大股东变更企业业绩改善研究

结合我国证券市场的制度背景,采用主成分分析法,以上市公司的综合绩效排名在大股东变更前后是否发生显著变化为标准考察了大股东变更的绩效。结果发现,在我国大股东的变更并不能给公司带来业绩的长远发展,它仅在大股东变更的当年提升公司业绩。笔者将此现象归因于我国目前不完善的证券市场制度。文章的意义在于指出当前完善我国证券市场制度的重要性。     

盈余管理与控制性大股东的"隧道行为"——来自配股公司的证据

我国上市公司处于大股东控制状态,在上市公司配股融资过程中,大股东具有通过盈余管理来获得配股资格和提高股票发行价格的强烈动机.本文以实施配股的上市公司为样本,基于行业横截面数据和修正的Jones模型研究了配股融资过程中盈余管理的分布特征,并分析了大股东控制下盈余管理行为带来的隧道效应.研究结果表明:(1)上市公司在配股前3个年度和配股当年存在显著的盈余管理机会主义行为,而配股后长期业绩趋于下降;(2)配股公司的盈余管理程度与第一大股东持股比例具有倒U型关系;(3)大股东的盈余管理行为导致了上市公司价值的下降.因此,大股东通过盈余管理实现了对小股东财富的掠夺效应,误导了外部投资者的决策,造成了上市公司资本配置效率、公司价值、声誉和后续融资能力的下降.     

关联交易与控制性股东的"隧道行为"

在信息不对称情况下,控制性股东能够利用其对上市公司的控制力或影响力进行非公允关联交易,从而以其他投资者的利益为代价从上市公司攫取财富.本文以1998-2005年实施配股的上市公司为样本,分析了配股后上市公司关联交易的分布特征,并研究了关联交易对控制性股东资金占用行为、股票收益和企业价值的影响.研究结果表明:(1)控制性股东通过关联借贷大量侵占了上市公司的资金;(2)投资者在关联交易发生后相应调整了股票价格,导致了上市公司股票收益下降;(3)控制性股东通过隐蔽的关联交易从上市公司输出了财富,造成了以托宾Q衡量的公司价值下降,关联交易与公司价值之间存在负相关关系.非公允关联交易成为控制性股东掠夺中小股东财富的重要方式,导致上市公司的资源被不断输送出去.     

盈余管理文献述评

盈余管理一直是资本市场研究的焦点问题,是投资者、债权人和社会公众等利益相关者深为关切的话题,同时也是各级财政、监管部门实施会计监管的重要内容。本文从盈余管理的概念、动机、影响因素以及经济后果等方面,对相关研究进行了梳理,并探讨了未来研究方向。     

微观治理、地区环境与控股股东的掏空行为

本文讨论了区域环境影响下的企业微观层面的治理对控股股东侵占行为的制约作用。研究发现：企业微观层面的治理和区域环境都能够制约控股股东的侵占行为,但是企业微观治理的制约效应在环境较差的地区显著变弱。本文的建议是,要提高上市公司质量,保护中小投资者,必须首先完善上市公司面临的环境。     

Career Concerns and Management Earnings Guidance

This study provides evidence that managers' career concerns affect their earnings guidance decisions. We hypothesize that CEOs who are relatively more concerned about assessments of their abilities have stronger incentives to guide the market expectations of earnings downwards to increase the likelihood of meeting or beating the expectations. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that (i) short‐tenured CEOs, CEOs promoted from inside the firm, and nonfounder CEOs are more likely to provide downward earnings guidance when they have bad news, and (ii) their downward guidance tends to be more conservative. In response, analysts revise earnings forecasts less for the downward guidance provided by more career‐concerned CEOs. This indicates that analysts rationally incorporate these CEOs' stronger incentives to be conservative in their earnings guidance. Consequently, we find that CEOs with greater career concerns are not more likely to beat the market expectations, even when they provide more conservative downward guidance.     

我国股票首次公开发行时盈余管理与上市后市场表现的实证研究

本文借鉴西方关于股票上市后市场表现的研究成果,结合我国股市的实际,选取沪市101只股票作为样本,计算上市公司上市后的超常回报率并依据它分组,运用统计方法分析发现,①首次公开发行股票的公司在发行当年进行的盈余管理程度与其股票上市后的短期市场表现显著相关;②首次公开发行的公司在发行当年进行的盈余管理程度与其股票上市后中、长期市场表现无显著关系。     

Earnings Management to Avoid Losses and Earnings Decreases: Are Analysts Fooled?*

This paper explores whether analyst forecasts impound the earnings management to avoid losses and small earnings decreases documented in Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, whether analysts are able to identify which specific firms engage in such earnings management, and the implications for significant forecast error anomalies at zero earnings and zero forecast earnings. We use data from Zacks Investment Research 1999 and find that analysts anticipate earnings management to avoid small losses and small earnings decreases. Further, analysts are much more likely to forecast zero earnings than firms are to realize zero earnings, and analysts are unable to consistently identify the specific firms that engage in earnings management to avoid small losses. This latter inability contributes to significant forecast pessimism associated with zero reported earnings and significant forecast optimism associated with zero earnings forecasts.     

Ex Ante Severance Agreements and Earnings Management

This research studies whether severance agreements may reduce fraudulent earnings management, and whether severance pay mitigates executives’ career concerns. In a sample of large U.S. firms, those with higher severance pay are less likely to be subject to accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs) by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Among S&P 500 firms in the post‐SOX period with premanaged earnings below analyst forecasts, firms with higher severance pay are less likely to meet/beat the analyst forecast using abnormal accruals. Overall, these results suggest that fear of losing a lucrative severance package, and/or the insurance offered by such a package curbs earnings management.     

盈余管理与董事会特征——基于面板数据的实证研究

在对董事会特征与盈余管理之间的关系进行理论分析的基础上,利用中国上市公司的面板数据对二者之间的关系进行了实证分析,结果发现董事会规模与盈余管理程度成负相关,独立董事的比例与利润虚增呈负相关、与利润隐藏增正相关,董事长总经理二职合一对利润虚增有着显著的正影响、对利润隐藏无显著影响,而董事会会议次数增加会加重盈余管理现象。     

Auditor Sensitivity to Earnings Management*

Abstract. Generally accepted auditing standards, auditing textbooks, and firm audit manuals indicate that, other things equal, the presence of significant monetary incentives based on financial results increases the inherent risk of material misstatement, and higher inherent risk should ordinarily cause the auditor to exercise a heightened degree of professional skepticism in conducting the audit. This article addresses the following basic research question: Are auditors sensitive to management's incentives to manage earnings? Research that examines whether auditors distinguish between explanations provided by managers with different incentives is important because audit standards indicate that inquiry of management can assist the auditor in evaluating significant unexpected differences. Two experiments were conducted. The first experiment explored whether management-buyout-induced incentives to make income-decreasing accruals affect auditors' judgments of the probability that a material misstatement exists. As predicted, auditors were sensitive to these incentives. The second experiment explored whether bonus-induced incentives affect auditors' judgments of the probability that a material misstatement exists. The auditors agreed that bonus plans such as the one in the experiment create incentives for management to make income-increasing or income-decreasing accruals depending on the terms of the plan. However, the auditors' judgments were unaffected by whether the unexpected difference and management's incentives were congruent. The auditors opted for potential audit effectiveness rather than potential audit efficiency by assuming that—on balance—management had incentives congruent with the unexpected overstatement. Résumé. Selon les normes de vérification généralement reconnues, les manuels de vérification et les guides de vérification des cabinets comptables, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, la présence d'encouragements monétaires substantiels basés sur les résultats financiers accroît le risque inhérent d'inexactitudes importantes, et un risque inhérent supérieur doit normalement amener le vérificateur à exercer davantage de vigilance dans la réalisation de sa mission de vérification. L'auteur s'intéresse à la question fondamentale suivante: les vérificateurs sont-ils sensibles aux motivations de la direction à user d'astuces comptables aux fins de l'établissement des bénéfices? Les recherches visant à déterminer si les vérificateurs établissent une distinction entre les explications fournies par les gestionnaires dont les motivations sont différentes revêtent beaucoup d'importance, compte tenu du fait que les normes de vérification indiquent que les demandes de renseignements de la direction peuvent aider le vérificateur à évaluer les écarts inattendus appréciables. Deux expériences ont été menées. La première avait pour but de déterminer si les motivations à agir sur les comptes de régularisation de manière à réduire les bénéfices, induites par un rachat de l'entreprise par les cadres, ont une incidence sur les jugements des vérificateurs relatifs à la probabilité d'inexactitudes importantes dans les déclarations. Conformément aux prévisions, les vérificateurs se montrent sensibles à ces motivations. La seconde expérience visait à déterminer si les motivations induites par les primes ont une incidence sur les jugements des vérificateurs en ce qui a trait à la probabilité de l'existence d'inexactitudes importantes. Les vérificateurs conviennent que les systèmes de primes, comme celui de la seconde expérience, motivent la direction à agir sur les comptes de régularisation de façon à augmenter ou réduire les bénéfices, selon les conditions du système. Toutefois, les jugements des vérificateurs ne sont pas influencés par le fait que l'écart inattendu dans les bénéfices et la motivation de la direction sont reliés. Les vérificateurs optent pour l'efficacité potentielle de la vérification plutôt que pour son efficience potentielle, en supposant que, dans l'ensemble, la direction présente des motivations qui vont dans le sens des surestimations inattendues en matière de bénéfices.     

Earnings Management under Price Regulation*

Price controls¹ have a major impact on firms' earnings and cash flows. Because price control regulation is costly to firms, it is a type of regulatory intervention that can impact a firm's accounting decisions (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Thus, regulatory changes that give firms relief from price controls provide incentives for earnings management. This paper examines discretionary accruals made by New Zealand manufacturing firms in response to two sets of regulations issued in 1971 and 1972. These regulations allowed manufacturing firms to apply for price increases to gain relief from financial hardship caused by the 1970 Price Freeze Regulation. Using a modified accruals mode! that adjusts for price-level movements, the paper tests discretionary accruals of two samples of manufacturing firms and one control sample of nonmanufacturing firms. The results provide evidence of income decreasing discretionary accruals by manufacturing firms for the years during which they could apply for price increases. The control firms do not exhibit significant discretionary accruals in 1971 or 1972. Also, this paper provides evidence that failing to adjust for price-level movements in high inflationary periods could result in inferences of income decreasing discretionary accruals where none may exist.     

盈余管理与公司治理理论透视

本文从委托代理理论和信息不对称理论出发,对公司内部治理结构与外部治理环境对盈余管理的影响进行了理论分析,认为盈余管理的治理必须借助于有效的公司治理机制,才能提高会计信息质量。     

The Relative and Incremental Explanatory Power of Earnings and Alternative (to Earnings) Performance Measures for Returns*

We analyze the ability of earnings and non‐earnings performance metrics to explain the variability in annual stock returns for industries where we identify, ex ante, an allegedly preferred (for valuation purposes) summary performance metric. We identify three industries where earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) and cash from operations (CFO) are preferred, and three industries where specific non‐GAAP performance metrics are preferred. As a benchmark, we also examine the ability of EBITDA and CFO to explain returns for seven industries for which earnings is the preferred metric. Results for the benchmark earnings industries show that earnings dominates EBITDA and CFO in explaining returns. All other results are inconsistent with the view that perceptions of preferred metrics are reflected in actual aggregate investment behaviors.     

盈余管理:动因分析与减少对策

盈余管理是公司管理层为实现自身效用或公司市场价值最大化等目的,进行会计政策的选择,从而调节公司盈余的手段。在我国特定的资本市场环境下,盈余管理的负面作用远远涵盖其正面作用,上市公司过多的盈余管理行为导致会计信息严重失真,有碍于资本市场资源配置功能。本文从我国上市公司盈余管理动因分析入手,提出了减少上市公司盈余管理行为的对策。