The ambitious entrepreneur: High growth strategies of women-owned enterprises

During the last two decades, researchers have sought to develop categories of entrepreneurs and their businesses along a variety of dimensions to better comprehend and analyze the entrepreneurial growth process. Some of this research has focused on differences related to industrial sectors, firm size, the geographical region in which a business is located, the use of high-technology or low-technology, and the life-cycle stage of the firm (i.e., start-up vs. more mature, formalized companies). Researchers have also considered ways in which entrepreneurs can be differentiated from small business managers. One of these classifications is based on the entrepreneur's desire to grow the business rapidly. This is the focus of our study.To date, the media have paid considerable attention to rapidly growing new ventures. However, still lacking are large-scale research studies guided by theory through which we can expand our knowledge of the underlying factors supporting ambitious expansion plans. Some research has identified factors that enhance or reduce the willingness of the entrepreneur to grow the business. Factors include the strategic origin of the business (i.e., the methods and paths through which the firm was founded); previous experience of the founder/owner; and the ability of the entrepreneur to set realistic, measurable goals and to manage conflict effectively.Our study attempted to identify the strategic paths chosen by entrepreneurs and the relation of those paths to the growth orientation of the firm. The entrepreneurs sampled in this study are women entrepreneurs across a wide range of industrial sectors. Recent reviews of entrepreneurship research have suggested the need for more studies comparing high-growth firms with slower-growth firms to better delineate their differences in strategic choices and behaviors.Our study sought to answer the following questions: What characterizes a “high growth-oriented entrepreneur?” Is this distinction associated with specific strategic intentions, prior experience, equity held in previous firms, the type of company structure in place, or success factors the entrepreneur perceives are important to the business? Do “high growth” entrepreneurs show greater entrepreneurial “intensity” (i.e., commitment to the firm's success)? Are they willing to “pay the price” for their own and their firm's success? (i.e., the “opportunity costs” associated with business success and growth). Other relationships under investigation included different patterns of financing the business' start-up and early growth. Do “high-growth” entrepreneurs use unique sources of funding compared with “lower-growth” entrepreneurs?Eight hundred thirty-two entrepreneurs responded to a survey in which they were asked to describe their growth intentions along nineteen strategic dimensions, as well as respond to the foregoing questions. Some of the strategic activity measures included adding a new product or service, expanding operations, selling to a new market, and applying for a loan to expand operations. Actual growth rates based on sales revenues were calculated, and average annualized growth rates of the industrial sectors represented in the sample were obtained. This study showed that high-growth-oriented entrepreneurs were clearly different from low-growth-oriented entrepreneurs along several dimensions. The former were much more likely to select strategies for their firms that permitted greater focus on market expansion and new technologies, to exhibit greater intensity towards business ownership (“my business is the most important activity in my life”), and to be willing to incur greater opportunity costs for the success of their firms (“I would rather own my own business than earn a higher salary while employed by someone else”).The high-growth–oriented entrepreneurs tended to have a more structured approach to organizing their businesses, which suggests a more disciplined perception of managing the firm. In summary, results showed the group of high-growth–oriented entrepreneurs, labeled “ambitious,” as having the following distinctions: strategic intentions that emphasize market growth and technological change, stronger commitment to the success of the business, greater willingness to sacrifice on behalf of the business, earlier planning for the growth of the business, utilization of a team-based form of organization design, concern for reputation and quality, adequate capitalization, strong leadership, and utilization of a wider range of financing sources for the expansion of the venture. The purpose in uncovering these differences is to enable entrepreneurs and researchers to identify more clearly the attributes of rapid-growth ventures and their founders and to move closer to a field-based model of the entrepreneurial growth process which will help delineate the alternative paths to venture growth and organizational change.     

Explaining the formation of international new ventures: The limits of theories from international business research

International new ventures (INVs) represent a growing and important type of start-up. An INV is defined as a business organization that, from inception, seeks to derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs in multiple countries (Oviatt and McDougall 1994). Their increasing prevalence and important role in international competition indicates a need for greater understanding of these new ventures (Oviatt and McDougall 1994).Logitech, as described in a case study by Alahuhta (1990), is a vivid example of an INV. Its founders were from two different countries and had a global vision for the company from its inception. The venture, which produces peripheral devices for personal computers, established headquarters in both Switzerland and the U.S. Manufacturing and R&D were split between the U.S. and Switzerland, and then quickly spread to Taiwan and Ireland. The venture's first commercial contract was with a Japanese company.Using 24 case studies of INVs, we found that their formation process is not explained by existing theories from the field of international business. Specifically, neither monopolistic advantage theory, product cycle theory, stage theory of internationalization, oligopolistic reaction theory, nor internalization theory can explain the formation process of INVs. These theories fail because they assume that firms become international long after they have been formed, and they therefore highlight large, mature firms. They also focus too much on the firm level and largely ignore the individual and small group level of analysis (i.e., the entrepreneur and his or her network of business alliances).We propose that an explanation for the formation process of INVs must answer three questions: (1) who are the founders of INVs? (2) why do these entrepreneurs choose to compete internationally rather than just in their home countries? and (3) what form do their international business activities take?Who are the founders of INVs? We argue that founders of INVs are individuals who see opportunities from establishing ventures that operate across national borders. They are “alert” to the possibilities of combining resources from different national markets because of the competencies (networks, knowledge, and background) that they have developed from their earlier activities. Following the logic of the resource-based view of the firm, we argue that the possession of these competencies is not matched by other entrepreneurs. Only the entrepreneur possessing these competencies is able to combine a particular set of resources across national borders and form a given INV.Why do these entrepreneurs choose to compete internationally rather than just in their home countries? The founders of INVs recognize they must create international business competencies from the time of venture formation. Otherwise, the venture may become path-dependent on the development of domestic competencies and the entrepreneur will find it difficult to change strategic direction when international expansion eventually becomes necessary. As the founder of one INV explained, “The advantage of starting internationally is that you establish an international spirit from the very beginning” (Mamis 1989:38).What form do their international business activities take? Founders of INVs prefer to use hybrid structures (i.e., strategic alliances and networks) for their international activities as a way to overcome the usual poverty of resources at the time of start-up.This study has important implications for the practice of management. In financing decisions relating to INVs, venture capitalists and other venture financiers should look for entrepreneurs who have a global vision, international business competence, and an established international network. When entrepreneurs start INVs they should create hybrid structures to preserve scarce resources. Finally, given the path-dependence of competence development, founders of new ventures should consider whether establishing a domestic new venture with plans to later internationalize will be as successful a strategy as establishing a new venture that is international from inception.     

Personal networks and firm competitive strategy—A strategic or coincidental match?

This article is based upon the premise that the personal network of the owner-manager is the most important resource upon which he or she can draw in the early days of the firm's development. This is particularly the case as the concept of personal networks is sufficiently general to include dimensions that include, for example, attention to customers, understanding of the business, market orientation, or stress on quality. As such, it is intuitively obvious that the nature and use of these networks must impinge upon the resultant strategy adopted in the firm, albeit often implicit rather than explicit. However, as yet there is no empirical evidence to support this conclusion. Therefore, this article probes one question: how do the characteristics of the owner-manager's network relate to the competitive strategy of new ventures? Clearly, within this, we expected to find relationships that were logically consistent.The research was conducted in two counties in England that possessed similar industrial structures and equal rates of new firm formation. A list of firms was obtained from local business directories, and all 629 firms that fit the criteria were contacted by telephone. Validation of the firms at this point resulted in a significant reduction in those that fit the sampling criteria.Four hundred twenty-three firms were mailed an 11-page questionnaire resulting in a 52% response rate.Preliminary analysis of the strategy variables identified six components that were consistent with previous literature. These were labeled as marketing differentiation, product innovation, market segmentation, distribution, growth through outside capital, and differentiation through quality. Correlation of these components with the networking characteristics of propensity to network, network activity, network density, network intensity, and content of network exchanges supports our proposition that entrepreneurs differ in their networking activities according to the competitive strategy pursued by the firm.Further classification of the owner-managers into strategic clusters demonstrates that most firms appear to follow multiple patterns of strategic behavior. Moreover, the comparison with the networking characteristics shows that owner-managers appear to differ in a logical manner in the use of their networks. Bailey, Montera, and Cardow (1992) argue that a firm's resource base consists of financial, physical, and human resources, and that the manner in which those resources interact is determined by the firm's strategy. Previous research on entrepreneurial networks has shown the amount of time and energy the owner-manager devotes to the development and maintenance of contacts. The underlying assumption of social-network theory is that through a personal network, the owner-manager of a new venture gathers access to critical resources, which for a variety of reasons the new firm does not possess internally. Consequently, this research has argued that this resource base cannot be ignored when attempting to understand the concept of “strategy” among new and small firms. In fact, this resource base may play a dominant role in formulating as well as implementing “strategy.”     

Size of investment,opportunity choice and human resources in new venture growth: Some typologies

A diversity of factors encompass entrepreneurship phenomena. An overview of theory and research in the field shows that entrepreneurship covers (1) number of start-up firms, (2) growth of the firm, (3) growth of the industrial economy, (4) individual mobility, and (5) social transformation. This paper tries to advance, through a partially developed formal model, an integration of some of the important aspects of entrepreneurship. Based on nearly 50 case studies carried out in the course of field work over North India, it examines the interplay of resources, opportunities and capabilities in new venture growth. The findings suggest that resource access may itself limit the range of opportunity choice and growth potential. Within these limits, managerial capability, as related to human resources in particular, could be more significant than hitherto recognized. A preliminary effort is made to develop a typology of firms based on the varying proportion of factors influencing growth of a venture. Further, a model of entrepreneurial firm stabilization and human resources is outlined. A path-based typology of new venture growth and human resource management is described. These include the use of family labor or supervisory resources, an empathetic leadership style and the presence of entrepreneurial teams.The findings in this paper result from a project to document profiles of entrepreneurs who have emerged through interactions with support systems, including entrepreneurship and small business development training programs in India. The states were divided into categories based on per-capita income and level of industrial development or backwardness. A judicious mix of purposive and random selection of cases was used. Criterion for selection included “extent of break from the past,” that is, non-business social origin of the entrepreneur and high-growth rate of the firm. Locationally, cases in a particular state have been selected from a) major urban center, b) smaller, more interior center, and c) small, remote center.The argument for small new ventures in developing countries lies in their positive employment and income generating effects. The claim rests on the presumed better efficiency of factor use in small enterprises—(surplus) labor in particular. Since the 1970s and the 1980s in the developed countries, too, new firms are acknowledged as being vital to an economy. The outlook for an individual new firm, however, can vary. High rates of sickness and mortality are also widely reported. Small firm start-ups are thought to play a role in widening the entrepreneurial base of a given society. It is an important expression of social mobility, as well as structural change, in a developing country context. At the micro-enterprise level, limited resources can restrict choice of opportunity to low growth ones. These represent a bad business idea, subsidized by family resources, including labor—the true self-employment cases. There could be a middle `growth zone’ where higher investment size widens opportunity choice.This slab represents the seedbed for firms with high-growth potential and merits the focus of policy makers, promotional agencies and advisory services. The strategic behavior of these firms can provide valuable insights into how `sweat equity’ is generated in growth ventures. There is a significantly sharp decrease in the number of firms in the third or highest, investment slab, approaching medium size. At this level, the size of the margin money required from the potential entrepreneur would limit the number of new entrants and their catchment sources. From a social transformation point of view, this may not be the desirable outcome. In the absence of developed markets for venture capital, this would render weak, the case for complete withdrawal of countervailing state assistance in industrially backward or depressed regions, which would favor those already advantaged.     

The Impact of Environment Uncertainty and Effectual Flexibility on Entrepreneurial Resource Combination: The Moderating Effect of Entrepreneurial Self-efficacy

Entrepreneurial resource combination is widely recognized as a key enabling factor to a new venture’s survival and growth, but how and why resources are integrated remain elusive. Borrowing from the theory of resource combination proposed by Sirmon, Hitt and Ireland (2007), this study empirically examines how environmental uncertainty impacts entrepreneurial resource combination. We also examine the mediating effect of effectual flexibility on the relationship between environmental uncertainty and entrepreneurial resource combination to see how new ventures utilize flexibility to neutralize the threat of environmental uncertainty. The moderating effect of entrepreneurial self-efficacy is also examined to see how entrepreneurs’ self-cognition affects these relationships. Examining data from 287 new ventures, we find that both environmental dynamism and environmental hostility have significantly positive influence on entrepreneurial resource combination (including entrepreneurial resource cohesion and entrepreneurial resource coupling). We also find that flexibility mediates the relationship between environmental uncertainty (including environmental dynamism and environmental hostility) and entrepreneurial resource combination. Empirical studies also show that entrepreneurial self-efficacy positively moderates the relationship between environmental dynamism and flexibility but negatively moderates the relationship between environmental hostility and flexibility. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

The Dilemma of Growth: Understanding Venture Size Choices of Women Entrepreneurs

In recent years the number of women-owned firms with employees has expanded at three times the rate of all employer firms. Yet women remain underrepresented in their proportion of high-growth firms. A number of plausible explanations exist. To develop richer insights, a two-stage research project was undertaken. A mail survey was sent to a sample of female entrepreneurs to assess motives, obstacles, goals and aspirations, needs, and business identity. Based on the survey results, follow-up, in-depth interviews were conducted with entrepreneurs, selecting equally from modest-growth and high-growth ventures. In terms of quantitative findings, growth orientation was associated with whether a woman was "pushed" or "pulled" into entrepreneurship, was motivated by wealth or achievement factors, had a strong women's identity in the venture, had equity partners, and believed women faced unique selling obstacles. The qualitative research made clear that modest- and high-growth entrepreneurs differ in how they view themselves, their families, their ventures, and the larger environment. The results of both stages suggest that growth is a deliberate choice and that women have a clear sense of the costs and benefits of growth and make careful trade-off decisions.     

Human resource flexibility and strong ties in entrepreneurial teams

Human resource flexibility is important in entrepreneurial ventures that need to respond to the changing challenges of growing the new business. This research investigates the impact of previously well-known people (strong ties) as entrepreneurial team members on the human resource flexibility of new ventures. Data collected from German founding entrepreneurs in technology-oriented, incubator-based firms shows that choosing a well known individual to join the entrepreneurial team increases the founder's ability to modify the team member's work role, but complicates asking the team member to leave the team if required. Hence, strong ties both increase and reduce human resource flexibility. However, the effect of strong ties on role modifiability is statistically significant only with novice entrepreneurs. These research findings counsel founders to discuss role modification and exit during partnership and entrepreneurial team membership negotiations.     

After the cash arrives: A comparative study of venture capital and private investor involvement in entrepreneurial firms

Equity investments in entrepreneurial firms continue to grow in number and dollar amount from both venture capital and private investment sources. Increasingly, these two sources of capital play an important role in the development of new and existing entrepreneurial ventures. Due to the sometimes hurried attempt to turn their dream into reality, entrepreneurs may fail to consider similarities and differences in the value-added benefits supplied by venture capital firms (VCs) and private investors (PIs).Accordingly, the purpose of this study was to determine how initial relationships are established and maintained between entrepreneurs and their primary investors. Specifically, we asked entrepreneurs to assess characteristics of the relationship with their primary investor. We then contrasted the results between entrepreneurial firms that had received venture capital funding versus private investor funding. Differences were examined along the following lines:

• 1.• Levels of investor involvement in entrepreneurial firms
• 2.• Reporting and operational controls placed on the firm
• 3.• Types of expertise sought by the entrepreneur

     

Perceived risks and choices in entrepreneurs' new venture decisions

Though risk plays a central role in most entrepreneurial decision making, little empirical research has explicitly examined how the elements of risk, risk perceptions, and entrepreneurs' propensities to take risks influence choices among potentially risky entrepreneurial ventures. This experimental study asked a sample of entrepreneurs leading America's fastest growing firms to make choices among a series of hypothetical new ventures. The results indicate that such choices are influenced by the risks inherent in the new ventures, as evidenced by the pattern of outcomes anticipated in each venture, the entrepreneurs' differing perceptions of those risks, and differences in their personal propensities to take risks.The subjects in our sample of entrepreneurs tended not to choose ventures having a high degree of variability in their pattern of anticipated outcomes. This avoidance of outcome variability suggests that the sensitivity analyses commonly prescribed for examining new venture attractiveness may inhibit risk taking, and may deter potential investors from investing in their firms. New approaches to assessing and presenting new venture risk, other than the traditional best case/expected case/worst case approach, may be advisable, as well as sufficiently through market research to provide evidence of the degree to which market acceptance is likely for the venture's products or services.We also found an effect of differences in risk propensities among entrepreneurs on their new venture choices. This effect suggests not only that entrepreneurs should be wary of any biases they bring to their new venture decisions, but that prospective investors should consider the degree to which entrepreneurs in whom they choose to invest are well-matched to the investors' own risk-taking propensities.Finally, while our sample of entrepreneurs tended to shun high levels of variability in their new venture choices, they appeared willing to accept a considerable degree of hazard, or possible downside, in their new venture choices, presumably in pursuit of potentially significant gains. Entrepreneurs are advised to seek a clear understanding of the downside entailed in their proposed ventures, and develop strategies to mitigate the likelihood of adverse outcomes. Thus they will not jeopardize chances for near term success and attracting support of investors and others in later stages of the venture or in subsequent ventures.Our research did not attempt to examine how our subjects' choices would have played out in terms of performance, but the apparent biases which entrepreneurs' risk propensities bring to their assessment of proposed new ventures is a potentially important issue that merits further scrutiny. On one hand, such biases may lead to patterns of suboptimal decisions. On the other hand, our results suggest that investors should entrust their new venture investments to entrepreneurs whose risk propensities (and perhaps other personal characteristics) best match the needs of both the opportunity at hand and the investor's objectives. As many venture capitalists attest, the management of a proposed new venture should lie at the heart of their investment decision.     

Entrepreneurial Orientation,Managerial Networking,and New Venture Performance in China

Based on institutional theory, this study investigates the moderating effects of different types of managerial networking (political networking, financial networking, and business networking) on the relationship between entrepreneurial orientation (EO) and new venture performance in China. The study finds that political networking has a negative moderating effect on the positive relationship between EO and new venture performance, financial networking has an inverse U‐shaped impact, and business networking has a positive effect. The findings not only enrich our understanding of the impact of managerial networking on the performance implication of EO in new ventures, but also offer new ventures some guidance on how to use EO and different types of managerial networking to enhance performance in China's transition economy.     

Venture capitalists' decision criteria in new venture evaluation

What criteria do venture capitalists use to make venture investment decisions? The criteria venture capitalists use to make their venture investment decisions are of interest for several reasons. First, venture capitalists are conspicuously successful in their investment decisions. The success rate of venture capital-backed ventures is significantly higher than the success rate of new ventures generally (Dorsey 1979: Davis and Stetson 1984). A better understanding of the criteria used could lead to a better understanding of the reasons for this success.Second, a better understanding of the criteria for successful new ventures could lead to an improvement in the success rate of new ventures. Although there is no clear agreement on the precise rate, the failure rate among new ventures is generally viewed as significantly higher than the average failure rate (Dun and Bradstreet 1984; Van de Ven 1980; Shapero 1981).Finally, venture capitalists' investment criteria are of enormous import to entrepreneurs seeking venture funding. Such entrepreneurs require a significant infusion of capital in order to grow their businesses, and knowledge of the criteria sought by venture capitalists can aid entrepreneurs in gaining the necessary financing.This study attempts to uncover the criteria used by venture capitalists through semistructured interviews and verbal protocol analysis of venture capitalists' evaluations of actual venture proposals. Sixteen verbal protocols—in which the participants “think aloud” as they review business proposals— were made of venture capitalists' venture evaluation decisions.The findings of this study suggest that venture capitalists screen and assess business proposals very rapidly: the subjects in this study reached a GO/NO-GO decision in an average of less than six minutes on initial screening and less than 21 minutes on proposal assessment. In venture capitalists' initial proposal screening, key criteria identified include fit with the venture firm's lending guidelines and the long-term growth and profitability of the industry in which the proposed business will operate. In the second stage of proposal assessment, the source of the business proposal also played a major role in the venture capitalists' interest in the plan, with proposals previously reviewed by persons known and trusted by the venture capitalist receiving a high level of interest.In addition to the specific criteria identified and how they were used in reaching GO/NO-GO decisions, the findings of this study also were surprising for the lack of importance venture capitalists attached to the entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team and the strategy of the proposed venture during these early stages of the venture evaluation process.     

知识型创业中的复合创业行为：企业家精神的视角

在创业行为的各个部分都达到高效率是非常困难的,因此很多知识型创业企业在很早就失败了。知识型创业者不仅需要对高技术环境中的创新活动非常敏感,也需要创新型管理组织的新活动、市场营销以及商业模式等。这需要创业者在早期的复合创业行为的企业家精神为主要资源来应付新创企业可能的衰退。本文回顾了知识型创业的企业家精神,构建了知识型创业中的复合创业行为的企业家精神的特征与概念框架,并提出了未来知识型创业活动可能的潜在的相关研究领域。     

Hidden ties in international new venturing: The case of portfolio entrepreneurship

A hitherto neglected phenomenon in international new venturing is portfolio entrepreneurship, which occurs when entrepreneurs found, own, manage and control more than one business at a time, with ownership of the new venture being distinct from that of the existing business ventures. This study introduces the phenomenon of portfolio entrepreneurship in international new venturing through a longitudinal study of a cluster of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Tasmania, Australia, where 6 of 11 firms in the cluster were international new ventures (INVs). The pattern of international portfolio entrepreneurship pursued by the Tasmanian entrepreneurs and coupling between firms is described. Key findings include the ability of portfolio entrepreneurs to leverage high-discretion slack resources, positive legitimacy spillovers, and learning effects and experimentation across loosely coupled INVs in the portfolio. The findings also identify dysfunctional elements of portfolio entrepreneurship, and cast doubt over the conventional use of ‘the firm’ as the focal unit of analysis in INV studies. A particular contribution of this study is to remind us of the richness and pluralism inherent in international new venturing.     

Critical success factors for e-commerce entrepreneurship: an empirical study of Thailand

The present study focuses on the relationships between entrepreneurial characteristics (achievement orientation, risk taking propensity, locus of control, and networking), e-service business factors (reliability, responsiveness, ease of use, and self-service), governmental support, and the success of e-commerce entrepreneurs. Results confirm that the achievement orientation and locus of control of founders and business emphasis on reliability and ease of use functions of e-service quality are positively related to the success of e-commerce entrepreneurial ventures in Thailand. Founder risk taking and networking, e-service responsiveness and self-service, and governmental support are found to be non-significant.      

Ambidexterity in new ventures: The impact of new product development alliances and transactive memory systems

Unlike established firms, new ventures often lack the resources and structure necessary to simultaneously pursue exploration and exploitation activities in the process of developing and introducing new products into markets. Thus, it remains unclear whether and how ambidexterity (i.e., simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploitation activities) can develop in new ventures. This study posits that product development alliances and the transactive memory systems of entrepreneurial teams contribute to new venture ambidexterity. Moreover, we propose that the two mechanisms reinforce one another. Data collected from 148 new Chinese ventures support these hypotheses.     

Passion for entrepreneurship or passion for the product? A conjoint analysis of angel and VC decision-making

Passion is important to venture investors, but what specifically do they want entrepreneurs to be passionate about? This study theorizes that angel investors and venture capitalists consider both entrepreneurs' passion for activities related to the product or service the venture provides (i.e., product passion) and passion for founding and developing new ventures (i.e., entrepreneurial passion). We demonstrate that both types of passion become more appealing when the investor perceives that the entrepreneur is highly open and receptive to feedback, suggesting that openness to feedback mitigates potential concerns associated with passion in its extremes. We further find that venture investors differ in their consideration of passion; angel investors and venture capitalists with more investing experience place greater emphasis on the combination of product passion and openness to feedback, whereas those with more entrepreneurial experience emphasize the combination of entrepreneurial passion and openness to feedback.     

The Corridor Principle

This article discusses how many entrepreneurs create multiple ventures, and thereby apparently lengthen the duration of their entrepreneurial careers. A new concept, called the Corridor Principle, is proposed as a possible explanation of the multiple venture phenomenon. The Corridor Principle states that the mere act of starting a venture enables entrepreneurs to see other venture opportunities they could neither see nor take advantage of until they had started their initial venture.The Corridor Principle presents an alternative model to the linear single venture career model, embodied by such celebrity entrepreneurs as Ray Kroc of MacDonald' s and Kenneth Olsen of Digital Equipment Corp. Six hypotheses test expectations about the timing and duration of entrepreneurial careers, as well as the relationship between entrepreneurial career length and the creation of multiple ventures.The findings strongly support: • the position that entrepreneurship is a dynamic, multi-venture process for a great many entrepreneurs the rule, rather than the exception. • the existence of a positive correlation between finding at least a second venture and realizing a longer entrepreneurial career. Though there are a variety of explanations for this, and the patterns include both sequential and overlapping ventures, the net effect of creating multiple ventures appears to produce a longer entrepreneurial career. • the position that significant numbers of entrepreneurs create their second venture very early in their entrepreneurial careers especially when contrasted to the group of ex-entrepreneurs, who create multiple ventures (if at all) at a slower rate and later in their careers.Overall, these observations reinforce the notion of the Corridor Principle. Though who can and cannot take advantage of the Corridor Principle is not entirely revealed by the data, some indication exists that an entrepreneurs ability to use Corridor Principle strategy to prolong his or her career is related both to age at startup, and to conscious anticipation and preparation for an entrepreneurial career.The main implications for entrepreneurship practitioners, advisors, researchers, teachers and students are these: Whether studying the entrepreneurial process or planning to start an entrepreneurial career, a long-term view should be taken, one that includes the likely possibility of multiple ventures. The minimum economic returns of earlier ventures can be lower than previously thought if these ventures provide entry to subsequent ventures that possess higher (more acceptable) returns to the entrepreneur. The evidence thus far available indicates that the creation of subsequent ventures occurs relatively quickly when corridors of opportunity become visible and attainable after earlier ventures are established. The likelihood of career failure, as opposed to venture failure, may be lowered if one selects earlier ventures based on their potential to reveal follow-on-venture opportunities that the entrepreneur can investigate and possibly pursue.     

The Relationship between Resource Acquisition Methods and Firm Performance in Chinese New Ventures: The Intermediate Effect of Learning Capability

Despite the omnipresent popularity of the resource‐based view of the firm, our understanding of how firms convert resource acquisition into performance returns remains something of a black box. We seek to unpack this problem in this study. Building on the resource‐based view and combining insights from organizational learning theory, this paper develops a theoretical model consisting of seven hypotheses in which resource purchase, resource attraction, and resource internal development are positively related to new venture performance, and in which learning capability mediates these relationships. We also posit that resource acquisition methods augment the learning capability of the firm en route to securing superior new venture performance. We test these hypotheses using survey data from new ventures in China. The results indicate that all three methods of resource acquisition have positive effects on new venture performance, that resource attraction and internal development have positive effects on learning capability in new ventures, and that learning capability mediates the relationship between these two resource acquisition practices and new venture performance. We put forward implications for theory and practice to close the work.     

Exploring start-up event sequences

This research analyzed new venture start-up activities undertaken by 71 nascent entrepreneurs. Nascent entrepreneurs are individuals who were identified as taking steps to found a new business but who had not yet succeeded in making the transition to new business ownership. Longitudinal data for the study comes from a secondary data analysis of two representative samples, one of 683 adult residents in Wisconsin (Reynolds and White 1993) and the other of 1016 adult residents of the United States (Curtin 1982). These surveys were conducted between 1992 and 1993, and the nascent entrepreneurs were reinterviewed six to 18 months after their initial interview.Three broad questions were addressed: (1) What activities do nascent entrepreneurs initiate in attempting to establish a new business? (2) How many activities do nascent entrepreneurs initiate during the gestation of the start-up? and (3) When are particular activities initiated or completed?Between the first and second interview, 48% of the nascent entrepreneurs reported they had set up a business in operation. Over 20% had given up and were no longer actively trying to establish a business. Almost a third of the respondents reported they were still trying to establish a firm.As a way to summarize the results and as a springboard toward some insights into the implications of this research for practice and future research, we developed the following activity profiles of the three types of nascent entrepreneurs studied. These profiles are offered as a combination of both fact and some intuition about the findings.STARTED A BUSINESS. Nascent entrepreneurs who were able to start a business were more aggressive in making their businesses real. They undertook activities that made their businesses tangible to others: they looked for facilities and equipment, sought and got financial support, formed a legal entity, organized a team, bought facilities and equipment, and devoted full time to the business. Individuals who started businesses seemed to act with a greater level of intensity. They undertook more activities than those individuals who did not start a business. The pattern of activities seem to indicate that individuals who started firms put themselves into the day-to-day process of running an ongoing business as quickly as they could and that these activities resulted in starting firms that generated sales (94% of the entrepreneurs) and positive cash flow (50% of the entrepreneurs). What is not known is how successful or profitable these new firms will be over time. For example, 50% of the firms that were started had not reached positive cash flow and these firms may have been started by individuals who were foolhardy and rushed into operation of a business that would not be sustainable.GAVE UP. The pattern of activities for the group of entrepreneurs who gave up seem to indicate that these entrepreneurs discovered that their initial idea for their businesses would not lead to success. The finding that the activity of developing a model or prototype differentiated individuals who gave up from those who were still trying would suggest that those who gave up had “tested” their ideas out and found that they would not work according to their expectations. Nascent entrepreneurs who gave up seemed to be similar in their activity patterns compared with those who started their firms, that is, individuals who gave up pursued the activities of creating a business in an aggressive manner at the beginning of the process. But as the business unfolded over time, these entrepreneurs decreased their activities and then ceased start-up activities. This group of individuals might be seen as either having the wisdom to test their ideas out before jumping into something that might lead to failure or lacking the flexibility to find more creative ways to solve the problems that they were confronted with.STILL TRYING. It would seem that those who are still trying are not putting enough effort into the start-up process in order to find out whether they should start the business or give up. Those still trying had undertaken fewer activities than individuals in the other two groups. The still trying entrepreneurs were devoting their short-term efforts toward activities internal to the start-up process (e.g., saving money and preparing a plan) and less effort toward activities that would make the business real to others. The still trying entrepreneurs may be all talk and little action. Or these still trying entrepreneurs might be involved in developing businesses that take longer for these particular opportunities to unfold. (It should be noted that there was no industry effect across the three groups.)Our advice to individuals considering business start-up is that the results seem to provide evidence that nascent entrepreneurs should aggressively pursue opportunities in the short-term, because they will quickly learn that these opportunities will either reveal themselves as worthy of start-up or as poor choices that should be abandoned. Individuals who do not devote the time and effort to undertaking the activities necessary for starting a business may find themselves perennially still trying, rather than succeeding or failing.What entrepreneurs do in their day-to-day activities matters. The kinds of activities that nascent entrepreneurs undertake, the number of activities, and the sequence of these activities have a significant influence on the ability of nascent entrepreneurs to successfully create new ventures. This study suggests that the behaviors of nascent entrepreneurs who have successfully started a new venture can be identified and differentiated from the behaviors of nascent entrepreneurs who failed. We believe that future studies will more precisely identify the kinds of behaviors appropriate for certain new venture conditions. If such contingency information can be generated, entrepreneurship research is likely to have significant benefits for entrepreneurship practice, education, and public policy.