Equilibrium Earnings Management,Incentive Contracts,and Accounting Standards*

In this paper, we model earnings management as a consequence of the interaction among self‐interested economic agents ‐ namely, the managers, the shareholders, and the regulators. In our model, a manager controls a stochastic production technology and makes periodic accounting reports about his or her performance; an owner chooses a compensation contract to induce desirable managerial inputs and reporting choices by the manager; and a regulatory body selects and enforces accounting standards to achieve certain social objectives. We show that various economic trade‐offs give rise to endogenous earnings management. Specifically, the owner may reduce agency costs by designing a compensation contract that tolerates some earnings management because such a contract allocates the compensation risk more efficiently. The earnings‐management activity produces accounting reports that deviate from those prescribed by accounting standards. Given such reports, the valuation of the firm may be nonlinear and s‐shaped, thereby recognizing the manager's reporting incentives. We also explore policy implications, noting that (1) the regulator may find enforcing a zero‐tolerance policy ‐ no earnings management allowed ‐ economically undesirable; and (2) when selecting the optimal accounting standard, valuation concerns may conflict with stewardship concerns. We conclude that earnings management is better understood in a strategic context that involves various economic trade‐offs.     

浅谈我国市场参与者资本成本意识

在当今世界资本市场不断完善的今天,我国的市场参与者对资本成本的意识却依然比较淡薄,这也引起了国家的关注。本文简要论述了资本成本与最优资本结构的相关含义,描述了我国的资本成本意识现状,重点说明了其主要行为表现及影响,最后针对相关建议提出了自己的建议。     

Private Information Production,Public Disclosure,and the Cost of Capital: Theory and Implications*

Both private information production by market traders and public disclosure by firms contribute to dissemination of financial information in the capital market. However, the motives and economic consequences of the two are quite different. In general, private information production is intended by investors to increase their trading profit, which has the effect of widening the information gap between informed and uninformed investors and increasing the firm's cost of capital. On the other hand, public disclosure can be used to narrow this information gap and to lower the cost of capital. This paper provides a theoretical model to examine the economic incentives behind these two forms of information dissemination and their consequences on the cost of capital. By simultaneously considering the firm's and the information traders' decisions, the paper derives an equilibrium in which the amount of private information production, the level of public disclosure, and the cost of capital are all linked to specific characteristics of the firm, of information traders, and of the market. In contrast to conventional beliefs, the paper predicts that, across firms, the cost of capital can be either positively or negatively related to the firm's disclosure level, depending on the specific factors that cause the variation within a particular sample. Similarly, the extent to which investors follow a firm and the firm's disclosure level can be either positively or negatively related to each other. Implications for empirical research are discussed.     

股权资本成本与高管薪酬激励--一个高管薪酬改革思路的理论性阐释

以会计绩效为基准的高管薪酬制度是当今的主流,广泛应用于国际企业界。然而越来越多的研究证据表明,高管薪酬与会计业绩之间的关系不足以成为建立高管薪酬制度的理论基础。唯有遵循股东至上原则的高管薪酬方案才能既满足管理层对于薪酬的预期,又有助于在可持续发展的前提下,实现股东财富最大化目标。股权资本成本是这种高管薪酬制度设计的基本因素与核心参数。     

隐性交易成本与资产定价的实证研究

本文利用上证180指数成份股票的高频数据计算隐性交易成本．探讨其与资产定价的关系。研究结果发现：1、隐性交易成本与换手率、规模和收益率都存在着明显的线性负相关关系。在股票收益率下降时期，隐性交易成本很可能通过流动性深度成本间接影响股票收益率。2、较之隐性交易成本，规模因素与换手率因素对收益率的影响有着更好的测度性，因为这两个因素与流动性深度成本也有着显著相关性。3、隐性交易成本与规模因素整体上是线性负相关关系．分段上的关系则很可能是凹函数与凸函数的组合。     

企业产权、社会责任与权益资本成本

企业社会责任是否是企业为社会利益而牺牲自身利润的行为一直是学术界争论的焦点,文章尝试从资本市场参与者的角度出发,通过考察我国上市公司的社会责任履行情况对权益资本成本的影响来回答这个问题。研究发现：（1）良好的社会责任表现确实能显著降低企业的权益资本成本,其中改善企业对投资者的责任起到的作用最为突出;（2）与非国有企业相比,目前国有企业的社会责任履行情况更好且权益资本成本更低,但是积极的社会责任行为在非国有样本中更能发挥降低权益资本成本的作用。     

中国资本市场一体化测度与利益评估

中国经济发展转型道路上,资本市场一体化的重要性日益凸显.但我国资本市场分割问题仍较为严重,对国民经济持续健康发展构成严重制约.文章通过比较资本生产率和资本边际产出的地区差异与产业差异,对我国资本市场一体化程度及其变化趋势进行测度,并基于政策模拟方法评估资本市场一体化的潜在利益,最后给出若干结论与建议.     

Fixed Cost Magnitude,Fixed Cost Reporting Format,and Competitive Pricing Decisions: Some Experimental Evidence*

Although neoclassical economic theory predicts that fixed cost magnitude and fixed cost reporting format will not influence short‐term pricing decisions, these factors systematically affected pricing decisions in a duopoly experiment. Increasing fixed cost magnitude (a pure sunk cost in this study) across experimental conditions caused participants to first lower, then raise, competitive prices. Consistent with the psychological phenomenon of loss aversion, this change in pricing behavior reduced the frequency of reported losses. This study further reveals that the accounting format for reporting fixed costs influenced pricing behavior. Specifically, participants receiving capacity costing feedback reports established increasingly lower selling prices relative to the prices established by participants receiving contribution margin feedback reports. Given that a very simple cosmetic reporting manipulation produced increasingly significant competitive pricing differences in a market setting, this study provides evidence that functional fixation is not necessarily eliminated by market forces.     

论资本成本理论的拓展

资本成本是特定主体为取得和使用资本而发生或应当发生的经济利益的总流出。在工业经济时代,资本主要是指财务资本,而在当今知识经济时代,最重要的资本是人力资本,财务资本是实现资本创造价值的条件。在会计上已提出建立人力资本会计,而在财务上还没有人提出将人力资本成本挪入到资本成本中去,从而造成资本成本理论的不完善。文章针对此问题,提出拓展资本成本内涵,完善财务理论。     

治理环境、终极控制人两权分离与股权融资成本

本文以2004—2006年非金融行业上市公司为样本,检验终极控制人现金流权、两权分离、治理环境和终极人性质对股权融资成本的影响,终极控制人的两权分离程度与股权融资成本之间的关系是否受治理环境的影响,以及上述治理环境与股权融资成本的直接和间接关系是否与终极控制人性质有关。研究发现,（1）两权分离与股权融资成本显著正相关,而现金流权与股权融资成本显著负相关。（2）治理环境本身与股权融资成本负相关,且治理环境的显著改善能弱化两权分离对股权融资成本的负面影响。（3）相对于非国有上市公司,国有公司的股权融资成本较低,且上市公司的国有性质在一定程度上能强化治理环境对股权融资成本的正面作用。     

人力资本、社会资本与心理资本对知识员工创新绩效的影响研究

为强化知识员工的创新绩效建立企业的核心竞争优势,聚焦知识员工人力资本、社会资本与心理资本的内涵及维度划分,在既定资本存量条件下,探索其对创新绩效的不同驱动作用,以及三类资本的动态协同作用对创新绩效影响的作用机理。在此基础上提出知识员工创新绩效的培养策略,从而为企业创造出可持续的、可预测的绩效增长。     

风险投资的控制权分配与双边道德风险激励

在风险投资过程中,由于信息的不对称以及不确定因素的存在,努力的不对称性和对剩余索取权的安排使得风险投资家与创业企业家都有动机谋求私人收益,从而导致双边道德风险的形成。文章回顾了关于风险投资中双边道德风险的研究,为了克服单纯契约工具都不能完全解决风险投资中双边道德风险的问题,指出将可转换证券和控制权相机安排结合起来,可以为双方提供激励,解决风险投资中的双边道德风险问题。     

人力资本产权视野下的公司激励机制研究

企业必须由多个产权主体分享企业所有权,其中剩余控制权与剩余索取权的对应是企业所有权安排的基本原则。文章在此基础上从产权纬度对企业激励机制进行了分析,提出激励机制的设计实际上是产权的有效安排问题。最后,对知识型员工、企业家、国企高管经营人员等不同属性的人力资本从物质激励、精神激励、文化激励等各个层面分别进行了激励机制的设计。     

浅谈人力资本出资的意义、风险和控制

随着经济的高速发展,人力资本出资已经是大势所趋.文章通过讨论人力资本出资在当前企业经营中所起到的积极作用揭示了人力资本出资的必然性,讨论了由于人力资本的特性所导致的人力资本出资所特有的一些风险以及对于这些风险的控制及防范措施.     

Market liquidity,private information,and the cost of capital: Market microstructure studies on family firms in Japan

We investigate cost of capital, information asymmetry, and market liquidity of listed family firms vs. non-family firms in Japan. First, we find that the cost of debt is lower and the cost of equity is higher for family firms than non-family firms, but the differences are not significant. The WACC of family firms becomes higher than that for non-family firms and the difference is significant probably because family firms in Japan use less leverage. Next, we find that the stocks of family firms are traded with higher information asymmetry than non-family firms. As for information asymmetry and illiquidity measures, we utilize the variables Adjusted PIN and Probability of Symmetric Order Flow Shocks (PSOS). Concomitantly we also estimate alternate conventional measures of market liquidity as a robustness check. Overall, the evidence on liquidity is somewhat mixed, while we find family firms show higher information asymmetry, which may affect cost of equity. As a final policy implication, we recommend family firms in Japan conduct more voluntary and timely disclosure, in particular, for the benefit of general stock investors, and may want to increase leverage to reduce the WACC.     

公司治理因素对内部资本市场效率影响的分析

在阐述了内部资本市场的产生及内部资本市场有效率与无效率方面的基础上,从公司治理的角度分析了影响内部资本市场配置效率的原因,本文认为,CEO与所有者之间的代理问题,总部CEO与部门经理之间的代理问题以及股东行为问题是影响内部资本市场配置效率的公司治理方面原因。     

参与成本、异质性与股市投资——基于城镇家庭数据的实证分析

本文利用2002年的CHIP数据分析了我国城镇家庭的股市投资行为。考虑到参与成本和异质性,本文使用Heckit模型来考察家庭股票数量与份额的决定。结果表明,家庭股市参与的概率与家庭的总财富水平、户主的收入以及教育水平之间存在显著的正相关关系,与户主的年龄呈倒U型关系。收入、财富水平和年龄对于家庭购买股票的数额也有类似影响;但教育水平的影响有所减弱。而对于股票在家庭总资产或金融资产中的份额,年龄和教育的影响在大部分模型中不显著;财富水平的系数显著为负。     

Time-varying Cost of Equity Capital in Southeast Asian Countries

This paper investigates variation in the cost of equity capital for the Southeast Asian countries using firm-level data over the period of 1990–2004. It is found that decreases in the firm-level cost of equity capital have been associated with stock market liberalization and securities market development. The results of the present study suggest that earlier empirical evidence regarding the decrease in the cost of equity capital using country-level data cannot be generalized to different types of firms. There has been significant time variation in the cost of equity capital within countries and across firms.     

Market Timing and Capital Structure: Evidence for Dutch Firms

Summary We examine market timing and its effects on capital structures for a sample of Dutch listed firms and a sub-sample of Dutch initial public offering (IPO) firms. The results yield evidence of market timing. Stock price run-ups increase the probabilities of equity and dual issues. Further, the effects of stock price run-ups on the choices between issuance of debt, equity or both are consistent with the predictions of the market timing hypothesis. However, in contrast to the existing evidence for US firms, we do not find persistent effects of market timing on capital structures of Dutch firms. This paper has benefited from useful comments from two anonymous referees, Allard Bruinshoofd, Frank de Jong, Jeroen Ligterink, seminar participants at De Nederlandsche Bank, and discussions at the 6th ONS Analysis of Enterprise Microdata Conference (Cardiff 2005).     

人力资本投资风险的产权经济学分析

人力资本投资风险会导致投资者无法获得预期收益和收回投资成本,而人力资本的产权特征是造成这一风险发生的内在根本原因。人力资本投资主体的多元性使得投资主体与单一载体之间存在收益分配的矛盾风险,人力资本载体的自主能动性会造成使用风险,人力资本流动性低更会造成人力资本资产的转移风险和买方讹诈风险。未来防范和化解人力资本投资风险必须在产权制度、激励机制、投资方式、退出机制和保障体系等方面作出适当变革。