Loan Sales and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing

When a loan is sold, it goes to a lower-cost financing sourcethan its originator. Yet, lending markets are less than perfectlycompetitive. Despite the lower funding cost, therefore, theloan price is not necessarily more favorable to the borrower.However, corporate borrowers are averse to the participationof their loans to other lenders because of the complexity ofdealing with multiple banks and the potential information costsof the sale announcement. Consequently, I conjecture that theborrower extracts a price concession in exchange for allowingthe bank to sell participations in the loan. Using a hand-matcheddataset of loans, borrowers, and lenders, I find that the averageyield spread on loans originated by active loan sellers is about20 basis points lower than the average spread on loans originatedby moderate loan sellers.     

贷款转让对道德风险监督的影响研究

贷款转让是银行可规避诸多监管而获得低成本流动性的一种有效途径。本文以控制借款人道德风险为目的,采用效用函数分析了不同贷款转让情景下银行监督水平的最优选择。研究结果表明,贷款转让比例越高,边际收益递减阻碍了银行监督水平,可能扩大借款人的道德风险。投资者承担合理监督成本是激励银行实施最优监督水平的一条有效措施。除了承担合理监督成本外,贷款投资者对贷款的合理定价也是激励银行监督借款人的一个重要积极因素。     

Bank Loan Supply, Lender Choice, and Corporate Capital Structure

This paper explores the relevance of capital market supply frictions for corporate capital structure decisions. To identify this relationship, I study the effect on firms' financial structures of two changes in bank funding constraints: the 1961 emergence of the market for certificates of deposit, and the 1966 Credit Crunch. Following an expansion (contraction) in the availability of bank loans, leverage ratios of bank-dependent firms significantly increase (decrease) relative to firms with bond market access. Concurrent changes in the composition of financing sources lend further support to the role of credit supply and debt market segmentation in capital structure choice.     

Loan Sales and Relationship Banking

Firms raise money from banks and the bond market. Banks sell loans in a secondary market to recycle their funds or to trade on private information. Liquidity in the loan market depends on the relative likelihood of each motive for trade and affects firms' optimal financial structure. The endogenous degree of liquidity is not always socially optimal: There is excessive trade in highly rated names, and insufficient liquidity in riskier bonds. We provide testable implications for prices and quantities in primary and secondary loan markets, and bond markets. Further, we posit that risk-based capital requirements may be socially desirable.     

Constraints on Loan Sales and the Price of Liquidity

In the syndicated loan market, borrowers and syndicate arrangers sometimes employ contractual restrictions that influence a loan’s liquidity. We analyze two types of constraints on loan resales: (1) prior consent constraints implemented by the borrower or the syndicate’s lead arranger and (2) a minimum denomination requirement for loan sales. We hypothesize that constraints could be mechanisms for fostering relationships and/or facilitating the resolution of financial distress and find some support for each notion. We find that resale constraints are more likely when borrowers are small and have relatively poor credit ratings. We also find that loans with any type of constraint have higher all-in-spreads and are more likely to be secured than unconstrained loans and that the marginal cost of constraining liquidity is relatively high.

Bank Competition and Loan Quality

We analyze the impact of bank competition on the equilibrium quality of loans in a formal model where banks do not observe the type of loan applicants, i.e. face an adverse selection problem, nor borrowers’ effort, i.e. also face a moral hazard problem. The main finding is that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and the average quality of loans. Policy implications are derived from this result and from an extension to the basic model where banks may sequentially acquire information about potential borrowers.     

委托贷款违约风险传染与企业银行借款

违约是信用风险传染的一种表现形式,现有研究忽视了委托贷款的违约风险。本文利用上市公司委托贷款数据研究发现,委托贷款借入方违约导致贷出方银行借款可得性下降。当贷出方两权分离程度和融资约束较高时,其抵御风险能力较弱,更容易受到风险传染;货币政策从紧时期以及经济政策不确定性较高时期,风险传染更容易发生。进一步研究发现,借入方违约通过提高贷出方的经营风险,降低了贷出方银行借款可得性。本文为企业间风险传染提供了实证证据,对于企业委托贷款决策、银行授信决策和监管部门防控金融创新工具的风险具有一定的启示作用。     

Loan Market Competition and Bank Risk-Taking

Recent literature (Boyd and De Nicoló, J Finance 60:1329–1343, 2005) has argued that competition in the loan market lowers bank risk by reducing the risk-taking incentives of borrowers. Using a model where competition arises from falling switching costs for entrepreneurs, we show that the impact of loan market competition on banks is reversed if banks can adjust their loan portfolios. The reason is that when borrowers become safer, banks want to offset the effect on their balance sheet and switch to higher-risk lending. They even overcompensate the effect of safer borrowers because loan market competition erodes their franchise values and thus increases their risk-taking incentives.     

公司治理与银行借款融资

本文以中国深沪两市A股上市公司为样本,检验了公司治理在银行信贷决策中的作用。通过检验公司治理水平对企业银行借款融资能力和融资成本的影响,我们发现,企业银行借款融资能力方面,无论长期借款还是短期借款,公司治理因素对企业银行借款融资能力均没有影响,银行更看重企业的经营状况。企业银行借款融资成本方面,我们发现公司治理机制中只有监事会特征和股权集中度对企业银行借款融资成本有显著影响。具体地,监事会规模越大,融资成本越低;股权集中度越高,融资成本越高。本文结果说明公司治理因素在我国银行放贷决策中的作用有限。     

汽车行业运行态势与银行信贷投放

商业银行应充分考虑行业运行态势及行业政策,通过细分客户市场与产品市场,确定安全、有效的信贷方式。2006年行业运行态势良好在经历了油价上涨导致的短暂低潮后,2006年我国汽车行业重新回到了高速增长的平台。根据中国汽车工业协会统计,预计2006年全年汽车销量将达到690万辆,超过日本,成为仅次于美国的世界第二大汽车消费国；增速将达到20%,超过2004年和2005年的水平(图1)。从全球角度看,我国汽车消费量占全球总消费量的比例已由2001年的4．3%上升至2006年     

Federal Home Loan Bank Advances and Commercial Bank Portfolio Composition

Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) advances are a source of government‐sponsored liquidity intended to encourage housing finance, although “community financial institutions” may use such funds more generally. Because money is fungible, it is an empirical question as to how advances are actually employed. Using panel‐vector autoregression techniques, we estimate dynamic responses of U.S. commercial bank portfolios to: FHLB advance shocks, bank lending shocks, and macroeconomic shocks. We find that FHLB advances: (i) are used as a general source of liquidity by U.S. commercial banks of all sizes and (ii) dampen the sensitivity of mortgage lending to macroeconomic shocks at small banks.     

商业银行贷款定价理论与实践

本文系统阐述了贷款定价的基本理论,对西方商业银行贷款定价主要模式进行了比较分析,结合我国金融市场发展现状和商业银行内部管理体制,提出建立我国商业银行贷款定价体系的建议.     

Bank Loan Availability and Trade Credit Demand

This paper investigates the effects of bank loan availability on the trade credit and credit card demand of small firms, using firm‐level data from the 1995 Credit, Banks, and Small Business Survey, conducted by the National Federation of Independent Business. We find that firms increase their demand for trade credit and credit card debt when facing credit constraints imposed by banks. These results provide evidence of a pecking order of debt financing, where firms increase their reliance on potentially expensive sources of funds when bank loans are not available.     

Information and the Cost of Capital

We investigate the role of information in affecting a firm's cost of capital. We show that differences in the composition of information between public and private information affect the cost of capital, with investors demanding a higher return to hold stocks with greater private information. This higher return arises because informed investors are better able to shift their portfolio to incorporate new information, and uninformed investors are thus disadvantaged. In equilibrium, the quantity and quality of information affect asset prices. We show firms can influence their cost of capital by choosing features like accounting treatments, analyst coverage, and market microstructure.     

Disagreement and the Cost of Capital

We assess how forms of disagreement among investors affect a firm's cost of capital. Firms experience a lower cost of capital if investors perceive that other investors are ignoring relevant disclosures (perceived errors of omission), but a higher cost of capital if investors perceive that others are responding to irrelevant disclosures (perceived errors of commission). The impact of these two sources of disagreement on the cost of capital is determined by the distribution of opinion and the nature of disclosure. For example, even though aggregated disclosures reveal less to investors, aggregated disclosures may decrease the cost of capital by eliminating disagreement associated with perceived errors of commission. These and additional results arise because the cost of capital is driven not only by investors’ uncertainty about the firm's future earnings performance, but also by investors’ uncertainty about the evolution of beliefs, which partly determines the path of prices.     

“票贷保”业务发的展特点及影响

正2011年以来,中央银行为收缩流动性,抑制通货膨胀,先后6次提高法定存款准备金率,同时将保证金存款纳入法定存款准备金的缴存范围。在稳健的货币政策背景下,商业银行信贷规模趋紧,但中小企业资金需求强烈。为满足中小企业的融资需求,同时缓解监管考核压力,商业银行在为企业办理贷款业务时要求企业将部分贷款转存为银行承兑汇票保证金,企业再以银行承兑汇票形式获得信用支持,从而导致银行签发的银行承兑汇票业务量激增,"票贷保"搭车营销现象较为普遍。为了解银行承兑汇