Entrepreneurial visions in founding teams: Conceptualization,emergence, and effects on opportunity development

Prior research on entrepreneurial visions has typically taken a leadership perspective and explored how the founders’ future images of their ventures motivate themselves and followers. Drawing on an upper echelon perspective and longitudinal case studies of eight founding teams, this study finds that founders’ entrepreneurial visions do not only capture the future images of their ventures, but also the future images of the founders’ relationship with it. Taking into account this personal aspect of visions, we show that within a founding team, the members’ visions can be incongruent, i.e., they cannot be realized simultaneously within the current venture. While our data reveal that vision incongruence tends to occurs when all team members perceive to have an equal status, vision congruence emerges when the attributed status in the team is heterogeneous. Founding teams with more congruent visions tend to follow a focused opportunity development path, while those with less congruent visions tend to follow a comprehensive opportunity development path. Depending on the teams’ behaviors in the face of challenging situations either path can lead to successful opportunity commercialization or failure. We discuss the implications of these findings for the literatures on entrepreneurial visions, opportunities, and upper echelons.     

The effects of human capital,organizational demography,and interpersonal processes on venture partner perceptions of firm profit and growth

Venture teams, which are comprised of two or more partners, are becoming one of the more popular and important modes of new business development. Traditionally, financial capital has been the primary perspective in assessing venture viability. To expand the venture evaluation horizon, we examined the effects of human capital, organizational demography, and interpersonal processes on partner evaluations of venture performance, defined as the presence of profit and growth. The results support this approach in analyzing venture teams, and we propose that this perspective be included in future venture viability assessment, and used for intervention to enhance venture success. Suggestions are provided for future research.     

从联系的视角看东西方合资企业中的组织学习

合资企业通过组织学习来实现知识转移,提高组织效能与竞争力的问题已引起理论界越来越多的关注。在东西方合资企业中,合资双方在资源、技术能力方面的差异导致了合作伙伴权力的不对称性,给学习与合作关系带来了不利影响。本文提出,为了把握合资企业组织学习与伙伴关系的动态性,合资双方应超越“掌握知识和技能”的局限性,从联系的视角理解构成学习过程的关系和情绪问题。     

Limited attention and the role of the venture capitalist

This research analyzes the venture capitalist's incentives to maximize the profits of the entrepreneurs of ventures and the limited partners of a venture fund. Venture capital is a professionally managed pool of capital invested in equity-linked private ventures. Entrepreneurs turn to venture capitalists for financing because high-technology startup firms have low or negative cash flows, which prevent them from borrowing or issuing equity. In addition, venture capitalists are actively involved in management of the venture to assure its success. This solves the problem of startup firms that do not have the cash flows to hire management consultants.Venture capital contracts have three main characteristics: (1) staging the commitment of capital and preserving the option to abandon, (2) using compensation systems directly linked to value creation, and (3) preserving ways to force management to distribute investment proceeds. These characteristics address three fundamental problems: (1) sorting the venture capital among the entrepreneurial ventures, (2) providing incentives to motivate venture capitalists to maximize the value of the funded ventures, and (3) providing incentives to motivate entrepreneurs to maximize the value of the ventures. Venture capitalists fund only about a dozen projects a year out of a thousand evaluated. Each project may receive several rounds of financing. Payoffs to VCs can be very high or be a complete loss.The typical venture capital (VC) firm is organized as a limited partnership, with the venture capitalists serving as general partners and the investors as limited partners. General partner VCs act as agents for the limited partners in investing their funds. VCs invest their human capital by placing their reputation on the line. The goal is to begin to convert the investment into cash or marketable securities, which are distributed to the partners. VC management companies receive a management fee equal to a percentage (usually 2.5%) of the capital of each fund. They also receive a percentage (15–30%) of the profits of each fund, called carried interest. Periodic reports are made by the VC firm to the limited partners. Usually these are only costs of managing the fund, and so revenues are negative. Most contracts specify the percentage of time that the VC will devote to managing the fund.The analysis of this research deals with the incentives of the VC who has limited attention to be allocated between improving current ventures and evaluating new ventures for possible funding. The analysis shows that the VC, as agent for both the entrepreneur and the general partners, does not have the incentives required to maximize their profits. The VC allocates attention among ventures and venture funds less frequently than required to maximize the entrepreneurs' and limited partners' profits. However, the VC does maximize the total profits of all ventures. Because the VC considers the opportunity cost of attention, the VC's allocation of attention is efficient. The implication of this result is that, although the entrepreneurs and limited partners could be made better off with a different allocation of the VC's time, this would be an inefficient use of the VC's time.     

Antecedents,moderators, and performance consequences of membership change in new venture teams

This paper focuses on initial team size and membership change of new venture teams in two studies: (1) a panel study of 408 emerging ventures, and (2) a cross-sectional study of 124 new ventures. The findings suggest that larger initial team size provides an advantage for new organizations, and that the benefits of adding and dropping team members are contingent on the stage of development of the organization and the dynamism of the environment. Both external environment and team composition factors are associated with turnover in venture teams.     

Obsessive passion and the venture team: When co-founders join,and when they don't

We investigate how potential co-founders' perceptions of a founder's obsessive passion (OP) influence the decision to join a venture team. Using a conjoint experiment with a primary sample of 116 founder-entrepreneurs and validating it with an additional sample of 59 founder entrepreneurs, we found that potential co-founders were more likely to join if they perceived that the founder had OP for developing ventures. Potential co-founders were less likely to join if they perceived OP for founding ventures. Further, we found significant interactions between perceived OPs, as well as interactions between perceived OP and potential co-founders' own OP.     

The determinants of foreign partner's equity ownership in Southeast Asian joint ventures

Using a sample of 375 equity joint venture agreements between 2 partners in 6 Southeast Asian countries, we document the active role of Asian companies in driving the flow of joint venture activity in this region and provide a comparative analysis of joint ventures in transitional and non-transitional Southeast Asian countries. Specifically, we analyze the relationship between the foreign partner's equity ownership and partner uncertainty, the types of joint venture activities, and the frequency of transactions between the joint venture partners. In addition, we show that the relationship between the foreign partner's equity ownership and partner uncertainty, as proxied by cultural dissimilarity, depends on the types of joint venture activities. In the case of Vietnam, a transitional economy, the evidence suggests that, in the presence of a weak legal and regulatory system, foreign firms are entering the country on a smaller scale and are more prone to informal, relational contracting as a substitute for legal enforcement.     

Entrepreneurial passion diversity in new venture teams: An empirical examination of short- and long-term performance implications

Empirical evidence is mounting that passion is an important part of entrepreneurship, contributing to behavior and outcomes for entrepreneurs, employees, and ventures. Yet knowledge of the performance implications of passion within new venture teams is sorely lacking. We examine how both the average level of entrepreneurial passion and the diversity of passion within new venture teams contributes to venture performance in both the short- and long-term. We test our model with multi-source, multi-wave data collected from 107 new venture teams participating in an accelerator program. Our findings indicate that average team passion is not significantly related to performance, but passion diversity, particularly intensity separation, is negatively related to performance. These findings have important implications for the literature on passion, new venture teams, and group affective diversity.Executive summaryWhile existing studies have substantially improved our understanding of entrepreneurial passion, its sources, and its subsequent impact, insight into this topic remains limited in at least three ways. First, most new ventures are founded and led by teams rather than individuals, yet existing studies predominantly focus on entrepreneurial passion at the individual rather than team level. Second, while there is a prevailing assumption in existing literature that entrepreneurial passion leads to beneficial outcomes consistent with longstanding work in psychology, there is emerging evidence in entrepreneurship that passion may not always be functional and that it can even be dysfunctional. Despite this, we have limited understanding of what types of passion or when or for whom it is dysfunctional. And third, extant work on entrepreneurial passion for individuals and within teams has focused on behavioral or self-report measures of performance (e.g. Cardon and Kirk, 2015; Santos & Cardon, 2019) as well as venture survival, rather than objective team or firm performance in the short- and long-term.In this paper, we study the influence of team passion on new venture team performance. We draw on theory concerning entrepreneurial passion within venture teams (Cardon et al., 2017) that suggests that different aspects of entrepreneurial passion within teams shape team dynamics and venture outcomes. While generally, theories of passion suggest that entrepreneurial passion is positively related to team outcomes due to the positive emotions it brings about, we find that in teams, the relationships are more complex. While the average level of passion among team members is positively related to team performance when considered alone, this effect is not significant when passion diversity is also considered. Diversity of passion among individual team members has a negative relationship with team performance, including diversity in the level of passion team members experience (intensity separation), as well as diversity in the object of their passion (focus variety). These negatively affect team dynamics due to conflicting emotions and identities among team members associated with passion diversity. We examine these relationships on specific team performance outcomes including evaluation of the business idea in the short-term and venture performance five years after their participation in an accelerator.The sample used in this study includes 107 entrepreneurial teams that were part of an accelerator program in the Netherlands. Teams were evaluated on the quality of their business ideas at the end of the accelerator program and the amount of investment the team had received five years later. Our results provide no support for positive effects of average team passion on the quality of the business ideas and confirm the negative effects of passion intensity separation on the quality of the business idea and the negative effects of passion focus variety on later venture performance.This paper makes several contributions. First, we expand the literature on passion in entrepreneurship, specifically adding to our understanding of passion within new venture teams. More specifically, we contribute to the growing body of evidence concerning potential dysfunctions of passion by uncovering a dysfunctional property of team passion diversity that uniquely manifests itself at the team level of analysis. We contribute to the literature on new venture teams by examining team composition in the form of passion diversity, and its relationship with team performance. Finally, our study extends work on the effects of entrepreneurial passion by looking at objective team performance outcomes in both the short- and long-term.For entrepreneurs, our findings confirm the importance of affect and identity for new venture teams, and specifically our findings indicate that there is a dark side to team passion. While passion is generally positioned as a positive phenomenon, we highlight the negative outcomes that passion can have in the team context. Diversity in the amount of passion team members experience can diminish the quality of the business ideas the team is able to generate in the short-term, while diversity in the focus of team members' passion can diminish the firm's long-term performance. For investors and accelerator communities this research validates the importance of considering entrepreneurial team composition and specifically entrepreneurial passion levels and domains when investing in teams or when supporting venture building.     

Birds of a feather get lost together: new venture team composition and performance

This study explores the relationship between new venture team composition and new venture persistence and performance over time. We examine the team characteristics of a 5-year panel study of 202 new venture teams and new venture performance. Our study makes two contributions. First, we extend earlier research concerning homophily theories of the prevalence of homogeneous teams. Using structural event analysis we demonstrate that team members?? start-up experience is important in this context. Second, we attempt to reconcile conflicting evidence concerning the influence of team homogeneity on performance by considering the element of time. We hypothesize that higher team homogeneity is positively related to short term outcomes, but is less effective in the longer term. Our results confirm a difference over time. We find that more homogeneous teams are less likely to be higher performing in the long term. However, we find no relationship between team homogeneity and short-term performance outcomes.     

Venture capitalist governance and value added in four countries

The rapid internationalization of markets for venture capital is expanding the funding alternatives available to entrepreneurs. For venture capital firms, this trend spells intensified competition in markets already at or past saturation. At issue for both entrepreneurs and venture capital firms is how and when venture capitalists (VCs) can provide meaningful oversight and add value to their portfolio companies beyond the provision of capital. An important way VCs add value beyond the money they provide is through their close relationships with the managers of their portfolio companies. Whereas some VCs take a very hands-off approach to oversight, others become deeply involved in the development of their portfolio companies.Utilizing surveys of VCs in the United States and the three largest markets in Europe (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France), we examined the determinants of interaction between VCs and CEOs, the roles VCs assume, and VCs' perceptions of how much value they add through these roles. We examined the strategic, interpersonal, and networking roles through which VCs are involved in their portfolio companies, and we analyzed how successful such efforts were. By so doing we were able to shed light on how and when VCs in four major markets expend their greatest effort to provide oversight and value-added assistance to their investment companies.Consistent with prior empirical work, we found that VCs saw strategic involvement as their most important role, i.e., providing financial and business advice and functioning as a sounding board. They rated their interpersonal roles (as mentor and confidant to CEOs) as next in value.Finally, they rated their networking roles (i.e., as contacts to other firms and professionals) as third most important. These ratings were consistent across all four markets. VCs in the United States and the United Kingdom were the most involved in their ventures, and they added the most value. VCs in France were the least involved and added the least value; VCs in France appeared to be least like others in terms of what factors drove their efforts. Our theoretical models explained a greater proportion of variance in governance and value added in the United States than elsewhere. Clear patterns of behavior emerged that reflect the manner in which different markets operate. Among the European markets, practices in the United Kingdom appear to be most like that in the United States.Determinants of Governance (Face-to-Face Interaction)We operationalized VC governance or monitoring of ventures as the amount of face-to-face interaction VCs had with venture CEOs. We found some evidence that VCs increase monitoring in response to agency risks, but the results were mixed. Lack of experience on the part of CEOs did not prompt significant additional monitoring as had been predicted. A more potent determinant was how long the VC-CEO pairs worked together; longer relationships mitigated agency concerns and reduced monitoring. Contrary to expectations, perceived business risk in the form of VCs' satisfaction with recent venture performance had little impact on face-to-face interaction. Monitoring was greatest in early stage ventures, indicating that VCs respond to high uncertainty by increased information exchange with CEOs. We measured two types of VC experience and found different patterns for the two. Generally speaking, VCs with greater experience in the venture capital industry required less interaction with CEOs, whereas VCs with greater experience in the portfolio company's industry interacted more frequently with CEOs than did VCs without such experience.Determinants of Value AddedWe argued that VCs would most add value to ventures when the venture lacked resources or faced perceived business risks, when the task environment was highly uncertain, and when VCs had great investing and operating experience. Contrary to expectations, VCs added most value to those ventures already performing well. As we had predicted, VCs did add relatively more value when uncertainty was high: e.g., for ventures in the earliest stages and for ventures pursuing innovation strategies. Finally, we found that VCs with operating experience in the venture's focal industry added significantly more value than those with less industry-specific experience. These results are consistent with anecdotal evidence that entrepreneurs have a strong preference for VCs with similar backgrounds as their own. We found no evidence that experience in the venture capital industry contributed significantly to value added. Together, these results suggest that investigations of the social as well as economic dimensions of venture building may prove a fruitful avenue for future study. Overall, the results showed that value-added is strongly related to the amount of face-to-face interaction between VC-CEO pairs and to the number of hours VCs put in on each individual venture.Implications for Venture CapitalistsThe competition for attractive investments is heating up as economies become more globalized. Thus, the pressure on venture capital firms to operate both efficiently and effectively is also likely to build. It is as yet unclear whether the recent trend toward later stage, safer investments will continue, and how those venture capital firms following this path can differentiate themselves from other sources of capital. Venture capital firms that are able to choose the appropriate bases for determining governance effort and the appropriate roles for delivering added value to their portfolio companies will be those most likely to survive.In the largest, most robust markets (i.e., the United States and the United Kingdom), more effort is expended by venture capitalists to deliver something of value beyond the money. This suggests that the tradeoff preferred by those succeeding is to be more rather than less involved in their investments. Our results indicate that VCs clearly economize on the time they devote to involvement in their portfolio companies. However, our results also indicate that they do this at the great peril of producing value insufficient to justify the cost of their product.Implications for EntrepreneursOur findings provide two important insights for entrepreneurs. First, they show that where and when they obtain venture capital is likely to have an impact on the extent and nature of effort delivered by their venture capital investors. It appears that on average entrepreneurs receiving venture capital in the United States and the United Kingdom will be more closely monitored and will receive more value-adding effort from their VCs than will those in France or the Netherlands. Needless to say, entrepreneurs should consider their preferences for level and type of involvement from their investors as they consider their choice of partners. In France, for example, VCs put great emphasis on their financial role in comparison with other roles, but they contribute much less than VCs elswhere via other strategic, interpersonal, and networking roles.The second key implication of our findings is that entrepreneurs may be able to gauge what roles VCs will see as most important, when VCs are more or less apt to become involved in their companies, and when they believe they can most add value. Such knowledge may help CEOs anticipate VC activity, be aware of the parameters of VCs' preferences, communicate their own preferences, and negotiate the timing and extent of interaction. For example, although our results indicate that geographic distance significantly limits face-to-face interaction, it appears to have less impact on the amount of value added.Implications for ResearchersMuch more can be learned about the relative efficiency and effectiveness of alternative governance arrangements. Little is known about how formal structures such as contract covenants and board control work in conjunction with informal oversight and interaction. Even less is known about how value is added and how it is best measured. Although this study took a step toward developing a model of the circumstances under which value is added, the theory and its operationalization await further development.     

Goal achievement and satisfaction of joint venture partners

Joint venturing is recommended to avoid some of the obstacles to successful business venturing, such as capability limitations and organizational resistance. However, the high dissolution rates for joint ventures suggest a need to learn how to utilize this cooperative strategy more effectively. Two frequently reported problem areas in joint venturing are unrealistic corporate expectations and inadequate planning. Thus, this study sought to examine the impact of strategic intent on joint venture success as measured by partner goal achievement and satisfaction.A review of the literature on strategic goals and goal consensus suggested that two variables are likely to affect joint venture performance: the number of partner goals pursued and the overlap in partners' goals. The type of goals pursued may also affect performance; that is, some goals may be more achievable through joint venturing than are other goals.The purpose of this research was two-fold: (1) to empirically explore the relative importance of a variety of partner goals for their joint ventures, and (2) to determine if goal disparity, and the number and type of goals pursued affected joint venture success. This approach draws attention to the expectations of partners rather than to the venture itself, the traditional focus in entrepreneurship.The hypotheses and exploratory propositions were tested using data from U.S. firms involved in manufacturing joint ventures. A categorization of partner goals was developed through factor analysis, in which five categories of goals emerged: knowledge transfer, market power, financial performance, efficiency, and financial structure. Partners were found to have pursued multiple goals simultaneously, with knowledge transfer and market goals being most frequently rated as critically important. These findings suggest the need to expand traditional performance measures to account for the diverse and nonfinancial nature of partner goals.When examined separately, it was found that a large goal set facilitated partner goal achievement and satisfaction, and that an overlap in partners' goals promoted partner satisfaction. The large goal set was argued to be necessary in the volatile environments that are often attractive for joint venturing. A large goal set reflects adaptation to environmental change and facilitates prudent strategy selection by subjecting alternatives to multiple goal hurdles. The overlap in partners' goals reflects a meshing of individual partner goals and helps to minimize conflict, which could stall strategy development and drain resources. However, when an integrated model was developed from multiple regression findings, the overlap in partners' goals became a moderator variable. This model exposed the negative as well as the positive effects of the overlap in partners' goals.Analysis further suggested that the joint venture strategy may be better suited to achieving efficiency goals than financial goals. Possible explanations for the difficulty in achieving financial goals include: insufficient time (or short lifespan of the joint venture), the complex structure inherent in joint ventures, and the possibility of disagreement between the partners about how the financial goals should be achieved. On the other hand, efficiency goals, such as vertical integration and economies of scale, require expansion or extension of operations and thus fit well with the pooling of skills and resources that are characteristic of joint venturing. Further, both partners contribute to and gain from efficiency goals, unlike with market access or knowledge transfer goals where one firm contributes more than it gains or vice versa for that particular goal.Additional analysis revealed that the goal types explained more variance in partner goal achievement and satisfaction than did the size of goal sets or the extent of overlap in partners' goals. Taken in combination, the various aspects of partners' goals explained 26% of the variance in partner goal achievement and 38% of the variance in partner satisfaction. When partner goal achievement was included in the multiple regression model for partner satisfaction, the amount of explained variance increased to 69%. The results suggest that a partner firm may be able to significantly enhance its chances of judging a joint venture to be successful if its goals focus on efficiency rather than revenues and profits, if it has a relatively large goal set, and if it concentrates on achieving the set of stated goals.     

A founding-team model of creating a venture's culture

As many new ventures are started by founding teams, it is these founding teams that likely engage in creating their venture's culture. We draw on theories of cultural dynamics and the literature on team cognitive diversity to investigate the creation of a new venture's culture. Specifically, we theorize how a founding team's cognitive diversity impacts the team's production of cultural information and the transmission of that information throughout the venture. Cognitive diversity directly influences the founding team's production of cultural information by shaping the diversity of the information set and the speed of its production. Moreover, cognitive diversity can give rise to faultlines within the venture, impacting how venture members interpret cultural information. Importantly, our model suggests a complex interplay between the production and interpretation of cultural information. Understanding culture creation in new ventures is important because a new venture's culture shapes its legitimacy and thus its access to stakeholder resources for venture emergence.     

Toward a Resource-Based Theory of Bargaining Power in International Joint Ventures

Political, cultural, industrial, and firm-specific factors comine to make the bargaining relationship between international joint ventures partners a particularly complex one. This study focuses on one aspect of the problem: the relationship between the resources that a partner contributes and the bargaining power that it achieves in the venture. It traces ideas of bargaining power in the literature, to elicit what types of resource are likely to lead to dominance, the identifies several resources generally thought to be important contributions to a joint venture. The resources are ranked according to criteria of tacitness and appropriability, then displayed in matrix form to illustrate the expected outcome of bargaining in two-party international joint ventures.     

Demographic diversity for building an effective entrepreneurial team: is it important?

Although traditional entrepreneurship literature often views entrepreneurship as an economic battle of a “lonely hero”, the prevalence of entrepreneurial teams is an emerging economic reality. This study examines the influences of demographic diversity variables in terms of age, gender, and functional background and team process variables in terms of team-level cognitive comprehensiveness and team commitment on entrepreneurial team effectiveness. With field interview data from 174 entrepreneurs representing 79 entrepreneurial teams, this study suggests that demographic diversity is not important for entrepreneurial team effectiveness, whereas the team process variables positively influence team effectiveness. The findings also suggest that the diversity in terms of gender, age and functional background does not contribute to the team-level cognitive comprehensiveness and team commitment. Finally, the study explores implications of the findings for practice and future research.     

Perceived social undermining keeps entrepreneurs up at night and disengaged the next day: The mediating role of sleep quality and the buffering role of trait resilience

Entrepreneurs work in an uncertain, novel, and high-stakes environment. This environment can lead to disagreements and conflicts over how to develop, grow, and run a business venture, thus triggering destructive social interactions. This research sheds light on the role of destructive interpersonal relationships by examining daily perceived social undermining from work partners and how and when this perceived undermining affects entrepreneurs' work engagement. Building on a resource-based self-regulation perspective, we develop a theoretical model of the self-regulation impairment process whereby an entrepreneur's perceived social undermining disrupts sleep quality at night, which dampens work engagement the next day. We further theorize trait resilience as a self-regulation capacity that buffers this impairment process. We test the model in a study based on daily surveys over 10 workdays from 77 entrepreneurs. The results largely support our hypotheses and further indicate that trait resilience is more crucial for less experienced entrepreneurs. Our study contributes to research on how entrepreneurs' interpersonal relationships—particularly destructive ones—affect entrepreneurial well-being.     

Venture capitalists' decision criteria in new venture evaluation

What criteria do venture capitalists use to make venture investment decisions? The criteria venture capitalists use to make their venture investment decisions are of interest for several reasons. First, venture capitalists are conspicuously successful in their investment decisions. The success rate of venture capital-backed ventures is significantly higher than the success rate of new ventures generally (Dorsey 1979: Davis and Stetson 1984). A better understanding of the criteria used could lead to a better understanding of the reasons for this success.Second, a better understanding of the criteria for successful new ventures could lead to an improvement in the success rate of new ventures. Although there is no clear agreement on the precise rate, the failure rate among new ventures is generally viewed as significantly higher than the average failure rate (Dun and Bradstreet 1984; Van de Ven 1980; Shapero 1981).Finally, venture capitalists' investment criteria are of enormous import to entrepreneurs seeking venture funding. Such entrepreneurs require a significant infusion of capital in order to grow their businesses, and knowledge of the criteria sought by venture capitalists can aid entrepreneurs in gaining the necessary financing.This study attempts to uncover the criteria used by venture capitalists through semistructured interviews and verbal protocol analysis of venture capitalists' evaluations of actual venture proposals. Sixteen verbal protocols—in which the participants “think aloud” as they review business proposals— were made of venture capitalists' venture evaluation decisions.The findings of this study suggest that venture capitalists screen and assess business proposals very rapidly: the subjects in this study reached a GO/NO-GO decision in an average of less than six minutes on initial screening and less than 21 minutes on proposal assessment. In venture capitalists' initial proposal screening, key criteria identified include fit with the venture firm's lending guidelines and the long-term growth and profitability of the industry in which the proposed business will operate. In the second stage of proposal assessment, the source of the business proposal also played a major role in the venture capitalists' interest in the plan, with proposals previously reviewed by persons known and trusted by the venture capitalist receiving a high level of interest.In addition to the specific criteria identified and how they were used in reaching GO/NO-GO decisions, the findings of this study also were surprising for the lack of importance venture capitalists attached to the entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team and the strategy of the proposed venture during these early stages of the venture evaluation process.     

合资企业的社会困境：交易成本理论新解与实证检验

合资企业管理面临的重要挑战是如何解决社会困境问题,即合资伙伴面临最大化自身利益与最大化整个合资企业利益之间的矛盾,困境管理能力直接影响着合资企业的有效运作。文章从交易成本理论的视角对造成合资企业社会困境问题的诱因和机理进行了全面解释,特别定义了合资企业的成本因素所包含的三部分内容并将其概念化(即伙伴选择成本、专用性资产和攫取准租成本)。通过对226家中国制造业企业的调查数据实证分析显示,三种成本因素对合作都产生正向显著影响,尤其是伙伴选择成本在三个成本因素中对其影响最大。攫取准租成本和合作都会显著影响机会主义行为。同时研究结果表明进行充分的伙伴选择能促进专用性资产投资。     

CEO Entrepreneurial Leadership and Performance Outcomes of Top Management Teams in Entrepreneurial Ventures: The Mediating Effects of Psychological Safety

This study examines whether the exhibition of entrepreneurial leadership by CEOs within entrepreneurial ventures fosters higher levels of top management team performance and job performance of team members, and whether psychological safety explains such effects. Utilizing four waves of multisource, multilevel data from 262 team members across 56 top management teams, we find that the exercise of entrepreneurial leadership by the CEO leads to higher levels of performance at the team and individual levels, and that psychological safety mediates such relationships.     

Informal risk capital investors: Investment patterns on the East Coast of the U.S.A.

In this study we profile a group of informal investors, their investment criteria and the nature of their referral network. The study supports the findings of several earlier studies. It indicates the existence of an extensive informal investment community on the East Coast of the U.S.A., which can provide substantial financial resources to startup and young firms. A full 58% of the sample investments were in startups; a huge proportion compared with formal venture capital sources. The study further supports earlier findings that this group is difficult to locate, for entrepreneurs and researchers alike. This opaque market consists primarily of friends and business colleagues who individually provide modest sums of money ($20,000–$50,000), but are often able to use their network to assemble a group of investors who will sponsor the entire funding requirement. 130 informal investors report that in three years they and their networks raised 38 million dollars to support 286 new venture proposals.There are also encouraging indications that these angels are both enthusiastic and persistent. Many of them claim that they have achieved higher returns via angel activity than any other investment options that they have tried. Of the angels who did better with alternative investment options, more than 80% are still prepared to make further investments. Even those who reported failed investments in the informal risk capital market remain supportive: over 65% indicate a willingness to invest again.The criteria by which the angels screen the proposals differ markedly from those of the venture capital community. In particular, the angels do not appear to be interested in a thorough business plan, a sine qua non for venture capitalists. Unlike the capital firms, angels are not interested in competitive insulation. They do not limit their investments to industries that are appealing, or with which they are familiar, nor do they care very much about the degree to which the entrepreneur has identified competition. However, they are in close agreement with the venture capital community in their concern with the management ability of the venture team and a requirement that there be a clear, demonstrated need for the product or service, preferably in a market with large potential.The study has shed some light on the structure of the referral networks of angels. Though we do not know from this study how the respondents themselves first heard of the ventures that were described in this survey, we do know that their referral network is composed primarily of friends and business colleagues; to whom they refer as much as 60% of the proposals that they receive and in which they themselves eventually invest. Thus they pass on serious opportunities to their network. Their referees are inclined to be very supportive; in our sample almost 75% of them also invested in the venture. The current strategy for informal investors is to approach mainly close contacts. These are inclined to be supportive (85% also invested in the venture) and to follow a trusting investment behavior pattern, relying mainly on the recommendation of the angel. This strategem ensures that the total capital requirements are met via the network. However, given the results of this study; the angels might be well-advised not to stop here, they might also approach at least one professional. Only a small proportion of professionals were approached by our sample of angels (less than 30%). As the study shows, professionals are more effective at selecting successful ventures. Thus a mixed strategy may be called for; use mainly trusting referees to ensure full capitalization and a limited number of professional referees to screen the proposals. This will help ensure that those proposals that do get supported by the more trusting members of the network have been competently screened, thus increasing to the probability of venture success.A discriminant analysis revealed some useful pointers in helping the informal investor select successful ventures. First it is critical to select only ventures in which the entrepeneur can be relied on to evaluate the risks of the ventures and manage these risks well; Angels do not need entrepreneurs that will gamble with their money. Equally important is to avoid placing too much credence on highly articulate sales pitches by the venture team, or too much reliance on ventures in which the main emphasis is on product and proprietary protection. Rather insist on being shown clear evidence that the product or service has channel and/or market acceptance. It is also important for Angels to stick to investments where they know the industry well, and to back venture teams with a solid reputation and a propensity to get involved in the details rather than gloss them over. As in the case of studies of venture capital investments, competitive insulation in the early stages of the venture is also important.