How to obtain venture capital

What do venture capitalists look for when evaluating proposals? What do they want in return? And how can you increase the likelihood that yours is one of the rare proposals that gets funded?     

Upper echelons and portfolio strategies of venture capital firms

In this study we analyze how the composition of the top management team (TMT) influences the portfolio strategy choice in venture capital (VC) organizations. We develop a model of risk perception to investigate how education and experience of TMT members impact whether VC organizations invest with a focus on early stage ventures or not, specialize or diversify across industries, and invest with a broad or narrow geographic scope.Evaluation of data on TMTs and portfolio strategies of 136 European VC firms revealed that VC firms with higher proportions of TMT members with science/engineering education and entrepreneurial experience more likely invest with an early stage focus. Furthermore, TMTs with more management education diversify their portfolios more across industries. Finally, the more international experience TMT members of VC organizations have, the broader the geographic scope of investees. We discuss the implications of our findings for the VC literature.     

Efficiency of venture capital firms: evidence from Spain

In recent years the venture capital (VC) sector has played an increasingly important role in financial systems. In general, this type of specialised financial activity is conducted by two types of operators, VC firms and VC management companies, each with its specific characteristics. The main objective of this paper is to evaluate the operating efficiency of these financial intermediaries in Spain, using data envelopment analysis, and to carry out an exploratory study of the variables that affect their level of efficiency, using a truncated regression model, and taking into consideration the nature of the operator (an approach not previously undertaken). Our analysis reveals, first, differences in the levels of efficiency achieved by VC firms and VC management companies and, second, that the most efficient organisations are those with more diversified ownership structures and which have a portfolio of companies active in the most innovative sectors.     

The structure of the investment networks of venture capital firms

Venture capital firms are linked together in a network by their joint investments in portfolio companies. Through connections in that network, they exchange resources with one another. The most important of those resources are the opportunity to invest in a portfolio company (good investment prospects are always scarce), the spreading of financial risk, and the sharing of knowledge. All venture capitalists operate in very uncertain environments, none more so than the one confronting high innovative venture capitalists, HIVCs,¹ that specialize in investing in high innovative technology companies. The most uncertain of all their investments is a high-technology start-up with nothing more than a product in the head of the founder. There is uncertainty about the talent of the entrepreneur, the market need for the product, the development of a saleable product, the raising of second-round financing for working capital and expansion; the manufacturing of the product, competitors' responses, and government policies such as capital gains tax and ERISA rules, to name some of the major components. It is a formidable list. Indeed, it is hard to name a segment of any other industry that bears more uncertainty than HIVCs.A venture capital firm copes with uncertainty by gathering information. This research shows that the amount of coinvesting by a firm depends on the degree of uncertainty it faces. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the degree of coinvesting.By examining how venture capital firms were connected by their joint investments, it was found that the top 21 HIVCs comprise a tightly coupled network. And of that group, none is more tightly bound than the nine HIVCs located in California. In contrast, the group of top 21 firms that invest mainly in low innovative technology companies, LIVCs, is more loosely bound. HIVCs are more tightly bound together because they shoulder more uncertainty and therefore have a greater need to share information with one another.The practical implications of this study are as follows: Venture Capitalists. It is vital to be well-connected to other venture capital firms. They are important sources of information and investment opportunities. For HIVCs, the California group is central in the network, so links to them are valuable. Communications in a tightly coupled system are swift, so it is likely that information is disseminated very quickly among members of the group. It probably facilitates the setting of a market rate for venture capital. A disadvantage of a tightly bound system is that information flowing among the members has a redundancy and sameness about it, so to ensure a supply of fresh information, members should have as many links as possible to other organizations and individuals besides venture capitalists. Entrepreneurs. When entrepreneurs submit a proposal for funding to venture capital firms, they can assume that news will spread fast to other firms. Thus, they should not use a bird-shot approach; rather, they should select their targets with rifle precision. The proposal should be submitted to a few firms that are known to specialize in the type of product or service that the entrepreneur is planning to make. Entrepreneurs should be concerned about more than the price of the deal. When the top 61 firms invest in a portfolio company, they bring information, contacts, and “deep pockets” to the companies in which they invest. Those factors are significant in nurturing a growing company. Policy Makers. The networks of HIVCs and UVCs are quite different. The HIVCs cluster around oases of high-technology entrepreneurship in the northeast and California, whereas the LIVCs are more evenly spread throughout the U.S.A. HIVCs are located almost exclusively in the so-called “bi-coastal regions of prosperity.”This study found cliques among the venture capital firms. But it found no evidence that the top 61 firms exclude other venture capital firms from their coinvestments of first-rounds of capital. More research is needed before conclusions can be drawn about the power and influence of the top firms. Researchers. In a recent article, Granovetter (1985) suggests that if we are to explain economic behavior, we must understand the networks in which transactions are embedded. This research shows that the networks formed by the syndicated coinvestments of venture capital firms may help us to explain their behavior. A general model for coinvestment networks that is developed in this article is applicable to analysis of syndicated coinvestments not only of venture capital firms, but of investors and lenders in general.     

Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: A networking perspective

The networking of 464 venture capital firms is analyzed by examining their joint investments in a sample of 1501 portfolio companies for the period 1966–1982. Some of the factors that influence the amount of networking are the innovativeness, technology, stage, and industry of the portfolio company. Using the resource exchange model, we reason that the relative amount of networking is explained primarily by the degree of uncertainty associated with an investment rather than by the sum of money invested.Among the findings of our study about venture capitalists are the following:The top 61 venture capital firms that managed 57% of the pool of venture capital in 1982 had an extensive network. Three out of four portfolio companies had at least one of the top 61 venture capital firms as an investor. Those top 61 firms network among themselves and with other venture capital firms. Hence they have considerable influence.Sharing of information seems to be more important than spreading of financial risk as a reason for networking. There is no difference in the degree of co-investing of large venture capital firms—those with the deep pockets—and small firms. Furthermore, where there is more uncertainty, there is more co-investing, even though the average amount invested per portfolio company is less. That, we argue, is evidence that the primary reason for co-investing is sharing of knowledge rather than spreading of financial risk. Venture capital firms gain access to the network by having knowledge that other firms need.It is likely that there will be increasing specialization by venture capital firms. Knowledge is an important distinctive competence of venture capital firms. That knowledge includes information such as innovations, technology, and people in specific industry segments. Among the portfolios of the top 61 venture capital firms are ones with a concentration of low innovative companies, others with a concentration of high innovative technology companies, and others with a no particular concentration. As technology changes rapidly and grows more and more complex, we expect that venture capitalists will increasingly specialize according to type of companies in which they invest. Only the largest firms with many venture capitalists will be like “department stores,” which invest in all types of companies. The smaller firms with only a few venture capitalists will tend to be more like “boutiques” which invest in specific types of companies, or in specific geographical regions around the world.We think that the networking of venture capital firms has the following implications for entrepreneurs:Entrepreneurs should seek funds from venture firms that are known to invest in their type of product. It speeds the screening process. If the venture capital firm decides to invest, it can syndicate the investment through its network of similar firms. And after the investment has been made, the venture capital firms can bring substantial expertise to the entrepreneur's company.Entrepreneurs should not hawk their business plans indiscriminately. Through their networks, venture firms become aware of plans that have been rejected by other firms. A plan that gets turned down several times is unlikely to be funded. Thus it is better to approach venture capital firms selectively.The extensive network of the leading venture capital firms probably facilitates the setting of a “market rate” for the funds they invest. The going rate for venture capital is not posted daily. Nevertheless, details of the most recent deals are rapidly disseminated through venture capitalists' networks. Hence, that helps to set an industry-wide rate for the funds being sought by entrepreneurs.Lastly, we give the following advice to strategic planners:Venture capital firms share strategic information that is valuable to others outside their network. Since they often invest in companies with emerging products and services, venture capitalists gather valuable strategic information about future innovations and technological trends. Thus, strategic planners should tap into venture capitalists' networks, and thereby gain access to that information. It is sometimes information of the sort that can revolutionize an industry.     

Exploring the innovation strategies of young firms: Corporate venture capital and venture capital impact on alliance innovation strategy

We investigate how governance structure and power influence alliance exploration strategy. Adopting a real options perspective and the agency view, we suggest that innovation strategies differ based on the firm's governance authority. We find that the motivations of corporate venture capitalist firms, venture capitalists, and firm founders may have an impact on the formation of exploratory alliances among adolescent firms. Using a sample of 122 adolescent firms, we examine the influence that governance structure has on the firm's alliance portfolio and innovation potential. While the influence of corporate venture capitalist firms alone do affect alliance formation strategy, corporate venture-backed firms with founders having high influence (knowledge or ownership in the firm) are more likely to form innovation-focused alliances. In contrast, venture capitalist-backed firms tend to avoid innovation-focused alliances, preferring more exploitive ones, even when founders have high influence within the firm.     

Strategic alliances by venture capital backed firms: an empirical examination

A growing body of literature examines the formation of strategic alliances as an important value-added role provided by venture capital firms. This paper contributes to this literature by examining two related questions: whether venture capital firms use strategic alliances as a substitute or compliment to capital infusion, and how venture capital firms use alliances to mitigate different types of risk. Results from 2505 venture-backed startups reveal that venture capital firms treat alliance formation as a substitute for capital infusion and that the breadth of the network of syndication partners investing in the startup increases the number of its strategic alliances. We also find intentionality in alliance formation. Specifically, firms operating in industry environments characterized by technical risk are more likely to form alliances with partners capable of mitigating technical risks, and firms operating in environments characterized by market risk are more likely to form alliances with partners capable of mitigating market risk. Our findings lend additional support to the perspective that alliances represent an important mechanism through which venture capital firms add value to their portfolio companies.     

Human capital theory and venture capital firms: exploring “home runs” and “strike outs”

Using a human capital perspective, we investigated the relationship between the education and experience of the top management teams of venture capital firms (VCFs) and the firms' performance. We found that although general human capital had a positive association with the proportion of portfolio companies that went public [initial public offering (IPO)], specific human capital did not. However, we did find that specific human capital was negatively associated with the proportion of portfolio companies that went bankrupt. Interestingly, some findings were contrary to expectations from a human capital perspective, specifically the relationship between general human capital and the proportion of portfolio companies that went bankrupt. Future research is suggested.     

The relationship between governance structure and risk management approaches in Japanese venture capital firms

This paper attempts to understand what drives Japanese venture capital (JVC) fund managers to select either active managerial monitoring or portfolio diversification to manage their firms' investment risks [J. Bus. Venturing 4 (1989) 231]. Unlike U.S. venture capitalists that use active managerial monitoring to gain private information in order to maximize returns [J. Finance 50 (1995) 301], JVCs have traditionally used portfolio diversification to attenuate investment risks [Hamada, Y., 2001. Nihon no Bencha Kyapitaru no Genkyo (Current State of Japanese Venture Capital), Nihon Bencha Gakkai VC Seminar, May 7]. We found that performance pay is positively related to active monitoring and that management ownership is positively related to active monitoring and negatively related to portfolio diversification. The managerial implication of our study is that venture capitalists should be as concerned about the structure of their incentive systems for their fund managers as they are for their investee-firm entrepreneurs. Agency theory says that contingent compensation is a self-governing mechanism for individual effort that is difficult to measure and verify. When properly applied, equity ownership and performance-based pay can have powerful influencing effects on the strategic choices of managers.     

Risk management in Indian venture capital and private equity firms: A comparative study

Venture capitalists and private equity funds are often considered experts at investing in high‐risk projects and firms. To be successful investors, venture capitalists and private equity funds must therefore manage the many aspects of risk associated with investing in unlisted small and medium‐sized enterprises. This study examines how Indian venture capital and private equity firms manage several dimensions of risk. We analyze risk management preferences in Indian venture capital and private equity firms. A comparison between Indian and U.K. funds is presented. The results are discussed in detail. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Fast growing small entrepreneurial firms and their venture capital backers: An applied principal-agent analysis

First the empirical background of the U.K. venture capital industry is developed using a panel of major U.K. venture capital funds over the period 1988–92. Then a framework for applied principal agent analysis is developed, focusing on risk management and information. Under risk management it explores attitude to risk, risk sharing and bearing, and the effects of risk bearing on effort. Under information handling, it explores information systems, information asymmetries between investor (venture capitalist) and investee (entrepreneur), and ways of attenuating them, and information variance and costs. Finally, the contract between investor and investee is seen as a device for trading risk and information. The implications of this trading for risk bearing, effort and efficiency are explored. The whole analysis is supported by a detailed case study which reflects current practice in the U.K. venture capital industry. The evidence provides striking confirmation of the applicability of the principal-agent model to the venture capital financing of hightech ventures.     

The influence of experiential,inherited and external knowledge on the internationalization of venture capital firms

This paper examines the effect of different types of international knowledge accumulation on the internationalization of venture capital firms, as a particular type of professional service firms. We distinguish between experiential knowledge acquired through previous activities, inherited knowledge through the management team and external knowledge through network partners. Hypotheses are developed for both the likelihood and the number of cross-border investments. The hand collected dataset comprises a combination of survey and archival data on a unique sample of 110 venture capital firms from five different European countries. Analyses indicate a positive effect of experiential and inherited knowledge on internationalization, but external knowledge has limited impact. Intense international contacts even decrease international activities. Together, these results highlight the importance of experiential and inherited knowledge to overcome information asymmetries inherent in the internationalization of professional service firms, and of venture capital firms in particular.     

Trademarks and venture capital valuation

This study investigates the role of trademarks in the start-up valuations of venture capitalists (VCs). Our results show that the number and breadth of trademark applications have inverted U-shaped relationships with the financial valuations of start-ups by VCs. The findings also indicate that in later funding rounds, the value of trademark applications decreases when the start-up progresses into more advanced development stages. Start-ups should consider these findings when seeking funding from VCs and should stress their market and growth orientations and their willingness to protect their marketing investments by highlighting their trademark activities.     

Pre-seed government venture capital funds

This paper analyses a Pre-seed Fund (PSF) government venture capital (VC) program for the purpose of improving our understanding about effective public policy towards entrepreneurial finance. The PSF program is a public-private partnership started in 2002 for the purpose of fostering more investment in nascent high-tech entrepreneurial firms in Australia. Data from Venture Economics indicate PSFs are the primary provider of seed stage VC in Australia, but PSFs are not more likely to invest in high-tech firms than other types of VC funds. PSFs have smaller portfolios (number of investees) per manager than other types of VC funds, and are more likely to invest in firms resident in the same state, but do not stage and syndicate more frequently than other types of VC funds. Overall, therefore, the structure of the program has given rise to mixed performance in terms of finance and governance provided to nascent high-tech entrepreneurial firms. As well, there is also suggestive evidence that the PSF program diminishes the incentives for Innovation Investment Funds (a previously existing Australian government VC fund program) to invest in seed stage ventures, and hence competing government initiatives appear to be crowding out one another. Further evidence suggests that among the four PSFs in existence, one PSF has outperformed the other PSFs in regards to the investee firm patents and financial statement performance, even though this fund has invested less money and charged lower management fees than its counterparts. Hence, a further implication is that the impact of government-sponsored VC funds depends not only on the design of the program but also on the selection of the VC managers carrying out the investments.

Incremental impact of venture capital financing

This paper investigates the differences in the return generating process of venture capital (VC)-backed firms and their peers that operate without VC financing. Using a unique hand-picked database of 990 VC-backed Belgian firms and a complete population of Belgian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), we focus on the extent to which the presence of a VC investor affects the sensitivity of a firm’s returns to the changes in the capital structure, in the operating cycle, and in the industry dynamics. The differences may stem from the (self-) selection of better companies into VC portfolios, from the venture capitalists’ (VCs) value-adding activities, and/or from both. We examine these factors in the context of a complex simulation procedure which allows separating selection from value-adding when traditional approaches are difficult to implement. Our results indicate that VC-backed firms are able to extract more rent from the changing industry conditions and from the optimizations in their capital structure. The presence of VCs in the firm’s equity seems to have only a marginal effect on the operating cycle efficiency. Overall, the results are suggestive of the value-adding being the main driver of the VC-backed firm’s performance.     

After the cash arrives: A comparative study of venture capital and private investor involvement in entrepreneurial firms

Equity investments in entrepreneurial firms continue to grow in number and dollar amount from both venture capital and private investment sources. Increasingly, these two sources of capital play an important role in the development of new and existing entrepreneurial ventures. Due to the sometimes hurried attempt to turn their dream into reality, entrepreneurs may fail to consider similarities and differences in the value-added benefits supplied by venture capital firms (VCs) and private investors (PIs).Accordingly, the purpose of this study was to determine how initial relationships are established and maintained between entrepreneurs and their primary investors. Specifically, we asked entrepreneurs to assess characteristics of the relationship with their primary investor. We then contrasted the results between entrepreneurial firms that had received venture capital funding versus private investor funding. Differences were examined along the following lines:

• 1.• Levels of investor involvement in entrepreneurial firms
• 2.• Reporting and operational controls placed on the firm
• 3.• Types of expertise sought by the entrepreneur

     

The founding rate of venture capital firms in three European countries (1970–1990)

In this article, the sectorial and environmental forces that facilitate or inhibit the creation of venture capital companies are studied in the three European countries where the industry is most developed: the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands. The focus is on the start-up phase of the industry, the period from 1970–1990. The founding of firms can be studied on four different levels: entrepreneurial, organizational, population, and macroeconomic. In this study, a population approach is taken; this implies that we do not attempt to explain any single founding, but rather the aggregate number of foundings that occur in an industry in a certain period in a certain country.According to the organizational ecology theory, the population density (i.e., the total number of organizations in a population) is the major environmental factor that affects the founding rate through two processes. Initially, when the density is low, each founding eases new foundings, because the simple prevalence of a form tends to give it legitimacy (thereby spurring imitations), the training ground for qualified personnel grows and the supporting networks are widened and strengthened. The legitimation process does not grow forever: once enough organizations of a certain kind exist, legitimation attains a ceiling. As the number of organizations increases, the second process becomes dominant: the competition for resources (raw material, personnel, customers, capital) grows, leading to a negative relationship between the density and the founding rate, everything else being equal. Thus, the founding rate declines as the number of organizations increases, once a threshold is reached. The major hypothesis that is tested here is that the population density has an inverted U-shaped effect on the founding rate of venture capital organizations.In addition, the effect that the venture capital firms of the three countries have on each other is studied. Two populations are said to interact when the populations affect each other's growth rate, but the interaction need not be symmetrical. The second hypothesis, tested in this study, is that populations in different countries have a positive effect on each other and not a competitive effect because the legitimating effect does not halt at geographical borders. Yet, the competition for resources (capital, people, deals) among geographically different populations is limited in this industry.This study is valuable because until now, the existing ecological studies focus on long-established industries. Testing, the theory in a young industry that emerged only in the seventies (in Europe) has merits in its own right, because the technological progress after the Second World War has altered the organizational environment tremendously. The communication and transportation revolutions may have especially influenced the way in which organizations interact with each other and with the environment. The venture capital firms are furthermore special in the way they are organized with the dual structure of management company and investment fund(s). If the theory holds in this young industry, important additional evidence will be given that the theory is truly applicable to “populations of all types, in any time period, and in any society” (Carroll 1988, p. 18). Finally, this study extends the theory by giving evidence on how industries in different countries may interact upon each other.We show empirically that the major factor that influences the overall founding rate in each of the three countries is the density of the industry, i.e., the number of organizations that already exist in the industry; this confirms the population ecology theory. When the density is low, adding a new organization to the industry raises the probability of a subsequent founding; when the density is high, the contrary is true. The institutional changes considered here, such as the establishment of tax transparent legal entities or state guarantees against losses (in the Netherlands) and the establishment of secondary stock markets, do not significantly influence the founding rate in any of the three countries. Moreover, the Dutch foundings are positively influenced by the British density and the French foundings by the Dutch density; the British foundings are, on the contrary, negatively influenced by the Dutch density. The competitive effects between the Netherlands and the U.K. are thus more important than initially thought.The relationship between the density and the founding rate is the strongest, most consistent, and most significant relationship found in this study. Thus, the number of organizations that already exist in an industry is very important in explaining the founding of organizations, apart from, for example, the personality of the entrepreneur or from the networks in which he or she is involved. This indicates that, when trying to explain the founding of organizations, the industry structure, and more specifically the number of organizations that exist at the moment of the founding, cannot be ignored.