCOUNT

This article examines the role of the discount rate in makingdecisions that will have significant implications for the environment.The authors begin by providing a rationale for discounting ingeneral and by describing the main factors that determine thediscount rate. These factors—the private and social ratesof time preference, the opportunity cost of capital, risk anduncertainty, and the interests of future generations—allhave an environmental dimension. The article goes on to examinethat dimension and to explore the connections between the choiceof the discount rate and environmental concerns, such as excessiveexploitation of natural resources, inadequate investment inconservation, and insufficient attention to the irreversibleloss of certain environmental resources. The authors conclude that, in general, environmental concernsare not best addressed by lowering the discount rate—anaction that might have both benefits and costs for the environment.A more promising course would be to incorporate a criterionof sustainability into certain aspects of decisionmaking. Howsuch a criterion could be made operational is touched upon butnot developed in this article.      

DUMPING AND ANTIDUMPING: THE RHETORIC AND THE REALITY OF PROTECTION IN INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES

A wide gap separates the rhetoric from the reality of protectionin industrial countries. Antidumping is the current realityof that protection. Protectionist interests stretch the definitionof dumping as far as they may to shelter actions against importsunder the antidumping umbrella. This article is about antidumping, in particular about the historyof antidumping regulation and its evolution under the GATT systeminto a major instrument of protection. The thesis is straightforward:antidumping is the fox put in charge of the henhouse—ordinaryprotection with a good public relations program. There is littlein its history to suggest that the scope of antidumping wasever more particular than protecting home producers from importcompetition, and there is much to suggest that such protectionwas its intended scope. The article has three sections. The first looks into the originsof antidumping regulation, the second examines contemporaryregulation (antidumping under the GATT), and the third summarizesthe significance of the first two.      

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND COMMERCIALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE: The Effect on the Poor

Do the economic gains brought by technological innovation andcommercialization in agriculture work their way through to thepoor? The prevailing optimistic view is that they do. But thisview is not universal: some hold that these forces for changecan interact with, or even induce, institutional and marketfailure, with adverse consequences for the poor. Adherents of the pessimistic view point to real-world instancesin which the poor have failed to reap the benefits, or evenhave lost, from the technological change or commercialization.Where these effects have occurred we find that they are mostlyattributable to inelastic demand or adverse institutional features;often, when technology or commercialization has been blamedfor the decline in income of the poor, other—not necessarilyconnected—policies have in fact been responsible for thedamage. This article contends that the optimistic view is, by and large,correct: normally, technology and commercialization stimulateagricultural growth, improve employment opportunities, and expandfood supply—all central to the alleviation of poverty.The evidence does not offer much encouragement to an extensionof this view—that through "social engineering" the benefitsfrom technology and commercialization can easily be targetedtoward the poor; the limited opportunities for such targetingshould of course be seized.