DETERMINANTS OF THE RATINGS AND YIELDS ON CORPORATE BONDS: TESTS OF THE CONTINGENT CLAIMS MODEL

A contingent claims model for corporate bonds is tested on newly issued bonds of firms with very simple capital structures. Two default risk measures derived from the model — firm return standard deviation (σ) and leverage (D/V) — explain approximately 78 percent of the variation in the agency ratings on the bonds, based on a probit analysis. Model yield premiums explain almost 60 percent of the variation in market yield premiums. In both analyses, however, firm size is a significant additional variable, suggesting that the contingent claims model is not robust to changes in scale. The assumption of nonstochastic interest rates also appears to be an important misspecification. Institutional restrictions on investments in speculative grade bonds, however, do not affect market yield premiums on such bonds, and thus do not appear to represent a serious misspecification.     

THE ANALYTICS OF RELATIVE HOLDING-PERIOD RISKS FOR BONDS

The relation between default risk measures and holding-period risk measures for bonds is confusing for bond investors. Past studies show that lower-credit-quality bonds exhibit lower holding-period risk. In this research I develop models to decompose the risk of corporate bonds and specify the conditions necessary for lower credit quality to result in lower holding-period risk measures. Additionally, I offer insight into the seemingly haphazard pattern of holding-period risk as related to credit quality.     

CORPORATE BONDS AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION

I examine the effect of product market competition on the yield spread of corporate bonds. I find that firms that face more competitive threats also face a higher cost of corporate bond debt. After controlling for common bond-level, firm-level, and macroeconomic variables, my results show that bondholders of firms that are subject to increased competition demand significantly higher credit spreads than holders of otherwise similar bonds. Furthermore, this effect is more pronounced for firms that have assets that are difficult to redeploy. Overall, my findings provide evidence that competitive threats are being reflected in corporate debt prices.     

EXPECTATIONS, SECURITY YIELDS, AND INFLATION: EX-ANTE RISK PREMIA ON UK SHARES, CORPORATE BONDS AND GILTS, 1969–1987

This paper provides estimates of monthly risk premia required by investors on shares, corporate bonds and government gilts during the period 1969–1987, based on the CAPM and using deviations between past actual returns and the model's forecast returns as inputs. Ex-ante risk premia increased dramatically during the 1970s and again on equities in the period around the October 1987 Crash. The risk premia moved closely in line with inflation in the 1970s, casting considerable doubt on the Modigliani and Cohn thesis that the fall in share prices in the middle of that decade was due to the market suffering from money illusion. When account is taken of trends in the premia and inflation timeseries, the correlation between the two disappears. This result is consistent with the findings of others that the widely observed negative correlation between share returns and inflation is a spurious one, traceable to monetary accommodation of supply-side shocks to the real economy — something which is hard to reconcile with the money illusion argument.     

THE EFFECT OF A SINKING FUND ON THE REOFFERING YIELDS OF NEW PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS

In this study, empirical tests are conducted to determine the impact of a sinking fund on reoffering yields of a sample of new public utility bonds sold between January 1977 and March 1982. The findings of the regression analysis are consistent with the hypotheses that the value of the sinking fund varies with the default risk of the issuer and with market expectations of future interest rate movements, and that the sinking fund improves the liquidity of a bond issue.     

AN INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION TO REDUCE THE AGENCY COSTS OF PUBLIC CORPORATE BONDS

This paper proposes an institutional innovation in the structure of public bonds that is intended to provide some of the advantages of private loans- active monitoring, tight covenants, and ease of reorganization-while retaining the benefits of liquidity and ease of diversification provided by publicly traded securities. The authors propose that a publicly registered corporate bond provide for a "supertrustee" who will act on behalf of bondholders. The supertrustee will be charged with responsibility to monitor the compliance of the borrower with the terms of the bond covenants and given exclusive authority to negotiate amendments to the covenants and decide what action to take in the event of a breach of a covenant.