掏空、合谋与独立董事报酬

本文建立了一个“全体股东/独立董事/大股东”三层代理模型,考察独立董事与试图掏空企业资产的大股东之间潜在的合谋对独立董事报酬合约的影响。基本结论是:大股东的掏空动机依赖于其实现控制企业的股权水平,越小的股权控制企业掏空动机越强烈;当独立董事合谋概率较小(比如有完善的独立董事市场激励和约束)或投资者法律保护水平较高的时候,可以对独立董事支付固定报酬;而独立董事合谋概率较大且法律对投资者保护水平较低的时候,为了尽可能维护全体股东的利益,就有必要对独立董事支付激励报酬。     

合谋激励与国有商业银行改革

作为一个典型的企业组织,商业银行面临一个多重代理问题,代理人合谋是团队道德风险的主要形式。本文利用多重代理的理论分析框架和大量事实证明,国有商业银行合谋问题非常严重。文章最后从反合谋角度提出国有商业银行改革的若干建议,包括建立合格股东和董事会把公司的经营管理权交给出资人和出资人的代表、实行组织机构精简与分拆上市(而非总体上市)、强化规则和股东权力并弱化总行和分行自由处置权、引入期权激励大幅提高银行管理层收入、银行内部组织结构更扁平化并适当授权给分行、建立提高员工参与程度的机制等。     

论大股东和经营者合谋与公司投资行为

企业股权的集中使股东群体分化为控制性大股东和中小股东两个不同的利益集团，而大股东和经营者一同成为企业的内部人，大股东一经营者合谋对中小股东的利益进行“隧道挖掘”成为现代公司的核心的代理问题。本文首先对大股东一经营者合谋的成因进行了探讨，然后通过简单的模型分析了这种舍谋行为会导致公司的次优投资和过度投资行为。     

国际视野的建筑业合谋及其发生机理分析——以荷兰建筑业为例

建筑业合谋问题是世界性难题,我国也广泛存在。荷兰建筑业合谋问题在世界范围内具有典型性和代表性,涉及荷兰全国28个建筑业卡特尔组织4000多家企业。文章以荷兰建筑业合谋现象为例剖析建筑业合谋的发展及影响因素。荷兰建筑业合谋的影响因素众多,包括市场、文化和法律3个方面,这些因素共同影响着合谋的产生与发展,研究荷兰建筑业合谋的发展和影响因素有助于研究我国建筑业合谋问题。     

新形式下我国企业实行经理股票期权博弈分析

近期，国家进行了一系列制度改革，我国企业对经理人实施股票期权激励的制度障碍得以消除，同时，进一步完善我国企业的公司治理结构，使股票期权激励顺利进行。股票期权激励是一项激励经理人勇于承担企业风险的长期激励计划。本文采用博弈的方法，分析了企业实施股票期权激励可在一定程度上防止经营者的“道德风险”和“逆向选择”行为，并分析了业绩发展空间有限的企业不适合实施股票期权激励。     

规制分权化对电力行业发展的影响:基于中国省级面板数据的经验研究

本文主要讨论了中国当前规制分权化背景下的地方规制机构与被规制企业之间的合谋问题,而合谋会导致规制低效率。基于面板数据,利用固定效应估计法对1998～2003年规制分权化的效果进行经验研究,结果表明规制分权化没有产生正面效应。因此,本文认为解决问题的关键是机制设计。     

基于WEB的快速报价系统的研究与开发

本文对国内外产品快速报价系统的发展现状进行了总结，结合我国中小型企业的实际需求，设计出一种适合我国中小型企业的快速报价系统。本文提出将客户关系管理（CRM）引入报价系统，应用SWOT模型分析法，引入模糊逻辑推理法得到最后的报价结果，应用B／S架构模式解决不同部门问数据实时共享的问题，对加速我国中小型企业的科学化管理提供了有益的建议。     

工程投标报价低于成本价的判定及企业防范对策

建设工程招标投标过程中,企业之间的投标竞争在形式上表现为投标竞价。在完全市场经济条件下,投标高报价并不总是意味着高利润,过高的报价往往会导致企业不能中标,从而根本谈不上实现预期利润的问题,但是低于成本报价也是法律所禁止的,《中华人民共和国招标投标法》第33条规定:“投标人不得以低于成本的报价竞标”,第41条第2项规定中标条件为:“能够满足招标文件实质性要求,并且经评审的投标价格最低;但是投标价格低于成本的除外。“这里所讲的成本,是指投标人为完成投标项目所需支出的个别成本,而不是社会成本。     

“家庭氛围型”激励模式的构建——激励知识型员工新途径的探讨

知识型员工的作用和地位已日益得到彰显,但以往专家学者的激励模式中仍存在不足,本文在“以人为本”的理念基础上,建立了“家庭氛围型”激励模式激励知识型员工,以期实现员工、企业与国家之间的多赢。     

非经济性激励成本控制在中国企业中的应用

本文从企业传统的以“高薪揽人”来吸引人才切入问题，指出在现代市场竞争和以人为本的思潮下非经济性激励成本的重要性，分析了中国企业进行非经济性激励成本控制的理论及现实运用，提出几种适用于中国企业的非经济性激励途径，并强调企业应针对自身特点，使经济与非经济性激励手段相配合，以最低的人力资本投入带来最高的产出效益。     

为何招标采购偏好“低于均价中标法”

低于均价中标法招标机制被广泛应用于各类招标采购中,但其合理性存在大量争议。文章首先在理论上证明了标准低于均价中标法下投标人不存在随真实成本严格递增的贝叶斯纳什均衡报价策略,然后基于某大型电力公司的招标采购数据,对投标行为进行实证分析,发现低于均价中标法下投标人报价可以反映其真实成本,且该机制在时间趋势上既可以激励投标人压缩利润,降低采购成本,又可以引导投标人形成稳定的低利润预期,指导投标人报"合理低价",防止"赢者诅咒"现象的发生。以上发现均说明低于均价中标法在业界被广泛应用的合理性,但这种招标机制也易于催生投标人间串谋。文章研究为低于均价中标法的合理使用提出了管理建议。     

An empirical examination of IPO underpricing in the Chinese A-share market

Research in the literature shows that initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stocks are systematically priced at a discount to their subsequent initial trading price. The large underpricing magnitude in the Chinese IPO market has attracted much attention. We consider three hypotheses that may explain the IPO underpricing in China. These are the winner's curse hypothesis, the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis and the signaling hypothesis. Among these hypotheses, the winner's curse hypothesis has not been tested in the Chinese market. Using IPO data for online fixed-price offerings from November 1995 to December 1998, our results show that the winner's curse hypothesis is the main reason for the high IPO underpricing in China. The signaling hypothesis is not empirically supported in the Chinese market during the sample period.     

城市土地出让中的问题与对策探讨

现代拍卖理论的研究表明,市场环境因素会对不同拍卖方式的效率产生影响。本文根据拍卖理论的一些研究成果,从受让人对土地估价的价值类型,招标拍卖中存在的“赢者诅咒”、“合谋”现象,以及事后土地交易合同的可执行性等方面,对不同的土地出让方式进行了比较分析。分析结果表明,在选择最有效率的开发商以及最大化收入等方面,市场环境因素对不同的交易方式产生不同的影响,因此,提高土地交易效率和效益,还必须进一步完善土地出让市场。     

The Size of the Affiliation Effect

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to investigate whether the affiliation effect is of only marginal importance or it is of the same order of magnitude as the winner's curse and competition effects. This paper is an application of Pinkse and Tan in which they show that bids can be decreasing in the number of bidders in private value auctions provided that the bidders' private values are affiliated. They argue that the affiliation effect is also present in common value auctions. If the affiliation effect is substantial then a regression of bids on the number of bidders will not help in distinguishing between the common and private value paradigms. We use the Offshore Continental Shelf auction data-set to estimate these effects and find that the affiliation effect is smaller than the other two effects in terms of size. Therefore, at least in this application it appears unlikely that the affiliation effect would often offset the competition effect.     

Competition and Prices in USDA Commodity Procurement

We evaluate United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) food procurement auctions. The Department spends nearly $1 billion a year for products for domestic feeding programs, such as the National School Lunch Program, and another $2.5 billion for international food programs. USDA's purchasing relics primarily on auction mechanisms designed to induce “hard” manufacturer price competition. We compare private-sector prices to low bids in 25,000 auctions, and find that typical private-sector prices substantially exceed USDA low bids for comparable products. We also assess the effects of competition on low bids. Low bids fall as the number of bidders increases, and the effects are nonlinear. Additional bidders have a very small effect on prices when there are already five or six bidders, but a stronger effect in markets with only one or two bidders. Even in this highly transparent bidding environment, competition matters.     

Selective Entry in Highway Procurement Auctions

When participating in an auction is costly, a potential bidder has to decide whether to enter the auction or not. The extent to which the potential bidders know their private cost before making their entry decisions determines how selective the entry process is. Endogenous selective entry is common in many auctions and it has important implications for designing auctions, in particular, choosing the bid discount policy that is frequently used in public procurements to achieve distributional goals of the government. Prior empirical studies of the bid preferences were based on frameworks that either did not explicitly model endogenous participation or assumed endogenous, but non-selective participation. This study empirically investigated whether the entry process is selective in the highway procurement auctions run by the California Department of Transportation. To this end, the asymmetric affiliated-signal model was adapted to permit endogenous selective entry. Model parameters, including entry costs and distributions of construction costs for regular and fringe companies, were estimated nonparametrically. The results show evidence favoring selective entry of the fringe firms and imply that the level of bid discount required to achieve the procurement buyer’s policy objective may be lower than what is previously found in the literature under the assumption of non-selective entry.

     

Bidding off the wall in common value auctions

This paper examines the practice of phantom bidding in common value auctions with asymmetric information. Unlike in private value auctions it is very difficult to profit from phantom bidding even if the auctioneer observes the number of interested bidders. We find that the auctioneer is worse off submitting low bids or mixing between his participation strategies. Phantom bidding can generate higher revenues if a single bidder with a high value estimate is likely to be present at the auction. Systematic observation of an isolated high estimate requires negative correlation across bidders’ information that is atypical in a common value environment.     

Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and its Applications

This paper provides a swift tour of auction theory and its applications. Among the questions it considers are: How much do bidders bid in commonly studied single-object auctions? How efficient are these auctions? How much revenue do they generate? Which single-object auction maximizes the seller’s expected revenue? What is the best way to auction incentive contracts? And, how efficient and complex are multi-object auctions?     

Multiunit Auctions in Which Almost Every Bid Wins

We consider multiunit auctions in which there are enough units so that each bidder but one wins every unit on which he bids. We characterize the equilibrium bidding strategy for three different payment rules: the pay-your-bid auction, the uniform-price auction in which the price equals the lowest winning bid, and the uniform-price auction in which the price equals the highest losing bid. We also consider the Vickrey pricing rule. In the case we examine, the auctions are all efficient and thus are revenue equivalent. The equilibria illustrate several phenomona that cannot arise in single-unit auctions. Even though the auctions are expected-revenue equivalent, different bidders may end up paying very different amounts. Also, in contrast to single-unit auctions, changing the seller's reservation price affects revenues, even if it remains below the lowest possible value to bidders.     

Repeated Auctions with Impatient Bidders and Externalities

This article studies collusion in repeated auctions both among patient and among impatient bidders when the outside option of the participation constraint is endogenous due to negative externalities. We find that (i) there are no bidding wars along the equilibrium path both for patient and for impatient bidders; compared to the optimal collusive bidding scheme for patient bidders, that for impatient bidders involves (ii) a lower threshold type above which bidding starts when externalities are small or (iii) more frequent jumps in a bidding scheme when externalities are large. The results carry an empirical implication that we should observe either a higher probability of sales or a higher number of bid levels in auctions that are repeatedly offered in unstable markets than those offered in stable markets.