Product market competition and intermediate-term momentum

Financial Markets and Portfolio Management - This paper examines the relationship between product market competition and intermediate-term relative strength strategies in the U.S. over the past two...     

Product market competition and credit risk

This study theoretically and empirically investigates effects of product market competition on credit risk. We first develop a real-options-based structural model in a homogeneous oligopoly and show that credit spreads are positively related to the number of firms in an industry. The disparity of firm size in an industry is relevant to both product market competition and credit risk, and we therefore extend the model to an asymmetric duopoly case. In particular, we demonstrate that credit spreads of relatively small (large) firms within an industry are positively (negatively) related to Herfindahl-Hirschman index, and the relative firm size in an industry is an important determinant of credit risk. The models’ implications are empirically scrutinized by a reduced-form hazard model and generally supported. By performing out-of-sample analyses, the results demonstrate that firm size together with the interaction terms between intra-industry firm size dummies and competition intensity can effectively predict default.     

Product market competition and cost stickiness

Extant literature on cost stickiness has focused on how firm-specific characteristics affect the asymmetric cost behavior. In this paper, we explore how a firm’s operating environment affects the firm’s cost stickiness. Specifically, we examine the effect of product market competition on cost stickiness since a firm’s investment and cost retention decisions partly depend on how the firm interacts with its rival firms in the product markets. Using two firm-level text-based product market competition measures extracted from management disclosures in firms’ 10-K filings (Li et al. in J Account Res 51(2):399–436, 2013; Hoberg and Phillips in Rev Financ Stud 23(10):3773–3811, 2010; J Polit Econ, 2015), we find strong evidence consistent with cost asymmetry increasing in competition after controlling for known economic determinants of cost stickiness. In additional analyses, we also find that the effect of product market competition on the degree of cost stickiness increases in firms’ financial strength, likely because management in financially stronger firms has more resources for investment expenditures in spite of a sales fall. We also find that cost stickiness is increasing in competition if management is optimistic about future demand, whereas competition is not associated with cost asymmetry if management is pessimistic about future demand. Finally, we find that the relationship between competition and cost stickiness, although statistically insignificant at conventional levels, is more pronounced for single-segment firms relative to multi-segment firms.     

Product market competition and analyst forecasting activity: International evidence

In this study, we investigate how product market competition affects the extent of analyst following and the properties of analyst forecasts. Using a broad sample of firms from 37 countries over the 1990–2008 period, we find that firms that operate in more concentrated industries and with stronger pricing power are associated with greater analyst following, higher forecast accuracy, and lower forecast dispersion. Moreover, the effect of product market power on analyst following and forecast properties is more pronounced in countries with less effective competition laws and higher entry costs. These findings suggest that high industry concentration and a dominant market position enhance the earnings predictability of firms and lower their information uncertainty, and that country-level institutions that promote competition effectively constrain the power in product markets.     

Product market competition and earnings management: Evidence from discretionary accruals and real activity manipulation

We examine the association between product market competition and earnings management activities. We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a widely used measure for market concentration, as a proxy for product market competition. We examine two forms of earnings management: accrual-based and real activity-based. Our results are mixed, but generally suggest that both income-increasing accrual manipulation and real activity-based manipulation are more prevalent among firms in low competition industries than those in high competition industries. Our findings are robust to various measures of earnings management, alternative measures of product market competitions, and different subsamples. We further explore the reasons why firms in low competition industries are more inclined to manage earnings and find that the market consequences of missing important earnings targets are more severe among firms in low competition industries than those in high competition industries.     

Product market competition and the cost of bank loans: Evidence from state antitakeover laws

The extant literature documents a positive relationship between a firm’s takeover vulnerability and its agency cost of debt. Using state antitakeover laws as an exogenous measure of variation in takeover vulnerability, I investigate whether product market competition has a disciplinary effect that can lower a firm’s cost of bank loans. After taking into account the industry composition of borrowers, I find that banks charge higher spreads to borrowers that are vulnerable to takeovers, but only in concentrated industries. In the absence of disciplinary competitive pressure, the effect of takeover vulnerability on the cost of bank loans is mitigated for larger firms, firms followed by analysts, firms with existing credit ratings, non-family firms, and for borrowers with shorter maturity loans or loans with covenants and collateral in place. Taken together, the results suggest that the effect of governance on the cost of financing is not homogenous across all industries, and that concentrated industry firms may need to use supplementary governance mechanisms to mitigate debt holder agency problems.     

Strategic IPOs and product market competition

We examine firms' incentives to go public in the presence of product market competition. As a result of their greater ability to diversify idiosyncratic risk in the capital market, public firms' owners tolerate higher profit variability than owners of private firms. Consequently, public firms adopt riskier and more aggressive output market strategies than private firms, which improves the competitive position of the former vis-à-vis the latter. This strategic benefit of being public, and thus, the proportion of public firms in an industry, is shown to be positively related to the degree of competitive interaction among firms in the output market, to demand uncertainty, and to the idiosyncratic portion of this uncertainty. Additional empirical predictions concern the effect of a firm's initial public offering on its market share and on its rivals' valuations. We test the model's predictions and find empirical support for most of them.     

Publicly traded versus privately held: implications for conditional conservatism in bank accounting

Compared with privately held banks, publicly traded banks face greater agency costs because of greater separation of ownership and control but enjoy greater benefits from access to the equity capital market. Differences in control and capital market access influence public versus private banks’ accounting. We predict and find that public banks exhibit greater degrees of conditional conservatism (asymmetric timeliness of the recognition of losses versus gains in accounting income) than private banks. We predict and find that public banks recognize more timely earnings declines, less timely earnings increases, and larger and more timely loan losses. Although public ownership gives managers greater ability and incentive to exercise income-increasing accounting, our findings show that the demand for conservatism dominates within public banks and that the demand for conservatism is greater among public banks than private banks. Our results provide insights for accounting and finance academics, bank managers, auditors, and regulators concerning the effects of ownership structure on conditional conservatism in banks’ financial reporting.

Audit results,market reactions and accounting conservatism: evidence from China

This paper examines China's securities market reactions to publication of the audits of state-owned companies. The impact of audit reports on accounting conservatism is also discussed. Recommendations are made for improving the current system.     

保险市场结构与非规范竞争

本文运用产业组织理论和简单的博弈论原理证明,保险企业采用给予折扣等非规范竞争是保险企业经营者的一种理性选择。而具体的非规范竞争行为又与市场需求弹性、保险企业管理水平、承保企业的所有制性质相关。根据对保险市场折扣行为的分析,笔者的结论是监管机构除了对相关行为进行有效监管以外,还要逐步放开费率厘定权、鼓励保险企业进行险种创新并进一步开放保险市场。     

Industry product market competition and managerial incentives

While some studies suggest that industry product market competition can substitute for managerial incentives, other studies suggest a complementary relation. The underlying assumption behind these studies is that competition can be uni-dimensionally proxied for by industry concentration. However, recent studies suggest that competition can reflect several dimensions: product substitutability, market size, and entry costs, given the level of industry concentration. Using these determinants of competition, this study contributes to the literature by showing that (a) firms provide stronger incentives when industry competition is greater, (b) competition is multi-dimensional in its relation to incentives; and (c) industry characteristics play a major role in influencing incentives.     

亚行关注中国市场竞争环境

竞争和反垄断:实现持续增长,经济发展模式转变 亚行驻中国代表处首席代表涩市彻指出:中国现在面临的挑战比以前更为复杂,这包括:与中国出口产品销售的主要市场之间的贸易问题,自然资源和环境的可持续发展问题,能源消耗日益增大的问题,等等.中国的增长模式依赖于资本、自然资源的大量投入和廉价的劳动力资源.向外国市场出口已经增大了环境、社会和政治上的压力.这种模式已经达到了推动经济高速增长的极限,无法在未来几十年依然保持这种很高的水平.     

The conservatism bias in an emerging stock market: Evidence from Taiwan

Behavioral theories predict that investors underreact to earnings announcements stemming from the conservatism bias and overreact to a string of earnings news due to representativeness heuristic. This paper thus examines trading strategies of buying past high EPS growth stocks and selling past low EPS growth stocks over 4 to 20 quarters. The results generally support conservative reactions in the medium-term horizon, but provide little support for the over-use of representativeness heuristic on the long-term horizon. Moreover, we find that investors react differently to the consistency sequences of the two extreme earnings growth portfolios.     

Foreign institutional ownership and demand for accounting conservatism: evidence from an emerging market

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This paper investigates the ‘price–concentration’ relationship in pricing syndicated loans. By measuring bank concentration at a...     

Product market advertising and new equity issues

We analyze the interaction between a firm's product market advertising and its corporate financing decisions. We consider a firm that faces asymmetric information in both the product and financial markets and that needs to raise external financing to fund its growth opportunity (new project). Any product market advertising undertaken by the firm is visible to the financial market as well. In equilibrium, the firm uses a combination of product market advertising, equity underpricing, and underfinancing (raising a smaller amount of external capital than the full information optimum) to convey its true product quality and the intrinsic value of its projects to consumers and investors. The following two predictions arise from our theoretical analysis for the relation between product market advertising and equity underpricing around new equity issues. First, firms choose a higher level of product market advertising when they are planning to issue new equity, compared with situations in which they have no immediate plans to do so. Second, product market advertising and equity underpricing are substitutes for a firm issuing new equity. We empirically test the above two predictions and find supporting evidence in the context of firms making initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings.     

Unionization,product market competition,and strategic disclosure

We examine the disclosure policies of non-unionized firms operating in unionized industries. We test the hypothesis that non-unionized firms have an incentive to disclose more information when their unionized rivals are engaged in labor renegotiations; that is, to weaken them. We find that non-unionized firms disclose more information and more good news when renegotiations are ongoing. This behavior is stronger for larger firms, firms with fewer peers in the industry, and firms more similar to their renegotiating rivals. We also find some evidence that unionized firms are harmed by this behavior and that non-unionized firms benefit from their increased disclosures.     

Optimal fiscal policies and market structures with monopolistic competition

International Tax and Public Finance - This paper develops a unified imperfectly competitive macroeconomic model, and uses it to analyze optimal fiscal policies in the presence of market...     

Product market effects of IFRS adoption

Prior literature finds that International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adopters enjoy lower financing costs subsequent to IFRS adoption. We predict and find that mandatory IFRS adopters exploit lower financing costs to increase market share vis-à-vis non-adopters. This effect is robust across several different model specifications in a sample capturing the universe of public and private firms in the EU, in a matched sample of public and private firms, and in a public firm sample comparing mandatory and voluntary IFRS adopters. We further find that IFRS is associated with an increase (decrease) in industry sales concentration (competition), consistent with large public firms increasing market share. In supplemental analyses, we find that mandatory adopters issue more equity and debt after IFRS adoption and that larger market share gains accrue to those mandatory IFRS adopters that issue more equity and debt after IFRS adoption. Overall, we provide evidence of unintended product market consequences of IFRS adoption.     

Testing conditional asset pricing models: An emerging market perspective

The CAPM as the benchmark asset pricing model generally performs poorly in both developed and emerging markets. We investigate whether allowing the model parameters to vary improves the performance of the CAPM and the Fama–French model. Conditional asset pricing models scaled by conditioning variables such as Trading Volume and Dividend Yield generally result in small pricing errors. However, a graphical analysis reveals that the predictions of conditional models are generally upward biased. We demonstrate that the bias in prediction may be the consequence of ignoring frequent large variation in asset returns caused by volatile institutional, political and macroeconomic conditions. This is characterised by excess kurtosis. An unconditional Fama–French model augmented with a cubic market factor performs the best among some competing models when local risk factors are employed. Moreover, the conditional models with global risk factors scaled by global conditioning variables perform better than the unconditional models with global risk factors.     

Stock returns and product market competition: beyond industry concentration

The main purpose of this paper is to provide direct evidence that product market structure affects stock returns. This is not only through industry concentration, as found in Hou and Robinson (J Finance 61:1927–1956, 2006), but also based on firms’ product substitutability and industry market size. Furthermore, the predictive power of product substitutability and market size for stock returns is not subsumed by industry concentration. Our results highlight the multi-dimensional structure of product market competition and its impact on asset prices.