Analyst Coverage and the Likelihood of Meeting or Beating Analyst Earnings Forecasts

This paper examines the relation between analyst coverage and whether firms meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts. We distinguish between whether a firm's reported quarterly earnings meet (i.e., equal or exceed by one cent) or beat (i.e., exceed by more than one cent) its consensus analyst earnings forecasts. We find a positive relation between analyst coverage and whether a firm meets or beats analyst forecasts. However, the more pronounced relation is that between analyst coverage and meeting analyst forecasts. Also, when we consider exogenous shocks to analyst coverage due to brokerage mergers or closures and conglomerate spinoffs, we continue to find a robust positive relation only between analyst coverage and meeting analyst forecasts. To shed light on the causal relation involved, we examine and find that greater analyst coverage is associated with a significantly larger market reaction to negative earnings surprises. We also document that firms with greater analyst coverage are more likely to guide analyst earnings forecasts downwards. Taken together, our evidence suggests that greater analyst coverage raises the pressure on managers to meet analyst earnings forecasts.     

Exchange‐Sponsored Analyst Coverage

Several major stock exchanges, including the NASDAQ and NYSE Euronext, have recently embarked on schemes to sponsor and promote analyst coverage for firms listed on their exchanges. We evaluate the efficacy of one such scheme pioneered by the Singapore Exchange (SGX). We find that sponsored analysts produce forecasts with similar bias, but lower accuracy than those issued by analysts voluntarily following a firm. In analyses that control for self‐selection into the SGX Scheme, we find that sponsored firms enjoy at best minor improvements in their information environments and stock liquidity. Any benefits accruing from the scheme are insufficient to make sponsored firms fully comparable to those of firms with voluntary analyst following on the measured attributes.     

Analyst Following and Market Liquidity*

This paper investigates the relation between analyst characteristics (number of analysts following a firm and their forecast dispersion) and market liquidity characteristics (bid‐ask spreads and depths and the adverse‐selection component of the spread). Prior research has found contradictory results on the relation between analyst following and market liquidity and has offered differing theories on how analysts affect liquidity. While prior research has posited analysts as proxies for privately informed trade or as signals of information asymmetry, I hypothesize that analysts provide public information, implying that analyst following (forecast dispersion) should have a positive (negative) association with liquidity. Cross‐sectional simultaneous estimations provide support for this hypothesis. The results are both statistically significant and economically important. Granger causality tests indicate that analyst characteristics lead market liquidity characteristics. These results clarify the role of analysts in providing information to financial markets and highlight benefits of increased analyst following.     

Information Uncertainty and Analyst Forecast Behavior*

Prior literature observes that information uncertainty exacerbates investor underreaction behavior. In this paper, I investigate whether, as professional investment intermediaries, sell‐side analysts suffer more behavioral biases in cases of greater information uncertainty. I show that greater information uncertainty predicts more positive (negative) forecast errors and subsequent forecast revisions following good (bad) news, which corroborates previous findings on the post‐analyst‐revision drift. The opposite effects of information uncertainty on forecast errors and subsequent forecast revisions following good versus bad news support the analyst underreaction hypothesis and are inconsistent with analyst forecast rationality or optimism suggested in prior literature.     

Information Conveyed in Announcements of Analyst Coverage*

This paper examines the security market response to the announcement of sell-side analysts' decisions to initiate coverage of a firm. We examine the market reaction to the initiation announcement and the accompanying investment recommendation, by disaggregating our sample based on existing analyst coverage at the announcement date. We find, on average, a significantly larger, positive stock price reaction to buy recommendations conveyed in announcements of coverage initiation for firms with a small existing analyst following compared to such announcements for firms receiving no prior analyst coverage. Tests show that the relation between the extent of preexisting analyst coverage and market response is nonlinear and concave down in shape. Specifically we find that lightly followed firms, on average, experience larger price reactions to announcements of coverage initiations than either previously uncovered firms or more heavily followed firms. We test for and find that this result holds over a range of definitions of light coverage and is not attributable to the presence of an underwriting relationship existing between the analyst's employer and the firm receiving coverage. We do find that initiations by analysts named to Institutional Investor magazine's “All-American Research Team” produce a significantly larger market reaction than do initiations by non-All-American security analysts. In addition, similar to the market response associated with other types of information events, we observe that proxies for the richness of the initiated firms' preannouncement information environment are associated with event-day average abnormal returns.     

分析师预测、投资机会与投资强度

以2008-2016 年沪深A 股上市公司为样本,实证检验了分析师盈余预测质量对企业投资 强度的影响,并考察了投资机会在盈余预测质量与投资强度之间的作用机制。结果表明,分析师 盈余预测质量（预测准确度和预测一致性）有助于提升企业投资强度,投资机会在盈余预测质量 影响投资强度的过程中存在部分中介效应;分析师预测对企业投资强度的影响在不同信息环境与 代理问题下存在显著差异,对于信息不对称程度高、代理成本高的企业,分析师盈余预测质量对 投资强度的影响更大;进一步研究表明,分析师盈余预测质量内部存在相互强化关系,预测一致 性能够加强预测准确度对投资强度的影响,分析师意见越一致,准确的分析师预测意见越易被企 业或投资者采纳。     

宏观经济政策、会计信息可比性与分析师预测

基于2008-2020年中国A股上市公司数据,分析了会计信息可比性在宏观经济政策紧缩时期对分析师预测行为的影响。研究结果表明：上市公司的会计信息越可比,跟踪该公司的分析师数量越多,分析师对该公司的盈余预测偏差越小,分歧度越低;宏观经济政策紧缩时期,上市公司的会计信息越可比,跟踪该公司的分析师数量越多,分析师对该公司的盈余预测偏差越小,分歧度越低。结论在使用替换变量的稳健性检验后依然成立。丰富了会计信息可比性的经济后果与分析师预测行为影响因素的研究,同时为改善企业信息环境提供了一定的建议。     

谈党报指导性与可读性的结合

党报指导性与可读性结合不仅是内涵深广的理论问题 ,而且是迫切需要解决的实际问题。党报的性质和任务决定了报纸在具有可读性的同时要增强指导性 ,指导性要寓可读性之中。从新闻工作的客观规律出发 ,把二者结合起来 ,既能使报道能够吸引群众 ,又有助于提高全民族思想道德水准和科学文化修养。     

Readability of 10‐K Reports and Stock Price Crash Risk

This study shows that less readable 10‐K reports are associated with higher stock price crash risk. The results are consistent with the argument that managers can successfully hide adverse information by writing complex financial reports, which leads to stock price crashes when the hidden bad news accumulates and reaches a tipping point. Cross‐sectional analyses show that the effect of financial reporting complexity on crash risk is more pronounced for firms with persistent negative earnings news or transitory positive earnings news, greater chief executive officer stock option incentives, or lower litigation risk. Finally, accrual manipulation appears to be positively related to crash risk, even since the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, if the manipulation is accompanied by complex 10‐K reports.     

Trading Behavior Prior to Public Release of Analyst Reports: Evidence from Korea

This paper investigates information leakage from analyst reports prior to their public release. Previous studies document abnormal trading by institutions or short selling before announcement of recommendation changes. Such prerelease abnormal trading is interpreted as evidence of information leakage from analyst reports. However, if sophisticated investors obtain information similar to what analysts have from other sources, abnormal prerelease trading patterns would be observed even if there were no information leakage from analyst reports. This paper, using a unique data set from Korea, aims to determine whether a direct causal link between recommendation changes and prerelease trading exists, by comparing trading behavior of client investors with non‐client investors. We find that abnormal prerelease trading by client investors, especially client institutions, is earlier in timing and greater in magnitude than that of other investor groups, supporting the information leakage hypothesis. We further find that net buying by client institutions and client large individuals is positively associated with firm, analyst, and earnings forecast change variables that influence formulation of recommendation changes and their impacts.     

Investor Reaction to the Ambiguity and Mix of Positive and Negative Argumentation in Favorable Analyst Reports

This study experimentally tests the hypothesis that investor reaction to favorable investment ratings is influenced by attributes of analysts’ supporting arguments. Specifically, I argue that argument ambiguity and the mix of positive and negative argumentation interact to influence how investors process and, in turn, react to information contained in analysts’ arguments. When positive arguments are unambiguous, I predict and find that investors react to the content of the arguments because they perceive the arguments provide sufficient support for the rating. In this case, investors react more favorably when the report includes strictly positive argumentation (i.e., one‐sided argumentation) than when it includes a mix of positive and negative argumentation (i.e., two‐sided argumentation). In contrast, when positive arguments are ambiguous, two‐sided argumentation acts as a credibility cue and leads to a higher likelihood of investment than one‐sided argumentation. These results provide important insights about the conditions under which investors react to justifications in favorable analyst reports and shed light on how analysts can credibly convey favorable information.