Discussion of “The Psychology of Billing”

Hansen, Jackson, Schaefer, and Stewart (2018) examine the effects of three contextual features on tax professionals’ billing decisions in a case involving issue‐specific tax research. In this discussion, we present a tax fee model. In contrast to determining a bill, our model views tax fees in a more comprehensive perspective. We subsequently use this model to discuss the design choices and limitations of their study and to provide suggestions for future research.     

Discussion of “The Effects of Vertical Pay Dispersion: Experimental Evidence in a Budget Setting”

Guo, Libby, and Liu (2017) (hereafter GLL), examine how pairs of experimental subjects interact in a game framed as a funding request from a privately informed subordinate to a superior. When the superior's pay is higher than the subordinate's, subordinates display more self‐serving dishonesty and superiors are more tolerant of it than when their pay is the same. In this discussion, I compare GLL's design with an ultimatum game, consider additional tensions that arise in pay‐level comparisons, address the applicability of their results, and suggest some extensions. I conclude by calling for new theory that regularizes GLL's surprising findings.     

Discussion of “Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness”

Kim and Zhang (2015) study the relation between corporate political connections and tax aggressiveness. In this discussion, I identify and evaluate three main limitations of their paper: the measurement of political connections, the empirical design, and the possible reasons behind the documented results. I build on these small shortcomings to provide suggestions for further contributions in this area of research.     

Discussion of “Flight to Quality in International Markets: Investors’ Demand for Financial Reporting Quality during Political Uncertainty Events”

In this paper, I provide a summary and discussion of Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang (2018). In my discussion, I summarize their main findings and focus on key conceptual aspects of their research design. I also comment more broadly on financial reporting quality. Throughout my discussion, I offer a number of specific opportunities to extend this line of research.     

Discussion of “Relating Product Prices to Long‐Run Marginal Cost: Evidence from Solar Photovoltaic Modules”

My discussion of Reichelstein and Sahoo (2018) is organized into three parts. First, what is the context for this work? That is, what are the energy and climate stakes? Second, what does the paper do? I will re‐work the equation defining the components of long‐run marginal cost to better reflect what is actually estimated and to better highlight some important choices about how the different components are modeled. Third, and most importantly, how do the results inform business decisions and policy choices regarding energy and climate? What more do we need?     

A Discussion of “Audit Review: Managers' Interpersonal Expectations and Conduct of the Review”

Gibbins and Trotman's study both explores reviewer attributes that auditors judge to influence review quality and replicates earlier, largely experimental findings about preparer and reviewer decision behavior. Such exploration and intra‐method replication create opportunities to refine theory and better design future experimental and nonexperimental studies. Naturally, as with any study, the opportunities that this study creates are not without bounds. To help in thinking about these bounded opportunities, this discussion raises four topics that I have entitled “retro‐spective biases”, “stylization perceptions”, “manager styles”, and “real‐time review complexities”. After discussing these topics in turn, I end with a short summary.     

Discussion of “The Effect of Information on Uncertainty and the Cost of Capital”

Johnstone (2016) provides a theoretical analysis of how information might increase uncertainty and a firm's cost of equity capital (COEC). The author's analysis serves to highlight outcomes that he suggests receive limited attention in prior studies. He focuses on how more information might result in greater, rather than less, uncertainty and whether a decrease in uncertainty leads to a lower COEC. I discuss how his study provides an incremental contribution to the theoretical literature and ways in which future work in this area might provide a richer framework for empirical studies.     

Discussion of “How Does Intrinsic Motivation Improve Auditor Judgment in Complex Audit Tasks?”

Kadous and Zhou (2018) investigate experimentally how intrinsic motivation improves auditor judgment in complex audit tasks. In my discussion, I elaborate on my comments from the 2016 CAR Conference. Specifically, I comment in the first part of my discussion on the motivation and contribution of the paper, the underlying theory, the experiment and the results. The second part of my discussion is focused on the broader picture of the paper for which I offer some thoughts based on cross‐fertilization of insights from the archival auditing research and I conclude with providing some suggestions for further research.     

A Field Study of Control System “Redesign”: The Impact of Institutional Processes on Strategic Choice*

Abstract. This paper studies the role of an organization's accounting control system (ACS) as part of an interrelated control “package,” in which other control systems function either as substitutes or complements. Drawing on resource dependence and institutional theories, it argues that this control mix is not only contingent on the organization's technical environment but also on its institutional environment. In addition, the paper draws on empirical evidence to demonstrate how the design of the “package” is actively shaped by the strategic choices of its dominant coalition. The empirics are based on a longitudinal field study of one large, public teaching hospital in Australia that underwent material changes in its governance structure, culture, and accounting control system. Résumé. Les auteurs étudient le rôle du système de contôle comptable d'une organisation, à titre d'élément d'une « famille » de systèmes de contrôle reliés entre eux à l'intérieur de Iaquelle les autres systèmes de contrôle jouent le rôle de substituts ou de compléments. S'inspirant de la théorie de la dépendance des ressources et de la théorie institutionnelle, ils affirment que cette combinaison de systèmes n'est pas seulement tributaire de l'environnement technique de l'organisation, mais de son environnement institutionnel. Ils se fondent, en outre, sur des constatations empiriques pour démontrer comment la structure de la « famille » de systèmes est activement façonnée par les choix stratégiques du groupe dominant. Les données empiriques proviennent d'une étude longitudinale sur le terrain, menée auprès d'un important hôpital public universitaire australien dont la structure de régie, la culture et le système de contrôle comptable ont connu des transformations majeures.     

Discussion of “Honor Among Thieves: Open Internal Reporting and Managerial Collusion”

Evans, Moser, Newman, and Stikeleather (2016) use experiments of a one‐shot game to analyze the impact of open versus closed internal reporting on collusive managerial behavior. They interpret their results as inconsistent with economic theory. To better contrast their findings with economic theory and to expand their view of same, we sketch economic models capable of explaining many aspects of their results. We also critique the research design and offer an alternative payoff structure. We then relate their experiments to the seminal research of Berg, Dickhout, and McCabe (1995) on trust and reciprocity. Finally, we provide suggestions for further research.     

Discussion of “The Consequences of Audit‐Related Earnings Revisions”

We organize our discussion of Haislip, Myers, Scholz, and Seidel (2017) (hereafter HMSS) around three areas: managing auditor business risk, a lack of auditor competence as an alternative story to auditors acting independently for their results, and drawing inferences from archival vis‐à‐vis experimental studies. We conclude our discussion by arguing that the investigation by HMSS sets the stage for future research concerning why earnings revisions occur and why auditors and CFOs appear to bear adverse consequences when they do occur.     

Discussion of “Optimal Conservatism with Earnings Manipulation”

In this discussion, I briefly summarize the key features of Bertomeu, Darrough, and Xue's (hereafter BDX) model. I then examine the four key assumptions that BDX employ to arrive at their results: (i) firms contract only on earnings; (ii) conservative earnings are better for contracting; (iii) conservatism motivates upward earnings manipulation; and (iv) conservatism is endogenous. I then briefly conclude.     

Social Information “Nudges”: An Experiment with Multiple Group References

Social information “nudges” concerning how others perform typically boost individual performances in experiments with one group reference point. However, in many natural settings, sometimes due to policy, there are several such group reference points. We address the complications that such multiple group social information might introduce through an experiment. The boost to average performance is significant and comparable to the one group case. Between‐group inequality does not change. Individual inequality falls, however, because the boost is largest among the pre‐“nudge” very poor performers. Finally, the boost to average performance is highest when individuals freely choose their group affiliations.     

Testing the “Inverted‐U” Phenomenon in Moral Development on Recently Promoted Senior Managers and Partners*

This paper examines the change in the average level of moral development over a 7.5‐year period of promotion, attrition, and survival in five Big 6 firms. The study improves upon previous cross‐sectional studies that found decreases in the average level of moral development at the senior manager and partner levels, which has been referred to as the “inverted‐U” phenomenon. Problems with these studies that limit the generalizability of their findings include their cross‐sectional nature and samples that usually come from one or two firms. Over a 7.5‐year period, we found that the participating Big 6 firms retained auditors with higher average levels of moral development (measured using the defining issues test), while those with lower average levels left the firms. The average level of moral development for new partners was at least as high as the group from which they came. This research suggests that the concern about Big 6 firms retaining a higher proportion of auditors with lower moral development may be an artifact of research design.     

The Role of Informal Controls and a Bargaining Opponent's Emotions on Transfer Pricing Judgments

While accounting research has demonstrated the role of a decision maker's own emotions during judgments, psychology research proposes that others’ emotions provide an informational signal to assess an opponent's limits, cooperativeness, and toughness during bargaining. We examine how a bargaining opponent's emotions provide information signals that can be used by a selling division manager during transfer pricing decisions and whether informal control system choices by corporate management to foster cooperation can create a context that influences how managers react to these signals. In an experiment, when informal controls to encourage cooperation were absent (less collaborative environment), managers’ selling price estimates were more conciliatory when the opponent was described as displaying negative emotions than when described as displaying positive emotions. However, when informal controls to cooperate were present (more collaborative environment), managers’ selling price estimates were more conciliatory when the opponent displayed positive rather than negative emotions. Path analyses suggest that managers’ perception of their opponents’ signals is the mechanism by which opponents’ emotions influence transfer‐price decisions. This study highlights the role of others’ emotions as information signals during accounting bargaining and provides insight into the context dependency of opponents’ emotions under various control system structures.     

Discussion of “Target's Tax Shelter Participation and Takeover Premiums”

Chow, Klassen, and Liu ( 2016 ), hereafter CKL, examine whether M&A bidding firms are willing to pay more for target firms that disclose they have not participated in a “tax shelter” sometime in the past. My discussion provides an overview of the past and current tax literature in accounting and places CKL within this expanding literature. I then provide a critique of this interesting and well‐executed study that exploits an unusual disclosure to examine tax shelter participation effects.     

Discussion of “Accounting Recognition,Moral Hazard,and Communication”

This paper addresses two issues within an agency setting. First, it identifies conditions under which late recognition of an event is preferred to early recognition in the absence of communication of other private information. Second, it demonstrates that the agent's ability to voluntarily disclose his or her private information interacts with the preference for early versus late recognition. Of special interest is the case where early recognition is preferred to late when there is no other source of information, but late recognition is preferred in the presence of a secondary source. I have three types of comments on the paper. The first summarizes the important aspects of the model. The second involves the interpretation of the control problem as accounting recognition. The third contains suggestions regarding how one might bring a valuation perspective into the control setting.     

The “North-South” controversy and Britain's regional problems

The extent of regional economic disparities in Britain has recently become the focus of considerable controversy. Attempts have been made to portray the existing situation in terms of a “North-South divide” or as “two nations”. Opponents of this point of view have argued that no such stark division of the country exists, and that prosperous areas can be found in parts of the North just as depressed areas can be found in parts of the South.

This paper considers the pattern of regional disparities which now prevails in Britain. Section I is a detailed presentation of the existing situation. Section II considers the question of how sharp a division there now is between different parts of Britain, followed, in Section III, by a discussion of the process of change which has brought about the regional disparities which we now observe. Implications for government policy are then considered.     

Financial Incentives and Herding: Evidence from Two Online Experiments

Social conformity and information-based herding have been studied extensively in the social sciences, but there is little experimental evidence on how financial incentives impact the likelihood that an individual will follow the crowd. We present the results of a pair of two-stage online experiments where we use answers to and confidence about trivia questions—with and without information about the choices of others—to test the impact of financial incentives on an individual's likelihood of engaging in herd behavior (i.e., switching their answer to the most popular answer when it is revealed). We find strong evidence that individuals are more likely to herd when there are financial incentives to be correct, suggesting that individuals are less likely to rely on their own beliefs and judgments when the stakes are higher. We also exploit the unique design of our experiments to show that in the absence of information about others' choices, men report higher levels of confidence than women.     

A Multiperiod Model and Experimental Evidence of Independence and “Lowballing”*

Abstract. Auditors, regulators, and academics are interested in the pricing practice of “lowballing” and its relationship to auditor independence. Several analytical models have examined these issues. However, these theories have gone untested primarily due to a lack of field data concerning important environmental variables. In this study, a multiperiod model of lowballing and independence is developed and tested in laboratory markets via the experimental economics methodology. The study contributes to the literature in two respects. First, it represents one of the first studies providing empirical evidence and theory testing of the relationship between lowballing and independence. Second, the model presents a new rationale for low-ball pricing and its relationship to auditor independence. Lowballing and impairment of independence, occurring without exogenous transaction costs, are caused by positing cross-sectional variation in audit cost and quality and an informational advantage that accrues to an incumbent auditor-client pair regarding future variation in these audit dimensions. The model is operationalized in a multiperiod laboratory market consisting of multiple sellers and buyers. Sixteen markets are conducted to test price and reporting predictions of the model. The markets strongly exhibit lowballing behavior, but the exact price predictions are generally not supported. The markets also support reporting predictions, with sellers deviating from truthful reporting (impairing their independence) only when additional future profits are greater than the additional cost of misreporting. Data availability. The laboratory market data used in this paper are available from the authors upon request.