国务院出台解决农民工问题的若干意见

国务院常务会议，审议并原则通过的《国务院关于解决农民工问题的若干意见》指出，解决农民工问题要坚持公平对待，一视同仁；强化服务，完善管理；统筹规划，合理引导；因地制宜，分类指导；立足当前，着眼长远。当前要着力做好以下几个方面工作：（一）抓紧解决农民工工资偏低和拖欠问题。（二）依法规范农民工劳动管理。（三）搞好农民工就业服务和职业技术培训。     

农民工工资歧视的计量分析

本文利用最新的调查数据，分析了当前农民工和城市工的工资歧视问题。本文认为，农民工和城市工的平均工资收入存在较大的差异，其中，44．8％的工资差异是由个人特征不同形成的，55．2％的工资差异要归结于歧视性因素。歧视性因素包括两个方面：一是对农民工的直接歧视，占到工资差异的36．2％；二是对城市工的制度性保护，即对农民工产生的反向歧视，占到工资差异的19．0％。     

农民工享有哪些基本权利？

农民工应享有的基本权利： 1．用人单位应当按时足额支付工资，不得克扣、无故拖欠农民工工资；     

农民工就业指导（一）

1．农民进城务工享有哪些基本权利？ 根据现行劳动保障法律法规的规定，农民工应当享有的基本权利包括：①用人单位应当按时足额支付工资，不得克扣、无故拖欠农民工工资；②用人单位支付的工资不得低于当地最低工资标准；     

国务院出台镇待农民工新政策

1．抓紧解决农民工工资偏低和拖欠的问题。严格规范用人单位工资支付行为，建立工资支付监控制度和工资保证金制度，确保农民工工资按时足额发放。严格执行最低工资制度，制定和推行小时最低工资标准。     

农民进城务工指南(之七)

去年12月22日，最高人民法院向全国各高级人民法院发出《关于集中清理拖欠工程款和农民工工资案件的紧急通知》，要求各高级人民法院高度重视锯决建设领域拖欠工程款和农民工工资问题，切实做好涉及工程款和农民工工资案件的执行工作。     

国务院研究室负责人就《国务院关于解决农民工问题的若干意见》答记者问（节选）

问：农民工工资偏低而且经常被拖欠是当前很突出的问题。《若干意见》在这方面提出了哪些政策措施？ 答：这是农民工最直接的切身利益问题．也是当前农民工和社会上反映最强烈的问题，必须首先下大力气加以解决。《若干意见》重点强调了三个方面的政策措施：一是建立工资支付监控制度和工资保证金制度，从根本上解决拖欠农民工工资问题。     

多部门开展农民工工资支付检查行动

由人力资源和社会保障部、住房和城乡建设部、公安部和中华全国总工会联合发起的农民工工资支付情况专项检查行动，目前正在全国范围内开展，并将持续至2010年2月5日。中华全国总工会发出《关于进一步推动解决农民工工资拖欠问题的通知》，要求各级工会以农民工工资支付情况专项检查为切入点，加强与政府部门的协调配合，     

烟台市开发区为农民工建工资档案

为有效解决近年来频繁出现的拖欠农民工工资问题，山东省烟台市开发区建设部门在全市率先为每一位建筑工人建立工资发放档案并发放《劳动和计酬手册》，避免工资被拖欠后农民工没有证据可依循。     

动态

人力资源和社会保障部等10部门：赴8省联合督查农民工工资支付情况 人力资源和社会保障部近日发布消息称．该部将会同公安部等9部门组成5个联合督查组，赴浙江、湖北等8省区督查农民工工资支付情况。人社部称，为进一步做好2014年春节前农民工工资支付保障工作，人社部会同公安部等9部门组成5个联合督查组，     

Land Heterogeneity,Agricultural Income Forgone and Environmental Benefit: An Assessment of Incentive Compatibility Problems in Environmental Stewardship Schemes

This paper examines the issue of incentive compatibility within environmental stewardship schemes, where incentive payments to farmers to provide environmental goods and services are based on foregone agricultural income. The particular focus of the paper is land heterogeneity, either of agricultural or environmental value, leading to divergence between the actual and socially optimal level of provision of environmental goods and services. Given land heterogeneity, such goods and services are likely to be systematically over‐ or under‐provided in response to a flat rate payment for income foregone.     

上市公司股份支付会计处理问题研究

以相关政策文件和上市公司公开披露的信息为基础,研究实施股权激励计划的上市公司股份支付会计处理中的问题并分析其可能产生的后果。建议进一步完善股份支付准则内容,包括细化对股份支付成本计量的规定、完善取消股权激励计划的会计处理等;同时,相关部门要加强对上市公司执行企业会计准则的监管力度;最后,强化对上市公司财务负责人的管理也有利于促进股份支付健康持续发展。     

SET-ASIDE PREMIUMS AND THE MAY 1992 CAP REFORMS

This paper considers the linking of participation in the set-aside programme to the receipt of a compensatory payment for proposed reductions in European Community price support announced in May 1992. It is shown that in this situation set-aside premiums should lie between a lower bound sufficient to deter opting-out in favour of full cropping, and an upper bound approximately equal to a level sufficient to induce voluntary participation in the programme. The initial level of Community price support and the extent of reductions from this level are shown to be the main factors determining the gap between the upper- and lower-bound premiums. The impact of removing the compensatory payment system is also examined.     

云南省自然保护区建设中集体林权属问题研究

通过对云南省4个不同级别的自然保护区进行案例研究,结合全省保护区权属统计资料的分析,发现在保护区的建设过程中,均存在不同程度集体林被划入保护区的现象。随着党和政府更加强调执政为民的思想以及《物权法》的实施,这一问题将成为潜在的社会矛盾根源之一。解决这一问题的思路应该是按照"环境价值、需求刚性和社会支付能力"的原则,重新检视保护区的规模和范围,如果确需包括部分集体林,应该坚持通过生态效益购买的制度安排,实现林权主体经营公益林和商品林的无差别待遇。     

A Partial Adjustment Model of Federal Direct Payments in Canadian Agriculture

Delays in direct payments to Canadian farmers reduce the income loss protection that is provided by federal income stabilization and related programs. This issue is examined using Statistics Canada federal direct payment and net farm income data from 1981 to 2010. An estimate of the reduced protection against farm income loss that can be attributed to payment delays is obtained using a simple partial adjustment model, first with and then without the assumption of a constant rate of adjustment over time. The results point to a highly significant reduction in program effectiveness that can be attributed to delays in direct payments. There is no evidence to support the common belief that payment delays have significantly increased since the introduction of the Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization program in 2003.     

促进农村基本公共服务发展的思考

该文首先明确了政府在农村基本公共服务中的主导职责理念；提出应从加强财政转移支付的相关法制建设、优化中央财政转移支付体系等4个方面构建完善的转移支付制度；指出从加快县域经济发展、完善县乡财政体制等5个方面加大县乡财政解脱困境的力度，最后提出要充分利用市场机制，促进农村基本公共服务发展的原则。     

Farmers’ Willingness to Participate in Payment‐for‐Environmental‐Services Programmes

Understanding farmers’ willingness to participate in agricultural payment‐for‐environmental‐services (PES) programmes is an essential precondition for designing effective and efficient programmes. Willingness to participate is typically examined via stated preference surveys using the standard hurdle model for whether and how much to participate. Among respondents who decline to participate, such analyses cannot distinguish between respondents who declined due to the payment level and those who were not interested at all. This paper applies a double hurdle model to incorporate a prior condition for whether a respondent is even willing to consider participating in the PES market. The model uses a unique stated preference survey permitting separation of the consideration and enrolment decisions of 1,700 farmers in Michigan, USA. The first hurdle probit model suggests that farmers’ willingness to consider PES chiefly depends on farm and farmer characteristics, while the second hurdle tobit model shows that decisions on whether and how much to enrol depend more on the payment offer and marginal benefit–cost criteria. This study provides fresh insights on facilitating farmer participation in PES programmes using tiered strategies that differ in costs of programme payment and administration.     

A dynamic analysis of cost-share agri-environmental programs

The purpose of this paper is to theoretically examine the efficiency of a cost-share agri-environmental program through a farm life cycle lens. Faced with a growing environmental impact from agricultural production, the farmer must decide when and how aggressively to invest in environmental capital. The steady state of the optimal control problem reveals the trade-off between allocating farm profits to consumption versus environmental improvements. A payment from a cost-share program reduces the time to investment in environmental capital, and also permanently increases the farmer's level of investment. A lack of targeting results in inframarginal farmers being paid more than the minimum amount that is required to induce investment. The portion of both the marginal payment and the average payment that induces new investment declines as the government's share of the payment increases, and this decline decreases overall program efficiency. Despite this inefficiency, a larger payment from a cost-share program is shown to decrease the farm's environmental impact in both the short and long run.     

Farm bankruptcy risk as a link between direct payments and agricultural investment

The European Union is increasingly relying on direct paymentsto support farm incomes. Recent research has shown that a directpayment may increase production and investment by risk-aversefarmers via a link between wealth, risk aversion and decisionmaking. This paper shows that, even in the absence of risk aversion,a direct payment may stimulate farm investment. With lendersusing a standard insolvency rule for determining bankruptcy,the direct payment raises the expected value of marginal investmentbecause it reduces the risk of bankruptcy over the farmer'soperating time horizon. The investment response to the directpayment is larger for a farmer with an intermediate versus lowor high level of equity, and for a farmer with a long versusshort-time horizon.     

Cost-effectiveness of alternative green payment policies for conservation technology adoption with heterogeneous land quality

This paper quantitatively analyses the cost‐effectiveness of alternative green payment policies designed to achieve a targeted level of pollution control by heterogeneous microunits. These green payment policies include cost‐share subsidies that share the fixed costs of adoption of a conservation technology and/or input reduction subsidies to reduce the use of a polluting input. The paper shows that unlike a pollution tax that achieves abatement through three mechanisms, a negative extensive margin effect, a negative intensive margin effect and a technology switching effect, a cost‐share subsidy and an input reduction subsidy are much more restricted in the types of incentives they provide for conservation of polluting inputs and adoption of a conservation technology to control pollution. Moreover, they may lead to varying levels of expansion of land under production. Costs of abatement with alternative policies and implications for production and government payments are compared using a simulation model for controlling drainage from irrigated cotton production in California, with drip irrigation as a conservation technology.