Firm‐specific knowledge assets and employment arrangements: Evidence from CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal

Research summary : We argue that firms with greater specificity in knowledge structure need to both encourage their CEOs to stay so that they make investments with a long‐term perspective, and provide job securities to the CEOs so that they are less concerned about the risk of being dismissed. Accordingly, we found empirical evidence that specificity in firm knowledge assets is positively associated with the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation design (indicating the effort of CEO retention) and negatively associated with CEO dismissal (indicating the job securities the firm committed to CEOs). Furthermore, firm diversification was found to mitigate the effect of firm‐specific knowledge on both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal, as CEOs are more removed from the deployment of knowledge resources in diversified firms. Managerial summary : A firm's knowledge structure, that is, the extent to which its knowledge assets are firm‐specific versus general, has implications for both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal. In particular, we find that a firm with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge has the incentive to retain its CEO through the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation. Such a firm is also likely to provide job security for its CEO, leading to a lower likelihood of CEO dismissal. These arguments, however, are less likely to hold in diversified corporations as CEOs in such corporations are more removed from the deployment of knowledge assets. A key managerial implication is that CEO compensation and job security design should be made according to the nature of firm knowledge assets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Settling up in CEO compensation: The impact of divestiture intensity and contextual factors in refocusing firms

We examine the relationship between strategic change and CEO compensation by studying how a firm's refocusing program influences CEO compensation after completing the change. We contribute to the ‘settling up’ literature by arguing that strategic change is often uncertain for both the CEO and the board of directors responsible for executive compensation. As such the firm is likely to settle up with the CEO by paying for compensation risk and effort undertaken during refocusing after the extent and impact of strategic change are better known. We find that refocusing intensity is positively related to post‐refocusing CEO total compensation, suggesting that ‘settling up’ through post hoc compensation is an important factor in strategic change. We also find that prior firm performance, governance structure and industry dynamism are important moderators of this relationship. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The influence of lead indicator strength on the use of nonfinancial measures in performance management: Evidence from CEO compensation schemes

Nonfinancial measures (NFMs) are a common feature of strategic performance management frameworks. We examine the role of one widely used NFM: customer satisfaction, in one aspect of strategic performance management: CEO compensation schemes. Drawing on agency theory precepts, we hypothesize that the extent to which firms link CEO compensation to customer satisfaction is influenced by satisfaction's ability to act as a leading indicator of future profitability (lead indicator strength). We further hypothesize that the extent to which customer satisfaction's lead indicator strength influences the weighting of satisfaction in CEO compensation schemes has a positive influence on future shareholder value. Our empirical results offer strong support for both hypotheses and extend research on the use and efficacy of NFMs in CEO compensation schemes. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO political ideologies and pay egalitarianism within top management teams

Research summary : We examine the influence of CEO and compensation committee liberalism on top management teams (TMT ) pay arrangements. Given that politically liberal individuals tend to value egalitarianism, we test whether firms with liberal CEO s tend to (1) reduce pay dispersion among non‐CEO executives; and (2) reduce pay gaps between CEO and non‐CEO executives, and whether compensation committee liberalism moderates these relationships. We find some evidence of a direct effect of CEO liberalism on TMT pay arrangements as well as some interaction between CEO and compensation committee liberalism on the pay arrangements. This study provides a better understanding of the antecedents of TMT pay arrangements and empirical evidence showing the influence of values at the top of organization . Managerial summary : Do the values of the CEO and compensation committee influence the pay of other top managers? Our study provides evidence that political ideology affects top manager pay. We examine whether CEO liberalism produces more egalitarian pay arrangements among top managers, and whether the liberalism of the compensation committee affects that relationship. We find that CEO liberalism reduces differences in the total pay among top managers, but does not influence the difference between CEO total pay and the total pay of top managers. We also find that compensation committee liberalism strengthens the negative influence of CEO liberalism on differences in total pay among top managers. Finally, we find that CEO liberalism reduces the difference between CEO bonus pay and the bonus pay of other top managers . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A dual agency view of board compensation: the joint effects of outside director and CEO stock options on firm risk

This paper contributes to multiple agency theory by examining how the compensation schemes awarded to outside directors and the CEO jointly affect firm‐level risk taking. Using data of the S&P 1500 firms from 1997 to 2006, we find support for earlier arguments that providing the CEO, the outside directors, or both with stock options increases risk taking. More importantly, we find that compensating outside directors with stock options has significantly stronger effects than CEO stock options. Finally, contrary to what one would expect, we find that these effects are mutually substituting; that is, if both the outside directors and the CEO are provided with stock option compensation, outside directors' incentives weaken the effect of the CEO's incentives on firms' risk taking. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social network contingency,symbolic management,and boundary stretching

A firm's structural position within corporate networks may affect the extent to which it engages in boundary stretching practices. Since social norms support low CEO compensation, offering high CEO compensation in China can be seen as a boundary stretching practice. Setting up a compensation committee (CC) may be viewed as a form of symbolic management in China. We argue that firms operating within central corporate network positions opt to pay higher CEO compensation without engaging in symbolic management. On the other hand, firms operating in structural hole positions tend to either pay lower CEO compensation or use CCs as a symbolic management tool in order to pay higher CEO compensation. Our hypotheses are largely supported based on 7,618 firm‐year observations in China. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of upper echelons’ compensation on firm internationalization

This paper is built upon previous work concerning how three factors—an upper echelon’s compensation, the total compensation level of a chief executive officer (CEO), and compensation gaps between a CEO and a top management team (TMT)—affect a firm’s international expansion level. Using longitudinal data (2000–2005) from 528 publicly listed firms in Taiwan as our sample, we found that CEO total compensation level and TMT total compensation were positively related to firms’ international expansion level, and that the larger the compensation gap between CEO and TMT, the higher the given firm’s international expansion level. The implications that these findings have for future research are discussed.     

Executive perks: Compensation and corporate performance in China

Many studies have examined CEO compensation in developed countries, where a long tradition of disclosure renders data readily available. In emerging economies, particularly in China, where market-based compensation is a relatively new phenomenon, there are few studies of CEO compensation. In addition, information on the use of non-cash compensation is almost absent. Building on the general literature on CEO compensation, and Chinese economic and management studies, this article singularly contributes to the extant literature by (1) examining the motivational determinants of CEO perk compensation, on the one hand, and (2) exploring the relative contribution of perks to performance. We anticipate that perks can serve two roles in China: (1) to provide incentives to deter managerial shirking, and (2) to facilitate work and improve production. We find that perks are positively associated with current and future returns on assets, supporting the view that some types of perks may improve firm profitability and/or that perks are paid as a bonus to reward performance. Our findings from stratified samples suggest that perks may incentivize managers, even after controlling for firm fundamentals, such as firm size, growth opportunity, and leverage.     

Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes

A model of the determinants of chief executive (CEO) compensation is presented and tested. Based on a sample from the leisure industry, the study finds that CEO pay has complex links to several factors: firm size, complexity, performance, CEO power, board vigilance, and the CEO's human capital. The study includes a separate examination of CEO salary and bonus, as well as a test of pay determination across McEachern's (1975) ownership categories.     

The strategic value of CEO external directorate networks: implications for CEO compensation

This study examines the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and CEO compensation. Drawing on previous research showing a link between executives' external networks, firm strategy, and performance, the study argues that executive external networks are strategically valuable to firms; thus, they should be reflected in executive compensation. The study further examines whether firm diversification, with its elevated demand for strategic resources, moderates the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and pay. Hypotheses are tested using a sample of 460 Fortune 1000 firms. Analyses reveal that the rewards to CEO external directorate networks are contingent upon the firm's level of diversification. Implications for future research and practice are discussed. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Top management team compensation: the missing link between CEO pay and firm performance?

In this research we discuss the relationship between CEO and top management team (TMT) member compensation, and explore the implications of TMT pay for firm performance. Specifically, we suggest that firm performance may benefit due to agency and group behavioral issues when top management team member pay is aligned—alignment is defined as the degree to which TMT member pay reflects (1) shareholder interests and (2) key political and strategic contingencies within the firm. In support of our theorizing, we found CEO pay to be related to TMT pay; TMT compensation, in turn, predicted performance (i.e., return on assets and Tobin's q) when aligned with shareholder interests and internal contingencies. Moreover, the effect of CEO pay on future firm performance was dependent on top team pay. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Revisiting the gender gap in CEO compensation: Replication and extension of Hill,Upadhyay, and Beekun's (2015) work on CEO gender pay gap

Research Summary: The increasing number of women chief executives motivates considerable interest in examining possible gender differences in CEO compensation. Recently, Hill, Upadhyay and Beekun reported that female CEOs receive greater compensation than male CEOs, which runs counter to common wisdom that the gender pay gap in the labor market favors men over women. With the goal of contributing to cumulative knowledge development in this area, we seek to reexamine Hill et al.'s finding about gender differences in CEO compensation by extending the analyses further in time, using a larger sample of firms and more rigorous empirical analyses. Our findings, which are robust to different statistical procedures and econometric specifications, do not reveal reliable evidence for differences in compensation paid to male and female CEOs. Managerial Summary : For years, a lively debate has centered on the issue of gender pay gap. The ubiquity of the pay gap between men and women has recently been questioned by Hill et al. who identify the chief executive officer (CEO) role as a workplace position where women receive greater compensation than men. Our investigation examines whether women CEOs are indeed compensated substantively more than male CEOs. We seek to replicate earlier work by Hill and colleagues, using an expanded dataset over a longer period of time and with more rigorous analytical tools. We do not find reliable evidence for a difference in compensation paid to male and female CEOs, suggesting that claims about gender gap in CEO compensation favoring women over men may be premature.     

Board control and ceo compensation

The board of directors has been identified as a key internal control mechanism for setting CEO compensation. Theory suggests that CEOs will attempt to circumvent board control in an effort to maximize salary. This hypothesis was tested using a sample of 193 firms in a cross-section of industries. Corporate governance literature was reviewed to develop a multiple indicator measure of board control. Although, as hypothesized, CEO salaries were greater in firms with lower levels of control, CEO compensation was not significantly related to firm size or profitability.     

Stakeholder management as a predictor of CEO compensation: main effects and interactions with financial performance

We test the effects of stakeholder management on CEOs' salaries, bonuses, stock options, and total compensation. We also examine the extent to which the interaction of stakeholder management and financial performance determines compensation. Using a longitudinal database of 406 Fortune 1000 firms, our results suggest that stakeholder management is relevant to boards of directors when setting CEO compensation. Specifically, we found a significant, negative main effect of stakeholder management on CEO salaries. Further, we found that stakeholder management typically reduces the rewards CEOs may get for increasing levels of financial performance. In tandem, these results indicate that CEOs may jeopardize their personal wealth by pursuing stakeholder‐related initiatives. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO compensation in relation to worker compensation across countries: The configurational impact of country‐level institutions

Executive compensation and its relation to that of rank and file employees are vital areas of strategy research. This study contributes to our understanding of cross‐national differences in executive compensation by exploring how key formal and informal country‐level institutions of social power structures combine to shape CEO and worker compensation across countries as well as the resulting pay dispersion. Analyzing data spanning 54 countries using the configurational approach fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), the study also explores the causal asymmetry underlying compensation outcomes by investigating institutional configurations linked to high CEO compensation, high worker pay, and high pay dispersion and those configurations linked to the absence of these outcomes. The article concludes by discussing the study's implications for theory and research on executive compensation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Going short‐term or long‐term? CEO stock options and temporal orientation in the presence of slack

Research summary: We draw on behavioral agency theory to explain how decision heuristics associated with CEO stock options interact with firm slack to shape the CEO's preference for short‐ or long‐term strategies (temporal orientation). Our findings suggest CEO current option wealth substitutes for the influence of slack resources in encouraging a long‐term orientation, while prospective option wealth enhances the positive effect of slack on temporal orientation. Our theory offers explanations for non‐findings in previous analysis of the relationship between CEO equity based pay and temporal orientation and provides the insights that CEO incentives created by stock options (1) enhance the effect of available slack upon temporal orientation and (2) can both incentivize and de‐incentivize destructive short‐termism, depending upon the values of current and prospective option wealth. Managerial summary: We explore how compensation design can play a role in affecting the CEO's preference for short‐ or long‐term strategic projects. When the CEOs have accumulated option wealth, they are more likely to invest in the long term. Yet when they have a large number of recently granted options with the potential to generate significant wealth in the event of successful risk taking, the CEO is more likely to prefer the short term in order to achieve personal wealth gains more quickly. The more liquid assets the firm holds, the weaker both of the aforementioned effects. An implication for boards is that they should anticipate CEO short‐termism if the CEO has been granted new options, underlining the potential negative consequences of option compensation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO compensation in EU telecom companies: Does the state design the right incentives?

This paper analyzes the structure of CEO pay in European fixed telecommunication companies, focusing on the impact of state ownership. Results show that, under the (partial or total) control of the state, the level of CEO compensation is lower and pay-performance sensitivity is higher than in privately-controlled firms. This finding suggests the state provides an incentive as well as a monitoring effect. However, when the state holds the majority of the shares, the pay level is significantly affected by the CEO power, suggesting that in these firms, CEOs are more likely to be entrenched with boards and succeed in raising their pay.     

Initial compensation of new CEOs hired in turnaround situations

Our paper examines the initial compensation of new CEOs hired in turnaround situations. Building on prior literature on executive job demands, we posit that new CEOs hired in turnaround situations will receive higher pay, particularly higher performance‐based pay, and that the pay premium will incentivize them to undertake retrenchment and restructuring turnaround initiatives. An interaction between pay premium and CEO credentials is shown to have a stronger effect on the extent to which firms engage in such turnaround initiatives. Our empirical results, based on 98 new CEOs hired in 223 turnaround situations, largely support our arguments. We discuss the contribution of our study to the CEO compensation, executive job demands, and corporate turnaround literature. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ceo selection,succession, compensation and firm performance: A theoretical integration and empirical analysis

This study seeks to extend and unify a set of research issues relating to CEO selection, succession, compensation, and firm performance. The study offers a model of these issues from a combined agency and organizational perspective, and tests the model using archival data and perceptual data from survey responses from 118 CEOs of the largest U.S. corporations. The results suggest that several CEO issues are significant predictors of variation in firm performance, supporting the paper's arguments for (1) a reinterpretation of the insiderfoutsider CEO distinction, (2) the relevance of CEO succession planning, and (3) the importance of CEOs' perceptions of the linkage between their personal wealth and firm wealth.     

Does good governance prevent bad strategy? A study of corporate governance,financial diversification,and value creation by French corporations, 2000–2006

Building on and extending prior research, we propose a comprehensive framework which posits that free cash flow moderates the impact of corporate governance on financial diversification. We argue that because it increases CEO perceived risk, alignment devices increase rather than decrease financial diversification. In a sample of 59 publicly traded French corporations during 2000–2006, we show that financial diversification negatively impacts shareholder return and firm value. We obtain support for several of our hypotheses: at high levels of free cash flow, CEO variable compensation increases financial diversification, whereas chairman/CEO non‐duality reduces it. In contrast, independent directors increase financial diversification at low values of free cash flow (although weakly). We also find that ownership concentration only reduces financial diversification when free cash flow is low.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.