A regime-switching approach to the study of speculative attacks: A focus on EMS crises

This paper implements a regime-switching framework to study speculative attacks against EMS currencies during 1979–1993. To identify speculative episodes, we model exchange rates, reserves, and interest rates as time series subject to discrete regime shifts between two possible states: “tranquil” and “speculative”. We allow the probabilities of switching between states to be a function of fundamentals and expectations. The regime-switching framework improves the ability to identify speculative attacks vis-à-vis the indices of speculative pressure used in the literature. The results also indicate that fundamentals (particularly budget deficits) and expectations drive the probability of switching to a speculative state. First Version Received: October 2000/Final Version Received: June 2001     

Experimental analysis on the role of a large speculator in currency crises

Corsetti et al. (2004) demonstrate that the presence of a large speculator in the foreign exchange market makes the remaining traders more aggressive in their speculative attacks. We conduct an experiment designed to test their theoretical predictions and also use the experiment to analyze an additional aspect that has not been previously covered in the literature: namely, whether the entry of a large speculator and the exit of the same speculator have the same effect in magnitude on the probability of a successful speculative attack. We obtain two main findings. First, the results support the main conclusion of Corsetti et al. (2004) that the presence of a large speculator makes other small speculators more aggressive. Second, the results suggest that the effect of the entry of a large speculator on the probability of successful speculative attacks is larger than that of the exit of the same speculator.     

Non-reversed trades: Further implications for currency trading

In markets populated by speculators, arbitrageurs and hedgers, it is shown that the conditions for non-reversed trading, which potentially combine investing (borrowing) with hedging must exist. Hence, forward exchange rates always contain an implicit risk premium. Non-reversed trading activity is necessary but not sufficient for all the other classes of trades to exist. If non-reversed traders are active and set arbitrage boundaries, no other type of riskless and profitable one-way arbitrage activity can exist. However, the activities of non-reversed traders cannot preclude rational pure forward speculative activity in the foreign exchange markets.     

Devaluation of fixed exchange rates: optimal strategy in the presence of speculation

Summary. This paper analyzes devaluations in a fixed exchange rate system by endogenizing both the speculation and devaluation decisions. It is shown that deterministic devaluation rules are generally sub-optimal for the central bank. In order to deter speculation the central bank introduces uncertainty into the timing of devaluation. The nature this mixed strategy is derived, as is the optimal strategy for speculators. The analysis allows an explanation of successful devaluations that are not precipitated by a speculative attacks, even under perfect capital mobility. Received: May 17, 1999; revised version: June 2, 1999     

THE EAST ASIAN CURRENCY CRISIS: CAUSES AND LESSONS

Financial deregulation and capital-account liberalization preceded speculative currency attacks in Thailand. A combination of de facto fixed exchange rates and high rates of interest generated excessive capital inflows, which led to too much liquidity chasing bad investments. The under-supervised and over-guaranteed financial sector extended loans excessively, particularly for non-productive, speculative purposes. Non-transparent practices, in the form of weak disclosure of institutions' true balance sheets and insider relations, masked these poor investments. The buildup of short-term, unhedged debt left East Asian economies vulnerable to a sudden collapse of confidence. Currency attacks ran down official foreign exchange reserves. Rapid capital outflows and the consequent depreciation of currencies exacerbated the strains on private sector balance sheets. The policy lessons are to (i) use macroeconomic policy to avoid excessive capital inflows and currency overvaluation, (ii) strengthen the financial system, with proper disclosure and accounting requirements, stringent loan classification and provisioning rules, and capital adequacy requirements, prior to capital-account liberalization, (iii) stabilize exchange rates based on currency baskets that reflect trade and investment linkages, and (iv) develop regional. financial cooperation with regional surveillance and peer pressure to maintain policy discipline.     

Collapsing Exchange Rate Regime Under Optimal Monetary Control

In this paper, we analyse the problem of optimal domestic credit expansion for a small open economy. We show that (i) the transition from the fixed to the flexible exchange rate regime proceeds smoothly with no speculative attack on the central bank's foreign reserves; (ii) once the exchange rate has floated, it will never be optimal to repeg it afterward; (iii) even under uncertainty, there will not be any speculative attack; however, the optimal rate of credit expansion jumps discontinuously at the date of complete depletion of the known stock of foreign reserves.     

外汇市场干预信号渠道与投机头寸相关性研究

文章主要通过研究外汇市场干预操作与货币政策改变之间是否存在相关性,来考察中央银行在外汇市场上进行冲销干预的效果。在央行拥有内部信息,投机者拥有基本面私有信息的条件下,文章使用GARCH时间序列模型,以期货市场上能够反映市场参与者对公开及私有信息理解的投机净头寸(变化)数据作为预期的代理变量展开分析。文章的结论不支持信号渠道,外汇市场上的可预期干预结果更可能与央行期望的干预方向相反,并且过去的投机者净头寸持有量可以促使干预发生。     

Turkish Currency Crisis of 2000–2001, Revisited

Turkey’s exchange rate based stabilization programme had collapsed within just 11 months of its implementation in the midst of a liquidity crunch in November 2000 caused by a reversal in the capital inflow. The onset of the stabilization programme created ample opportunities for speculative investors to make relatively safe one‐sided bets, and the initial success of the programme in bringing down interest rates implied substantial capital gains over securities obtained in 1999 and early stages of the programme. It was only natural that speculative investors would take the opportunity to realize these gains while the firm exchange rate commitment was still in place. The programme failed to deal with this contingency effectively, assuming that as long as it was implemented faithfully, long‐term investors would be forthcoming to takeover positions speculators would want to unload. That assumption proved disastrously wrong.     

Endogenous inflows of speculative capital and the optimal currency appreciation path

Abstract This paper examines the optimal appreciation path of an undervalued currency in the presence of speculative capital inflows that are endogenously affected by the appreciation path. A central bank decides its appreciation policy based on three costs: (i) misalignment costs associated with the gap between the actual and long‐run equilibrium exchange rates, (ii) short‐term adjustment costs due to resource reallocation, and (iii) capital losses due to speculative capital inflows. Our model finds (1) when speculators face no liquidity shocks, the central bank tends to appreciate the currency quickly to discourage speculative capital; (2) when speculators face liquidity shocks, the central bank optimally pre‐commits to a slower appreciation path, and the appreciation takes the longest time when the probability of liquidity shocks takes intermediate values; (3) the central bank tends to appreciate the currency more quickly when it conducts discretionary policy.     

The Penn Effect revisited: New evidence from Latin America

In this paper, we examine the role of relative productivity growth in real misalignment of exchange rates in Latin American countries. Specifically, we verify the validity of the Penn Effect for selected countries in this region. Our sample consists of 15 countries for the period 1951 to 2010. We employ both short‐ and long‐panel data techniques, which allow us to experiment with estimators suitable for short and long time dimensions of panel data. The Penn Effect is found to be supported for the entire sample, and for subsamples. Relative productivity growth is dominant in the real exchange rate movement during periods of mild or weak speculative attacks, as compared with periods of severe speculative attacks. To correct for real misalignment of currencies in Latin America under speculative attacks, relative productivity growth must be sizeable.     

A behavioral cobweb-like commodity market model with heterogeneous speculators

According to empirical studies, speculators place significant orders in commodity markets and may cause bubbles and crashes. This paper develops a cobweb-like commodity market model that takes into account the behavior of technical and fundamental speculators. We show that interactions between consumers, producers and heterogeneous speculators may produce price dynamics which mimics the cyclical price motion of actual commodity markets, i.e., irregular switches between bullish and bearish price developments. Moreover, we find that the impact of speculators on price dynamics is non-trivial: depending on the market structure, speculative transactions may either be beneficial or harmful for market stability.     

A heterogeneous agent exchange rate model with speculators and non-speculators

This paper constructs a heterogeneous agent exchange rate model of speculators and non-speculators from a simple monetary framework. The model replaces rational expectations with an adaptive learning rule that forecasts future exchange rates with an econometric model, and assumes two types of market participants, speculators and non-speculators, that differ by their forecasting model. Speculators employ a correctly specified forecasting model, are relatively short-term oriented, and are subject to momentum and herding effects via an expectation shock; non-speculators utilize a simple forecasting model, have no incentive to be short-term oriented, and are not subject to herding effects. Parameters are calibrated and estimated using the method of simulated moments, and simulation results show that the model is able to replicate foreign exchange market stylized facts better than a model of representative agent rational expectations. Furthermore, the dynamics of the model are shown to derive from both agent heterogeneity and the expectation shock.     

Spillover Dynamics of Central Bank Interventions

Abstract. Central banks frequently intervene in foreign exchange markets to reduce volatility or to correct misalignments. Such operations may be successful if they drive away destabilizing speculators. However, the speculators do not simply vanish but may reappear on other foreign exchange markets. Using a model in which traders are able to switch between foreign exchange markets, we demonstrate that while a central bank indeed has several means at hand to stabilize a specific market, the variability of the other markets depends on how the interventions are implemented.     

Speculative attacks and defenses as wars of attrition

This paper extends the currency crisis models in Obstfeld [Obstfeld, M., 1994. The logic of currency crises. Cahiers Economiques et Monetaries], [Obstfeld, M., 1996. Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features. European Economic Review 40, 1037–1047] by modeling both the government's side and speculators' side and introducing uncertainty about each party's payoff. We argue that a speculative attack (defense) can be well modeled as a war of attrition between the government and speculators under asymmetric information. We then solve for a pure strategy, weakly perfect, Bayesian rational expectation equilibrium in which each party's time until concession depends on her benefits from winning and her costs of fighting. Using this model, we are able to explain important facts of currency crises. First, the model shows that failed defenses (attacks) can be ex-ante rational for governments (speculators). Second, the model predicts systematic variations in the durations of defenses. Finally, we also show that currency crises can be self-fulfilling in the sense that there exist multiple rational expectation equilibria in our model.     

Costs and benefits of unilateral euroization in central eastern Europe

Countries unable or unwilling to join a monetary union can replicate most membership effects unilaterally through either a currency board or the formal replacement of domestic currency by that of the Union. Potential benefits include lower transaction costs, lower interest rates, and lower exposure to speculative attacks. Costs include initial reserves, inadequate response to asymmetric shocks, loss of seigniorage, no lender of last resort. Expected costs and benefits have probably been exaggerated. Net effects depend primarily on the degree of monetary, real, and institutional convergence. Positive net advantages will accrue to countries that are either already converging, or wish to use a single currency to speed up convergence — especially if small. There is no legal or economic justification for EU aversion to unilateral euroization in accession candidate countries. JEL classification: F33, F36, E58, P33.     

Speculative attacks with multiple targets

This paper examines a global games model of speculative attacks in which speculators can choose to attack any one of a number of targets. In the canonical global games model of speculative attacks with a single target, it is well known that there exists a unique equilibrium that survives iterative deletion of dominated strategies, characterized by the threshold values of the private signal and the fundamentals. This paper shows that with two targets, there is again a unique, dominance-solvable equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the threshold value of signal for attacking a given currency is a function of the signal for the other target, and the threshold value of fundamentals that determines the outcome of attack on one currency is a function of the other target’s fundamentals. Under certain condition on the noise distribution, the result is shown to extend to environments with any \(N\) symmetric targets. This paper then presents a number of numerical examples and shows, among other results, that more accurate private signals have a decoupling effect on the outcomes of attack on different currencies.     

Rational destabilizing speculation and exchange intervention policy

The fact that speculators might incorporate psychological factors in their stock market predictions, and be right in doing so, is a fundamental feature of most portfolio balance models postulating rational expectation formation. Here the so-called “extraneous-variable” problem is focused upon as a characterization of rational, but destabilizing speculation. Perfectly rational speculators cause the exchange rate to fluctuate more than would be warranted by market fundamentals. This characterization may be incomplete, as it involves a certain indeterminacy in the solution for the exchange rate. The implications for intervention policy are somewhat unconventional.     

On the Tobin Tax

Abstract

This paper clarifies why a transaction tax, such as the Tobin Tax, can stabilize financial markets. In markets that are already fairly deep, relatively small changes in trading volume are unlikely to have any impact (positive or negative) on volatility. Thus, a Tobin Tax can potentially have a stabilizing effect on international currency markets not because it reduces the excessive volume of transactions of speculators, but because it can slow down the speed with which market traders react to changes in prices of currencies. Moreover, it can lower their elasticity of future price expectations with respect to current price changes, which also has a stabilizing effect. Thus, to the extent that a Tobin Tax causes traders in financial markets to delay their decisions, a few ‘grains of sand in the wheels of international finance’ can indeed be stabilizing. Whether or not that is sufficient to prevent speculative attacks on currencies is a different matter.     

The ‘compensation’ thesis,as exemplified by the case of the Chinese central bank

This paper extends the theory of demand-led money supply endogeneity to the case of an open economy with a fixed exchange rate. This theory is contrasted to the standard Mundell-Fleming view. In the compensation approach advocated here, central banks are able to set interest rates, even in a fixed exchange rate regime, either because there are automatic market mechanisms that will induce the private sector to act in such a way that changes in foreign reserves will be compensated by opposite changes in central bank claims over the domestic economy, or because the central bank will engage in endogenous sterilization operations in its efforts to enforce its benchmark interest rate. Analyzing the balance sheet of the Chinese central bank, we find that the large rise in foreign reserves on the asset side is compensated by large positive changes in items of the liability side, mainly bonds issued by the central bank. Foreign reserves are not cointegrated with the monetary base, meaning that there is no long-run relationship between foreign exchange reserves and the supply of base money. We also find no long-run relation between foreign exchange reserves and the consumer price index.     

Exchange Market Pressure in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) Area: Empirical Assessment of the Macroeconomic Determinants

ABSTRACT

The current empirical study contributes to the literature on the exchange market pressure. First we construct as proposed by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz [1996. Contagious currency crises: First tests. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 98 (4), 463–484], a continuous measure of EMP for the CAEMC franc zone, using quarterly data from 1985Q1 to 2012Q2. We then address the main macroeconomic determinants of this EMP.

We find that our main measure for EMP as well as two alternative measures of this index captures quite well episodes of crises of the CFA (XAF) currency. During the period of study, the common currency of the CAEMC countries experienced about four speculative attacks, with the one in 1993 ending with the devaluation of that currency in January 1994. The other attacks were warded off through reserves losses, as it is clear that the currency peg was maintained principally through changes in reserves. We also find that the GDP growth, the trade balance and the international oil price are the main contributors of EMP and therefore the most significant predictors of currency crises in the CAEMC area.